Much admired on its original publication in 1997, Marie McGinn’s well-known guidebook now reappears after a period of sixteen years in a revised second edition which places it in a series entitled ‘Routledge Guides to the Great Books’. Previously part of a different series of ‘Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks’, the new series under a different editor is clearly intended to be more wide-ranging in its scope, listing works by figures including Newton and Wollstonecraft. The Acknowledgements page from the first edition has been removed, to be replaced by a Preface to the second edition.

The principal purpose of the new edition, according to McGinn, is to incorporate, within two new chapters, treatments of intentional concepts - thinking, imagining, believing, expecting and intending - taking the book up to § 693 with, where applicable, discussion of related issues in Part II of the Investigations, now Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment. The new Hacker-Schulte 4th edition of the Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell 2009) is used because it is ‘clearly destined to become standard’ (Ibid. xii). Whilst there is still a significant gap in the coverage of the Investigations with the omission of §§ 39-88 on simples and family resemblance, the most important feature of McGinn’s work remains, viz., its evident unity of approach, which she has managed to emphasise to an even greater degree than before given that ‘there is no paragraph, and barely a sentence, that has not been revised with a view to increasing the clarity of the interpretation I develop’ (Ibid.). That interpretation is clearly reflected in every chapter, and expressed in the following terms:

Although the interpretation I develop emphasizes the idea of a grammatical investigation of our concepts, and resists the claim that Wittgenstein’s aim is to refute philosophical theses or prove what must be the case, it nevertheless serves to reveal that one of the fundamental themes of his remarks is to show
that the idea that psychological expressions function as descriptions of events and processes occurring in an inner realm is an illusion (Ibid.)

It would be a commonplace to say that this illusion, criticised throughout the book, underpins much of the thinking which motivates many philosophers of mind within the analytic tradition today. Yet it is not so much the insights to be found in Wittgenstein’s work that McGinn finds most significant, since he is not alone in expressing them, but ‘the unique style of thought, and the distinctive conception of philosophy, that his writing presents us with’ (Ibid., 9). According to McGinn, it is his entire approach to philosophical problems and how he overcomes them that is unique and important. That his insights are not understood by him to be the ground of a positive philosophy, is central to McGinn’s treatment of Wittgenstein’s ideas. These insights, however, are important in themselves, and she succinctly outlines what they are:

The idea that language can only be understood from the perspective of language-in-use; the rejection of a private inner realm of phenomena;
the emphasis on the body as the objectification of the human soul;
the replacement of the division between matter and mind by a division between the living and the non-living; the emphasis on the deed;
the idea that the roots of language lie in natural reactions; the appeal to a pre-epistemic relation to other human subjects which is rooted in our immediate responsiveness to them: all of these ideas are familiar in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Ibid.)

This passage occurs in a short Introduction of ten pages or so that provides an obligatory account of the main events of Wittgenstein’s life. Stressing once again that whilst Wittgenstein’s work is often referred to in the philosophical literature, both Anglo-American and European, and that there is undoubtedly evidence of his influence on contemporary philosophical thinking, the feeling nevertheless remains that his ‘distinctively intense and individual voice is ultimately inimitable’ (Ibid., 8).
This emerges clearly in the first major chapter of the book on ‘Style and Method’, dealing with §§ 89 - 133, the so-called ‘Philosophy’ section of the *Investigations* in which Wittgenstein is often said to present his metaphilosophy, or way of approaching and dealing with philosophical problems (1). McGinn reinforces her outlook on Wittgenstein by arguing that what makes his work so hard to understand is precisely this unique way of dealing with the topics he discusses, so that on first coming to the *Investigations* from a conventional philosophical background, readers will almost inevitably be perplexed because they will simply not see ‘in the style of the book, what Wittgenstein’s method is or how it is supposed to work’ (*Ibid.*, 12). Yet on McGinn’s view, to obtain an understanding of his method and how it finds expression in his remarks, is the key to grasping what the *Investigations* is all about:

.....Wittgenstein emphasises over and over again that it is a method or a style of thought, rather than doctrines, which characterizes his later philosophy. It is, moreover, his insistence that his philosophical aims do not involve him in putting forward ‘any kind of theory’ (*PI* § 109) that makes the question of method, and of how to read his remarks, such a difficult one, for it suggests that we cannot approach the book in the usual way, with a view to finding and extracting the claims that are made in it (*Ibid.*)

One not uncommon reaction to Wittgenstein’s style of writing is to regard it as a bar to understanding the theoretical positions he is really arguing for, so that these then have to be extracted from a text which is no more than the reflection of an apparent inability to write in a conventional manner. What has the appearance of little more than a ‘stylistic preference’, as McGinn puts it, is then treated as if it were totally irrelevant to the underlying philosophical positions that Wittgenstein is genuinely presenting. But, as McGinn argues, quoting A.C. Grayling as a philosopher who believes that being unsystematic in style does not mean being unsystematic in content (*Ibid.*, 14), this is entirely at odds with the attention that Wittgenstein pays towards finding the proper means
of conveying what he really wants to say, reflected in his sometimes referring to himself as a bad draughtsman, only hitting the mark occasionally, and so on. In short, the form of his writing must be treated as something which is integral to the nature of what he uses it to express:

Here we come to the nub of our resistance to entering into and understanding the sort of investigation that Wittgenstein wants us to engage in; we’ve come to the exact point at which his style of thinking ‘goes against the grain’. For we simply don’t see how what appear to be completely unexceptionable questions - ‘What is meaning?’ .... ‘What is thought?’ .... - could possibly be answered by anything other than a theory which explains or elucidates the nature of these phenomena (Ibid., 18 et seq.).

But that reaction is consequent upon the attitude that philosophers, at least within the analytic tradition, have generally been trained to adopt as part of their method of dealing with ‘the problems of philosophy’. On McGinn’s view, however, ‘It is vital to our coming to understand Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that we come to understand the way in which Wittgenstein works to overcome the desire for explanation....’ (Ibid. 19), so that because everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain (§ 126).

Nevertheless, describing in general terms how a ‘grammatical investigation’ of the use of our ordinary concepts within the context of ‘our life with language’ may allow us to understand how philosophical problems arise from our adherence to ‘misleading pictures’, ‘false analogies’, and ‘surface similarities’ (Ibid., 23), is not going to seem particularly convincing to a philosopher who is wedded to the ways of thinking that Wittgenstein is attempting to overthrow. Consequently, this chapter as a whole ought properly to be regarded as something of a promissory note, to be redeemed later in the book when a detailed examination of the problems there discussed is actually undertaken. This is consistent with McGinn’s claim that ‘...the anti-systematic nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is connected with the idea that his grammatical investigation is one that “gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems” (PI § 109)’ (Ibid., 30).
This clearly connects with the notion of Wittgenstein’s method as a form of therapy, although just how overtly clinical this diagnosis is understood to be, has assumed various forms within the secondary literature. McGinn adopts something of a middle way between those whose readings verge on the pathological, and those at the other extreme who see Wittgenstein adopting argumentative strategies in pursuit of his aims:

.....Wittgenstein’s philosophical method aims to engage the reader in an active process of working on himself....the reader’s acknowledgement of Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of the source of philosophical problems and paradoxes is a vital part of his method...If the reader is to be liberated from what Wittgenstein sees as the disastrous effects of the misapplication of pictures that have their roots in our forms of expression, then he must first of all acknowledge that Wittgenstein has indeed identified ‘the source of his thought’ (BT, p. 303) (Ibid., 26).

