British Wittgenstein Society

Wittgenstein and Quine: Not such an odd couple

Andrew Lugg

Abstract

Wittgenstein and Quine are generally, if not universally, regarded as poles apart and their philosophical approaches deemed mutually exclusive.  In opposition to this wisdom I argue that philosophers do not have to choose Wittgenstein over Quine or Quine over Wittgenstein or reject both.  While acknowledging that Wittgenstein and Quine are temperamentally very different sorts of thinker, I provide reasons for taking their philosophies to be complementary, not opposed.  I contend that when properly and charitably understood, Quine is wrongly dismissed by Wittgensteinians as scientistic and flat-footedly empiricist, Wittgenstein wrongly regarded by Quineans as a philosophical know-nothing, blind to the achievements of science.