

## **British Wittgenstein Society 2018 – Abstracts for parallel sessions**

### **Sunday 29 July**

#### **15.30-17.00 Parallel Group Session 1**

##### **1.1a Tom Eide Osa (University of Bergen) – Language games and grammars in music performance practices**

The hypothesis of this music performance research project is the existence of diverse and systematic intersubjective ways of playing and singing within communities of practice. The uses of different bundles of selected ways of playing and singing – at different times and in different places – constitute different music performance practices, cultures and lifeworlds. By being able to correctly play and sing in a particular style and genre, the players and singers show their knowledge in that music performance practice. They play and sing by the culturally established rules – they master the grammar of the current aesthetic practice.

When I portray music practices like this, I bring together music performance practices and Wittgenstein's ideas about language games and grammar/rules. The claiming of rules and standards for how to play and sing in music practices will for advanced musicians and singers – if not primarily verbally articulated, so in practice – be obvious/taken for granted and unproblematic. This leads us to knowledge and ways of articulating knowledge, to who knows what in what ways, and challenges in understanding and recognizing nonverbal intersubjective expressions and practices – such as music performances – as knowledge.

If we want to understand something, gain insight into areas of knowledge, insights can be achieved by investigating how insights are taught and learned, something Meredith Williams in Wittgenstein's spirit touches on: "I will argue that *how* we learn, as initiates into practices, is constitutive of *what* we learn" (Williams, M. 2010. *Blind Obedience: Paradox and Learning in the Later Wittgenstein*: Routledge). This is the method in my research: searching for 'what' by looking at 'how'. Based on fieldwork with video in music practices, I try to sketch surveyable representations of how ways of playing and singing are used. I identify and analyse musical language games in musical practices where knowledge is mediated, instructed and taught in social practices – where experts teach the less experienced in large groups/ensembles. The sketches will say something about the grammars of the investigated practices.

By going from language games to music performance games, I examine nonverbal ways of playing in music practices. Analogous to the meaning of words in language games, the meaning of sounding ways of playing is understood as their use according to the grammar of the respective style and genre, in the respective aesthetic practice as a music performance game. In his writings Wittgenstein frequently uses educational situations to bring out philosophical ideas. In identifying grammars in music performance practices, I look at three influential expert musicians' teaching as paradigmatic case studies: a singer teaching Norwegian vocal folk music, a trumpeter/conductor leading an American style big band; and a violinist/conductor working with a string orchestra. Grammars are identified by the researcher as normative knowledge regarding uses of ways of playing and singing is highlighted and pointed to in various ways during mediations in numerous language games/music performance games involving interplay between musician/teacher and

students/musicians.

### **1.1b Carla Carmona (University of Seville) – Overcoming the distinction between the inner and the outer in arts education: a close look at the case of dance education**

The command of the tendency toward affectation among immature practitioners is one of the targets of arts education. This paper shall examine the idea that overcoming the distinction between the inner and the outer, against which the later Wittgenstein battled so much, is useful in order to triumph over affectation in the practice of the arts. Once I have offered a general account of the problem, considering the visual arts and music, I shall focus on the case of dance practice where “the invention of interiority” becomes particularly obvious.

Wittgenstein’s dialogical approach to persistent philosophical tangles shall prove useful in this context. I shall be looking closely at how language is used in the dance studio, both at dance instructions and at the kinds of statements that are common among practitioners. Affectation can be a result of the following misconception on the side of the dancer: “I have to make extra effort to make sure they see what it is going on inside me”. By contrast, I shall consider how the dancer relates to the mirror. While learning a movement, or while perfecting it, the dancer stands before the mirror. Even in the case of experienced dancers, a movement is most often acknowledged as true from the outside, after the evaluation of the image that one gets back from the mirror. The dancer still checks with the mirror even if she feels that she has got it right. In fact, while the dancer repeats the movement in question and examines closely her image in the mirror, one often hears expressions such as “I got it, I think I got it! Let me see”. Besides, when a dancer cannot check with the mirror, she often feels the need to confirm with a fellow dancer that she has got the movement right. Thus, expressions such as “Please, check! Did I get it right?” or “Does it look alright?” abound in the dance studio.

