

CRITICAL NOTICE

Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy

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Paul Horwich's new book presents a Wittgenstein viewed from the perspective of a philosopher who very much belongs to a 'mainstream' analytic tradition. For this reason, the figure described by Horwich may occasionally be unfamiliar, indeed foreign, to readers whose outlook is wholly *therapeutic* in a sense with which contemporary followers of Wittgenstein have become only too familiar. Although Horwich uses this term often (*e.g.*, *Ibid.*, 54), this point is one of which he is only too aware. As he puts it in presenting three main beliefs which govern his account of Wittgenstein:

I am afraid that the reaction of most Wittgensteinians to this set of commitments will be that it so badly distorts the essence of his thought that there is no reason to read any further. Still I hope to convince anyone who does persevere, not only that these theses are correct, but that they dispel the elusiveness of his philosophy and help reveal its power and plausibility (*Ibid.*, viii).

The first thesis to which he refers is that 'Wittgenstein's ideas may be formulated clearly and that decent arguments may be given in support of them' (*Ibid.*, vii). This is presented in opposition to a view which Horwich believes is common to 'many professional philosophers', to his detractors and even to his admirers, *viz.*, that Wittgenstein's 'unconventional style' and 'lack of sustained reasoning is integral to his radical and anti-theoretical view of what philosophy can accomplish' (*Ibid.*, viii). In the hands of his critics, this is expressed as the claim that Wittgenstein's work is of little philosophical value because it is 'self-indulgently cryptic and obscure' (*Ibid.*).

The second thesis expounded by Horwich is that the foundation of Wittgenstein's treatment of mind and language rests not on his claims about rule-following and meaning, but in 'his deflationary *metaphilosophical* point of view' (*Ibid.*, vii). This is adopted in opposition to claims which he takes to

be expressed by Dummett, Baker & Hacker, Kripke, Katz, Soames and Pears, all of whom are said to put the discussion of meaning at the centre of Wittgenstein's thinking. Horwich, however, wishes to see Wittgenstein's 'treatment of meaning' as 'one application of the general therapeutic methodology' - in Horwich's use of 'therapeutic' - that stems from Wittgenstein's conception of what philosophy is and of what it can achieve (*Ibid.* x). What Horwich calls a 'common sense critique' of certain 'scientific aspirations and methodological assumptions' underlies Wittgenstein's view that mainstream academic philosophy is occupied with 'pseudo-problems' addressed by philosophers who attempt to resolve them by introducing 'irrational' theories (*Ibid.*).

If there is a difficulty with this way of describing what Wittgenstein is doing, it surely must lie in the thought that Wittgenstein's methodology is so deeply intertwined with his treatment of individual philosophical problems that it must seem pointless to attempt to separate them. This is implicitly admitted by Horwich when he states that the common sense critique referred to 'has an abstract character', so that 'each problem calls for its own peculiar diagnosis and treatment' (*Ibid.*) On the other hand, Horwich is clearly in opposition to a viewpoint he finds expressed quite often in the secondary literature, *viz.*, that Wittgenstein's avowedly therapeutic methodology is not at all consistent with the clearly argumentative strategies that some 'mainstream' philosophers even find reason to value in his work. Nevertheless, one is bound to question the compatibility of the belief that 'the rationally disciplined character of Wittgenstein's thought' allows us to 'formulate his views precisely and defend them rigorously' (*Ibid.* ix), with a Wittgensteinian methodology which is employed to describe the surrounding circumstances in which terms are used as one means of uprooting those 'misleading pictures', 'false analogies' and 'surface similarities' amongst the applications of terms that underlie some main 'problems of philosophy'. This apparent attempt to defend the anti-theoretical by argument, is going to leave readers with the feeling that what the blurb on the cover of his book describes him as doing, *viz.*, developing 'an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings... that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature', involves a rather awkward contradiction in terms.

The third thesis to which Horwich commits himself is that an account of Wittgenstein's 'mature philosophy can be extracted from Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations*, and that this work should be taken to override any other writings in tension with it' (*Ibid.*, viii). His reason for saying this is that this is a work which, unlike 'the other notes and manuscripts, found in drawers in various parts of the world, that his executors decided to print' (*Ibid.*, xi), has the authority of Wittgenstein himself, who painstakingly prepared it, over a rather long period, for publication. Furthermore, 'the common view of Wittgenstein - that he produced two distinct philosophies - is mistaken' (*Ibid.*) This statement very much speaks for itself, given the extent to which it is open to question whether this view has ever really been all *that* common. The question Horwich then asks concerning how many different 'philosophies' Wittgenstein prepared after 1929, is of scholarly interest, as are the various changes and developments in Wittgenstein's views that took place in the approach to the final version of the *Investigations*, and even after it - for Horwich also takes issue with the idea of a *third* Wittgenstein (*Ibid.* 12). But it is made perfectly clear that his main aim is not to contribute to scholarship, but to expound, explain, assess and develop the 'revolutionary' ideas contained in Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations* (*Ibid.*, xii). Applauding Kripke's 'celebrated account of Wittgenstein's philosophy' for the spirit in which it is written as distinct from its detailed content, Horwich sums up his approach by saying that his own 'style throughout is analytic, there is frequent engagement with *non*-Wittgensteinian points of view, and the emphasis is on philosophical understanding rather than interpretation' (*Ibid.*, xiii). This is all very much with the aim of restoring 'Wittgenstein's unique perspective to the mainstream of academic philosophy':

For some years now there has been a polar split between, on the one hand, the great majority of philosophers, who don't think that his ideas are relevant to their work, and, on the other hand, the Wittgensteinians themselves, who are engaged in feuds with one another that no one else cares about. It would be good if this ghettoization could be done away with (*Ibid.*).

Horwich mentions that his current monograph was begun twenty-five years previously, at a time when 'the idea of prioritizing Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical metaphilosophy was much less common than it is now', although he maintains that 'this *interpretative* strategy, and the process of developing and defending the position itself, are carried further in the present work than they are elsewhere' (*Ibid.*, xiv). The first introductory chapter presents Wittgenstein's general outlook in the *Investigations* as one which is destined to overturn the 'prevailing' view that philosophy is in the business of providing 'surprising discoveries' involving facts inaccessible to the methods of science, yet attainable from the armchair 'by means of some blend of pure thought, contemplation, and conceptual analysis':

It's taken for granted that there are deep discoveries to be made about the nature of existence, how knowledge of other minds is possible, whether our actions are free or determined, what is the structure of a just society, and so on - and that philosophy's job is to provide such understanding. Isn't that why we are so fascinated by it? (*Ibid.*, 2).

