Category: Uncategorized (page 1 of 19)

Wittgenstein on lying

Wittgenstein on lying
Wittgenstein & le mensonge

16 & 17 May 2024 – Nancy, France, Université de Lorraine
Campus Lettres et Sciences Humaines
23 Bd Albert 1er, 54000 Nancy, France
Building G, room G04 (ground floor)

Organisation: A. C. Zielinska, R. Pouivet & L. Sanzey
Please subscribe here to get the program, and the information concerning the online participation (zoom).
Presentations will be made in English and in French (please trust the language of the titles). 

Facebook page – click here.
Poster & programme 

Program of the conference

Thursday May 16, 2024

9:30 – Anna C. Zielinska (Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France), Introduction 
10:00-11:00 – Roger Pouivet (Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France), « Le vice du mensonge : Wittgenstein et Thomas d’Aquin » (a written English version will be provided)

11:15-12:00 – Fabrice Louis, « Wittgenstein et le mensonge : quelle perspective anthropologique ? » 

12:00-12:45 – Yoen Qian-Laurent (Sorbonne Université), « Videte an mentiar : axiologie ou généalogie du mensonge selon Wittgenstein ? »

14:00-15:00 – Hans Johann Glock (Universität Zürich, Suisse), «What is wrong with lying? A Wittgensteinian analysis of the concept and an objection to the practice which is Wittgensteinian but not Wittgenstein’s own»

15:00-15:45 – Ulrich Arnswald (University of Innsbruck / University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU)), «Lies as Play-acting: The Peculiarity of “White Lies” in Wittgenstein’s Work»

16:00-16:45 – Antonia Soulez (Université Paris VIII), «Wittgenstein “par-delà le bien et le mal”»

16:45-17:30 – Pierre Fasula (Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne), «Mentir à la 1ère personne. Le mensonge sans l’aliénation»

Friday May 17, 2024 

10:00-11:00 – Edward Kanterian (University of Kent, UK), «Wittgenstein on Myths and Illusions in Philosophy”

11:15-12:00 – Jonathan Gombin (Laboratoire SPH – Université de Bordeaux), «Ryle and Wittgenstein on Learning How to Lie»

12:00-12:45 – Léo Grenier (EHESS), « Individuation et discernement (avec Descombes)»

14:00-15:00 – Maximilian de Gaynesford (University of Reading, UK), «Wittgenstein and the Poets»

15:00-15:45 – Danka Radjenović (University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU)), «Wittgenstein on the role of pretence in our lives»

16:00-17:00 –  Elise Marrou (Sorbonne Université, France), « L’expression du mensonge : Wittgenstein face au paradoxe du Crétois et de G. E. Moore »


17:30-20:00 – Movie screening & discussion : Wittgenstein by Derek Jarman (1993) – closing of the conference and celebration of the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia (17 May) – cf. facebook event


The question of the nature of lying is very present in Wittgenstein’s later texts. Lying is often understood as “speaking against one’s thought with the intention of deceiving”, which presupposes that a person who lies is entirely transparent to themselves and has a unique access to their distinctive mental states. Yet Wittgenstein is well known to precisely challenge this “myth of interiority” (the expression comes from Jacques Bouveresse), i.e. the thesis, sometimes called “mentalist”, that thinking presupposes awareness of meanings that are in the mind, and to which each consciousness then alone has access. Indeed, much of Wittgenstein’s “philosophy of psychology” consisted in analyzing the difficulties encountered by this presupposition of psychological interiority. Then how can we define lying if it cannot consist in speaking against one’s conscious thinking, disguising it in and through what we say?

Wittgenstein says in Philosophical Investigations :

Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence?-And on what experience is our assumption based?
(Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.) (PI 249)

Why is it difficult to imagine a lying baby? Because lying has to do with the intention to deceive by saying what we believe to be false, but does not have to correspond to a particular impression, but rather to what we know how to do with language. Many of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Cambridge Courses, 1946-1947 criticize the notion of an “impression of lying”. In the notes taken by A.C. Jackson, Wittgenstein insists that lying does not consist in this impression, but presupposes “a motive, a situation” ([p. 314]) And Wittgenstein is even quoted as saying that, when it comes to lying, this is “the essential thing”! Wittgenstein thus seems to propose that the tools for explaining lying are not internal psychological states or processes, but a particular language game.