All these cases are examples of the fact that the dancer uses outer evidence to make sure that she is on the right track. The relevance of this kind of evidence shall show that both the distinction between the inner and the outer, and the picture of the execution of a movement as a complex internal process, are wrong and confusing. If the dancer herself examines her movements from the outside, it does not make sense to think that a competent spectator needs help to understand the workings of the movement in question, and appreciate it in a full manner. Pointing out these aspects about the dance practice to the dancer will stop her from picturing the activity of dance as a mysterious inner process that cannot be shared easily unless one makes extra effort and spells everything out. This kind of insight leaves little room for affectation.

Moreover, I shall propose that understanding that the inner is the outer can shed light on the relationship between representation and content in art from a non-dualistic perspective.

### **1.2a Renia Gasparatou (University of Patras) – Science education and the tightrope between scientism and relativism: a Wittgensteinian balancing act**

Science Education Research (SER) proposes strategies by which science education could offer students an accurate understanding of the sciences. However, many of SER’s proposals lurk into *scientism* or *relativism* or even both. Each of these mentalities misrepresents the sciences; and both could be prevented if SER incorporated a Wittgensteinian account of what it is to understand something.

Wittgenstein suggests that in order to understand what "eight" or "banana" means, I don't have to recall a definition of eight or a banana; I ought to be able to actually use eight or banana to do stuff: articulate a syllogism about 2+2+4 bananas, make suggestions about how many bananas one should eat per day, give advice on where to store my bananas. In fact, even to understand the ostensive definition "this is a banana", I need to grasp a whole set of rules around the practice of using ostensive definitions: the gesture of how to point, where to look when one is pointing, where to focus. It is because I have grasped the practice of ostensive definitions that I understand the link between, e.g., the phrase "this is a banana" and bananas (*PI*§1-5). To understand something then, you need to engage in the practices around it and grasp the rules or the criteria that underlie such practices (*PI*§1-38). Rules may be implicit and subject to change; in fact, they do change all the time (*PI*§138-242). Note however, that to change a rule means to replace it with a different rule; it does not mean there are no rules.

Most slippery slopes of science education and SER begin with our habit to look for a definition pointing to the meaning of a term; or, having failed to find one, deny there is any meaning attached to the term. *Scientism* is an excessive admiration towards science, together with a tendency to impose its method to all questions. The basis of this admiration however, is the belief that there is such a thing called science, that a definition is possible. *Relativism*, on the other hand, assumes that, since there is no such thing called science, there is no real meaning attached to the term. The former misses the fact that the term cannot have a single definition, methodological or otherwise; to understand it is rather to understand a matrix of overlapping, often implicit, always evolving rules that one needs to grasp while engaging in scientific practices. The latter misses the fact that there are certain criteria about what kinds of things we call by a name; that the meaning of the term "science" is attached to the rules governing scientific practices, rules that even though they may be context dependent or evolving, they are always at play.

Despite its many advancements, there are many instances of SER's terminology and suggested practices that imply scientific or relativistic misunderstandings of the sciences. I will point out to some of them and show that a Wittgensteinian account of understanding could help SER avoid such misconceptions.

### **1.2b Magdalena Kersting (University of Oslo) – The role of imagination in the language games of the science classroom**

Imagination plays a crucial role in science practice and education, because science often deals with the unobservable. The aim of this work is to re-examine imaginative practices in the science classroom from a Wittgensteinian perspective. For Wittgenstein, imagination is not limited to the arts; it extends through the sciences and lies at the heart of our thinking (Harris, 2017, 2018). Indeed, imagination is central to the thought and method of Wittgenstein.