Whilst there is a perspective from which Wittgenstein may be regarded as treating these problems as what Horwich calls 'mere pseudo-questions - the products of muddled thinking', it is also important to emphasise that Wittgenstein took our attachment to them to be a matter of deep philosophical significance, so that the methodology employed to tease out what gives rise to them can involve a great deal of detailed exploration of how certain relevant terms are *used*. As it is, Horwich's description of what Wittgenstein is doing here does not differ all that much from what a logical positivist might have said or a latter-day empiricist might want to say about the value of philosophy as a discipline whose sole purpose is 'conceptual analysis'. So if Horwich is correct to argue that Wittgenstein's apparent denigration of philosophy as a worthless discipline results in his name's being uttered in mainstream circles with 'a curl of the lip' (*Ibid.*, 3), this can only be from a misunderstanding of what his methodology actually involves.

This does not mean that it is easy to capture exactly what Wittgenstein is up to in the *Investigations*, as the wealth of interpretative literature testifies, and Horwich suggests another route into Wittgenstein's thinking by proposing that philosophical problems have a certain form, *viz.*, that of putting in question some ordinary phenomenon the existence of which only becomes controversial within a philosophical context, *e.g.*, the reality of the world around us (Descartes), free and blameworthy human action (Hobbes), motion (Zeno), time (McTaggart), space (Leibniz), causation (Hume), future facts (Aristotle), and meaning (Quine) (*Ibid.*, 5). On this assessment, Wittgenstein is in the business of uprooting the confusions underlying the misguided philosophical arguments that would appear to lead us to these negative conclusions. At the very least, this must persuade us to believe, although Horwich does not put it in this way, that in some sense 'what we would ordinarily say' about such matters, and what therefore a faculty called 'common sense' must lead us to 'think' about such matters, must be 'alright' and not open to question. But in what sense might that be ?

Horwich then introduces a couple of examples of basic kinds of 'confusion'. The first is arithmetical, and concerns a payment of \$ 30 for a hotel bill, a true cost of \$ 25, a \$ 5 refund and a \$ 2 tip from the \$ 30. The confusion turns on differentiating between ' $30 - 5 + 2 = 27$ ', leaving \$ 3 back, and ' $3 \times 9 + 2 = 29$ '; and the second recounts Wittgenstein's tale about the piece of rope wound tightly round the Earth's surface which is then lengthened by one yard. How high above the Earth's surface would the rope then be ? The confusions which can arise in these cases are fairly simple, and Horwich extends his examples to cover the technical meanings given to 'intersect' and 'imaginary' when straight lines intersect circles at imaginary points in mathematics, and the so-called 'unconscious pain' supposedly discovered by a psychologist whom Wittgenstein in the *Blue Book* shows *via* 'unconscious toothache' to be misusing language. The discussion then turns to names and noun phrases which we have a tendency to think must denote *things* of some kind or other, including 'Father Christmas', and this extends to examples like 'Time is one dimensional', 'Seven is prime', and 'My after image is red', where our concept of the paradigmatic *thing* as a physical object, can lead us to ask strange questions about

the nature of what must appear to be these extraordinary entities. But, as Wittgenstein points out in § 36, where our language suggests a *body* and there is none, we are inclined to imagine that there must be a *spirit*. (*Ibid.*, 15). As Horwich sums up his discussion about the supposed reality of mathematical entities called 'numbers':

We should learn to see that neither mathematical discourse nor the natural interpretation of it as referring to an abstract, mind-independent reality need necessarily carry with them the propriety of puzzlement about the nature, location and accessibility of that reality (*Ibid.*).

Having provided what is in effect an elementary introduction to certain very basic and not at all controversial ways in which Wittgenstein indicates to us that we can go wrong when doing philosophy, Horwich draws our attention at the end of the Chapter to five questions which arise about the nature of the methodology that Wittgenstein employs to reach these kinds of conclusions. Firstly, can we *precisely* articulate what this methodology is and how it works in practice to account for the processes by which language leads us astray? Secondly, it is certainly not self-evident that the content of the philosophical canon as 'traditionally' pursued is vacuous, yet Wittgenstein provides no arguments beyond his series of examples for adopting this outlook. Thirdly, there surely are genuine philosophical problems to be explored in ethics, 'naturalistic epistemology', and in the foundations of physics, for example, that do not obviously arise from misuses of language, and these do not have the origins that Wittgenstein describes. Fourthly, if the goal of philosophy is not to establish theories, but to describe how language is ordinarily used, is this not itself a theory on a par with those that Wittgenstein believes are without content? Lastly, is Wittgenstein - or rather Horwich - right to think that his scepticism about the prospects for philosophy itself underlies and precedes his other 'doctrines', including that of *meaning as use*? As Horwich believes, there are a number of philosophers who would argue that Wittgenstein's 'metaphilosophical conservatism' as expressed in the view that 'ordinary language is sacrosanct'

instead issues 'from his conception of meaning' (*Ibid.*, 17).

These questions in one form or another have all been asked before, and Horwich is not alone in believing that they can be provided with fairly definite answers, in spite of Wittgenstein's acknowledgement that any attempt to organise his ideas in one particular direction would go against the grain of his thinking (*Investigations*, Preface). This, however, is for Horwich no more than an expression of what he describes as Wittgenstein's 'aesthetic sensibility':

.....I shall be working on the assumption that it is possible to explain Wittgenstein's philosophy in a more conventional, rational way than he does himself - clearly articulating its basic principles, reconstructing persuasive arguments in favour of them, and spelling out their consequences. It seems to me that this assumption is vindicated in what follows. Wittgenstein's importance for us must surely depend on its being correct (*Ibid.*, 18).

