This collection of previously unpublished manuscripts was posted off by Wittgenstein to be considered for publication during World War 2, in October 1941, however, remained hidden for over two generations. There are many competing interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy, but his work and its impact have been felt in the arts, humanities and social sciences.
The book further includes key explanations by the editors of the origin and background of these previously unknown manuscripts. It investigates how Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought-processes are revealed in his dictation to, as well as his editing and revision with Francis Skinner, in the latter’s role of amanuensis. The book displays a considerable wealth and variety of Wittgenstein’s fundamental experiments in philosophy across a wide array of subjects that include the mind, pure and applied mathematics, metaphysics, the identities of ordinary and creative language, as well as intractable problems in logic and life. He also periodically engages with the work of Newton, Fermat, Russell and others. The book shows Wittgenstein strongly battling against the limits of understanding and the bewitchment of institutional and linguistic customs.
The reader is drawn in by Wittgenstein as he urges his audience to join him in his struggles to equip them with skills, so that they can embark on devising new pathways beyond confusion.
To Francis Skinner – The Wittgenstein-Skinner Manuscripts
To Francis Skinner – The Wittgenstein-Skinner Manuscripts
Editors: Gibson, Arthur, O'Mahony, Niamh Ann (Eds.) Is a newly discovered and unpublished collection of Wittgenstein's continuous manuscripts
Reviews In this volume we witness Wittgenstein in the act of composing and experimenting with his new visions in philosophy. The book includes key explanations of the origin and background of these previously unknown manuscripts. It investigates how Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought-processes are revealed in his dictation to, as well as his editing and revision with Francis Skinner, in the latter’s role of amanuensis. The book displays a considerable wealth and variety of Wittgenstein’s fundamental experiments in philosophy across a wide array of subjects that include the mind, pure and applied mathematics, metaphysics, the identities of ordinary and creative language, as well as intractable problems in logic and life. He also periodically engages with the work of Newton, Fermat, Russell and others. The book shows Wittgenstein strongly battling against the limits of understanding and the bewitchment of institutional and linguistic customs. The reader is drawn in by Wittgenstein as he urges us to join him in his struggles to equip us with skills, so that we can embark on devising new pathways beyond confusion.
This collection of manuscripts was posted off by Wittgenstein to be considered for publication during World War 2, in October 1941. None of it was published and it remained hidden for over two generations. Upon its rediscovery, Professor Gibson was invited to research, prepare and edit the Archive to appear as this book, encouraged by Trinity College Cambridge and The Mathematical Association. Niamh O’Mahony joined him in co-editing and bringing this book to publication.
3rd Hinge Epistemology Conference: Hinge Epistemology and Religious Belief
NOVA University of Lisbon
Tuesday 15 - Wednesday 16 June 2021
Submissions of abstracts are invited for a two-day conference on Hinge Epistemology, hosted by the NOVA Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA) at the NOVA University of Lisbon (Portugal), in collaboration with the University of California, Irvine (USA), and the University of Hertfordshire (UK).
· Annalisa Coliva (Irvine)
· Juliet Floyd (Boston)
· Hans-Johann Glock (Zurich)
· Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (Hertfordshire)
· Duncan Pritchard (Irvine)
· Genia Schönbaumsfeld (Southampton)
· Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins)
· Crispin Wright (New York / Stirling)
Symposium on Hinge Epistemology and Religious Belief:
· Modesto Gómez-Alonso (La Laguna)
· Sofia Miguens (Porto)
· Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte (Valencia)
· Nuno Venturinha (Lisbon)
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
The conference will include a number of sessions for submitted papers. Selection will be based on review of long abstracts (max. 1000 words). Please submit your abstract as an email attachment to Prof. Nuno Venturinha (), copied to Prof. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock () by 1st April 2021. Presentation time for accepted papers will be 30 minutes plus Q&A.