In recent years, science educators have promoted a sociocultural view towards learning. In light of this increased interest in classroom practices of discourse and participation, Wittgenstein's writing serves as a natural starting point to conceptualize science learning as successful participation in language games (Heckler, 2016; Roth, 2015; Serder & Jakobsson, 2016). This work aims to examine the role of imagination in the language games of the science classroom.

Adopting a Wittgensteinian perspective allows exploring imaginative processes as collaborative practice. Instead of conceiving of imagination as mental images within the

mind of an individual, science educators can watch the patterns of imagination unfold in the language games of students. In these activities, imagination might take on organizational features (Nishizaka, 2003) or it might become visible in form of “imaginary language games” that help to clarify the use of words (Heckler, 2014).

To identify imagination in the language games of the science classroom, two key concepts of Wittgenstein’s work can give guidance: “Seeing-as” and “standing fast”.

### **Seeing-as**

Wittgenstein introduced the concept of “seeing-as” to account for the plural ways of perceiving images (1997). Seeing-as is not an ordinary act of visual apprehension but rather a special sort of seeing which occurs under certain conditions (Seligman, 1976). Alternating between ambivalent realities, seeing-as presupposes experience with a phenomenon and depends on intention and perspective.

Seeing-as aligns with an educational characterisation of imagining as ‘juxtaposing displacements’. Nemirovsky and Ferrara describe imaginary activities as jumping from one point of view to another, as juxtaposing glimpses of seemingly disjointed aspects of abstract concepts (Nemirovsky & Ferrara, 2009). To understand imaginative processes, this work suggests putting focus on the contrast between seeing and seeing-as when students engage in the language games of the science classroom.

### **Standing fast**

Science educators have used Wittgenstein’s concept of “standing fast” to analyse students’ actions in language games (Lundqvist, Almqvist, & Östman, 2009; Serder & Jakobsson, 2016). Studying which words stand fast in language games allows insights into the collaborative and situated processes of meaning making. However, there seems untapped potential of using this approach to characterize imaginative practices. Looking at Wittgenstein’s conception of imagination, Harris notes that “things are conditioned by what has been said before, but also there are endless possibilities of language and what I shall call new directions of projection” (Harris, 2017). This work suggests combining Harris’ observation with the analytic lens of standing fast to explore imagination as something held fast by a vast set of possibilities or projections of action.

## **1.3a Shannon Rodgers – Minding education**

The older I get the more I realize how terribly difficult it is for people to understand each other, and I think that what misleads one is the fact that they all look so much like each other. If some people looked like elephants and others like cats, or fish, one wouldn’t expect them to understand each other and things would look much more like what they really are (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Letter to P. Sraffa*, 23 August, 1949 in Constantine Sandis, *If Some People Looked Like Elephants and Others Like Cats: Wittgenstein on Understanding Others and Forms of Life*).

The efficacy of magic implies a belief in magic. The latter has three complementary aspects: first, the sorcerer’s belief in the effectiveness of his techniques; second, the patient’s or victim’s belief in the sorcerer’s power; and, finally, the faith and expectations of the group, which constantly acts as a sort of gravitational field within which the relationship between sorcerer and bewitched is located and defined (Claude Levi-Strauss, (1963) *Structural Anthropology*, p. 168).

Excerpts from one of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s letters and from Claude Levi-Strauss’s *Structural Anthropology* provide metaphors for what follows in this paper. Perhaps educators are victims of sorcery, bewitched by a scientific picture of the world. Under a

spell, where it is assumed that what another *knows* and *understands* are observable and measurable, educators participate in a kind of magic when assessing students. As the seeming efficacy of magic leads to a *belief in* magic, so too, does the seeming efficacy of assessment lead to a *belief in* assessment. Specifically, one must believe that the “un-seeable” (in this case, another’s knowledge and understanding) *can* be made “seeable” – a kind of magic where the invisible becomes visible, the concealed is revealed and the hidden is exposed.