Having decided to adopt the original Anscombe translation as ‘perspicuous representation’ in § 122 as against the new Hacker-Schulte ‘surveyable representation’ because it more properly captures Wittgenstein’s method of dealing with the ‘particular case’, McGinn then attempts to explain this expression in terms of our achieving a ‘clear view’ of our practice of using words. Here we have an understanding that consists in ‘seeing connections’, and this involves, amongst other things, ‘seeing clearly what is there before our eyes, but which we had previously neglected or overlooked’ (Ibid., 29). None of this may be thought to be as helpful as it might be, but that is hardly McGinn’s fault. One is left with the impression that in this section dealing with the idea that ‘....the philosophical problems should completely disappear’ (§ 133), there is a certain amount of repetiton in the attempt to come fully to grips with what Wittgenstein is about. Nevertheless, the chapter manages to clearly convey the kind of understanding that Wittgenstein is attempting to achieve in order that we can come, not so much to solve philosophical problems, but to gain an appreciation of what it is that underlies the importance that the philosopher attaches to them:
This understanding is expressed, not in doctrines, but in a change of attitude which is connected with the emergence of a concern with what lies open to view in the concrete details of our practice of using expressions, and with the abandonment of the attempt to construct elucidations or speculative accounts. This not only makes the *Investigations* difficult to understand, it makes it exceptionally difficult to write about (*Ibid.*, 33).

One significant feature of the next Chapter 2 on ‘Wittgenstein’s Critique of Augustine’ dealing with §§ 1 - 38 of the *Investigations*, is that the problems discussed by McGinn would appear to occur at an interface where both ‘grammatical’ and empirical questions meet. Indeed, the major error that McGinn attributes to Augustine *via* Wittgenstein’s critique of what he says in that well-known quotation from the *Confessions*, might be interpreted in a way which makes it seem that Wittgenstein is involved in providing some kind of empirical hypothesis:

*Wittgenstein suggests that Augustine describes the child’s learning his first language as if he were a foreigner coming into a strange country. He does not yet understand the language of the inhabitants of this strange country, but he is already master of the linguistic techniques that are employed in operating with the expressions of the language.....Any sense that the account of language acquisition that Augustine presents somehow explains how we learn language is thus shown to be an illusion. For the picture actually presupposes what it purports to explain, by assuming that the child possesses a mastery of the techniques, or ways of operating with words, that provide the necessary background to his understanding what is meant when an adult points and utters a sound (*Ibid.*, 69).*

The passage referred to here, of course, is the famous § 32, in which Augustine’s child
is presented as if he were an individual who already possesses a language in the course of learning a second one, so that he can think, only not yet speak, where ‘think’ would mean something like ‘talk to himself’. This is a picture which appeals to us, as McGinn rightly implies, because we naturally look upon ourselves as individuals who already possess the capacities and competencies which are integral to having a language. Yet McGinn could be interpreted in a way which makes it look as if Wittgenstein is attempting to provide a hypothetical explanation for the acquisition of these competencies which the ‘account’ provided by Augustine fails to supply.

But providing an explanatory hypothesis is not what Wittgenstein is about. Perhaps it ought to go without saying that we fall into the trap of assuming the possession of these competencies at all times because we have no idea of what it would be like from a first-person perspective not to be in possession of a language. It is for a very good reason, therefore, that Wittgenstein draws our attention to the ‘surroundings’ in which a child is taught, and in which he learns a first language. Augustine’s approach surreptitiously divorces our competencies and capacities with language from this background. It is this move alone which allows the philosopher to arrive at the central features of this ‘Augustinian picture’ in which it seems that the child could come across many different kinds of items in his surroundings prior to going on to ‘name’ them.

Yet there are obvious empirical questions in the neighbourhood, so much so that there are philosophers who would wish to argue, for what they would take to be sound empirical reasons, that Augustine must in some sense be right, because the child must bring to his ‘learning situation’ capacities and competencies which allow him to ‘latch on’ to the linguistic symbols that he is able to memorise. This would not be inconsistent with the conclusion that a feral or wolf child would be quite incapable of learning a language, on the grounds that no matter what ‘internal’ capacities he may possess, he needs to be subjected to the requisite training in a social context. The fact that this is an empirical question has allowed Baker and Hacker to adopt the view, contra Malcolm and Kripke (2), for example, that from a Wittgensteinian
perspective the genesis of an ability is quite irrelevant to its exercise, so that there need be no contradiction in imagining a ‘born-Crusoe’ inventing a language for himself which he might eventually teach to Man-Friday (3). But the fact that this is conceivable does not mean that it is at all relevant to the grammatical significance that Wittgenstein attributes to the surroundings in which a language is taught and learnt. The opposition between ‘Communitarianism’ and ‘Individualism’ as commonly understood in terms of the ‘necessarily shared’ v the ‘necessarily shareable’ is misconceived. Consider in more detail McGinn’s perceptive account of the nature of the grammatical critique of Augustine that Wittgenstein provides:

...we can see Augustine’s tendency to think of the human subject in terms of a private essence or mind - in which there are determinate wishes, thoughts, desires and so on - and a physical interface with the outside world. The private essence is conceived as somehow already fully human, but as lacking the capacity to communicate with others. It already possesses its own internal articulations into particular thoughts and wishes, which cannot yet be expressed, in much the way that the physical world is seen as articulated into particular objects that the names of language unproblematically latch on to. The primary purpose of language is to communicate the thoughts and wishes that are initially locked within this private sphere. It is the private essence that makes the essential link between a word and the object which is its meaning, and understanding is conceived as the mind’s making the appropriate connection between a sound and the object it signifies (Ibid., 41).

But, of course, it is integral to Wittgenstein’s concept of a grammatical investigation that all of these suppositions concerning a ‘private essence’ are of a ‘something’ which exists in isolation from the contexts in which language is actually taught, learned, used and understood.
It is only natural, therefore, that McGinn should see the first forty paragraphs of the *Investigations* as a part of the book in which these various ideas, encapsulated in this summary of an aspect of the ‘Augustinian picture’, are subject to investigation and critique. The remainder of the chapter is taken up with a description of how Wittgenstein uses the shopkeeper, the builders, the comparison of the function of linguistic expressions to the tools in a took-kit, the description of language-games, the many and various ways in which words are used, and so on, in pursuit of his overall goals; and in these sections McGinn provides a fairly conventional account of what is going on within Wittgenstein’s continuing grammatical investigation. Indeed, there are points at which it may seem too conventional.

Here is what she has to say about the famous shopkeeper in § 1:

Wittgenstein invents this example of a simple language, in which each of the individual words - ‘five’, ‘red’, ‘apples’ - has a distinct technique associated with it, in order to bring out, on the one hand, how language is interwoven with non-linguistic activity, and on the other, how it is in use that the different functions of expressions become apparent (*Ibid.*, 43).

