CRITICAL NOTICE

When Words Are Called For
A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy
Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall

Equally at home either in the kindergarten or in the philosopher’s study, sentences like ‘the cat is on the mat’ or ‘the pillar box is red’ have, on Avner Baz’s reckoning, something of importance to tell us about the approach that we ought to adopt to a philosophical understanding of language. His main reason for believing this is that one natural and popular response to these examples is to say that they have a meaning dependent upon the meaning of their component parts and how these are strung together. Yet this meaning is independent of any context of use. If, however, context of use is neglected, it will seem obvious that this meaning will be carried into all the multifarious situations in which they might be used to make different possible statements. One will then be inclined to conclude that although these sentences are not saying anything in isolation from context about any particular cats, mats or pillar boxes, we do know the kinds of circumstances in which they might be used to assert true propositions. This point can appear so obvious that it must be perverse to question it. According, however, to William Child, this is only one of a set of ideas that Wittgenstein is subjecting to attack:

Wittgenstein’s view ties the sense of a sentence on an occasion to the point or purpose of uttering it. That contrasts with the traditional, and more orthodox, view that there is a sharp distinction between a sentence’s *semantic* features (features having to do with its meaning) and its *pragmatic* features (features of its use that are not part of its literal meaning). On this way of seeing things, there is a sharp distinction between the literal meaning of a sentence and the point or purpose of uttering it. But Wittgenstein rejects that distinction. In his view...there is no single standard of what a proposition means; and there is no clear, non-arbitrary division between a sentence’s
meaning and other aspects of it use. The very idea that a sentence has a ‘strict and literal meaning’, he thinks, is a philosopher’s myth (1).

So if Child’s Wittgenstein is right, then it would appear that the overwhelming temptation to reflect that ‘the cat is on the mat’, whilst clearly meaningful, is meaningful in part because we can imagine situations in which it can be used to make true statements, is already to neglect a fundamental role that context plays in our understanding of sentences of this kind. It is to neglect how they may be actively used in practice. For in the absence of context, it may be that there is no such thing as ‘using the sentence to make a true statement’. Consider, for example, young Lucian, who has just returned to the UK from Paris, and who blurts out in front of the assembled company ‘the cat is on the mat’. Far from congratulating him on his perspicacity, his elders express an immediate concern whether Lucian has become subject to a kind of mental affliction which forces him to state the obvious, since the presence of the cat hardly seemed to anyone a matter for comment. Our fears are put to rest, however, when his mother explains that there is really nothing to worry about. Lucian has a tendency to show off, sometimes at the cost of embarrassing his family: he is only revealing how much his command of English has recently improved. Our worries over Lucian would, of course, be of an entirely different order if this were a sentence he were to utter all the time whether there was a cat in his presence or not.

But can we even say with certainty what Wittgenstein’s outlook on this matter actually is? The following example seems quite uncommitted to any particular view:

‘After he had said this, he left her as he did the day before.’ -

Do I understand this sentence? Do I understand it just as I should if I heard it in the course of a narrative? If it were set down in isolation I should say, I don’t know what it’s about.

But all the same I should know how this sentence might perhaps be used; I could myself invent a context for it.

(A multitude of familiar paths lead off from these words
in every direction.) (*Philosophical Investigations* Part I, § 525.)

Avner Baz, on the other hand, makes it clear in his new book that he has a particular quarry in mind in emphasising the importance of context:

Why *must* our capacity to competently employ each and every one of our words presuppose a capacity just to apply this word to cases, apart from any particular interest and without doing anything else with the word beyond sheer application? Why *must* there be a purely semantic component to the understanding of every general term - a component that may theoretically be separated from all of the rest of what this understanding involves and requires, and that may fully be cashed in terms of ‘reference’ and ‘truth-conditions’? (*Ibid.*, 119).

Why indeed? What Baz regards as nothing more than a prejudice underlying current research programmes, he understands to form the root of one prevalent objection to Ordinary Language Philosophy as generally understood, *viz.*, that it confuses meaning and use, a complaint based on the very conception of meaning that is in question. Stanley, for example (*Ibid.*, 15), is quoted as arguing for the view that ‘any adequate account of meaning fundamentally employs the conceptions of reference and truth’, whether within a specific context or not. Williamson (*Ibid.*, 16) is quoted as claiming that ‘the reference of a complex expression is a function of the reference of its constituents, and the reference of a sentence determines its truth value’. Bach is quoted as saying (*Ibid.*, 14) that the meaning of a sentence is ‘determined compositionally by the meanings of its constituents in a way that is predictable from how its constituents fit together syntactically’. Searle argues that Ordinary Language Philosophers have confused the truth conditions of a proposition with the point or force of uttering it (*Ibid.*, 10). More generally:
Any analysis of the meaning of a word (or morpheme) must be consistent with the fact that the same word (or morpheme) can mean the same thing in all the grammatically different kinds of sentence in which it can occur (Ibid., 28, Searle as quoted without Baz’s emphases).