The aim of the symposium is twofold. In the first place, we would like to gain a better understanding of what Wittgenstein says about lying (and hence of his philosophy of meaning and psychology). Secondly, we would like to better understand the nature of lying itself, its moral, anthropological and interactional stakes, with Wittgenstein, but also with inputs from other traditions and methods (ethnomethodology in particular).

Wittgenstein's Poker 🔱 Animated Short Film

The BWS supports this kickstarter project to create an animated film dramatising the famous conflict between Wittgenstein and Popper.

Under the skilled direction of Christian De Vita, renowned for his work on Wes Anderson's FANTASTIC MR. FOX and Tim Burton’s FRANKENWEENIE, and with a screenplay by producer Casey Cohen, this story is adapted from the best-selling book by ex-BBC journalists David Edmonds and John Eidinow. In a traditional 2D hand-drawn animation style complemented by a watercolour aesthetic, this film will immerse viewers into the intellectual battleground where a 10-minute argument intensified emotions to a boiling point that became instant folklore.

Join us in immortalizing this historic moment on screen and be part of a project selected by Kickstarter and the Annecy International Animated Film Festivalas part of their prestigious call for creators. Your support will help us complete this remarkable short film and will contribute to the ongoing legacy of these era-defining philosophers.

Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929

Reviewed here

The book explores the impact of manuscript remarks during the year 1929 on the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. Although its intention is to put the focus specifically on the manuscripts, the book is not purely exegetical. The contributors generate important new insights for understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy and his place in the history of analytic philosophy.

Wittgenstein’s writings from the years 1929-1930 are valuable, not simply because they marked Wittgenstein’s return to academic philosophy after a seven-year absence, but because these works indicate several changes in his philosophical thinking. The chapters in this volume clarify the significance of Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 1929. In Part 1, the contributors address different issues in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. Wittgenstein's understanding of certain aspects of intuitionism and his commitment to verificationism, as well as his idea of "a new system". Part 2 examines Wittgenstein's philosophical development and his understanding of philosophical method. Here the contributors examine particular problems Wittgenstein dealt with in 1929, e.g. the colour-exclusion problem, and the use of thought experiments as well as his relationship to Frank Ramsey and philosophical pragmatism. Part 3 features essays on phenomenological language. These chapters address the role of spatial analogies and the structure of visual space. Finally, Part 4 includes one chapter on Wittgenstein’s few manuscript remarks about ethics and religion and relates it to his Lecture on Ethics. 

Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929 will be of great interest to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein and the history of analytic philosophy.

CFA: 13th Annual Conference of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society

CFA: 13th Annual Conference of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society


Helsinki, Finland, June 17–18 2024


Questions related to aspect-seeing and interpretation occupied Ludwig Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical career – all the way from the Necker cube of the Tractatus to the duck-rabbit of the “Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment”, previously known as Part II of the Philosophical Investigations. In the latter, Wittgenstein asks, “Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way?” (PPF §248.) The purpose of the 13th Annual Conference of the Nordic Wittgenstein Society, Wittgenstein: Aspects and Interpretations, is to provide a platform for philosophers to discuss this and related questions in Wittgenstein’s work. The title of the conference may also be read as pointing to different aspects and interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy itself, which is notoriously difficult to decipher and has given rise to a number of interpretative traditions. Topics to be discussed may thus include but are not limited to:

aspects, aspect-seeing, and aspect-blindness

perception and the role of concepts therein

method of projection

interpretation and its limits


interpretative reception of Wittgenstein

influences of different philosophical traditions in Wittgenstein’s work.

The keynote speakers of the conference are

Annalisa Coliva (University of California Irvine)

David Stern (University of Iowa)

We welcome paper proposals for the conference to be held in Helsinki, Finland, on June 17–18 2024. Abstracts up to 500 words should be submitted by email to hanne.appelqvist[at] Please title your email: NWS Conference Proposal. Abstracts should include the author’s name, affiliation, contact information, and the title of the paper. Accepted proposals will be given a presentation time of 40 minutes (25 minutes for presentation and 15 minutes for discussion). The deadline for proposals is Friday December 15 2023. Notification of acceptance will be sent out by January 15.

There is no conference fee. However, selected speakers should be prepared to pay for their own travel and accommodation. The organizers are grateful to Emil Aaltonen Foundation and the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies for supporting the event.