The second chapter, extending to over 50 pages and the longest in the book, is entitled 'A critique of theoretical philosophy'. It elaborates in much greater detail on what has been covered in the first. Horwich describes Wittgenstein's 'revolutionary metaphilosophical perspective', which 'in a nutshell' is the view that 'the important revelations that are typically promised within our subject are impossible' because the only *theses* that can be propounded in philosophy relate to 'observations about the use of words' which help 'loosen the grip of overstretched analogies'. Reference is made to the *Blue Book's* claim that 'Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes' (*Ibid.*, 20), and the notion of *scientism* will come to play an important role in Horwich's description of what he refers to as 'T-philosophy', the 'traditional' and 'theoretical' subject against which Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy is directed.

If Wittgenstein seems to disappear from these pages at this point, this is largely because Horwich then devotes himself to providing an account of T-philosophical theories as they

are inspired by the goals and methods of the empirical sciences (*Ibid.*, 24). We are then introduced to the Liar Paradox, The Sorites Paradox, Newcomb's Paradox and The Ship - of -Theseus Paradox, as fairly typical examples of problems which, although they may have the appearance of arising from the inherently self-contradictory nature of the phenomena under investigation, are more likely on Horwich's view to reflect 'certain distinctive elements of our methodological goals and assumptions' (*Ibid.*, 28). Consequently, far from leading us to doubt the legitimacy of these kinds of 'problems', our encounter with them in Horwich's eyes serves 'as a stimulus to yet more elaborate projects of the same kind' (*Ibid.*, 29). At this point we are re-introduced to the kinds of 'Sceptical theories' which lead us to doubt our belief in 'free choice' and in 'causal relations' *etc.*, to 'Error theories' which actually deny the existence of the phenomena themselves, 'Revisionist theories' which attempt to revise our common opinions about these phenomena, and 'Mysterian theories', peculiar to philosophy, which involve phenomena - the example provided concerns one common understanding of what is involved in the following of a rule - regarded as '*truly* paradoxical and *essentially* bizarre' (*Ibid.*, 31). In a section entitled 'The Irrationality of Scientism', he then elaborates in detail on what he understands to be Wittgenstein's reasons for believing that a theoretical approach to philosophical problems is misconceived (*Ibid.*, 33); and this is partly achieved by comparing the genuinely valuable results uncovered by proper scientific theories, with the lack of 'genuine explanatory depth' provided by the theories of philosophy, so that it is difficult to see 'what sort of "understanding" its theories could conceivably provide' (*Ibid.*, 39).

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein does occasionally surface in these pages, as for example in connection with § 125 concerning Philosophy as a discipline which may in no way interfere with the actual use of language (*Ibid.*, 41), or in relation to § 188 and § 195 (*Ibid.*, 47 *et seq.*) concerning the kinds of things we may be tempted to say about the following of a rule: 'the uncomfortable truth is that paradoxes are blameworthy confusions in *us*, not bizarre features of the world' (*Ibid.*). However, many readers will be struck here, as elsewhere, by the disparity between the apparent simplicity and transparency of the original texts, and the elaborate theoretical framework provided by Horwich for understanding them.

This becomes more obvious in the section entitled 'The General Form of a Philosophical Issue', where Horwich attempts to make explicit the 'abstract structure' that philosophical problem areas tend to share. This he does by using a number of examples concerning 'Number', 'Time', 'Truth' and 'Good', in which there are said to be eight elements or stages underlying the Wittgensteinian 'treatment' leading to the final dissolution of the problem in each particular area. In the case of Time, for example, we are introduced to (1) *Scientism* urging us to strive for theoretical unification, leading to (2) *Analogy* persuading us to stress the similarity between duration predicates and distance predicates, which leads to (3) *Generalisation* so that a temporal interval is seen as a line in space. We believe, however (4) *Idiosyncrasy* that at any moment of time no more than that moment actually exists, and this results in (5) *Paradox* so that, following St. Augustine, we come to ask how Time can possibly be measured. This has the consequence of (6) *Bewilderment* because we are at a loss to explain what Time can possibly be. This leads to (7) *Theories* like McTaggart's denial that Time exists, or Russell's view that tensed facts are analysable in terms of untensed facts. However, the proper answer lies in (8) *Therapy* which enables us to realise that the problem arises in the first place from misconstruing the significance of the analogy initially drawn between terms for duration and terms for length in space.

As Horwich points out, it would be absurd to suggest that his 'snappy' treatment of Time, which stretches to two pages, can be regarded as anything other than a brief and cryptic summary that captures 'the rise and fall of philosophical problems' on Wittgenstein's understanding of what it is to dissolve the kind of puzzlement that they engender. Similar lengthy treatments are provided for the other examples quoted. The question at issue is how far this approach can be said to enhance our understanding of Wittgenstein, and on this point opinions are inevitably going to be divided over the question of how close we ought to come to regard the original texts, together with their forms of expression, as integral to their content.

Towards the end of the chapter, Horwich again raises the question whether Wittgenstein is providing an 'anti theoretical theory', and makes the uncontentious observation that this will be

true only if he can be shown to be making claims of the very kind that he is condemning (*Ibid.*, 64). As it turns out, Horwich sees no basis for the charge, judged by the methodology that he takes Wittgenstein to be employing, so that 'there is simply no need for any of the radical escape tactics that have been urged on his behalf' (*Ibid.*, 66). There follows a repeat of the question whether Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy rests on his view of meaning, a view summed up in the rather brief argument that from the 'use' account of meaning, as Horwich describes it, one can infer that philosophical theories are meaningless, so that philosophical theorising is itself inevitably misguided. Whilst there are good reasons for saying that this entire way of thinking can have no role to play in our understanding of Wittgenstein's method, Horwich sees this 'way of deriving his metaphilosophy from his account of meaning' as one which is commonly attributed to him in the literature. Reiterating his view that this claim is wrong, he goes on to provide what he regards as reasonable arguments for saying that 'an identification of meaning with use cannot get us to the conclusion that philosophical theorizing is misconceived' (*Ibid.*, 71). Yet he does not find any reason to question whether this entire approach is itself misconceived, because we are already misconstruing the role of Wittgenstein's 'metaphilosophy' should we believe that it can even be granted a role that enables us to distinguish it from his 'account of meaning' in the way that Horwich describes.