My purpose is to argue that given the relationship among the concepts of mind, knowledge, education and assessment, educators must pay attention to our current view of mind. Educators use assessment practices, for example, to reduce complex, abstract concepts such as knowledge, understanding and mind because of a commitment to a particular view *of* mind. To understand this relationship, mind’s primacy must be acknowledged. As there is significant debate about the idea of mind, examination of this debate must *precede* discussion of deep, conceptual problems in our learning theories, assessment practices and views of education. The primary concerns I address in this paper include: the degree to which a particular view of mind frames the aim(s) of education, particularly framing what knowledge and understanding *are* and what assessment practices are best; and that any view of mind inherits a problematic history and confused vocabulary. To escape this “fly bottle,” and to address these concerns, the analysis includes:

- A brief, historical account of mind from philosophy of mind
- An examination of how metaphors of mind are used in an attempt to clarify the concept of mind
- Thought experiments from philosophy of mind used as entry points to encourage new and deeper dialogue about mind and education

### **1.3b Ruth Heilbronn (UCL Institute of Education) – Stories well told: ethics education following Wittgenstein**

Wittgenstein offers us text which invites us to attend and to respond, mostly through questions and stories but sometimes without guidance. We are ‘the reader in the text’, making sense, or not, in our own way. The opening of the *Investigations* (PI § 1) is representative of the writing in the book and the beginning of some of its central lessons. Its four paragraphs contain two stories, first from St. Augustine and in the 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph, Wittgenstein’s story about buying apples. When we get to read Wittgenstein’s story, we understand that Augustine’s view of language acquisition is wrong. Language is culturally and socially learnt. Wittgenstein’s story tells us what we need to know to make up our own minds about Augustine’s linguistic theory. Narrative is crucial to understanding Wittgenstein and his way of showing not telling.

Significantly in ethics, Wittgenstein tells us it is ‘enquiry into what is valuable or into what is really important... into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living’ (LE p. 5), but when we try to capture ethical theory we find ourselves constantly ‘running up against the walls of our cage’ which is ‘perfectly, absolutely hopeless’ (LE p. 12). Ethics, like religion and aesthetics, cannot be transmitted as a body of knowledge. There is a multiplicity of moral grammars. ‘Light dawns gradually over the whole’ (OC § 141), because what we believe ‘is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions’. There needs to be an initiation into a form of life, a becoming within a practice of life. Showing in its wider sense, not telling in its narrow sense is a way of inducting children into the practices of ethical life and examples and stories are important.

This paper aims to account for moral education that accords with Wittgenstein's views on culture and language and the impossibility of ethical theory. How might children develop a moral sense? Where might ethics usefully situate itself in the school curriculum? Wittgenstein thought that art rather than science is a gateway to understanding in existential matters. 'We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place' (PI § 109). Since we cannot tell children anything meaningful about ethics, we need to initiate them into ethical situations. Literature and the arts offer up ways of making connections, using the imagination and stimulating moral imagination and sympathy. Drawing on Wittgenstein this paper argues, with Nussbaum, Greene and others, that we must protect the arts and humanities in the school curriculum against the technically rational agenda that is diminishing their curriculum time and importance, in the context of current demands made by a performative agenda.

Wittgenstein (1965), *Lecture on Ethics*, *The Philosophical Review*, 74 (1): 3-12 (LE)

Wittgenstein (1972), *Philosophical investigations* (3rd edition) (Eds.) R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe (PI).

Wittgenstein (1974), *On Certainty* (Eds) G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe (OC)

#### **1.4a Nuno Venturinha (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) – Wittgenstein and the epistemology of education**

