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CFP: Wittgenstein: language, practical knowledge and embodiment

Call for papers - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio

Vol. 12, N. 2/2018: Wittgenstein: language, practical knowledge and embodiment

Edited by Annalisa Coliva

Deadline: 30.06.2018

This special issue of RIFL is devoted to the re-contextualization of Wittgenstein's ideas regarding the nature of our linguistic competence and abilities at large, in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of mind, such as the raise of the enactivist program (Hutto, Myin, Noë) and the development of a usage-based theory of language acquisition (Tomasello). Central to these approaches is the idea, proposed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty, that at the bottom of our language games is a practice ("In the beginning it was the deed", writes Wittgenstein in On Certainty, quoting Goethe). Some interpreters, have taken this to mean that our basic certainties, on which our language games hinge, are ultimately non-propositional, but enacted in our everyday practices. The implications of these ideas for our understanding of language, language acquisition, and other human abilities, such as for instance reading, are enormous. In particular, these ideas have been taken as a start for a thorough anti-representationalist program, in the philosophy of mind, but also in linguistics and in developmental psychology, capable of challenging dominant views in each of these areas, championed, for instance, by Fodor in the philosophy of mind, by Chomsky in linguistics and by Gopnik in developmental psychology. At the same time, this topic connects with reflections at the interface between epistemology, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, regarding the nature of these abilities. Namely, if they have to be considered, ultimately, as specimens of propositional knowledge, as Chomsky and more recently Williamson and Stanley have maintained, or whether they are irreducibly practical, as Ryle and Wittgenstein, as well as enactivists nowadays maintain.

We invite contributions on the following topics:

  • the nature of linguistic competence;

  • practical vs propositional knowledge;

  • abilities and skills;

  • reading;

  • situated and embodied cognition;

  • action and perception;

  • memory;

  • the later Wittgenstein's conception of linguistic abilities.

Submissions may be in English, French, Italian and Spanish. Abstract in English of no more than 250 words is required for all manuscripts submitted. Each manuscript should have title and 5 keywords in English. Submissions must be prepared for blind review. The author’s name, the institutional affiliation and the title’s paper must be placed in a separate file. Manuscripts must be sent as Microsoft Word file (.doc or .rtf) to:

Instructions for authors:

Max length:
40000 characters (including spaces) for articles (including the references) and reviews;
20000 characters (including spaces) for interviews;
10000 characters (including spaces) for specific paper review.

Submission deadline: June 30, 2018
Issue publication: December 2018



Gregynog Hall, Friday 4th – Sunday 6th May 2018

54th Session: Programme

Friday, 4th May

4 p.m.              Tea

4.30 pm           Postgraduate paper:  Rhianwen Daniel (Cardiff), 'Appropriating Wittgenstein for Linguistic Nationalism'

7.00 p.m.         Dinner                                                  

8.00 p.m.         Hugh Knott (Anglesey) will introduce a discussion of Dick Beardsmore’s ‘Learning from a novel’

Saturday, 5th May

8 a.m.              Breakfast

10 a.m.            Hans Fink (Aarhus), ‘On Løgstrup on Trust’

11 a.m.            Coffee, followed by discussion of paper

12.30 p.m.     Short business meeting

1 p.m.           Lunch

4 p.m.           Tea

4.30 p.m.        Toby Betenson (Bangor), 'Sense and Sensitivity: Referents for the Moral Law'

7.00 p.m.         Dinner

Sunday, 6th May

8 a.m.            Breakfast

9.15 a.m.         Annual Wittgenstein Lecture: Ian Ground (Hertfordshire and Newcastle), ‘Ensonification: Reflections’

10.15 a.m.       Coffee & Discussion

11.45 a.m.       Departure

The conference is sponsored by generous contributions from the British Wittgenstein Society and University of Wales Trinity St David.

If you would like to attend the meeting please complete and return the form below electronically, and send the requisite payment. The deadline for registration is Wednesday 31st January.  While it may well be possible to register after this date, it cannot be guaranteed.

The registration fee covers full bed and board from afternoon tea on Friday to morning coffee on Sunday. If you do not fall clearly into any of the three categories listed below, if you will be coming for less than the full period, or if you are a postgraduate from outside Wales, please contact David Cockburn before making payment. It may be possible to make limited adjustments to rates to reflect individual circumstances. Please note that if you have to cancel, refund will be possible only if your place can be filled.