The chapter ends by repeating that Wittgenstein is 'often credited with having invented two distinct philosophies' (*Ibid.*, 72), and Horwich expresses his belief that this view is seriously mistaken for the following reason:

For his philosophy evolves towards the mature position of the *Investigations* (which is further elaborated in subsequent work), and the *Tractatus* should be seen as a first approximation to that position. After all, the most distinctive and important of his ideas is already present in the *Tractatus*: namely, his view of traditional philosophical perplexities as pseudo-problems based on confusions stemming from features of language (*Ibid.*, 73).

However, it becomes clear in the following chapter, devoted to the *Tractatus*, that this viewpoint, one that often accompanies what has come to be regarded as a 'resolute' approach to the idea of 'nonsense' used in that work, is combined by Horwich with a more traditional outlook on its logic and metaphysics. Here we become perplexed because the 'enlightened state' in which we are to 'see the world rightly', is one in which we are to entirely refrain from making *any* philosophical assertions, and to regard as *nonsensical* the philosophical assertions of anyone else. Nevertheless, it is a state at which we have arrived because we have achieved positive *insights* of some kind - insights that can be *shown* although they cannot be *said* - that have steered us in the *right* direction:

It would seem, therefore, that Wittgenstein is 'committed' (in *some* sense) to his metaphilosophical propositions. And since these emerge from his propositions about metaphysics, meaning, logic, and language, he must be 'committed' to those as well. (*Ibid.*, 93).

Horwich is therefore drawn to reflect that what he terms the 'reductio' view of the *Tractatus* is of 'questionable coherence', not only for the reasons given, but also because it is difficult to reconcile with Wittgenstein's expressed intention in the Preface to 'draw limits to thinking' and with his claim that 'the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassailable and definitive'. This is entirely consistent with his later reference in the *Investigations* to the mistaken opinions expressed in the *Tractatus*, and with what Horwich, together with many other commentators, regards as the critique of the 'old doctrines concerning language, logic, meaning and ontology' (*Ibid.*). Consequently, on this particular question Horwich follows the approach of two well-known papers (Peter Hacker's 'Was he Trying to Whistle it?' and Ian Proops's 'The New Wittgenstein: A Critique') (as quoted *Ibid.*, 95), which argue that Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* really is 'expressing some form of attachment to the propositions he appears to be endorsing' (*Ibid.*, 94).

Horwich next turns his attention to what the 'grave mistakes' in the *Tractatus* as mentioned in the Preface to the *Investigations* actually are, and these he divides into three main groups:

first, those directed against presuppositions of the approach; second, objections to the integrated theory of reality, meaning and language that he presented as satisfying those presuppositions; and third, the critique, arising from these objections, of his original metaphilosophical point of view (*Ibid.*, 96).

Horwich discovers eight separate claims made in the *Tractatus* that are criticised in the *Investigations*, and the first seven of these are, briefly, that language has an essential nature and that its central function is the description of reality; that the meaning of a word is its reference; that an empty name has no meaning; that understanding a language involves operating a calculus according to definite rules; that there is a set of basic entities from which all facts are composed and a set of basic words in terms of which all meaningful expressions are defined; and, lastly, that logic provides an *a priori*, metaphysically necessary structure for thought and for the world.

It has become a commonplace in elementary introductions to the *Philosophical Investigations*, to argue that all of these Tractarian ideas are criticised within its earlier sections, not to say implicitly throughout the book. Horwich adopts this fairly conventional approach by pointing to the later use of notions like *language-game* and *family resemblance*, to the many different uses of language that there are, and to the dictum that the meaning of a word is its *use* in the language. These points are understood to reflect Wittgenstein's repudiation of the main claims made in the *Tractatus*.

Of more obvious significance to his overall purpose, however, is Horwich's detection of the eighth claim criticised later on, and this concerns 'a small but momentous change in Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical view'. This is said to lie in the change from regarding philosophical confusion as the result of taking the superficial forms of certain propositions to be their real forms - the gap between 'superficial grammatical form' and 'underlying logical form' - to regarding it as the tendency to 'insistently over-generalize': philosophical confusion now 'resides in the tendency to stretch analogies in the uses of words, to be unnecessarily perplexed by the tensions that result, and to wrongly feel that an *a priori* theory of the phenomenon in question is needed to demystify it' (*Ibid.*, 103). As Horwich

sums up this assessment at the end of the chapter, philosophical problems are still taken to be derived from 'linguistic illusions - but these stem from mistaken analogies rather than missing analyses.' (*Ibid.*, 104). Any kind of philosophical *theory* is, therefore, no longer required.

The next chapter, devoted to 'Meaning', is to a large extent concerned with how we are to understand Wittgenstein in § 43: 'For a *large* class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language'. Horwich's first reaction to this paragraph is as follows:

It would be quite wrong, however, to think that the point of his discussion is to expound and support that opinion. For he would of course reject any suggestion that this identification qualifies as a genuine *theory* - hence, in need of support - rather than a mere definition, as trivial and obvious as the synonymy of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'. So it is hardly surprising that, although he reminds us of the usage of the word 'meaning' that reveals our commitment to this definition, he offers no arguments in favour of it. - He takes it for granted from the very outset of his book and relies on it throughout (*Ibid.*, 106).

This is going to seem inadequate to anyone who takes § 43 to have repercussions that run through Wittgenstein's entire philosophy. It is not irrelevant that the second paragraph of § 43 states that 'the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer', and that the entire passage occurs in a section of the *Investigations* which places it between a discussion about proper names as they are used in ordinary language - in which names may have meaning, in Wittgenstein's terms, even if nothing corresponds to them - and the treatment of the names of 'simples' as the 'objects' or 'primary elements' of the *Tractatus*. The conclusion that the meaning of a word is its *use* in the language is an invitation to look at the surrounding circumstances in which

words are *used* as factors which are integral to our understanding, for example, of the use of psychological expressions, which are not *used* on a Wittgensteinian reading to 'denote' or 'describe' mental events taking place in an 'inner realm', events perhaps discoverable to be 'identical' to physical events with explanatory causal roles. This also helps to explain why Wittgenstein can with propriety say that no supposition seems to him more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking, or that it is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena *cannot* be investigated physiologically because physiologically nothing corresponds to them (*Zettel* §§ 608 - 9). The operative word is 'corresponds', for what is being rejected here is the idea of one-to-one correspondence, the result of that 'primitive interpretation of our concepts' referred to in *Zettel* § 611; and this has nothing to do with an acceptance of the fact that, in general terms, psychological phenomena are causally dependent on neurophysiological processes. As it turns out, despite his initial and rather disappointing account of the significance of § 43, matters improve later on when we find that this is entirely compatible after all with aspects of Horwich's account of its role in relation to his rejection of 'a tempting Augustinian view of meaning':

This view is that almost all words are conventionally associated with observed aspects of reality, and that we learn a language by attending to the behaviour of its speakers and noticing which such associations have been established. But in fact, as he now recognises, it is only a small subset of terms that are learned in roughly this way; and only within that narrow domain does the functioning of language depend on a perception-mediated, causal correlation between words and things (or properties) (*Ibid.*, 107).