In his later philosophy Wittgenstein describes our social practices in terms of "language games". His view is that language is not acquired by means of an instruction that is independent of life. Even infants are already in the midst of a certain activity when they learn their first words. Learning the meaning of words is, indeed, but part of an extraordinarily complex process that involves the grasping of key epistemic operators. A child learns the word "horse" at the same time that she learns, or has learned, many other things. For example, she learns that the same word is used for *real* horses and *decorative* or *toy* horses. But she also learns that decorative or toy horses are *real*, in contrast with *non-real* decorative or toy horses, as when they are drawn or imagined. She learns that she can touch the horse, if it exists, and feel a surface because it has a body, be it a living or an inanimate body. She learns that the distance to that body can be changed through some movement of her. And she starts to integrate all these data into a coherent whole, according to and by means of which she acts. We can understand why Wittgenstein takes up Frege's context principle in his philosophy. It would be of little use to consult the dictionary in order to learn the meaning of words if we were not familiar with innumerable meanings allied to them. I shall claim that this, for the later Wittgenstein, corresponds to the natural course of our lives and not to any possible *status quo* determined by culturalization. That even babies apply modal categories when they take an object as existing, looking at it or touching it, is not something caused by culture. Some animals do exactly the same at a basic level. What this shows, I argue, is that our social dependency, with its rule-following, lies within a deeper form of ontological dependence which matches the very idea of human nature. This allows us to conciliate the contextualism that must be conceived in order to render a situation epistemologically intelligible with the objectivism that the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions seems to challenge. It is not due to the fact that I have learned a language, which comes together with a worldview, that a cup of coffee may be said to sit on a table. The "cup of coffee" is "sitting" upon the thing I call "table" even if I were not to notice it, and I can only notice it because language was developed in accordance with the nature of the world.

#### **1.4b Cristiane Gottschalk (University of São Paulo) – Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy on norms and descriptions for clarifying educational confusion**

It is well known that in the second phase of his thought, Wittgenstein does not aim at the production of theses, but only the clarification of traditional problems of philosophy. My purpose will be a reflection on the results of his philosophical therapy, in particular the statements that touch on themes dear to educators in the field of teaching and learning. For example, statements such as:

*Any explanation has its foundation in training. (Educators ought to remember this). (Zettel, §419).*

*When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.) (On Certainty, §141).*

*At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) (On Certainty, §612).*

Could these statements, among many others in Wittgenstein's extensive work, eventually give rise to an educational theory? I will argue that these statements do not constitute theses but are only clarifications; and yet they can help to revise our pedagogical practices and prevent learning difficulties that stem, for the most part, from a referential conception of language. In opposition to this reductionist conception of language, Wittgenstein leads us to see how we actually use our linguistic expressions, without having to resort to metaphysical theories as to how we access their meanings. Using his philosophical therapy, the philosopher shows that meanings are constituted within the language itself; where part of its statements begin to exercise a normative function, unlike empirical statements, with a descriptive function. These different uses constitute what he will come to call the deep grammar of our language, as opposed to superficial grammar. From this new perspective, grammatical statements play the role of *condition of meaning* for what we do and say. The confusions begin when we consider that some of these statements would have a descriptive function, in my view, one of the main misunderstandings that affect the educational environment. For example, we come to naturalize statements that are conventional in nature, which leads to various confusions in our pedagogical practices. To avoid these confusions, I will argue that the concepts forged by Wittgenstein such as "language-game," "family resemblances," "forms of life," and particularly the concept of "following rules" are powerful tools that could contribute to teacher training. In possession of them, the teacher may be able to see that our grammatical statements are like rules that we learn to follow blindly, whose necessity stems from our daily actions, so commonplace that we no longer notice them. And yet, it is these statements and actions that are the condition for there to be, in fact, learning. I will conclude that one of the tasks of the philosophy of education of Wittgensteinian inspiration could be to explore this domain that is overlooked in classrooms, even before our eyes, thus avoiding possible confusion arising from educational theories and public policies still attached to a referential conception of language.

**Monday 30 July**

**09.00-10.30 Parallel Group Session 2**

**2.1a Casey Doyle (Oxford University) – Aiding self-understanding**

Wittgenstein tells us that knowledge and understanding are akin to abilities. But what kind of ability is self-knowledge or self-understanding? Is self-knowledge just an instance of the more general ability of knowledge applied to a particular subject matter, the self? And is the same true of self-understanding? This paper takes an indirect approach to these questions by considering self-understanding in the educational context, and in particular the role of others, especially teachers, in achieving it. The proposal is that self-understanding, in at least one important sense, is realized by changing one's mind in a way that is answerable to a previous state of one's mind, if an inchoate one, so that one comes to accept what one believed all along, as we say.