If you have any questions, about travel or anything else, please contact David Cockburn. If you are coming by train your station is Newtown (Powys). (David will try to coordinate transport from the station.)

David Cockburn, University of Wales Trinity St David

Registration Form

Please complete and return a copy of this form electronically by Wednesday 31st January. At the same time, either put a cheque in the post or pay through internet banking: Welsh Philosophical Society, 40-27-01, 21296280. Give your surname as the reference. (Cheques, payable to 'Welsh Philosophical Society', should be sent to: David Cockburn, Department of Philosophy, University of Wales Trinity St David, Lampeter, Ceredigion SA48 7ED) All reservations must be accompanied by payment!

Name: ..................................................................

e-mail address: ......................................................

Postgraduate [Wales] (£ 80): .......  Staff: (£ 185): .....   Retired (£ 170): .........

Paid by (i) internet ….   (ii) cheque …..

Dietary Requirements: Vegetarian.......Vegan ...... Other …….




Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, 5th – 11th of August 2018






Scientific Organizers:

Gabriele Mras (Vienna)

Paul Weingartner (Salzburg)

Bernhard Ritter (Klagenfurt)



  1. Wittgenstein
  2. Traditional and Modern Logic
  3. The Structural Complexity of Judgments – Propositions – Sentences
  4. Logic: Absolute Normativity or Alternatives
  5. The Infinite
  6. Foundations of Mathematics


WORKSHOP 1: Wittgenstein on the Philosophy of Mathematics,

1937–1939: The Projected Early Version of PI." – with Joachim Schulte


WORKSHOP 2: Logical Paradoxes – with Hannes Leitgeb




Matthias Baaz (Vienna)

Francesco Berto (Amsterdam)

Jean-Yves Béziau (Rio de Janeiro)

Günther Eder (Vienna)

Susan Edwards-McKie (Cambridge)

Oliver Feldmann (Vienna)

Juliet Floyd (Boston)

Pasquale Frascolla (Potenza, Basilicata)

Volker Halbach (Oxford)

Richard Heinrich (Vienna)

Wolfgang Kienzler (Jena)

Sandra Lapointe (Hamilton, Ontario)

Hannes Leitgeb (Munich)

Bernard Linsky (Edmonton, Alberta)

Itala Maria Loffredo D’Ottaviano (Campinas)

Paolo Mancosu (Berkeley)

Mathieu Marion (Montréal)

Felix Mühlhölzer (Göttingen)

Julien Murzi (Salzburg)

Michael Potter (Cambridge)

Christoph C. Pfisterer (Zurich)

Richard Raatzsch (Wiesbaden)

Esther Ramharter (Vienna)

Štefan Riegelnik (Zurich)

Georg Schiemer (Munich)

Joachim Schulte (Zurich)

Dana Scott (Pittsburgh)

Stewart Shapiro (Columbus, Ohio)

Gila Sher (San Diego)

Karl Sigmund (Vienna)

Isidora Stojanovic (Paris)

Barry Stroud (Berkeley)

William W. Tait (Chicago)

Mark van Atten (Paris)

Maria van der Schaar (Leiden)

Vladimir Vasyukov (Moscow)

Jan von Plato (Helsinki)

Heinrich Wansing (Bochum)

Jan Woleński (Kraków)

Michael Wolff (Bielefeld)

Richard Zach (Calgary)


Deadline for submission of contributed papers (to section 1-6):

March 30, 2018

(Instructions for authors:







Antecedent to the symposium:



(Juliet Floyd, Mathieu Marion)


July 31st – August 4th, 2018 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria



Wittgenstein´s Philosophy of Mathematics


With: Juliet Floyd (Boston) and Mathieu Marion (Montréal)

Scientific Organization and Direction: Volker A. Munz (Klagenfurt)


(For applications see:


For further information:


Wittgenstein and Hegel – Reevaluation of Difference

Wittgenstein and Hegel – Reevaluation of Difference

TU Dresden, Germany

June 28–30, 2017

“Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (Recollections of Wittgenstein)