But this takes no account of the shock with which many commentators have reacted on reading this tale. Lars Hertzberg, for example (4), reacts to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that it is in this and similar ways that one operates with words, by claiming that this remark must strike us as ‘outrageous’. However, his reason for saying this is just that the skills which actually underlie even the simplest use of words to talk about the items in our surroundings, are highly complex and hidden from view, so that Wittgenstein is to be congratulated on spelling out what is going on behind the scenes. But this would suggest that Wittgenstein is in the business, which he is not, of providing some form of empirical explanation of the ‘inner workings’ of our minds that are revealed via the shopkeeper’s robotic-like behaviour. This, however, is the very picture that David Stern, following Stephen Mulhall (5), takes Wittgenstein to be subjecting to ridicule because it consists in ‘an acting out on the public stage of just those mental processes that philosophers have often thought must underlie our public performance: correlating the word “red” with a mental image of the colour red, correlating
number words with imagined counting procedures’. But if these procedures seem lifeless when brought out into the open and expressed in the shopkeeper’s robotic behavioural repertoire, then why, Stern asks, should we suppose that they are of any value in providing our words with meaning when they are imagined to animate the mind?

It may indeed be argued that in an introductory text, which to some degree McGinn can be understood to be providing, issues of this kind ought to be passed by; but not only is Stern’s text also introductory, but there are good reasons for saying that when dealing with the work of Wittgenstein, there can be no such thing as a text which does not take a stance on controversial questions of interpretation. This is also true of the builders in § 2, which McGinn describes as a ‘vivid’ illustration of Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea that ‘the meaning of a word is the object that it stands for’, as illustrated in ‘the idea of a language more primitive than ours’:

We are to imagine this primitive language as the whole language of a community of speakers. However, we are asked to imagine this language when it is functioning, where we can see it woven into the practical lives of those who use it. Wittgenstein now uses this example to explore the picture of language and language acquisition that Augustine presents us with (Ibid., 44).

There is a famous controversy between Rush Rhees and Norman Malcolm (6), whose papers are actually included in McGinn’s references to the chapter, over the question whether the idea that a primitive language of the highly restricted kind used by the builders can even make sense to us, with Rhees arguing for precisely this point of view. Fortunately, Wittgenstein does come some way to settling our worries when he suggests (Zettel §§ 98-99) that he has no real intention of presenting the builders as automatons who carry out their procedures mechanically, for if this is what we do imagine, then we would not call it the use of a rudimentary language at all. The answer provided by Wittgenstein is effectively that he is viewing their ‘primitive language’, for the purposes of his treatment, in isolation from the normal surroundings in which of course these
men would be envisaged to carry out their activities as builders. Nevertheless, within this narrow context, their language, and their thinking too, which is expressed in their behaviour, may really be rudimentary in just that way he wishes to capture in offering the builders’ tale. This connects closely with Zettel § 100, where the activity of the worker is an expression of his wordless thinking, so that an account of what he is doing might later be captured in words.

Whether this fulfils the suggestion that the builders in § 2 really provide an example in which the description given by Augustine is right, however, remains an open question, just as the suggestion (§ 8) that we need not worry about the incompleteness of the builders’ languages just because our own language need not be understood to be complete, may be thought rather to beg the question - as Wittgenstein recognises in the Zettel passages. McGinn introduces us to the important distinction between ostensive teaching in the process of learning a first language, and ostensive definition, carried out against the background of a language already acquired (Ibid., 45), and from this perspective there really cannot be on Wittgenstein’s assessment, any language in which the description given by Augustine, with its attendant presuppositions, could be right. Towards the end of the chapter, McGinn sums up what she takes to be important in the critique of Augustine as portrayed in these sections:

In thinking of language as a system of signs, abstracted from its use within the ordinary lives of speakers, Augustine’s picture turns our attention away from ‘the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language’ (PI § 108) and towards an abstract phantasm. In this act of turning away from the practice of using language, we inevitably lose sight of the way language actually functions, and conceive of language’s ability to represent as ‘some remarkable mental act’ (PI § 38) (Ibid., 75).

There can be little doubt that the book’s three central chapters, concerning rules, private language and the inner and the outer, deal with the main subjects which have formed the principal topics for debate within the secondary literature. The first of these, Chapter 3, which is concerned
with ‘Rules and Rule-following’, dealing with §§ 138-242, extends to 56 pages and is the longest in the book. We can obtain the proper measure of McGinn’s approach here if we begin from the realisation that the idea of ‘logical compulsion’ which, philosophers are sometimes inclined to believe, governs the connection between a rule and its application, has no proper content (Ibid., 122). We are then perplexed because it can appear that ‘anything goes’ given that, on some interpretation or other, whatever a speaker decides to do can be in accord with a rule. But, as McGinn expresses the matter, ‘If our reflections lead us into the extraordinary position of saying that we could no longer speak of what someone does as either in accord or in conflict with a rule, then we know that we are deep in misunderstanding (Ibid.).

This misunderstanding is on a par with that expressed by Kripke in his conclusion, already discussed by McGinn earlier in the chapter, that there is no ‘fact about me’ that distinguishes between meaning a definite function by ‘plus’ and meaning nothing at all (Ibid., 84). The crucial point here is that it seems that there ought to be some fact about me in which my meaning that ‘plus’ rather than ‘quus’ can be understood to consist. In its Wittgensteinian guise, the muddle that McGinn identifies here is expressed in the famous second paragraph of § 201, which is effectively a way of saying that if we insist on taking the expression of the rule out of its ordinary context within the surroundings of the practice in which it is embedded, then of course it will seem that every step forward will be a ‘leap in the dark’. It is, however, only when doing philosophy that one might be led to oscillate between an objectionable ‘Platonism’ and a form of ‘scepticism’ which makes it appear that anything one does can be the ‘right’ response. As McGinn puts it:

The misunderstanding that is expressed by the paradox with which § 201 opens....is the thought that, if the rule itself does not compel an application, then our response to the rule cannot be a case of following it: anything we do will count as an interpretation of the rule. We can see that this is a misunderstanding simply by observing that in the course of our discussion we have continually come up with pictures and rules that
do not seem to us to require an interpretation, but which seem to meet
our idea of a ‘superlative link’ between a rule and its application. We do
not have a sense, in these cases, that we are choosing one interpretation
over another, for no other application occurs to us (Ibid., 123).

This sense that there is something inexorable about what it is to follow a rule is
nevertheless alright. It is just that when doing philosophy we are inclined to misrepresent
this thought that a rule ‘forces itself on us’ in terms of the idea of ‘logical compulsion’ or, as
expressed in § 188, in terms of the notion that ‘the steps are really already taken, even before I
take them in writing or orally or in thought’, a further expression of the claim that ‘It’s as if
we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash’ (§ 197). Yet we do follow the rule ‘blindly’
(§ 219), i.e., with the natural confidence that comes with a familiarity with what it is, in any
particular case, to ‘obey the rule’ or ‘go against it’ (§ 201). McGinn expresses the point as follows:

The grammar of our concept of following a rule, the way this concept
functions, connects the notion of following a rule with the existence of
a practice, or form of life in which there is a customary usage, which
provides the background to its application. Thus, the concept does not
describe anything that occurs ‘in the minds’ of those who use the rule
......It is not in virtue of the psychological accompaniments to following
a rule....that one’s act counts as a case of obeying a rule or going against
it, in any particular case; it is in virtue of the circumstances which surround
one’s response to a rule that it counts as a case of following a rule (Ibid., 125).