Organizing committee:

Hanne Appelqvist (University of Helsinki)

Martin Gustafsson (Åbo Akademi)

Lassi Jakola (The Finnish Institute at Athens)

For further information, please contact hanne.appelqvist[at]





Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, August 11–17, 2024

FACETS OF REALITY – Contemporary Debates

Scientific Organisers:

Asya Passinsky (Vienna), Julio De Rizzo (Vienna) & Benjamin Schnieder (Vienna)


1. Reality and Cognate Notions

Appearance, Existence, Essence, Reality

2. The Structure of Reality

Dependence, Grounding, Fundamentality

3. Acting on Reality

Agency, Freedom, Norms

4. Social Reality

Gender, Race, Social Construction

5. New Realities

Fictional, Virtual, Digital

6. Wittgenstein


Ásta (Durham)

Rami Ali (Tucson)

Singa Behrens (Bielefeld)

Karen Bennett (New Brunswick)

Sarah Bernstein (Notre Dame)

Paul Boghossian (New York)

Niels de Haan (Vienna) 

Esa Diáz León (Barcelona)

Matt Dougherty (Vienna)

Matti Eklund (Uppsala)

Brian Epstein (Medford)

Maegan Fairchild (Michigan)

Katharina Felka (Graz) 

Martin Glazier (Geneva)

Verónica Gómez Sánchez (Berkeley)

Eve Kitsik (Vienna)

John Litland (Austin)

Antonella Mallozzi (Providence)

Alissa Ney (Davis)

Daniel Nolan (Notre Dame)

Kevin Richardson (Durham)

Sonia Roca-Royes (Stirling)

Gideon Rosen (Princeton)

Carolina Sartorio (New Brunswick)

Jonathan Schaffer (New Brunswick)

Erica Shumener (Syracuse)

Olla Solomyak (Jerusalem)

Amie Thomasson (Hanover)

Anand Vaidyia (San Jose)

Barbara Vetter (Berlin)

Lisa Vogt (Berlin and Lucerne)

Michael Wallner (Graz and Klagenfurt)

Nathan Wildman (Tilburg)

Tim Williamson (Oxford)

Charlotte Witt (Durham)

Papers (to section 1–6) may be submitted via our online platform until March 1st, 2024

Instructions for authors:

Students and early career researchers are especially encouraged to submit a presentation.


Antecedent to the 45th International Wittgenstein Symposium:

15th Ludwig Wittgenstein Summer School, August 5–10, 2024

organised by ILWI in cooperation with the Universi




The yearbook Wittgenstein-Studien (published by de Gruyter) offers a forum for articles and materials on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, his Nachlass and life as well as his philosophical and cultural environment. We welcome contributions from both traditional and contemporary approaches.

What we offer to our authors:

-        All submitted articles are peer-reviewed and indexed to Scopus and Web of Science.

-        Each article is assigned a DOI.

-        Authors will be informed about the decision on acceptance (potentially with revision) or rejection of the submitted article usually within 6 to 8 weeks.

-        In case that changes or improvements of the article are requested by the reviewers, the authors will receive profound/detailed feedback which helps them improving the article. Feedback is also provided in case of rejection.

-        Continuous submission: The yearbook does not have any specific deadlines. However, if you want to ensure that your contribution (in case of acceptance) will be included in the next volume, you should submit your text by the end of October in order to complete the review process in time.

Articles should be prepared according to the journal’s author guidelines ( and sent to the Editor-in-chief, Ass.Prof. Dr. Anja Weiberg, at .

Book review proposals can be sent to the Book Review Editor, Prof. Dr. Nuno Venturinha, at .

For more information about Wittgenstein-Studien, please visit:

Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Interpreting Human Nature and the Mind

Read More


Advancing our understanding of one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers, Robert Vinten brings together an international lineup of scholars to consider the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to the cognitive science of religion. Wittgenstein's claims ranged from the rejection of the idea that psychology is a 'young science' in comparison to physics to challenges to scientistic and intellectualist accounts of religion in the work of past anthropologists.

Chapters explore whether these remarks about psychology and religion undermine the frameworks and practices of cognitive scientists of religion. Employing philosophical tools as well as drawing on case studies, contributions not only illuminate psychological experiments, anthropological observations and neurophysiological research relevant to understanding religious phenomena, they allow cognitive scientists to either heed or clarify their position in relation to Wittgenstein's objections. By developing and responding to his criticisms, Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion offers novel perspectives on his philosophy in relation to religion, human nature, and the mind.