Baz is nevertheless careful to point out that he is not questioning every distinction that can be drawn between what may be called ‘semantics’ and what may be called ‘pragmatics’: he is merely trying to question a very particular way of drawing that distinction (Ibid., 120), one which ultimately relies on thinking that the meaning of philosophically troubling expressions can be studied in the abstract, outwith those ordinary situations in which the expressions are used in day-to-day discourse (Ibid., 132). Though he does not present the point in this way here, Baz is reflecting Wittgenstein’s desire to return words from their metaphysical to their everyday use (Investigations § 116), a point which he expresses by saying that the ‘meaning’ of the ordinary language philosopher ‘is not essentially different from the work that we ordinarily and normally do with this word outside of philosophy’ (Ibid., 36). Ultimately, therefore, all this talk about meaning and use should not be thought to constitute an end in itself:

The basic disagreement between OLP and the philosophical tradition it responds to, at any rate, is not about the meaning of ‘meaning’, or even about what meanings are; rather it is about the nature of philosophical difficulty, and the response for which it calls....in appealing to the ordinary and normal uses of a philosophically troubling word, the ordinary language philosopher is seeking to elucidate not its meaning, but rather the particular philosophical puzzlement or difficulty in hand. (Ibid., 37).
As Baz puts it at the end of this first chapter on ‘The Basic Conflict’, and in a way with which students of Wittgenstein will be only too familiar:

Put in Wittgensteinian terms, the assumption that ought to be given up is that by reflecting on words on holiday, we may discover something that is essential to them when they are being employed, and which suffices for sustaining fruitful and significant philosophical inquiry (*Ibid.*, 45).

These considerations reappear throughout the book. Reiterating later on, for example, that it is a fundamental error to assume that it must always be possible to separate the ‘semantic’ and ‘referential’ powers of words from their other powers, Baz hints that separating meaning and use in this way encourages a certain belief: that the traditional problems of philosophy are themselves quite unproblematic, when in fact they gain what ‘sense’ they have from the fact that they rely precisely on our reflecting on words in the abstract, when they are ‘on holiday’, and outwith those particular circumstances in which they are ordinarily used (*Ibid.*, 125). Remarking that the difficulty to which he is drawing our attention here affects not only professional philosophers, he adds:

Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘picture’ is relevant here. Wittgensteinian pictures are prototheories, as it were. Similar to theories, they can interfere with our seeing aright the ordinary and normal functioning of our words. And we needn’t be philosophers to form pictures for ourselves - for example, of the soul as separable from the body, or of the soul of the other as hidden behind, or inside, her body (*Ibid.*, Note 44).

Baz, in fact, has already in his earlier treatment of Austin’s ‘Other Minds’ tackled this problem when he argues that Austin aims to transform this traditional philosophical idea of what it is to ‘know’ about other minds, in order to resolve the difficulty to which it gives rise:

he invites us to consider that coming to know that someone else is, for example, angry is not a matter of drawing an inference from
one thing (‘behavior’) to another (‘the anger itself’) but rather is
a matter of recognizing what the other feels and manifests in her
behavior to be anger - telling that it is anger she feels. One thing
this suggests is that the essential difference between our relation
to our own feelings and emotions and our relation to the other’s
feelings and emotions is better seen as metaphysical, and ethical,
as opposed to epistemological (Ibid., 42).

This is an echo of the Wittgensteinian point (Investigation §§ 300 - 1) that the wholly
misleading picture of ‘other minds’, already described by Baz, that may accompany our practice
of attributing thoughts and feelings to others, especially when doing philosophy, is incidental to
what our ordinary reactions actually reveal to us, viz., that the human body is the expression of
what is ‘inner’. That, in Baz’s sense, is the ‘metaphysical’ point he understands Austin to be making.
Consequently, that the problem at stake here could even be thought to be ‘epistemological’ would
on this view depend for Wittgenstein on attempting to apply the misleading picture in question.