McGinn understandably remarks that because of the brevity of § 202, the interpretation
of ‘privately’ must depend on that of the sections which precede it, and she bravely connects the
use of this term with the ‘psychological accompaniments’ to following a rule which are isolated
from the surrounding circumstances in which one can be said to ‘follow the rule’ or ‘go against it’,
so that merely ‘thinking’ (‘in the mind’ ?) that one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. There is,
surely, an important conclusion of some kind to be drawn from the Baker & Hacker line on this question that because § 202 derives from MS 129 written after August 1944, and transposed from its original home in which it appeared after § 258, it has ended in its present position as what they refer to as an ‘anticipation’ of ‘the private language argument’. Yet this seems incongruous given that in its present position, Wittgenstein has not yet explained what ‘privately’ means (7).

Only a short way into her exposition in this chapter, McGinn introduces what she refers to as ‘an inspired reading’ of the text by Saul Kripke (Ibid., 79), a reading which she expounds in detail but which must nevertheless be regarded as a misreading of Wittgenstein’s intentions. Any attempt to provide an overview of the vast critical response in the secondary literature to the Kripkean paradox and the ‘sceptical solution’ to it that he proposes, would of course be impossible in this context, but the new edition of McGinn’s book has been augmented by the inclusion of a section dealing with the responses made to Kripke by Crispin Wright and John McDowell. It is hardly surprising that as interpretations of what Wittgenstein is about, McGinn takes the reactions of all three to the rule-following remarks to be unsatisfactory, largely because in her terms they fail to do justice to Wittgenstein’s method, and to his idea of a grammatical investigation:

Kripke sees him as responding to a genuine sceptical problem.

Wright sees him as putting forward a substantial philosophical account of what following according to a rule consists in, which embeds a surprising discovery about the nature of meaning and understanding. McDowell claims that he is out to defend what he calls our commonsense conception of meaning from sceptical attack, but it is hard to see how this gets us beyond the ‘strange idea’ that, insofar as the meaning of a word lies in its use, the use of a word must in some way already be present in the act of understanding it, so that the act of understanding ‘already suffices to determine what it is going to be correct’ in new cases (Ibid., 95, quoting McDowell).
Chapter 4 on ‘Privacy and Private Language’, which deals with §§ 243 -275, is a contribution, as McGinn understandably remarks, to a vast debate which it would once again be quite impossible to describe in any detail within the limitations imposed by her intention to provide a grammatical reading of the relevant passages:

Those who are inclined to believe that there is a valid argument against the possibility of a private language to be extracted from Wittgenstein’s remarks have seen it as providing a decisive refutation of the philosophy of Descartes, classical empiricism, phenomenalism, and sense-data theories of perception. Others have argued that, as it is traditionally presented, the private language argument represents nothing more than a verificationist theory of meaning used in defence of a version of logical behaviourism. Moreover, the conclusion of the argument is seen as going counter to our commonsense intuition that psychological concepts describe internal states that play a causal role in explaining a subject’s behaviour (Ibid., 138).

Whilst this last sentence does indeed remind us of an underlying presupposition that motivates a great deal of current thinking within the philosophy of mind, it would be regarded as a ‘commonsense intuition’, surely, only by those who are inclined to take its validity for granted. It is, of course, completely at odds with the Wittgensteinian view that we are deluded to think that psychological concepts function, as McGinn puts it, as descriptions of events and processes in an inner realm (Ibid.), a point already emphasised at the beginning of her book.

The greatest barrier to achieving a proper perspective on what Wittgenstein is up to in these passages, however, lies in the almost inevitable presuppositions that commentators bring to the debate. In the same way, the greatest obstacle to empathising with Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the ‘surroundings’ in which our sensation concepts are used within the context of a practice, is the prevailing tendency to stare at the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription in
isolation from the circumstances in which sensation concepts are taught, learnt, used and therefore understood. If there is any philosophical context in which what Wittgenstein appears to propose ‘goes against the grain’ for many people, it must lie in what he has to say about our sensation concepts. The very idea that what is important about their application should rest, not in their first person use to talk about our immediate feelings as they present themselves to ‘consciousness’, but in the surrounding circumstances in which we learn how to use them, seems to many philosophers, even today, quite bizarre. The tendency to concentrate on the ‘qualitative feel’ of a sensation which appears to carry its own ‘representational content’ is so strong, that for many philosophers this consideration alone is sufficient to subject to decisive refutation what it is that Wittgenstein is supposedly presenting in his ‘private language argument’.

The irony, of course, is that Wittgenstein is not denying anything that these philosophers are inclined to say, as distinct from proposing a change of emphasis in the way we are tempted to view our talk about sensations within a philosophical context. We are indeed inclined to stare at first person sensation ascription in isolation from the existence of the familiar background of learning and teaching upon which the exercise of this tendency, on a Wittgensteinian perspective, is actually parasitic, and it may very well be true that at least some versions of empiricism can be shown to have found their raison d’etre, unwittingly, by exemplifying tendencies of this kind.

Yet if they have, it is an open question just how far they may be thought to illustrate the radical kind of privacy that Wittgenstein is evidently rejecting in § 243, § 258 and in surrounding passages. Indeed, it has even been argued (8) that Wittgenstein’s very presentation in § 243 is flawed, because it does not follow from the proposal that the individual words of this private language refer only to what is known to the person speaking, that another person cannot understand the language. If, however, we think of the world of Wittgenstein’s ‘private linguist’ as one which is inherently solipsistic, then it may be argued, at least from a wholly pragmatic perspective, that the question of the existence of other ‘selves’ simply does not arise. It is arguable, therefore, that even to raise this kind of objection is to fail to grasp the extent to which Wittgenstein’s treatment in these passages is
intentionally ironic. After all, the idea of a world of individual private linguists as disembodied selves who have no knowledge of each other’s existence, would require that we view this world sub specie aeternitatis to a degree that would be quite unWittgensteinian in character.

A more serious question is the one raised by McGinn when she asks, with Wittgenstein in § 243, whether we can imagine a language which conforms to the strictures he lays down. But rather than attempt to answer this question, he immediately, as McGinn is careful to point out, ‘takes up a grammatical investigation of our ordinary sensation language’ (Ibid., 143) by in § 244 asking how words refer to sensations within the context of our ordinary practices in which the child expresses his sensations in his behaviour. This is McGinn’s cue to draw our attention to the fact that ‘we are already beginning to see that introspection plays no essential part in the sort of training we receive with sensation words; learning what pain is - what the word ‘pain’ means - does not depend upon a process of “turning my attention inwards” or “concentrating my attention on what is occurring inside me”, but on my learning new ways to give expression to what I feel’ (Ibid., 144).

It is significant that ‘what I feel’ here is precisely what the philosopher who wishes to explore the ‘felt quality’ of his sensations usually begins from, when he describes their ‘representational content’, so we cannot take McGinn’s Wittgenstein to be in any way denying the reality and significance of what is actually felt, as distinct from providing a completely different perspective from which to view ‘the felt character of our sensations’, sensations we can be said to ‘identify’ and ‘name’ in an innocuous way within the context of our use of a public language.