James Conant (Chicago)
Rico Gutschmidt (Chicago)
Bruno Haas (Dresden)
Herbert Hrachovec (Vienna)
Karl-Friedrich Kiesow (Hannover)
David Kolb (Bates College)
Ingolf Max (Leipzig)
Aloisia Moser (Linz)
Thomas Rentsch (Dresden)
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (Leipzig)
Gottfried Gabriel (Constance)


Alexander Berg (TU Dresden & Charles University Prague)
Jakub Mácha (Masaryk University Brno)
Louisa Frintert (TU Dresden)
Marco Kleber (TU Dresden)
Alexander Romahn (University of Leipzig)


Wittgenstein once said: “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (Recollections of Wittgenstein, ed. by Rush Rhees, Oxford 1981, p. 157) This difference between Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s thinking has been seldom raised despite being, from a contemporary point of view, particularly pertinent.

According to Hegel, the purpose of philosophy is to consider the thoughts of its respective periods. While Wittgenstein was a focal point of 20th century philosophical discourse, it was Hegel’s philosophy that brought the essential discourses of the 19th century together. After this convergence different movements began to individuate themselves from his system of thinking, allowing for the development of the analytical-continental split in the 20th Century. This now-outdated conflict, which was promoted by Bradley and Russell, took for granted Hegel and Wittgenstein’s opposing positions and is being replaced by a continuous progression and differentiation of several authors, schools, and philosophical traditions, which themselves are guided by various interests, shades, and transitions.
The term ‘split’, however, is anachronistic, problematic, and, therefore, the two, Hegel und Wittgenstein, must be reconciled. It is because of the lack of overlap between these two internally developed spheres of thought that this schism still exists in 20th Century philosophical scholarship. This stems from the split and the institutions themselves. Subsequently, each has a serious interest in the other’s research, specifically how it might impact their own.
The development is already evident in the tendency to identify a progression from a “Kantian” to a “Hegelian phase” of analytical philosophy as well as in the extension of right and left Hegelian approaches by modern and postmodern concepts.
In this process it has become quite clear that the systemic interests of Wittgenstein and Hegel – be it in philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of science or in other areas – coincide stronger than anticipated by one-dimensional, traditional paradigmatic analyses. This recognition of shared systematical interests opens up new constructive and productive ways of relating both paradigmatic theories.
Taking this into consideration it is reasonable to suppose that assessing the difference between Wittgenstein and Hegel will outline different intersections of 21st century's variously differentiated philosophical discourse. We hope that not only will the contemplation of Hegel’s thinking bring about a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's research, but that Wittgensteinian scholarship will also allow for new answers to old Hegelian problems. A conjoint holistic philosophical discourse remains our discipline's ambition.

Suggested topics include, but are not limited to:

Anticipation of Wittgensteinian motives in Hegel’s philosophy
Hegelian motives in Wittgenstein’s thinking
Wittgenstein’s reception of Hegel’s philosophy
The role of Neo-Hegelianism and British idealism in the emergence of analytic philosophy
Differences between Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical approaches as they relate to the analytic-continental split


Some slots are reserved for contributed papers. There are no parallel sections. We invite submissions for a 30 minute presentation followed by a 20 minute discussion. Papers may be submitted on any issue falling within the conference theme. Please send an abstract in English or in German as attachment (about 500 words), prepared for multiple blind review, to by March 31, 2017. The author’s name and affiliation should be included in the body of the e-mail. Notification of acceptance will be given by April 22, 2017. It should go without saying, but we highly encourage submissions from those who are traditionally under-represented. Conference languages are English and German. For all accepted speakers, we provide free accommodation during the conference.


For more information, visit our conference website:
Please do not hesitate to contact the organizers () if you have any questions about the conference. ​​

The conference is funded by the Graduate Academy of the Dresden University of Technology and by the Excellence Initiative of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research

Seventeenth BWS Lecture

Rule-Following and Reflective Judgement

Dr Hanne Appelqvist

May 22nd, 2017

@ 6:15 pm - 8:00 pm

Bloomsbury, 50 Bedford Square

London WC1B 3DP


About the Speaker
Speaker Bibliography
About the Reporter

About the Speaker

Hanne Appelqvist is Docent of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and a Fellow of the Turku Institute for Advanced Studies. She received her PhD degree from Columbia University in 2007. In her dissertation Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication (Acta Philosophical Fennica 85, 2008) she defended a formalist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music. Since then, she has worked on Wittgenstein’s ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of language from the viewpoint of the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein philosophy. Her work has appeared in journals such as the British Journal for the History of Philosophy, History of Philosophy Quarterly, the British Journal of Aesthetics, and Metaphilosophy. Appelqvist is currently preparing a book manuscript on the relevance of aesthetic judgment for Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.   