Papers will address (positively or critically) the application of Wittgenstein's notion of ‘hinges’ or ‘hinge certainty’ to religious epistemology but also to epistemological problems in any discipline. The conference will be held in English, and peer-reviewed proceedings will be published in an edited volume of the series Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein.
This conference is organized within the framework of the FCT-funded project ‘Epistemology of Religious Belief: Wittgenstein, Grammar and the Contemporary World’ (PTDC/FER-FIL/32203/2017, PI: Nuno Venturinha), hosted by the Reasoning and Argumentation Laboratory (ArgLab) of IFILNOVA. For more information about the project, please visit: www.arglab.ifilnova.pt/en/projects/erb
We hope to hold the conference in-person but if this is not possible we will move to a virtual conference. Further updates on the conference format and registration will be provided in due course.
A new effort to build a platform for philosophers’ collaborative studies
Wittgenstein who was born in Vienna and known as an Austrian-philosopher has been widely studied in Europe and Asia. Although the significance of the collaborative studies by various countries’ philosophers is recognized, it is challenging to develop a connection with philosophers whose studies have been traditionally based on individual works. In particular, activities by researchers of Western philosophy in Asia have been relatively unknown. Therefore, this crowdfunding project is launched to create opportunities for exchange and collaboration among philosophers by holding an international workshop in Tokyo. New collaborations can be promoted by an open call for participants rather than the Japanese conventional style. The future task is to hold the workshop regularly aiming to establish a platform where philosophers stay connected.
Please pay attention to your time zone when scheduling the chat!
Carla Carmona Escalera (Universidad de Sevilla) Bettina Funcke (Art historian, New York) James Klagge (Virginia Tech, College of Liberal Arts) Désirée Weber (The College of Wooster)In 1925, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote a dictionary for elementary school children. His Wörterbuch für Volksschulen (Dictionary for Elementary Schools) was designed to help his students learn to spell. Wittgenstein began teaching kids in rural Austria in 1920, after abandoning his life and work at Cambridge University.
Word Book is the first-ever English translation of Wörterbuch. This publication aims to encourage and reinvigorate interest in one of the greatest modern philosophers by introducing this gem of a work to a wider audience. Word Book also explores how Wörterbuch portends Wittgenstein's radical reinvention of his own philosophy and the enduring influence his thinking holds over how art, culture and language are understood.Word Book is translated by writer and art historian Bettina Funcke, with a critical introduction by scholar Désirée Weber, and accompanied with art by Paul Chan.
Call for Workshop Participants/Special Issue: New Perspectives on Wittgenstein on Expression
Organizers: Michael Campbell (Centre for Ethics, Pardubice); Lynette Reid (Dalhousie) Advisors/participants: David Cockburn (Lampeter); Lars Hertzberg (Åbo Akademi)
We invite applications for participation for a virtual workshop on Ludwig Wittgenstein's use of the concept of expression and related notions, centered around the question of the integration of what was formerly presented as Part I and Part II of the Investigations. (See the workshop format below.)
A pivotal difficulty for what is in earlier editions presented as Part II of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is the question that launches II.x: “how did we ever come to use such an expression as ‘I believe…’?”. The discussion that follows moves from the concept of belief to the phenomena of aspect-perception and the possibility of meaning-blindness, to aesthetic taste and judgement. These discussions of distinctive experiences are intended to enable us to “shift for ourselves” (II.xi, p. 206) when confused about expression and meaning. Wittgenstein frames his investigations into aspect seeing and related phenomena as training ground for navigating the complexity of the dual face of expression: in making an assertion, I say something about the world and, in so doing, express my own state of mind.