Here is how this plays out in the educational context. It is often said that teaching isn't telling. Instead of simply acquiring a bunch of true beliefs, we want students to come to understand the subject matter. Understanding involves the ability to "grasp" connections between propositions, and this ability cannot be transmitted by testimony. After sketching this familiar line of thought, this paper considers an additional explanation: one aim of education is a form of self-understanding that cannot be transmitted by testimony. It draws an analogy between education and therapy in this respect, and raises a question about the role of the teacher in the achievement of self-understanding. A tenet of much psychodynamic practice is that transformational self-knowledge must be achieved by the patient herself. It cannot be transmitted by the therapist, even if his expertise equips him with the relevant knowledge. What role does the teacher, with her particular expertise, play in the achievement of self-understanding if not providing testimony? We can make a start by recognizing that the knowledge the teacher possesses isn't ordinary knowledge of another's mind, the state she happens to consciously hold here and now. A hopefully familiar example of teaching relativism in a philosophy class suggests that the teacher's expertise equips her with what I will call "proleptic knowledge": knowledge of what a student would think, given her current state of mind, were she to reflect a bit. That the knowledge is proleptic explains why it cannot be transmitted by testimony. It also makes room for distinctively first-personal form of self-understanding and a role for the teacher in achieving it. The main aims of the paper are to raise the puzzle about testimony, articulate the idea of proleptic knowledge, and sketch a solution to the puzzle.

**2.1b Patrick Quinn (University College Dublin) – On Wittgenstein and learning as self-education**

Towards the end of his own life, Wittgenstein argued that life can educate someone to believe in God and experiences are what do this including suffering. Experiences, thoughts and life, he adds, can "force this concept on us" (*Culture and Value*, 97e). This paper will explore what exactly he means in terms of experiencing God and how this, if at all, is compatible with his philosophical and analytical method. His discovery of Tolstoy's *The Gospels in Brief* during his time as a soldier for Austria-Hungary in World War 1 was of primary significance in a religious sense as a compelling educational text which was followed by his references to God, conscience and related issues in his *Notebooks 2014-2016*. In addition, those references in his *Tractatus* which may be interpreted as religious and his



1929 Cambridge Lecture on Ethics, followed by his growing respect for human ritual and his reading of *St. Augustine's Confessions* (and later St. John of the Cross), all contributed to his education in the religious sphere. In today's world, Wittgenstein might be thought of as one of those "anonymous" Christians mentioned by Karl Rahner. In a more general sense, he comes across as a life-long learner interested in a wide variety of subject areas, whose form of teaching demonstrated this, especially from the early 1930's onwards, when his compelling method of thinking aloud before his students represented his way of teaching them and himself about a wide range of philosophical, logical and other interests. His obvious difficulties in expressing himself at times whether before students or fellow colleagues was earlier summarized by his friend, Paul Engelmann, who said that Wittgenstein in a manner reminiscent of Socrates' midwife metaphor in Plato's *Theaetetus*, in commended Engelmann for providing the forceps and skill to formulate what he (Wittgenstein) was struggling to say. His often painful efforts to think and communicate his thoughts were frustrating and annoying when this "mental block" manifested itself. In his early years, he was often very troubled psychologically (and probably sexually) and later developed health problems, which ultimately culminated in prostate cancer from which he died. As regards suffering then both physically and psychologically, it might be said that Wittgenstein was being educated in a religious way by his sufferings which led to his to believe in and think about God ever the course of a lifetime. He seems to have valued such belief as attested to in that very personal collection of his thoughts in *Culture and Value*. This paper will explore, among other things, some examples of his belief system and will comment on its place in his life and thoughts as the often hidden background that served to educate him in what counted for a form of life that directed his work and thought.