If this should leave us wondering what the fuss is all about, and what it is that Wittgenstein can be said, if anything at all, to be denying, it is worth looking at the reasons given by McGinn for rejecting a fairly common interpretation of § 258 in which the private linguist finds that having first associated his term ‘S’ with a sensation, he cannot re-identify his sensation a second time round because there is no non-circular means of justifying his continuing ‘use’ of ‘S’ because there is no guarantee that his memory of his original sample is correct. So whatever seems right is
right, and ‘S’ has no meaning because ‘there is no way of determining whether a future use of “S” is correct or incorrect’ (Ibid., 155). McGinn glosses this as the view that the meaning of our psychological terms depends on their possessing ‘public criteria of application’, against which their first-person uses can be checked, a familiar view indeed which she finds expressed to varying degrees in quotes from Malcolm, Hacker, McGinn (Colin), Budd and Grayling (Ibid.,156).

If McGinn finds this view inadequate, it is mainly because it appears to be providing some form of proof that our psychological concepts must have public criteria of application, and this is quite at odds with the point of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation:

The point of the investigation of the idea of a private language, on this reading, is not to prove that our psychological expressions must possess public criteria, but to put in question the role that introspection, or turning our attention inwards, has in understanding the meaning of a sensation word (Ibid., 157).

On this reading, speaking or writing the sign down in § 258 whilst concentrating attention on the sensation does not determine a use for the sign ‘S’ because a bare act of introspection cannot by itself determine a linguistic technique which would provide a grammar for ‘S’ within the normal public surroundings in which ‘S’ would ordinarily be used.

If there is a problem with this presentation, it must lie in the thought that McGinn’s private linguist is attempting to achieve something which makes proper sense but which just cannot be done. But here those philosophers with empiricist leanings can come to our aid with their interpretations, for either the sensation described has their ‘representational content’, in which case on Wittgenstein’s reckoning they are using the sensation term outwith the normal surrounding circumstances upon which its meaning actually depends; or the sensation is to be understood - a rather queer idea - as having no representational content, in which case the corresponding term has already been defined in such a way that it has no application because it is being given a wholly bogus ‘use’ within a context in which it is supposedly referring to a ‘private object’ that can have no role to play in the context of our ordinary sensation talk.
This comes out clearly in § 288, where the ordinary criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription, a function of the normal language-game with sensations, is said to involve no expression of doubt. However, if we assume the abrogation of this normal language-game, then a criterion of identity is required for the sensation (as a private object); and on this model it is said that ‘the possibility of error also exists’. But this is not a viable model because in the normal public language-game we do not identify our sensations by criteria. One of the main reasons why the ‘private language argument’ has led to so many different interpretations, is that as it is expressed in § 258, the private language can on this reading already be understood to have been defined in a way which rules it out as a language which can have any relation to the circumstances in which we ordinarily talk of our sensations. Indeed, it is already implicit in the Investigations up to § 243 that outwith this context the idea of a language of the kind envisaged could have no genuine application and, indeed, no real sense. McGinn herself comes close to expressing the point in this way later on:

It is part of the description of the example that ‘S’ refers to something which can be known only to the person speaking, and has no connection with the natural expression of sensations.

In fact, given that ‘S’ is introduced purely on the basis of looking inwards and saying or writing down a sign, there is no justification for any description of ‘S’ which identifies its function with that of one of our ordinary linguistic techniques, all of which involve a distinctive kind of use of expressions, to which ‘S’, by definition, fails to conform (Ibid., 160).

Nevertheless, there surfaces occasionally a certain ambivalence in McGinn’s presentation, and this arises from her use of the term ‘introspection’, which can have a perfectly legitimate use in an ordinary context, but which she uses mainly to convey Wittgenstein’s idea of his illegitimate ‘private object’ model. This comes out clearly in the following paragraph, which might lead at least some readers to the conclusion that Wittgenstein appears to be denying what is obviously true:
There is a great temptation to think that we understand what the word ‘pain’ means on the basis of being presented with a sample or a specimen of pain, which we fix in our minds by concentrating our attention on our feeling......Even if an act of introspection does not by itself determine the meaning of a word for a sensation, we are still tempted to think that, given a public language in which we speak about our sensations, introspection plays a vital part in our coming to understand the meaning of sensation words (Ibid., 162).

This is misleading, for fairly obvious reasons, and McGinn goes some way to explaining why when she issues what can be regarded as something of a corrective later on in the chapter:

Wittgenstein is not suggesting, quite absurdly, that what a speaker feels is quite irrelevant to our concept of pain; the fact that the word ‘pain’ describes a feeling is shown by the use of the word in sentences which are employed by speakers in giving articulate expression to what they feel. It is rather that there is nothing independent of this grammar, this particular way of employing expressions, that serves to fix what we mean by the word ‘pain’; and there is nothing over and above our all using this word in the same, distinctive way that constitutes our meaning the same thing by it (Ibid., 167).

This is clearly much nearer the mark, and it goes some way to explaining Wittgenstein’s method in the well-known § 265 about the dictionary which exists only in the imagination, an example which McGinn regards as an ‘analogy’ which questions ‘the idea that introspection, or private ostensive definition, plays a role in defining our ordinary sensation words’ (Ibid., 162).

According to McGinn, by attempting to give ourselves a ‘private’ exhibition of pain, we are thinking of a kind of ‘pointing’ that we do only in our imagination, and this is not a genuine pointing, because ‘Our picture of pain as an inner state tempts us to imagine that an act of private ostensive definition is vital to our grasp of what the word means’ (Ibid., 163). This is again misleading, and it
would be better to say that Wittgenstein constructs § 265 in such a way that looking up a table in the imagination is not a genuine method of approach, since it can by definition constitute only a poor second best to doing the real thing, viz., checking the objective content of a table which exists in reality and not in the imagination at all. Similarly, in § 270, which McGinn understands to raise the question of the role an alleged private act of identifying ‘the same again’ plays in the language-game of correlating the occurrence of a sensation of a particular kind with a blood pressure reading, the conclusion is drawn that it plays no role at all because we do not identify our sensations by criteria. In this case, the meaning of the term derives from ‘its use in the language-game’ (Ibid., 166).

Both § 265 and § 270, therefore, are not used to ‘prove’ anything. It is better to regard them as illustrations of the distinction drawn in § 288 between our ordinary language-game with sensations in which there is no expression of doubt, and the hypothetical private language which presents a model in which private objects would be identified by criteria. But this model has no application because, associated as it is with Wittgenstein’s ‘mental pointing’, it exhibits no relation to our ordinary sensation discourse. This is why Wittgenstein allies the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription to the learning of a public language in a public context, when he states that he knows this colour to be red, not by this form of ‘mental pointing’, but because he has ‘learnt English’ (§ 381, Cf. § 384). If, for example, we imagine someone whose behaviour indicates that he is persistently calling a current pain of his a tingle, when it is obvious to those around him that he is not making a slip of the tongue, then he would be accused, not of exhibiting a deficiency in his powers of inner observation - the point about ‘introspection’ to which McGinn is directing our attention - but of having an inadequate command of the English language.

But this makes the private object model so esoteric that it becomes difficult to see why Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ should have been thought by so many commentators to provide such a decisive refutation of traditional phenomenalism, empiricism, and those theories concerning sense-data to which McGinn refers at the beginning of her chapter. What Wittgenstein actually does is use his examples as illustrations in which his private-object model appears to act
as a viable picture of how our sensation language functions, only to be undermined in the very presentation of the examples themselves. This method is certainly in keeping with McGinn’s wholly grammatical treatment, which she extends in the following chapter.