Wittgenstein’s comments about aspect seeing and meaning blindness have intrinsic interest as investigations of human experiences of meaning, and some construe them as a distinct project, one that stands apart from Wittgenstein’s concerns with language and logic. However, a number of considerations speak against this bifurcation. Peter Winch pointed out (1996/2001) that the Necker cube discussion in the Tractatus is a comment on Wittgenstein’s analysis of Russell’s theory of judgment, a move echoed in the ordering of Moore’s paradox about belief and the aspect-seeing discussions of the traditional Part II of the Investigations. Lars Hertzberg (1992) argued that Wittgenstein’s interest in primitive reactions straddles—and undermines—the distinction between logic and anthropology. More recently, Hugh Knott (2017) presents historical and exegetical evidence that, from the Blue and Brown Books onwards, Wittgenstein saw his discussion of aspect seeing as an intrinsic culmination of his treatment of language and logic. An utterance may express both a proposition (a claim about the world; capable of being true or false) and something about the person making the utterance (at least, their belief, or some closely related characterization of the person or their point of view). Two questions then arise: what is the nature of the relation between the sign and what is expressed by it, since these things appear to be of entirely different orders?; and what is the relation between these two expressive functions of an utterance—how does the meaning of an utterance relate to the one who makes it, their person or their point of view? These questions and the presuppositions that give rise to them exercised Wittgenstein throughout his life.
We invite papers that explore how the discussions of aspect seeing help us “shift for ourselves when we encounter conceptual difficulties” that arise in, and in reflection on, our practices of expressing and attributing inner states, and of seeing things as meaningful or meaningless.
Questions could include, for example: • How do we characterize challenges in the attribution of belief across historical, conceptual, cultural, scientific and political change? (Cf. Diamond 1999, 2012) • Is there philosophically significant variety we have been ignoring in what it is for one person to respond to another person as believing something—or in what it is to believe another person—in different contexts? • What should we retain and what should we discard from the Tractatus view of the “enormously complicated” “silent adjustments” necessary “to understand colloquial language” (4.002)? • Does the word “expression” in the phrases “self-expression,” “expression of a thought,” and “expression of a belief” mean the same? In the phrases “expressive face” and “expressive musical passage”? Could we replace “expression” with a different word in each of these uses? • Can Wittgenstein’s comments cast useful light on debates concerning the doctrine of expressivism? • What can we learn about the question of II.x (“how did we ever come to use such an expression as ‘I believe’?”) from investigating examples of owning and disowning one’s words, avowing and disavowing beliefs or their implications? • Is there a connection between Wittgenstein’s early discussion of Russell’s conception of belief and his later discussion of Moore’s paradox? • What is the relationship between the logical and the psychological, if we are true to the particularity of uses of language in context? • In what sense can “making a move in a language game” characterize who a person is? What is the relationship between expression and identity? • How do the visual features of objects relate to the judgements which can be made about them? And, is this related to the question of how we ought to characterise the relationship between pictorial models and our understanding of the phenomena which they depict?
Format: We intend to form a group of approximately 12-20 participants, of whom 12 will present papers (via zoom, dates and times tbc) on the topic, to be followed by discussion with the group. We envision fruitful collaboration between a diverse group of academics working to make Wittgenstein's philosophy relevant to contemporary questions, both academic and practical. Participation in all 12 sessions is not mandatory but is strongly encouraged, and we would expect participants to commit to attending a majority of the sessions. We envision approximately 12 sessions to be held over approximately 6 months, beginning in January 2021 and running until June 2021, and will do our best to come up with a schedule that suits the majority of participants.
At the end of the process, interested participants may submit their papers to a special issue of a journal devoted to the topic. (The Nordic Wittgenstein Review have expressed an interest.)
Please submit a 500 word abstract (for paper presentation) or statement of interest (for participation without presentation) to by November 27, 2020. Successful applicants will be notified by Dec 1. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to email us on and . This workshop is hosted by the Centre for Ethics, at the University of Pardubice.