Or, again, pointing to the discussion of §§ 138 - 242 that will take place later in the chapter:

This is not to deny that the equation of meaning with use may be found puzzling and questionable. But, for Wittgenstein, the controversial character of his claim does not betray it as the sort

of philosophical *theory* that he opposes. Rather, such controversies are regarded as the result of confusions that lead us astray - lead us away from the definition of 'meaning' that is plainly implicit in ordinary discourse, and towards various mistaken accounts of it. One such misbegotten account is the Augustinian - Tractarian view mentioned above. Other examples...derive from the tempting idea that what one means by a word is an introspected, guiding mental state (*Ibid.*, 115).

Horwich then turns to the second paragraph of § 43, and makes the uncontentious claim that it is not incompatible with the first. The conclusion of this section is that whilst what Horwich has had to say about § 43 and its implications, often goes beyond the material contained in the *Investigations*, it is nevertheless quite compatible with it. His next move is to attempt to fit §§ 138 - 242 within the eight-fold framework from 'scientific expectation' to 'therapeutic dissolution' that he has already applied to notions like 'Time' and 'Good'. If we begin by believing 'that there are various suggestive parallels between how we think of instances of meaning and understanding,' *i.e.*, in terms of patterns of use, 'and how we think of introspectible mental states' (*Ibid.*, 126), this must give rise to an inevitable tension. Horwich sees a 'special case' of this tension reflected in the thought that our understanding of an explicitly formulated rule must consist in our providing it with a certain 'interpretation', which must lead to an infinite regress; yet we also believe that when we do follow a rule we have no choice in the matter because the rule settles what we have to do (*Ibid.*, 128 *et seq.*). Furthermore, if a mental concomitant cannot, as Horwich puts it, determine a use, this is not unconnected with the idea that a momentary (mental) state of understanding surely cannot 'yield the vast body of usage that meanings do in fact determine' (*Ibid.*, 130).

Consequently, the kinds of paradoxes induced by the tension to which Horwich refers, produce in us the sense that meaning and understanding are extraordinary phenomena (§ 153, § 188, § 191, and § 195), and this leads the philosopher to attempt to introduce a *theory* to account

for them: accounts of meaning that are 'sceptical, revisionary, systematic and mysterianist' (*Ibid.*, 132). Broadly speaking, Horwich identifies Kripke, Quine, Grice and Katz, and Brentano as philosophers who respectively adopt these various reactions to the puzzle (*Ibid.*, 133). The correct solution, however, instead rests in therapeutic dissolution:

The solution is, first, to remind oneself...of the limitations of the analogy between states of understanding and mental states; and second, to appreciate that some (indeed most) rules are followed without being interpreted....It is to say that our understanding of them - our giving them meaning - consists in our simply responding to the words as we have been shown and taught (*Ibid.*, 137).

Horwich uses passages like §§ 195 - 198, § 201, § 211 and § 219, quoted in full, to support his 'therapeutic' claim that 'Wittgenstein's view, quite clearly, is that the meaning consists in the disposition' (*Ibid.*, 141):

Our confusions are exposed, the paradoxes they engendered dissolved, and our puzzlement removed. We are now able to see, as entirely obvious and unproblematic, that the meaning of each word consists in our basic propensities concerning its use (*Ibid.*, 142).

In the simplest possible terms, this is the answer that Horwich provides to the Kripkean 'sceptical paradox' that forms the subject of the following chapter on 'Kripke's Wittgenstein'. This is in spite of the fact that at one point it is made to appear that what Kripke is propounding is not really as clear as many readers may have believed:

Kripke's overall thesis - that there are no genuine 'facts' as to what words mean - is somewhat obscure. But it is supposed to derive from his critique of dispositionalism, together with his

additional arguments...that meanings cannot be engendered by mental facts and cannot be irreducibly semantic. Therefore, in so far as there turn out to be substantial flaws in his case against *a priori* dispositionalism, then we can safely take it that his sceptical conclusion - whatever it means exactly - will also be unproven (*Ibid.*, 161).

On the face of it, this is very much at odds with what must seem the obvious fact that what has helped to give Kripke's 'sceptical paradox' its place in the secondary literature is precisely that there is no doubt about the view that it expresses. Kripke begins with the claim that one 'grasps' the rule for addition 'by means of my external symbolic representation and my internal mental representation' (1), and that what is 'crucial' to the 'grasp' of this rule is that although the number of relevant arithmetical calculations already made is finite, the rule itself 'determines' the 'correct' answer to be provided for an indefinite number of new calculations that I have never previously encountered.

It should have been obvious from the beginning, however, that it is only because this presentation seduces us into believing that this properly captures (2) our *ordinary* understanding of what it is to 'grasp' a rule, that we are stunned by the conclusions of Kripke's 'bizarre sceptic'. Without this presupposition, the sceptic cannot reveal to us that what we firmly believe we are doing is compatible with following, at any finite point in the sequence, an entirely different 'quus-like' rule. But if the sceptic's case is granted, then of course it will come to seem that every attempt to follow the rule will have the appearance of making a 'stab in the dark'. Presented in these terms, there can be no *direct* answer to the so-called 'sceptical paradox'.