The last of the three major chapters, No. 5 on ‘The Inner and The Outer’ dealing with §§ 281 - 315 together with sections from the former Part II, discusses matters which are generally much less obviously problematic, just because it is used to convey two of the major insights referred to at the beginning of the book, the human body as the objectification of the human soul, and the change wrought by replacing the distinction between mind and body by that between the living and the non-living. The dramatic effect of these changes can be expressed by saying that philosophers go astray because they are inclined to take the pictures that are mere accompaniments to our ordinary practices, as a foundation for a metaphysical interpretation of the nature of the phenomena under investigation. What are mere pictures are then understood to capture, for example, the real nature of the pain that goes on in him ‘behind’ his behaviour in the way it goes on in me, so that there then must exist a question whether there is really anything going on behind the behaviour at all: the ‘problem of other minds’. Wittgenstein is effecting a change in the emphasis that the philosopher in all of us is inclined to give to what we might ‘intuitively’ take to be the case, so that it is only by turning our eyes away from these pictures, and not by regarding them as the foundation for distinct philosophical problems requiring a definitive solution, that we will bring these matters to rest. McGinn makes it clear at the beginning that, seen from the proper perspective, the picture as a mere picture, e.g., the pain which is ‘inside us’ and to which only the person who feels it has access, can often be regarded as a misapplication of an ordinary distinction reflecting the grammar of our sensation talk:

I have continually emphasized that, insofar as this picture is an attempt to capture the difference between the use of expressions for sensations and expressions that describe behaviour, Wittgenstein acknowledges its aptness. At the moment it is nothing more than a picture. And while it seems to sum up the grammatical difference between pain and crying,
it has not yet, Wittgenstein insists, been shown how it is to be \textit{applied}.

The problems arise when we come to apply the picture, for it is in
the application which we are inclined to make of the picture that
misunderstandings and confusions arise (\textit{Ibid.}, 174).

McGinn sees this perspective reflected in §§ 423 - 426: ‘the uncertainty and
indeterminacy which characterizes our ordinary psychological language-game…….comes to look
like a defect that does not afflict the reality that our psychological expressions describe’, so ‘that a
god who could see into human consciousness might know what we, whose eyes cannot penetrate
to what lies behind behaviour, can only guess at’ (\textit{Ibid.}, 175). Consequently, when doing philosophy
we begin to feel a certain dissatisfaction that \textit{we} cannot attain this god’s eye perspective, a point
reflected in that brilliant passage, § 426, in which it seems that in our actual use of expressions we
make detours and go by side roads, we see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot
use it because it is permanently closed. The straight highway leads to the revelation that is denied
to \textit{us}, for it seems that only a god could see what is going on behind the scenes; and this is the origin
of that permanent sceptical doubt which can never be allayed \textit{even} when it appears that all of our
ordinary criteria for the application of a sensation concept to a third person are actually satisfied.

This leads McGinn to draw our attention to her central conclusion: the ‘false application of
the picture of the inner, which tempts us to make a distinction between a “physical realm” and a
“psychological realm”, is replaced by a recognition which is made in grammar between those bodies
which are accessible to the concept of pain and those which are not’ (\textit{Ibid.}, 182). This captures the
distinction between the living and the non-living, a distinction which views the human body as the
objectification of the human soul. In philosophy, however, there is an ever present tendency to
misapply the distinction between the inner and the outer, the result of which is that we construct
a ‘mythical entity’ that we can do nothing with, ‘when all along the distinction we are struggling to
make is already there, right before our eyes, in the grammatical differences between language-games,
in the differences in how we operate with signs for sensations and with signs for physical states or
process’ (*Ibid.*, 185). McGinn is at her best here in taking us through what Wittgenstein is about in these passages, § 281 on the application of our psychological concepts to a human being and what is like one, § 282 on the fairy tale in which a pot can see and hear, where our tendency to animate the inanimate by picturing it with facial expressions is all too evident.

McGinn reiterates her earlier point that on the interpretation that she is recommending, Wittgenstein is not offering a proof ‘that the intelligibility of the concept of pain depends upon there being behavioural criteria of application against which a first-person use of the word can be checked’ (*Ibid.*, 187), since the point at issue is purely grammatical: if we sever the concept of pain from that of the living human being who expresses it, then we end with a concept which has become totally divorced from the day-to-day surroundings in which it would ordinarily be used. But this results in turning pain into a ‘something’ the existence of which can become problematic, a private object about which it might really make sense to wonder whether it is pain or not that is being ‘identified’. McGinn sees this point reflected in § 288, where the question of doubt which does not affect the ordinary language-game with sensations in which first-person sensation ascription is criterionless, raises its head because we are now dealing with a sensation as a private object over which the possibility of error in identification arises (*Ibid.*, 188).

This leads shortly thereafter to § 293, one of the most famous passages in the *Investigations* (9), and one which, like § 258, has resulted in an extraordinary number of variant readings. Yet § 293 can be regarded as another expression of what is going on in §§ 270 - 273: the ‘beetle in the box’ is the same ‘something’ which has no role to play in correlating a sensation of a particular kind with a manometer reading (§ 270), the ‘something’ that the word ‘pain’ means in § 271 that might be constantly changing, and the ‘this’ of § 272 which might vary from one individual to another even when the public use of their terms perfectly agrees. The consequence of this is that, judged from the perspective of our ordinary language-game with sensations, ‘the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (§ 293).
After two pages on § 293, McGinn turns to § 296, a particularly interesting passage in which a voice insists that there really is something behind the behaviour, accompanying the cry of pain, and it is this which is really important. This, however, is the sort of thing that one would be inclined to say only when doing philosophy: whilst in the grip of a picture, it seems the natural response to Wittgenstein’s apparent denial that there is anything behind the pain. Yet all he is doing is pointing towards the misapplication of a picture which in itself is quite harmless, for the distinction between the feeling of pain and the cry which expresses it is found in the grammar of the language of pain.

Turning next to the famous pictured pot of § 297, McGinn presents us with an account in terms of two different language-games, one referring to a practice of using pots, water and heat in connection with cooking etc., and one in which pictures are used in illustration. Whether or not the reader will find this exposition particularly helpful is an open question, since the main point of the parable rests, as McGinn emphasises, in the philosopher’s dissatisfaction with what lies on the surface as an indication of what he believes must really be going on behind the scenes. This belief is prompted entirely by his adherence to the misleading picture which, harmless in itself, he is convinced must ground our understanding, when doing philosophy, of what talking about the sensations of others really (metaphysically) means.

This point is integral to that highly significant passage, § 300, which Peter Hacker is almost forced into regarding as incapable of adequate translation (10), and it is an open question whether the new 4th edition rendering is an improvement from a philosophical perspective on the Anscombe - English only - 2nd edition version from 1958. Hacker, (Op. cit.) focusses on a confusion towards which Wittgenstein is drawing our attention between the concept of a mental image and that of a picture, so that one can imagine a toothache or remember a headache, although this does not provide one with a picture. This is comparable to McGinn’s claim that insofar ‘as the word “pain” refers to a feeling, it refers to something that can be imagined, but not pictured or visualized’ (Ibid., 200). So the temptation to say that it is not merely the picture of the behaviour but also that of the pain that enters into the language-game with ‘he is in pain’, is on McGinn’s assessment linked to
the temptation to suppose that understanding the word ‘pain’ requires us to imagine something in connection with it’ (Ibid., 201). This point she relates to the thought that, knowing as we do what the word ‘pain’ means in our own case, we then tend when doing philosophy to ‘imaginatively’ transfer this idea to others, so that pain becomes a ‘something’ out of sight ‘behind’ their behaviour, and this leads directly to ‘the problem of other minds’.