SELECTED Bibliography

Appelqvist, H. (2019). Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language (1st ed.). Routledge. Cite
Appelqvist, H. (2016). On Wittgenstein’s Kantian Solution of the Problem of Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 24(4), 697–719. Cite
Appelqvist, H. (2017). Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25(1), 217–219. Cite
Appelqvist, H. (2011). On Music, Wine, and the Criteria of Understanding. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), 18–35. Cite


According to Wittgenstein, the understanding of language is a normative phenomenon. It is not yet enough that my application of words and sentences conforms to the rules that are constitutive of their uses in our language. If I understand, then my behavior ought to be internally related to the rule so that I can appeal to the rule in justifying my application thereof. However, as Wittgenstein states repeatedly, such justifications given by explicit rule-formulations come to an end. This talk will address the moment of reaching the bedrock that marks the boundary where justifications come to an end, where my grasp of the rules takes a form other than interpretation, where I follow the rule but do so ‘blindly’. It will do this by discussing Wittgenstein’s way of connecting the moment of ‘blind rule-following’ with the understanding of a musical theme. The talk argues that the understanding of music is evoked as an example of a judgment that is normative in spite of resisting conceptual justifications. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s appeal to musical understanding may be seen as relevantly similar to Kant’s appeal to reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as one that ends the regress of conceptual justifications for the application of conceptual rules to sensible particulars.



by Fionn O’Donovan


The lecture began with a consideration of Wittgenstein’s paradox about rule-following. For Wittgenstein, Appelqvist suggested, it is not sufficient for an action to (properly speaking) accord with a rule for it to "fit" with the rule. That might happen as a result of sheer luck. To count as understanding, the agent’s behaviour and the rule must be internally related: for instance, the agent will be able to appeal to the rule in explaining their behaviour. There is, however, an apparent problem here: does the agent not need to be able to interpret the appealed-to rule to count as understanding that? And would the further rule appealed to in the second-order interpretation not also need further interpretation? How then do we avoid an infinite regress?

Appelqvist highlighted Wittgenstein's claim, in response, that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation" (PhilosophicaI Investigations, 201). How is it that we grasp a rule without interpreting it? She answered these questions via a detour to Kant’s First Critique, suggesting that there Kant also recognises the insufficiency of mere appeals to rules in judgment. He claims that what we need to be able to apply a general conceptual rule to a particular case is a "power of judgment", which is in Kant's sense an intuitive (as opposed to a conceptual) power. Crucially, this power shows itself not in an agent articulating or formulating some rule, but in action. Appelqvist suggested that, when utilising the power of judgment, agents exhibit a rule which cannot be conceptually formulated. Kant’s position, for Appelqvist, is a bipartite analysis of what is involved with understanding: on one side, we have the formulated conceptual rules which the agent can appeal to, and on the other the non-conceptual rules grasped by the power of judgment, exhibited in action.

Appelqvist argued these Kantian ingredients are essential to Wittgenstein’s own solution to the problem about rule-following. Her idea is that Kant’s “power of judgment” is the way of grasping a rule that is not an interpretation Wittgenstein mentions. It is this idea that Wittgenstein purportedly uses to stop the regress of interpretations. She supported this claim by examining Wittgenstein’s remarks on the understanding of a musical tune.

In Philosophical Investigations 184, Wittgenstein considers the case of suddenly recalling how to play a musical tune. The suggestion is that the criteria for the tune really being “there” in one’s mind is that one can then actually play it, either in one’s head or aloud. However certain we may feel that we know it, or however competently we can explain the relevant rules, it may turn out that we are after all unable to complete the tune upon attempt. In such cases, while the conceptual, rule-based part of understanding is present, the part based on the power of judgment is lacking. Thus, Appelqvist argued, for Wittgenstein, too, both these parts are necessary for understanding.