But it should also be fairly obvious that ideas about 'grasping' a rule in terms of 'external symbolic and internal mental representations' already sound highly *unWittgensteinian*. Indeed, a great deal of §§ 138 - 242 is intended to lead us away from the thought that if we find ourselves forced to oscillate between adopting forms of so-called 'Platonism' at one extreme, and making 'stabs in the dark' at the other, then we have seriously misunderstood the proper role in our ordinary practices

of what it is to grasp a rule in a way which is '*not an interpretation*', but which is instead revealed in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases (§ 201). This is not an adherence to 'dispositionalism' as a questionable 'answer' to Kripke's bizarre sceptic, but a rejection of the role that Kripke attributes to the misleading *pictures* that force us to oscillate between these two extremes.

In some respects at least, Horwich's presentation does follow this way of capturing what Wittgenstein is about, albeit that he takes Wittgenstein to be presenting a 'straight' solution to Kripke's 'sceptical paradox' based on an acceptance that our 'dispositions' - a term which in this context may have the appearance of begging the point at issue - provide us with 'canonical inductive evidence for the genuinely factual conclusion' that someone has had, and still has '*a general tendency* (propensity, disposition)' to use a word in a consistent way, and so according to a rule (*Ibid.*, 164):

So if, as Kripke says, such an observation is recognised as the condition for a certain meaning-attribution to be assertible - that is, justifiably maintained - the obvious explanation lies in our taking this meaning-attribution to be made true by S having that general tendency. Thus an ironic feature of Kripke's sceptical solution to his paradox is the way that it leads directly to the correctness of a straight response (*Ibid.*).

If this account of what Wittgenstein is about is interpreted charitably, it becomes a way of saying that the misleading pictures that cloud our judgement when thinking philosophically about what it is to follow a rule, prevent us from realising that is only by studying our ordinary practices, in which we do talk about 'obeying rules' and 'going against them', that we will discover the true nature of what it is to obey and disobey a rule. Consequently, on this assessment, Kripke's Humean 'sceptical solution' to his paradox only becomes 'sceptical' because of the role in his thinking that

he is attributing to those misleading *pictures* that, as Wittgenstein would put it, he finds that he is quite unable to apply (Cf. § 426).

Here, as is so often the case in philosophy, a great deal is going to depend on where the emphasis falls. On this assessment of Horwich's treatment, he would be correct to say, as he does, that as a 'straight solution', what he is proposing does differ from other 'solutions' given the same title by their proponents in the literature. As Horwich sees it, the great majority of these 'solutions' *either* resist Kripke's argument 'that no non-semantic analysis of a word's meaning (in terms of use dispositions, for example) could directly explain how it comes to have the particular extension that it does (e.g., Blackburn), or they suppose that, although Kripke is right about that, the moral is simply that meaning attributions, though factual, are irreducible (e.g., Boghossian)' (*Ibid.*, 160).

There are, nevertheless, aspects of Horwich's treatment in this chapter with which one might quibble, e.g., his account of 'private' in § 202, which is said to mean, not 'independent of others', but 'the sort of state, like an experience, that its subject is peculiarly well-positioned to pronounce upon, since someone tends to be in it when and only when he *thinks* he's in it' (*Ibid.*, 166). If this may seem unclear, Horwich nevertheless draws from it the conclusion that Wittgenstein is distinguishing between *private* rule-following and rule-following as an objective practice, which might very well be grounded 'in the regular activity of a single isolated person, independently of anyone else' (*Ibid.*). This leads Horwich in a footnote to discuss Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea of a language which *cannot* be understood by anyone else, and this he identifies with a 'private language' whose terms designate 'raw-feels' (qualia), an idea that Wittgenstein is said to subject to severe criticism. This, of course, is to be distinguished from the language which is private only insofar as one person may be said to speak it in isolation, even although it could be taught to others.

Horwich's adherence to 'Individualism' in these passages is not all that controversial in itself, insofar as it turns on the principle - originating in Baker and Hacker - that the genesis of an ability is irrelevant to its exercise. However, this does become controversial when it is understood to lead to the idea of a born-Crusoe *inventing* a first language for himself, for this contradicts the idea

which Wittgenstein treats as empty of content in § 32, the idea of a child who can *think*, only not yet *speak*, a child who has a 'language of thought' so that he is conceptually articulate prior to learning to talk. Furthermore, Wittgenstein did not deny that we can readily *imagine* individuals who can invent languages for themselves, or who have private images of 'red', say, that differ from the private qualia of others. The texts indicate that his difficulty with these suggestions is rather that we can imagine them only *too* readily, and that this leads us to give them the wrong kind of emphasis in our thinking. These suppositions arise only when language is 'idling' and doing no real work (§ 132), so that they have no role to play in the ordinary day-to-day use of our concepts. They occur, in other words, only when we are doing *philosophy* (Cf. § 109), so that there is an inevitable irony in the fact that what for many philosophers who regard the 'what it is like' quality of a sensation as a feature of fundamental importance to their (philosophical) thinking, is for Wittgenstein a consideration that can play no useful role in his investigations.

The final chapter entitled 'The "mystery" of consciousness', begins by drawing a distinction between genuine questions resulting from ignorance, and pseudo-questions that are prompted by confusion. Horwich's examples of pseudo-questions are 'What time is it on the sun?', 'Where is the number three?' or 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' Once again using the example of Time, he continues by drawing our attention to the confusions arising from the idea that *time flows*:

So there can be no deep issue as to *why* time passes at the speed it does, or whether it could go in the opposite direction. Such questions are tempting only given an irrational overstretching of the superficial analogy between 'time flow' and normal motion (*Ibid.*, 172).

It may be thought that in saying this, Horwich has forgotten familiar kinds of examples in which a physicist might conclude that when approaching the speed of light, time *slows down*, a way of speaking which is intended to capture the verifiable hypothesis, say, that someone travelling through space at near the speed of light would age much more slowly over a period of 'conventional time' than

someone who remains firmly at the Earth's surface. On the other hand, if we believe that this talk of time moving slowly or quickly can make no sense, then we are free to find some other means of expressing the nature of the hypothesis in question; just as we can replace talk of 'curved space' by reference, say, to the verifiable effect of gravitational fields on stellar bodies. The entire point of the example of Time is to show how the idea of 'consciousness', as understood by Wittgenstein, can come to be used by philosophers in a way that makes it appear, amongst other things, to be a kind of non-physical entity which may accompany human behaviour. As Horwich sums up his treatment later in the chapter:

I have been suggesting, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that lying behind the 'mystery' of consciousness is an inflated-private-arena model of experience, and that lying behind this inflation is an exaggeration of the similarities between sensation reports and observation reports. However, if that suggestion is correct, then we should be able to see how the overstretched analogies would *directly* engender our various problems (Ibid., 186).