From a strictly philosophical perspective, however, there is, equally, much to be said in favour of Saul Kripke’s account of § 300, albeit that it is used to express his anti-realist account:

To use the image of pain as a picture is to attempt to imagine the pain of another on the model of my own, and to assume that my statement that the other person is in pain is true precisely because it ‘corresponds’ to this picture....To use the image of pain as a picture is to suppose that by an appropriate use of this image, I can give determinate truth conditions for the other person’s being in pain, and that one need only ask whether these truth conditions ‘correspond with reality’ to determine whether my statement that he is in pain is true or false (11).

But in Kripke’s understanding of the Investigations, Wittgenstein rejects this paradigm of truth conditions, replacing it with assertion conditions resting in the circumstances which allow us in practice to conclude that ‘he is in pain’. This Humean ‘sceptical solution’ to ‘the problem of other minds’ has anti-realist credentials, expressed in the claim that Wittgenstein would reject any attempt to ‘explain’ my attitude and behaviour towards a sufferer by a ‘belief’ about his ‘inner state’: ‘I can be said to think of him as having a mind, and in particular as suffering from pain, in virtue of my attitude and behavior toward him, and not the reverse,’ (Ibid. 138 et seqq.)

Because Kripke’s rendering depends on granting to the misleading picture the role that Wittgenstein explicitly denies to it, it clearly cannot capture Wittgenstein’ intentions, although of interest in its own right. This is highly relevant to a section on ‘Criteria’ that McGinn introduces
us to in the new edition in which she discusses the interpretations of this concept provided by Peter Hacker, Crispin Wright, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell.

The significant feature of the accounts of criteria provided by Hacker, Wright and McDowell, on McGinn’s reading, is that they are all variations on the view, as Hacker presents it, that the criterial relation as expressed in Wittgenstein’s work is ‘a relation of a priori, non-inductive, or necessarily good evidence’ (Ibid., 207, Hacker as quoted). Wright is presented as sharing this view in part, disagreeing with Hacker over the point that criterial evidence is essentially defeasible: should we take any statement about another person’s sensations, for example, ‘a claim made on the basis of its criteria can subsequently be jettisoned, consistently with retention of the belief that the criteria were indeed satisfied’ (Ibid., Wright as quoted.). This view would appear to find its source in the old empiricist principle that no finite number of observation statements can ever be conclusively verified. On McGinn’s assessment, McDowell is presented as arguing for the conclusion that when criteria are genuinely satisfied, ‘the mental state of another is made manifest in a way that makes it cognitively accessible to us’ (Ibid., 209), although she has doubts whether this really solves the problem given that McDowell allows that criteria are, in the final analysis, really defeasible. In more general terms, she expresses her dissatisfaction with all these accounts because:

All three of the above accounts make a connection between
Wittgenstein’s concept of a criterion and the question of our
epistemic entitlement to claim to know what mental state
another is in. The concept is seen as having a central role in
answering scepticism about other minds: the concept is
employed as a means to show that, on certain occasions, we
are in a position to know that another is in a given mental state.
It is not clear, however, that any of the accounts we’ve looked at
succeeds in putting an end to sceptical doubt (Ibid., 210).
Indeed, what might be said about all three proposals, is also captured in what McGinn is drawn to say about the version provided by Wright:

Thus, far from showing how scepticism about other minds is to be resisted, the proponent of the idea of criterial evidence seems ultimately forced to concede that there are no circumstances in which a doubt about another’s mental state is logically ruled out. All that can be said is that, in certain circumstances, we don’t doubt, or it is against the conventions of our ordinary practice to doubt, but that hardly counts as a refutation of scepticism. This interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria still seems to be committed to picturing the pain as something which accompanies the behavioural evidence, and whose presence can, from a third person perspective, only be conjectured at (Ibid., 208).

The puzzling feature of what McGinn further goes on to say, however, is that rather than draw the obvious conclusion that these conceptions of criteria are committed to the kind of ontological distinction between the mental and the physical that Wittgenstein is repudiating, she prefers to present the matter as if his approach is not really intended to ‘justify our certainty, or answer the sceptic about other minds’ (Ibid., 214). If this is how we are to see his approach, then ‘the result tends to be disappointing’ (Ibid.)

If, however, her reading of Stanley Cavell is correct, then what Wittgenstein is actually proposing is an ‘answer’ to sceptical doubt because it shows, in the final analysis, that outwith the framework in which we employ criteria in practice in order to determine whether another person is, say, in pain, then general sceptical doubt concerning ‘other minds’ has no genuine application. This point emerged earlier on in her treatment of §§ 422 - 426, because ‘the problem of other minds’ leaves the impression that there is a queer kind of question of fact whether other people really have certain thoughts and feelings as I do, a question that is being asked outwith
the only conceivable framework in which it could even make sense. This is the framework in which there are circumstances in which we are certain that after a serious accident, say, someone is in great pain, or in which we see an actor feigning pain convincingly in a dramatic portrayal, or in which we are taken in by someone who successfully dupes us into believing that she is in great pain in pursuance of a fraudulent insurance claim. If Wittgenstein’s approach is to be taken seriously, the only conclusion to draw from the method he adopts is that outwith these kinds of circumstances, general sceptical, philosophical doubt depends on the metaphysical misapplication of the kinds of misleading pictures of ‘other minds’ that McGinn has already described to us.

The three remaining chapters in the book, amounting in total to not much over 100 pages or so, include the two new chapters which deal specifically with intentional concepts, Chapter 6, ‘Intentionality: Thinking, Imagining, Believing’ concerning §§ 316 - 427, with further use of passages from the former Part II, and Chapter 7, ‘Intentionality, Thinking, Expecting, Intending’ concerning §§ 428 - 693. As McGinn remarks, after the remarkable sections of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein has undertaken to investigate ‘meaning, understanding, rule-following, sensations and privacy’ (Ibid., 216), the second half of the book appears to abandon this clear order so that we are often left with brief, disconnected, ‘and maddeningly inconclusive’ discussions of a wide range of topics that for philosophers who are not particularly sympathetic to his method in the first half of the book, will hardly seem to be of philosophical relevance at all. Furthermore, material in Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment is closely related to passages in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Vols I & II and Zettel. Material in Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vols. I and II is also relevant.

Chapter 6, amounting to 42 pages, contains an interesting 13 page discussion on Moore’s paradox concerning belief, together with a treatment, 6 pages in length, of ‘“I” is Not a Name’, which draws our attention to the different ways in which ‘I am in pain’ and ‘MM is in pain’ are used in the course of explaining why ‘I’ cannot properly be regarded as an referring expression (Ibid., 243). As McGinn points out, commentators who discuss Wittgenstein’s treatment of Moore’s
Paradox have generally tended to concentrate on his critique of how Moore treats ‘p’ but I don’t believe p’, for if this is a genuine contradiction, then ‘I believe that p’ cannot just be a report, as it is on Moore’s reading, of his own mental state. According to McGinn, Wittgenstein believes that the issue is considerably more complex than this would indicate: ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to asserting that p, a point captured in the claim that if there were a verb meaning ‘to falsely believe’, it could have no meaningful use in its first person present tense. McGinn later concludes with the thought that there is a distinctive way of using the words ‘I believe’ that ‘characterizes our capacity to judge, and reveals our relation to our own words’ (Ibid., 256).