Baz returns to this matter in his final chapter when he invites comparison between
a method of approach he discovers both in Kant and within ordinary language philosophy. Once
again referring to Wittgenstein’s pictures as ‘proto-theories’ (Ibid., 204), he interestingly elaborates
on this comparison when he manages to identify an idea found in Kant with a well-known feature
of Wittgenstein’s later work:

Kant’s idea that certain mental representations or pictures
may seem harmless when considered on their own, and that
their inadequacy only betrays itself when we attempt to reason
or otherwise proceed on their basis, is strikingly echoed in a
series of remarks in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
(Ibid., 207).
The remarks in question are §§ 422 - 426, a series of passages in which Wittgenstein brilliantly unravels the part that a picture can come to play in directing the philosopher towards a misleading theoretical understanding of what our ordinary words convey. Baz again talks of the soul or mind of another as ‘an entity or item separable from the human body’ (Ibid., 208). Taken in itself, the idea may be quite harmless, but as Baz indicates, the sense it acquires within philosophy depends entirely on the role being allocated to the picture. Glossing the ‘straight highway’ of § 426 as ‘the philosopher’s pure “application” of the word’, Baz interprets the ‘permanent closure’ of the highway as the philosopher’s inability to use the misleading term. Baz, if indirectly, is pointing here to the following conclusion: certain that this picture captures the real meaning of what it is to talk about the soul of another person, the form of anti-realism espoused by Kripke’s Wittgenstein can then be argued to be a direct consequence of the inability to apply it. (2) As in Investigations, Part II, vii, 4, p 184, what the language here primarily describes is a picture, but it remains obscure what has to be done with it. Wittgenstein indicates that it is by exploring the detours and the side roads of § 426 that we will come to discover, not Kripke’s assertibility conditions, but the actual truth conditions of the statement in question.

Ordinary Language Philosophy in its proper historical context is a fairly broad church, and it would be highly misleading to suggest that Avner Baz in this book is attempting in any way to capture the role it actually played in the twenty years or so after Wittgenstein’s death (3). What in effect he is attempting to do is to use a method he broadly identifies in the work of Wittgenstein and Austin, in order to undermine a ‘current research program’ in philosophy of language which he regards as totally misguided. Referring in the opening of his Introduction to the promise of a fresh start in the approach to the problems of philosophy that was offered by ‘ordinary language philosophy’, he remarks that it is ‘now widely held that OLP has somehow been refuted or otherwise seriously discredited’ (Ibid., 1). Only too aware of what he refers to as ‘the deep hostility and dismissive attitude to Wittgenstein’s work’ (Ibid., Preface, xi) which he finds expressed within ‘wide circles of mainstream analytic philosophy’, he even finds himself having to apologise for what may to some readers have the
appearance of a form of missionary zeal he deploys in the attempt to undermine the views of
those whose attacks on Wittgenstein are ‘harsh, impatient, and heavily reliant on rhetoric’ (*Ibid.*, xiii). But are things really that bad? Here is a representative view of Ordinary Language
Philosophy from Scott Soames, hopefully not too reliant on rhetoric:

> Once a reasonably cohesive and self-conscious approach to philosophy
> characterized by rough and ready adherence to T1–T3, the school
> flourished for a time, and eventually died.

**T1.** All philosophical problems are linguistic, arising from the misunderstanding
and misuse of language.

**T2.** Meaning, in so far as it is central to philosophy, is not to be studied from a
theoretical or scientific perspective. Instead, philosophers must attend to
subtle aspects of language use, and show how misuse of words leads to
particular philosophical confusions.

**T3.** Illuminating philosophical analyses almost never state necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of a term; instead they trace
the intricate and philosophically significant web connecting the use of
that term to the uses of other, related terms.