Appelqvist explored many of Wittgenstein’s other examples and remarks pertaining to the relationship between music, rules and understanding to support this reading. She also explored the relationship between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein on this subject and their views on aesthetics. One question raised in the discussion concerned whether, when we apply the power of judgment, we do so qua individuals or qua members of a common linguistic community with common standards. Appelqvist replied that the conceptual rule-based component of her account implies that there will always be a part of aesthetic judgment that involves reference to communal standards, but that the more subjective, power-of-judgment side leaves room for freedom to make one’s own judgment.

Fionn O’Donovan


BWS Member and PhD Philosophy Student, University of Southampton

See more BWS Lecture Series videos


KU Leuven, Belgium
September 21-23, 2017

James Conant (University of Chicago)
Raimond Gaita (University of Melbourne)
Sophie-Grace Chappell (The Open University)
Edward Harcourt (University of Oxford)
Sabina Lovibond (University of Oxford)
Martin Stokhof (University of Amsterdam)

We invite submissions for a 25 minute presentation followed by a 20 minute discussion. Papers may be submitted on any issue falling within the conference theme. Please send an abstract as attachment (about 500 words), prepared for multiple blind review, to by April 15, 2017. The author's name and affiliation should be included in the body of the e-mail. Notification of acceptance will be given by May 15, 2017.

Please note that no financial support can be provided for travel expenses and accommodation.

For more information, visit our conference website:

Please do not hesitate to contact the organizers () if you have any questions about the conference. ​​


The British Wittgenstein Society was founded in 2007 in an effort to rekindle what seemed a waning interest in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. To mark the success of this endeavour, and the Society's 10th anniversary, the 2017 BWS annual conference will be devoted to celebrating Wittgenstein's contribution to thought across philosophy and other disciplines. Our guest speakers will be:

Louise Barrett (Lethbridge, Canada) on primatology

Michel Bitbol (CNRS, Paris) on philosophy of science and mathematics

Peter Hacker (Oxford) on philosophy of mind

Edward Harcourt (Oxford) on ethics and aesthetics

Richard Harper (Swansea) on communications technology

Peter Hobson (UCL) on psychology

Sandra Laugier (Sorbonne, Paris) on social philosophy

Ray Monk (Southampton) on Wittgenstein's place in 21st century thought

Paul Standish (UCL) on philosophy of education

The conference will take place at Beales Hotel, Hatfield on 29th-31st July, 2017. We look forward to your participation in making this an exceptional event – both intellectually and convivially!

Full conference registration: includes refreshments and a 2-course lunch on both days: £95 / student: £65

Conference Package 1: includes full conference registration; 30 July bed/breakfast at Beales Hotel 4* (single occupancy); conference dinner (3-course; coffee/tea; wine): £219 / student £190


Other options are available on the registration website.




Kirchberg am Wechsel, 6 - 12 of August 2017
Scientific Organizers:
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau (Vienna)
Friedrich Stadler (Vienna)

1. Wittgenstein
2. Perception and Intentionality
3. Perception and Concepts
4. The Epistemology of Perception
5. Theories of Perception in the Cognitive Sciences
6. Theories and Scientific Observation

Workshop (organizers: Johannes Brandl und Guillaume Fréchette): "Franz Brentano and the Myth of the Given" (on the occasion of the Brentano Centennial), participants: Johannes Brandl, Guillaume Fréchette, Uriah Kriegel, Olivier Massin, Michelle Montague, Marcello Oreste Fiocco

The list of invited speakers includes:

Johannes Brandl, Salzburg
William Brewer, London
Tyler Burge, Los Angeles
Ophélia Deroy, London
Marcello Oreste Fiocco, Salzburg
Guillaume Fréchette, Salzburg
Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Bergen
Christopher Gauker, Salzburg
Kathrin Glüer, Stockholm
Pierre Jacob, Paris
Mark Eli Kalderon, London
Uriah Kriegel, Paris
Michael G. F. Martin, London
Julian Kiverstein, Amsterdam
Olivier Massin, Geneva
Sofia Miguens, Porto
Michelle Montague, Austin
Erik Myin, Antwerp
Bence Nanay, Antwerp
Matthew Nudds, Coventry
Jesse Prinz, New York
Athanassios Raftopoulos, Nikosia
Johannes Roessler, Coventry
Susanna Schellenberg, New Jersey
Hans Sluga, Berkeley
Paul Snowdon, London
David Stern, Iowa
Charles Travis, London
Michael Tye, Austin
Frédérique de Vignemont, Paris