Consequently, someone might actually entertain this model almost, as it were, subliminally, so that it could have an effect on his thinking although he might not claim to be consciously aware of entertaining it. There are a number of passages in *Zettel*, e.g., §§ 401 - 402, and §§ 394 - 396, which bring out quite brilliantly what Wittgenstein thinks about consciousness. These are much more successful, and succinct, than Horwich's further subjection of Wittgenstein's thoughts about consciousness to his eight-fold schema. Indeed, there are aspects of his discussion here that are open to question, like Gilbert Ryle's supposed espousal of '*Sceptical eliminativism*', said to be the view that there is no such thing as pain over and above behaviour (Ibid., 193). And would Frank Jackson, Galen Strawson, and David Chalmers, wholly approve of the claim that they are proclaimers of '*Mysterianistic Dualism*'? There is, on the other hand, every indication that both Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn would not object to being classed as philosophers who

would regard 'consciousness' in their use of the term as beyond any form of scientific explanation. However, leaving aside the issue of whether this way of classifying the beliefs of philosophers is of any identifiable worth, Horwich provides us in these sections with a fairly standard account of Wittgenstein on *consciousness* and *privacy*, and why these notions cannot quite be given the *special* kinds of *uses*, peculiar to philosophy, that many philosophers believe that they can grant to them.

If the following treatment of 'private language' that stretches to just three pages, seems rather perfunctory, this can only be on the assumption that most of the real work has already been covered in his discussion of consciousness, and that what is required here is a short summary of issues already adequately addressed. To some extent this is true: Horwich repeats his claim that 'Wittgenstein's fundamental critical point on this issue' is that sensation terms do not function at all like observation terms, and it is for this reason that there must be something radically wrong with the very idea of a language which is supposedly employed to 'refer to the peculiar introspected qualities of his own experiences - that is, to refer to his own "qualia"' (*Ibid.*, 196). From this, it can be taken to follow that third person sensation ascriptions do not require to be justified 'on the basis of the first person rule', and that 'narrowly described sensation types have no subjective character capable of varying from one individual to another'. There cannot, therefore, *be* a language in which 'these (non-existent) introspected subjective characters are named' (*Ibid.*)

However, Horwich sees the idea of a 'private language' that is used in § 258 as one which is not tied to 'qualia' in this way, because it relates solely to an individual who goes through a ceremony of introducing a term 'to name what she *takes* to be some peculiar, new experience of hers', peculiar because it has no behavioural manifestation. This individual says 'Now I have S again' from time to time, even although this has meaning only to this speaker. The question posed by Horwich is whether this idea of a 'putative private language' properly represents the target at which Wittgenstein is really aiming, 'the intended upshot of Wittgenstein's "private language argument"' (*Ibid.*, 197).

Horwich's answer is that it does not, because such a language would *not* be rendered

impossible based on what is said in § 65. What Wittgenstein is actually implying is that there would be no *point* to such a language, and nothing would be achieved by it. This is quite apart from the separate issue that, on Horwich's view, 'there would be no possibility of correcting someone's application of the terms of such a language - there would be no distinction between an application's *being* right and its *seeming* right' (*Ibid.*)

This bears a somewhat distant resemblance to a view once put forward by Oswald Hanfling (3). Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that apparent differences of opinion here can often be differences purely of emphasis, Wittgenstein's treatment has a much greater unity than this would suggest, so that making *this* kind of distinction based on qualia *v* a lack of behavioural manifestation, puts the emphasis in the wrong place. First of all, first person sensation ascription in our ordinary language is criterionless, yet Wittgenstein *defines* a private language in terms of its requiring *criteria* for the application of its terms (§ 288). The point here is not so much that such a language would be in some sense 'impossible', but that judged in terms of the application of our ordinary sensation-concepts, it is teetering on the brink of making little or no sense. This is connected with the idea that instead of attempting to provide a meaning for a sensation-term by a form of 'mental pointing' (§ 258) - a term for a *sensation* that cannot already be understood to have what is referred to in the literature as *representational content* - Wittgenstein allies the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription to the learning of a public language in a public context (§ 381 & § 384). § 265 echoes the aspect of § 258 that says 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right', not obviously on verificationist grounds (*Cf. Ibid.*, 196), but because this follows directly from the definition of a private language which requires criteria for the application of its terms: in relation to what our ordinary sensation language *is*, 'either right or wrong' is incoherent. The issue of 'qualia' is separate, and here the point to emphasise is not that introspective sensation types have no character which is *unique* to me, so that 'there could not be a private language to talk about them'. It is rather that when we are inclined, sometimes in everyday life, sometimes when doing philosophy, to get the 'fill of a colour' (§ 277), to immerse one's self in the colour, or

for that matter in the pain, there is a natural tendency to *imagine* that this really is unique to my 'consciousness', that no one else could possibly see *this* colour or feel *this* pain. But on this point, it is our capacity to *imagine* this that is leading us astray: all we are succeeding in doing is to give this way of talking the wrong kind of emphasis in our thinking. Now we require to be *reminded* of the fact that *these* kinds of *apparent* applications for our concepts only occur to us when we are doing philosophy, and not when we are using these concepts in their ordinary surroundings.

Turning next to the section on 'Behaviourism', Horwich emphasises that in spite of some passages that may give an impression to the contrary (§ 281, § 283, § 580 and § 304), Wittgenstein adheres to behaviourism in neither its *eliminativist* (denial of experience) nor in its *reductionist* (equivalent to behaviour) forms. However, Horwich may appear to present what Wittgenstein does want to say in a form which will at the very least raise a few eyebrows:

The situation, rather, is that our observation of the behaviour has a natural tendency to bring about the beliefs. Thus we *implicitly* master something like a function, 'The probability that he is in pain, given that he exhibits behaviour of type B in conditions C is x ', which specifies how much confidence, x , to have in a third-person pain attribution, as a function of behaviour and other circumstances B & C. (*Ibid.*, 199).