To my knowledge, no major philosopher today adheres to T1–T3. (4)

Referring to Kripke as someone who repudiates all three of Soames’s conditions, he continues
by saying of Kripke that ‘His affinity with ordinary language philosophy consists primarily in
respecting what we pre-theoretically think, and distrusting unmoored, revisionary speculation.
In this he is closer to Moore than to ordinary language philosophers’ (*Op. cit.*). Although some
people may think of Moore as the archetypal ‘ordinary language philosopher’, a belief we may see
confirmed by Austin’s famous endorsement of Moore (5), we have also come to think of him as a
philosopher who espouses a form of common sense metaphysics, in which there ‘really’ are other
minds behind people’s bodies and a ‘real’ external world behind their sense-data *etc*. It is difficult
not to think of the Kripke of ‘Wittgenstein and Other Minds’ (6) with his adherence to what we
'pre-theoretically think’ as someone whose approach does not in this respect seem all that different from Moore’s. This, ironically, would make him a target for Avner Baz as a philosopher who relies heavily on his ‘intuitions’, although Kripke admittedly makes only a minor appearance in Baz’s book in precisely this connection, where discussion of his treatment of the necessary and the a priori is confined to a page reference with related footnote running from 85-6. (7)

In a short Introduction, Avner Baz advises that he had originally intended to present his book without its two opening chapters, on the grounds that the approach he adopts could be viewed in its own light, and free from what he refers to as the ‘ancestral baggage’ associated with the term ‘ordinary language philosophy’. It may be, as he advises, that a number of readers will gain some advantage from beginning at the third chapter ‘Must Philosophers Rely on Intuitions?’ where he engages directly with ‘the prevailing program’ and associated issues relating to ‘current debate’; but the vast majority of readers who take the sub-title of his book seriously will much prefer to see this debate in relation to the historical period in which his general method of approach originally flourished, an approach with the distinctively Wittgensteinian credentials that Avner Baz clearly wishes to ascribe to it. The first 86 pages of the book, amounting to 40% of its total, are therefore well spent in bringing the reader to the point at which Baz engages with what he calls ‘the theorist’s question’ about the proper application of a concept, one based on the philosopher’s ‘intuitions’ over how it is to be applied. The following example from chapter 3, and how Baz reacts to it, well illustrates the flavour of his approach:

Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.

Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?

(Ibid., 106 et seq.)
Baz, in accordance with his preferred method, immediately raises doubts whether this question as framed allows for the availability of resources to properly answer it:

The philosopher who holds the prevailing conception of language and is committed to its attendant research program assumes that the question that we are here invited to answer is one that, as competent employers of ‘know that’ and its cognates, we ought in principle to be able to answer correctly, and for the simple reason that our ‘capacity’ for answering this question correctly is also required for the competent employment of these expressions in everyday life (Ibid., 107).

It can come of no surprise that, on Baz’s account, there is no ordinary answer to the question posed, because it is not a genuine question. That aside, it may be felt that were it not for the importance of the issues he is raising about the viability of the ‘research program’ in question, he might be charged with making rather heavy weather of this story, because the discussion runs on and off for a further twenty pages. What has to be established is that this tale about Bob and Jill raises ‘the theorist’s question’ because, as presented, it cannot be provided with an ordinary answer. Let it be taken for granted that an American car is a car produced by an American-owned company, given that a Nissan manufactured in the USA, for example, may still be thought to be a Japanese car. If we accept that Bob may know that Jill drives a Buick whilst mistakenly believing that a Buick is really a European car, and that he can have come to know that Jill drives an American car without knowing its make or model, this must lead us to doubt the implication that ‘Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car’ solely on the grounds that he knows her to drive a Buick, for in some contexts at least this may be assuming too much. Furthermore, as the story is presented, the proper conclusion to draw from Bob’s failure to keep his knowledge about Jill’s current car up to date, is just that he mistakenly believes that she still drives a Buick when in fact she now drives a Pontiac. If asked in these specific circumstances whether Jill drives an American car, Bob may very well
answer that he *knows* that she does because he knows her to drive a Buick; although *we* know from the story that in entertaining this belief on *these* grounds he is simply mistaken. But there remain no *other* grounds for *any* belief entertained by Bob about the national origin, American or otherwise, of the car she drives. The ‘theorist’s question’ is arising in a vacuum. Consequently, far from raising a *genuine* question whether Bob ‘really’ in these circumstances ‘knows’ or only ‘believes’ that Jill drives an American car, one to be answered by an appeal to our ‘intuitions’, the question in the context as described has no genuine application. It would arise again as a genuine question if Bob, say, had heard that Jill had secretly and, contrary to her employer’s ‘American-only’ policy, managed to buy a Jaguar, in which case he would have good grounds for believing that the car she was driving was not American after all (8).