Deadline for submission of contributed papers (to section 1-6): 15th of April, 2017
(Instructions for authors:

Antecedent to the symposium:

9th LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN SUMMER SCHOOL 2017 (David Stern, Hans Sluga)

2–5 of August 2017 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria

Meaning, Mind, and Action: Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1930-33

With: David Stern (Iowa) and Hans Sluga (Berkeley)
Scientific Organization and Direction: Volker A. Munz (Klagenfurt)

(For applications see:

For further information:


Call for Papers: Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916

Call for Papers
The colloquium ‘Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916’ will take place at the Université du Québec à Montréal and Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (Montréal and Trois-Rivières, Canada), on May 4-6, 2017.

The aim of the colloquium is to encourage a more systematic study of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks 1914-1916, hoping to achieve a better understanding of his earliest philosophy, and to understand how they prefigure or differ from those expressed in the Tractatus. The hope then is to reach, on a broad range of topics, a better understanding of the Tractatus itself and the originality of the Notebooks.


Invited speakers:

Guido Bonino (Università degli Studi di Torino)
Pasquale Frascolla (Università degli Studi della Basilicata, Potenza)
Sébastien Gandon (Université Blaise-Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand)
Fraser MacBride (University of Manchester)
Ray Monk (University of Southampton)
Kevin Mulligan (Université de Genève)
Ian Proops (University of Texas at Austin)
Janyne Sattler (Universidade Federal de Santa Maria)
Genia Schönbaumsfeld (University of Southampton)
Peter Sullivan (University of Stirling)
Peter Simons (Trinity College, Dublin)
José Zalabardo (University College, London)
Limited funding is available for up to two PhD students or young scholars, who have obtained their diploma within the past 5 years.
Proposals should not be more than 1000 words in length, written in English or French, and should be sent to one of the organizers, below, by February 1, 2017.
Proposals will be anonymously refereed and notice of acceptance will be sent by the second week of March.


Mathieu Marion (UQAM)

Jimmy Plourde (UQTR)

The colloquium is organized with the support of the British Wittgenstein Society


Call for Abstracts

What’s Wrong (and What’s Right) with Ordinary Language Philosophy?

The 8th Nordic Wittgenstein Society Symposium
Åbo Akademi University (Turku, Finland) May 5-6, 2017

The label “ordinary language philosophy” (OLP) was probably coined by its detractors. Common objections against OLP are that philosophers engaging in it gratuitously limit their attention to the most common ways of using words, that they give current or non-specialized usage normative ascendancy over more sophisticated uses, and that they neglect the need for empirical investigation in settling issues of usage.
In defence of OLP it has been suggested that much of the criticisms are due to misunderstandings of methodologies such as those adopted by Wittgenstein, Austin, and others. The ordinary language philosophers are the ones who intend to approach language without preconceptions, by attending to the way words actually occur in interaction – not so much the language of everyday as the everyday of language. Nor are ordinary language philosophers out to chart maps of current or correct usage: their aim is rather to dissolve worries that arise out of misconstruals of our own ways of speaking. They are not in the business of new discoveries but rather of reminding ourselves of how we speak.
The aim of this closing conference of our research project “The Philosophical Import of Ordinary Language Philosophy: Austin, Ryle, Wittgenstein, and their contemporary significance” (2013-17) is to explore the aspirations and procedures of ordinary language philosophy. Are they unified or diverse? Are they intelligible? Are they defensible? How do philosophical outlooks that have an apparent affinity with ordinary language philosophy, such as experimental philosophy or various contemporary forms of contextualism, relate to OLP?

We invite submissions from those wishing to present a paper on a topic related to the conference theme. Speakers will be given 20 minutes for presentation and 15 minutes for discussion.
Please send an abstract of up to 500 words to by February 1, 2017. Applicants will be notified of the selection result by March 1, 2017.
The conference is organized by the Nordic Wittgenstein Society and the research project "The Philosophical Import of Ordinary Language Philosophy" [ ], which is financed by the Academy of Finland and coordinated by Professor Martin Gustafsson, Åbo Akademi University. The organizers are doctoral candidate Kim-Erik Berts, Professor emeritus Lars Hertzberg, and Dr Yrsa Neuman.

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