A claim which emerges from time to time in these pages is that ‘thinking’ does not denote a process that takes place in the mind or brain (Ibid., 229): this runs counter to the belief, referred to occasionally in the pages of this book, and one which underlies current procedures in the philosophy of mind, that psychological concepts describe internal states that play a causal role in explaining a subject’s behaviour (e.g., Ibid., 138). This is not, of course, to deny that our mental lives, in the most general terms, have indeed been shown to be causally dependent on processes which are neurophysiological in nature. It is, however, to reject what Wittgenstein regards as a wholly primitive interpretation of the use of our concepts, expressed in the tendency to take it for granted that there must be a one-to-one correspondence between physical events in the brain and what come to be pictured as the mental acts that our psychological concepts are understood to describe. Once this thought is abandoned, the tendency towards psycho-physical parallelism evaporates (Cf. Zettel, § 611).

The penultimate chapter is concerned with a different kind of confusion, that of picturing mental states as having representational powers which fly beyond themselves, so that a thought becomes ‘a remarkable mental act’ with an ‘apparent power to anticipate what is possible in reality’ (Ibid., 272). McGinn sees Wittgenstein in these sections that deal with expecting, intending, wishing, as directing our attention to the way in which we operate with our terms in practice: everything lies open to view and nothing extraordinary is involved (Ibid.) We encounter expecting as an internal
Chapter 8 on ‘Seeing and Seeing Aspects’ which in the first edition followed directly from the chapter on ‘The Inner and The Outer’, deals with §§ 398-401 together with a wider range of passages (§§ 111 - 160) from Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment. McGinn begins from the conception of visual experience that would picture what is seen as ‘a field of spatially related coloured shapes that is produced in the perceiving subject by the influence of physical objects on his sensory surfaces (Ibid., 298 et seq.) On this view, however, what would ordinarily be viewed as ‘a friendly smile’, ‘an angry frown’, or ‘a bored look’ become irreducibly subjective, because on this assessment of what is real, these phenomena cannot ‘really’ be seen. According to McGinn, Wittgenstein wishes to trace the roots of this picture back to a basic unclarity about how concepts like ‘visual experience’ and ‘what is seen’ are actually used. Discussing §§ 398 - 401, ‘notoriously difficult passages’ (Ibid., 301), she argues that the visual impression, understood as that to which only the viewer has access, breaks down because it cannot be something which is ‘seen’ in any ordinary sense - when it could be objectively available to others - and this throws doubt on what can be meant by saying that only the viewer can ‘have’ it.

This leads to the introduction of the concept of the visual room, which for the reasons given can have no owner in any proper sense, and this means that on thinking of this visual impression as an object of sight, we have ‘created a chimera’ (Ibid., 307). Far from making a new discovery, a significantly new philosophical way of looking at things, if judged by the standards set by our ordinary discourse, this is no more than a new comparison or way of speaking. As he puts it in § 401, ‘You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object’. This conclusion results from a grammatical investigation into the ordinary use of our concepts, an investigation continued in the sections from Philosophy of Psychology - A Fragment.
There follows the famous treatment of aspect-seeing and the duck-rabbit. McGinn discusses cases in which the possibility of any ambiguity in the interpretation of the picture is simply not recognised, and those in which it is. The point is made that this discussion allows us, with its introduction to a complication in our use of the word ‘see’, to offer a correction to the earlier temptation to think of visual experience solely in terms of a projection of colours and shapes onto sensory surfaces, because we respond to these figures as seeing now one thing, now another. The presentation continues with further examples that reinforce the thought that there are a wide variety of cases that show how complex visual experience actually is, and how it fails to correspond to the simple picture of colours and shapes already mentioned:

Our concept of a representation of what is seen is not restricted to exact copies or straight perceptual reports of what we see, but descriptions which are in part perceptual, part thought, and which are essentially expressive of a visual experience which is not part of perception......representations which are, in the ways we’ve been observing, expressive of experiences which depend upon the subject’s being involved with what he sees: ‘Now it’s a duck’, ‘A rabbit!’ and so on (Ibid., 320).

All of this, in the final analysis, frees us from the idea that, as Wittgenstein puts it in § 158 of the Fragment, what is seen ‘must be describable in purely spatial terms’. The return to the ordinary, complex language-game of what is seen, releases us on this view from the belief that we do not really see the friendliness in a face, for example, for this belief arises from ‘nothing more than a mistaken idea of how the concept of visual experience functions’ (Ibid., 326).

Whilst McGinn is undoubtedly correct to draw our attention to the fact that the second half of the Investigations does not, at least initially, instil the same sense of excitement in the reader as the first, so much depends on the quality of the individual remarks and how the reader is able to respond to them. Some of the material in the Fragment, like some of the material in Zettel, for
example, is amongst the finest that Wittgenstein ever produced.

What is certain is that Marie McGinn has succeeded in providing what is the most sustained attempt in the secondary literature to date to provide a grammatical approach to the *Philosophical Investigations*, and this gives her book an admirable unity that would be difficult to improve upon in a field which is now so replete with varying accounts that even the best of them can suffer the fate of going unnoticed. As McGinn remarks in her Preface (*Ibid.*, xii), the book offers what is still only one way of reading the text, and there are, indeed, ‘matters of both detail and substance which others would regard as contentious or mistaken’. As an example of only one opposing reading - as it happens from the same publisher - which sees Wittgenstein pursuing a range of argumentative strategies in pursuit of his goals, one need only call to mind a recent work by Meredith Williams, whose *Blind Obedience Paradox and Learning in The Later Wittgenstein* (Routledge, Abingon, Oxon, 2010) offers a level of argumentative and interpretative sophistication which some would take to be quite *un*Wittgensteinian. It is also worth mentioning that whilst the series editor declares that each book is ‘bookended by an opening discussion of the context within which the work was written and a closing look at the lasting significance of the text’ (*blurb*), this latter promise is not in this instance actually fulfilled. However, Marie McGinn’s book is none the worse for that. It remains a significant achievement in an extremely crowded field.
ENDNOTES

(1) According to David Stern, it would be an error to lay too much stress on the fact that ‘a rather small proportion of the “Philosophy” chapter of the Big Typescript’ (earliest parts 1931) ‘makes up a rather small proportion of §§ 89 - 133’, and it is ‘far from obvious that the Philosophical Investigations is to be read as carrying out the programme’ set out in that book. David Stern: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations An Introduction (Cambridge, C.U.P., 2004), 123 et seq.


(4) Lars Herzberg: ‘Language-Games and Private Language’ Wittgenstein Key Concepts Edited by Kelly Dean Jolley, (Durham, Acumen, 2010), 42.


As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. A paper on Wittgenstein appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, another on Ebersole / Ayer in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010, a later paper on Wittgenstein in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, March 2013 and a further one on Ryle, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, forthcoming.