If we are prepared to accept that this is a pretty good rendering of the true significance on Baz’s assessment of the tale of Bob and Jill, then one will be inclined to agree with the conclusion at which he arrives after a further two chapters which expand on it by providing further examples relating directly to the contextualist v anti-contextualist debate as it takes place in the current literature:

I have not denied that questions that look or sound just like the theorist’s question may naturally arise in nonphilosophical contexts. My overarching contention, rather, is this: when competently raised, everyday questions concerning someone’s knowledge of this or that have a point - they are expressive in one way or another of some particular interest in that person and his epistemic (or other) relation to such and such. In competently going about answering everyday questions, or trying to.....we are beholden to their point and are guided by it. And no such point is present when we are invited by the philosopher to intuit whether the protagonist of his example knows......All that ordinarily and normally guides us in answering everyday questions has been
methodically removed, and we are left with nothing but the fictional

narrative and some familiar words to which we are invited to respond...

(Ibid., 189).

On this view, it is hardly surprising that Baz should conclude by remarking that the theorist’s ‘semantic’ question, one which is totally unrelated to the ordinary circumstances which surround the day-to-day use of the relevant terms, should seem so bewildering and intractable, demanding a wholly ‘intuitive’ answer.

This, as has already been amply illustrated, is a further expression of the main point of his book, one which constantly appears in different guises throughout. It emerges in another form when he argues that one of the ordinary language philosopher’s important revelations lies in his recognition of how easy it is when doing philosophy to utter a string of familiar words which have all the appearance of saying something when they in effect succeed in saying nothing, or nothing clear that ‘the utterer could reasonably be taken to have meant to say’ (Ibid., 12). This is a Wittgensteinian point, one echoed again in Baz’s identification of three features that underlie the ‘prevailing conception of meaning’, a) that for every word there is something one can refer to as its ‘meaning’, b) that this point applies equally to sentences, and c) that at least in the case of singular substantives, the meaning of a word is identifiable with something that it ‘denotes’ (Ibid., 13 et seq.) Arguing against these presuppositions by drawing attention to the importance of context is central to the replies that he provides to Grice, Soames and Searle in the first chapter on ‘The Basic Conflict’. It also plays a role in replying to Williamson later on.

This point is also central to the comments he makes about someone who is perhaps his most recent predecessor as a proponent of ordinary language philosophy, Oswald Hanfling in his Philosophy and Ordinary Language: The Bent and Genius of Our Tongue (London, Routledge, 2000) (Ibid., 2, Note 2). On Baz’s assessment, Hanfling appeals to ‘what we say’, as opposed to what it ‘makes sense to say’, and this means that his appeal to ‘existing standards of correct use and inference’ (Hanfling Ibid., 202), is almost inevitably going to subject him to charges of begging
the question from the perspective of the ‘traditional philosopher’. Classic objections to familiar arguments from the paradigm case, for example, consist in pointing out that the mere existence of ordinary criteria by which we can determine when someone is acting freely, or has certain thoughts and feelings, does not ultimately justify a belief in ‘free will’ or in ‘other minds’; for these ‘beliefs’ involve acceptance of the truth of certain metaphysical theses which ‘traditional philosophers’ are putting in question. The point already emphasised about Moore is that he would appear to have treated these theses as ‘literally’ true. Yet, as philosophers like A.J. Ayer never tired of pointing out, from the fact that there are ordinary situations in which we are prepared to accept that people have certain thoughts and feelings, it does not follow that the theory which underlies these kinds of attributions, viz., that there ‘really’ are other minds, can actually be justified. Whilst it would be unfair to claim categorically that Hanfling, unlike Malcolm on occasion, fails to recognise this objection, and the kind of answer that Wittgenstein provides to it - that the philosopher is himself confused in these kinds of cases by misleading pictures of his own - Hanfling’s book has not arguably received the critical attention that Baz would appear to suggest that it merits.

Exhibiting at least some of the characteristics of a philosophical original, and having already elicited glowing reports on its dust jacket from Stanley Cavell and Juliet Floyd, Avner Baz’s new book, like all good treatments of its kind, will appeal at different levels to readers with different interests. On the one hand, it makes a contribution to ‘current debate’ on contextualism and criticises a conventional and unquestioned ‘research program’ in analytic philosophy, whilst on the other it manages to explore the rationale behind the methodology implicit in Austin’s writings and especially in the later work of Wittgenstein. As such it cannot avoid making some contribution to the exegesis of passages in the Philosophical Investigations, as it succeeds in doing in its treatment of §§ 422- 427. These passages are central to an understanding of what Wittgenstein is questioning in the accepted historical approach to ‘the problems of philosophy’, which regards them as arising genuinely from, in Soames’s words, what we ‘pre-theoretically think’. But, in terms of Wittgenstein’s methodology, this is a highly dangerous conception which attempts to secure a kind of theoretical status for what,
at the level at which it is said to arise, cannot be truly theoretical in any proper sense. Those pictures are misleading precisely because, at the level at which they do arise, they are truly incidental to the practice, say, of making knowledge claims (Baz), or of talking about other minds.