Even if we allow that Horwich is speaking from the perspective of someone steeped in mainstream analytic philosophy, this will seem strange to anyone who is familiar with Wittgenstein's idea of behaviour as an expression of the 'inner', an idea that goes hand in hand with Marie McGinn's description of his replacement of the (ontological) distinction between matter and mind by that between the living and the non-living (4). Horwich's alternative is to argue that because first person attributions are not covered by third person rules, Horwich's Wittgenstein cannot be a reductive behaviourist. Horwich then argues that 'he clearly does deny

...the existence of pain *qualia*, of private “raw feels” ‘, though he is not denying the existence of pain (*Ibid.*, 200). The point here is mainly terminological, for we could just as easily say that Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of ‘qualia’ as the ‘raw feels’ in which we can become immersed, as distinct from denying our belief, when doing philosophy, that they are *unique* and *private* to the individual who happens to experience them. The passage to which Horwich primarily draws our attention on this point is § 293, quoted in full, although he could just as easily have pointed to §§ 271 - 278. The section ends by quoting § 304, which denies that the function of language is always to convey thoughts about things, although that point is already captured by the final paragraph of § 293.

The final sections of the chapter are devoted to certain objections made in the secondary literature, primarily by Ned Block and Sydney Shoemaker, to the arguments provided by Horwich on Wittgenstein’s behalf against the possibility of ‘inverted spectra’. Generally speaking, claims to the effect that someone sees colours differently from most other people are quite acceptable provided that they are empirically verifiable. A classic example rests in standard cases of colour blindness, where there are tests to determine whether someone is capable of discriminating amongst a range of shades of the same colour. He may discover that he has a defect in his vision, judged by the standard set by the majority, of which he had hitherto been unaware. But these are clearly not the kinds of cases in which Wittgenstein shows an interest in § 272. These are instead examples in which the supposition that ‘one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another’ are *in principle* unverifiable, otherwise they would have no philosophical value. It has already been proposed that Wittgenstein does not deny our ability to *imagine* these cases, as distinct from arguing that we can imagine them only *too* readily. His difficulty with them is that we can do nothing with them because they occur only when language is ‘idling’ and doing no real work (§ 132).

Insofar as the issue at stake is understood to be whether there *really* can be qualia as the *private* ‘raw feels’ already mentioned by Horwich, then cases like that of colour blindness evidently fail to fit the bill because the ‘private’ shade of red detected by the colour blind person differs from that of

most other people only insofar as it is, say, publicly detectable that they can discriminate two shades where he can pick out only one. It does not take a great deal of ingenuity, however, to *imagine* cases where there may appear to be genuine *empirical* reasons for saying that someone really has *private* qualia of which he is unaware even although he uses language in the same way as everyone else. In keeping with the classic 'what would we say if...?' type format only too common in philosophy, Horwich recounts the example of someone who undergoes an operation on his brain so that instead of seeing things normally as before, red things start to look green to him and *vice versa*. No doubt the same effect could be produced by wearing appropriately devised tinted spectacles. So far everything is alright, for this is clearly a matter of public record and a great surprise to *him*. However, he is then said to suffer amnesia so that he has no recollection of this new way of seeing things, albeit that he now continues to use his colour terms in the same way as everyone else. But it must then surely follow that what he 'sees' remains *different* from what everyone else sees and from what his *former* self saw, even although, because *private* in the required sense, he is now totally unaware of it.

Horwich, on his reading, wishes to question the cogency of these kinds of thought experiments on Wittgenstein's behalf, and argues that what he refers to as Block's 'new-fangled pseudo-qualia' do not really conform to the pattern set by the 'genuine' examples of qualia as 'raw feels' that have already been criticised because they 'engender the epistemological and metaphysical controversies' discussed earlier on. 'So let them exist, by all means. But why, as philosophers, should we care?' (*Ibid.*, 209). Although this may seem a rather offhand reply, the fact remains that the sole reason for adopting the view that in this case there really are *private* qualia of the required sort, is that a certain causal link has been established between how things appear to a subject and certain identifiable occurrences in the subject's brain. Without this empirical discovery, there would be no reason to say that he was genuinely experiencing these *private* visual sensations, private because, *ex hypothesi*, he is totally unaware that his vision differs in this respect from that of anyone else. Horwich may well be correct to suggest that cases of this kind, were they to occur in fact, would - like others connected in their various ways to scientific discovery - really require some form of *legislation* over what is the 'right' thing to say.

Paul Horwich has managed to provide a fairly wide-ranging account of Wittgenstein's method in the *Philosophical Investigations*, one that is certainly worth reading because it reflects a great many years of study by someone who undoubtedly has an individual, though not entirely unique outlook on what Wittgenstein's philosophy is about. Indeed, insofar as it is unique, there are grounds for questioning some of his main ideas. The very distinction between the 'metaphilosophy' as the way of approaching philosophical questions in general, and 'the treatment of meaning' is not as clear-cut as Horwich makes out, and his eight fold schema at times seems rather unwieldy. There can be little doubt that the overtly theoretical approach does from time to time leave the reader with the thought that matters are better expressed in the original texts. There are also a few mistakes in proof-reading that with a little more care could have been avoided. It would, however, be unfair to end on a churlish note. The book is packed with argument and there are extensive footnotes in most chapters that explore highways and byways connected to their main themes. Horwich's book is one more example of the quite extraordinary amount of commentary on the work of Wittgenstein, most of which is now achieving a fairly high level of competence, that is regularly continuing to appear on publishers' lists.

ENDNOTES

- (1) Saul Kripke: *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982), 7.
- (2) A point of view clearly expressed by Peter Winch in 'Facts and Super Facts', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 133, October 1983, 398.
- (3) Oswald Hanfling: 'What does the private language argument prove?' in *Wittgenstein and The Human Form of Life* (London, Routledge, 2006), extensively revised from a paper in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 1984.
- (4) Marie McGinn: *The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), 9.

As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle's comment that "the matter is stated well and almost interestingly" referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle's aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. A paper on Wittgenstein appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, another on Ebersole / Ayer in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010, a later paper on Wittgenstein in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, March 2013 and a further one on Ryle, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, forthcoming.