Title: Teaching and Learning with Wittgenstein in Dark Times: or How I Learned to Stop Doubting and Live with Contingency
Abstract: By tracing the teaching and learning references in Wittgenstein’s last writings, especially On Certainty, I will explicate his unique conception of certainty and doubt and the centrality of the learning process to our ability to navigate said certainties and doubts. Many treatments of this text make sense of Wittgenstein’s position in relation to traditional philosophical debates about certainty. My approach shifts the focus so that Wittgenstein’s remarks on certainty and doubt are contextualized in the larger arc of his later work, and especially its relation to his own teaching experience. This line of inquiry also relies on my extensive work on the Dictionary for Elementary Schools which he authored while he was a schoolteacher for 6 years in rural Austria, as well as textual exegesis of other later works such as the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s unique position on certainty and doubt – and how the processes of teaching and learning relate to them – has implications for both philosophical and specifically epistemological questions, but also for our understanding of politics. The conditions of certainty and doubt are a perennial political concern, but especially in democracies where claim-making is contested– and even more so in our current dark times.
Bio: Dr. Weber’s expertise includes modern and contemporary political theory, with a particular focus on language, discourse and argumentation in political thinking. Her area of specialization is the influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein and other language philosophers on political understanding and judgment. She teaches a variety of political theory courses. She is currently working on a monograph about the role of teaching and learning in Wittgenstein’s biography and later work – and the implications for understanding our capacity to make meaning as well as judgments about meaning. In collaboration with renowned contemporary artist Paul Chan, she has contributed a critical introduction to a new edition of Wittgenstein's Wörterbuch für Volksschulen [Dictionary for Elementary Schools] which will appear in November 2020.
Most commentators agree that the notion of a practice plays a significant role in Wittgenstein’s work, especially in his later thought. Yet there is no general agreement on how we should understand that role. The purpose of this workshop is to explore this question.
Confirmed speakers include
Cheryl Misak (Toronto) David Stern (Iowa) Juliet Floyd (Boston) Lars Hertzberg (Åbo)
This workshop is being organized as part of the four-year project “Mathematics with a Human Face: Set Theory within a Naturalized Wittensteinian Framework”, which received funding from the Research Council of Norway in December, 2018.
While talks that focus on practice in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics are naturally encouraged, talks may address any aspect of the theme of Wittgenstein on practice. Possible topics may include the following: the nature of practice, normativity, naturalism, use, custom, history and culture, teaching and learning, or the perspectives of other philosophers.
The workshop will be held at the University of Bergen, Norway. The dates are May 19-21, 2021.
Please send an abstract of 300-400 words to by no later than February 1st.
There is no registration fee. However, those whose abstracts are accepted will need to provide their own transportation and accommodations. The organizer may be of assistance in making recommendations. Lunch, snacks, and coffee are included, as is an invitation to the workshop dinner.
Those wishing to attend the workshop without presenting a paper should inform the organizer by no later than March 15th as there is limited space.
The holding of the event is dependent on an improvement of the Covid situation.
If you wish to ask your questions directly during the Livestream, please let us know at . You will be sent the Chat ID a day before the Livestream starts. Please pay attention to your time zone when scheduling the chat!
James Conant (University of Chicago, Universität Leipzig) Christian Erbacher (Universität Siegen, author of Wittgenstein's Heirs and Editors, Cambridge University Press 2020) Allan Janik (Forschungsinstitut Brenner Archiv, Universität Innsbruck) Ray Monk (University of Southampton, author of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius) David Stern (University of Iowa, editor of Cambridge Elements. The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein)
Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most widely read philosophers of the twentieth century. But the books in which his philosophy was published – with the exception of his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – were posthumously edited from the writings he left to posterity. How did his 20,000 pages of philosophical writing become published volumes? Using extensive archival material, this book reconstructs and examines the way in which Wittgenstein's writings were edited over more than fifty years, and shows how the published volumes tell a thrilling story of philosophical inheritance. The discussion ranges over the conflicts between the editors, their deviations from Wittgenstein's manuscripts, other scholarly issues which arose, and also the shared philosophical tradition of the editors, which animated their desire to be faithful to Wittgenstein and to make his writings both available and accessible. The book can thus be read as a companion to all of Wittgenstein's published works of philosophy.