This specific methodology can be used to distinguish Wittgenstein from others who practised ‘ordinary language philosophy’. Indeed, there are commentators who would prefer to treat Wittgenstein’s method as one which is unique, so that he ought to be removed from the category of ‘ordinary language philosopher’ altogether. However, insofar as ‘ordinary language philosophy’ has already been referred to as a rather broad church, any reasons we might provide for saying that Wittgenstein was, or was not an ‘ordinary language philosopher’ in some pre-defined sense can have no effect on the overall value of Avner Baz’s new book. (9)
ENDNOTES


(2) Saul Kripke: *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982), Postscript. This helps to explain why the difference between Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Wittgenstein should sometimes seem to stand on a knife-edge: everything depends on how committed one feels towards the picture in question.


(4) Scott Soames: ‘What we know now that we didn’t know then: reply to critics of The Age of Meaning - The Ordinary Language School: reply to Weatherson’, *Philosophical Studies*, 2007, Volume 135, Number 3, Pages 461 - 478.

(5) This relates to Austin’s remark: ‘Some people like Witters, but Moore is *my* man’, quoted by Peter Hacker (*Op. cit.,* 172 and Endnote 105, p. 314). A great deal depends, of course, on precisely what aspects of Moore’s work Austin was alluding to. It is also worthwhile listening to what must also seem a rather odd comment from Ryle: ‘What had, since the early days of this century, been the practice of G.E. Moore has received a rationale from Wittgenstein; and I expect that when the curtain is lifted we shall also find that Wittgenstein’s concrete methods have increased the power, scope and delicacy of the methods by which Moore has for so long explored in detail the internal logic of what we say.’ (Gilbert Ryle ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ in *Wittgenstein The Man and His Philosophy* (New York: Delta, Dell Pub., 1967) originally a B.B.C. Third Programme talk, May 26th, 1951. Odd indeed if Moore is providing a metaphysics of ‘Common Sense’ based on our ‘intuitions’ about the existence of ‘other minds’ and of an ‘external world’.


(7) Baz is also firmly of the traditional belief that the questions addressed by Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* are thoroughly conceptual rather than ‘metaphysical’ in nature, a belief which will be sacrilege to those who are wholly convinced by the ‘turn’ in analytic philosophy wrought by Kripke’s thinking. Whilst this is far too wide a question to discuss here, there are aspects of Kripke’s work, on natural kinds, for example, where it is possible to regard the necessity we would appear to attribute to certain scientific statements e.g., ‘water = H2O’ as something which arises more from our relation to our scientific practice than to overtly ‘metaphysical’ considerations, ie., ‘true in all possible worlds’. See my ‘Necessities of Origin and Constitution’, *Philosophical Investigations* January 2010, 24.

(8) Should it not already be obvious, although Bob may even in this case have 101 other reasons for thinking that Jill drives an American car, these as ordinary reasons could not be relevant to ‘the theorist’s question’, e.g., Bob may have a friend in the police force who has told him confidentially that Jill is to be charged with drink driving in her car, said to be American, though his friend does not remember the make. It is also of minor interest to note that although, culturally, a Jaguar is regarded as the British car par excellence, had this mention of the Jaguar been made in 2007 rather than in 2012, then on the criterion used here, Jaguar under Ford ownership would have been an American brand after all, just as it is now Indian (Tata).

(9) Constantinos Athanasopoulos has pointed out to me that this ought to throw doubt on a great deal of what has already been said by Baz about Wittgenstein as ‘an ordinary language philosopher’. But if any concept is a family resemblance concept, then it is surely that of an ‘ordinary language philosopher’. Baz in any event has no desire to see what he wishes to establish, as standing or falling on some pre-defined use of this term.
As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, PHILOSOPHIA, THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH (2008) PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2010) and ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY (forthcoming late 2012-13).