### **2.2a Ieuan Lloyd (Swansea University) – Education as a lifeless body**

The search for a rational education has been the quest for a number of philosophers of education. Professor Paul Hirst can be regarded as the person who first held and promoted the view that the curriculum must be based on "Forms of Knowledge". He identified these forms as having the following characteristics – Central concepts that are peculiar to them: concepts arranged in a network; and propositions that in some way can be tested for their truth. It may appear that Hirst is offering a sympathetic and individual epistemology to each of these forms but there is an empiricist thread that runs through each one. His writing is abstract in form and examples are few. The worthwhile life is one that is concerned with the pursuit of knowledge even for morals and religion. Recent philosophers that have followed in this tradition are John White, Michael Hand and Geoffrey Hinchliffe.

One puzzling feature that their position implies is that rationality is a norm. While it is true that rationality entails the recognition of certain norms, it does not make sense to say that one of these norms is that you must recognise norms. More generally, Wittgenstein shows he is unsympathetic with this whole way of speaking. He questions the whole notion of foundations. In *On Certainty* he questions why we have to seek foundations as if we cannot speak of the book resting on the table unless in turn we state what the table is resting on. He also discusses the notion of changes in a practice. I wish to argue for a novel way of presenting such changes without speaking of hinge propositions and how these changes avoid a charge of relativism. Wittgenstein also questions the role of propositions in our way of life. Further, he does not see that science is a model for ethics and religion. Ideas such as hope and love are absent in the vocabulary of Hirst and associates. But the importance of these ideas is evident in Wittgenstein's respect for the writings of, for

example of Lessing, Tolstoy and William James. Hinchliffe's article in the current issue of Philosophy is meant to soften the rationalist approach by introducing the ideas of judgment from Davidson and McDowell, and practice from McIntyre. Nowhere does he or his predecessors speak of the character of the teacher where, certainly in the case of ethics and religion the character of the teacher is paramount.

## **2.2b Antonio Scarafone (University of Reading) – What do we learn when we learn the meaning of words?**

In the last three decades, the psychologist and primatologist Michael Tomasello has developed and championed a usage-based approach to linguistics, language acquisition and evolution. Usage-based theories ambitiously aim at offering a feasible alternative to more traditional conceptions of language and linguistic competency. Contrary to the main tenets of the Chomskyan tradition specifically, usage-based theorists conceive of language as essentially tied to the communicative functions that it serves, and the grammatical dimension of language as constituted by an array of constructions that can be (and in fact is) acquired without requiring anything like an innate Universal Grammar.

Michael Tomasello presents his views as inspired by, and in an important sense based on, Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Wittgenstein's influence over Tomasello's work has not been extensively studied, but researchers in the fields of psychology and linguistics, as well as most (though not all) Wittgenstein scholars acquainted with language acquisition studies, do not seem to find the association between Wittgenstein and Tomasello problematic. My aim in this paper is to argue that, on the contrary, while there are recognizably Wittgensteinian strands in Tomasello's theorizing, the core of Tomasello's proposal is fundamentally Gricean, and his understanding and adoption of a Gricean model of communication seems to commit him to a conception of language and linguistic competency that is at odds with Wittgenstein's later philosophy.

In a nutshell, Wittgenstein conceives of the first steps into language acquisition as a matter of being suitably trained, namely, as a matter of acquiring an ability to do something that should be independent from the acquisition of any form of knowledge. On the other hand, Tomasello seems to propose that prelinguistic children start to acquire the meaning of words because they are able to infer the content of a communicative act from the mutual knowledge they establish with others in the context of joint activities.

In other words, there is a sense in which Tomasello seems to place prelinguistic children in the same position of the Augustinian infant, thus suggesting that the acquisition of the first language is, in an important respect, analogous to the learning of a second language. Indeed, Tomasello seems to think that pre-linguistic children's production and understanding of communicative acts is based on their ability to attribute beliefs and other propositional attitudes to others. Importantly, Tomasello uses a cognitivist vocabulary to speak about intentions and mental states, thus suggesting an underlying picture of the mind that Wittgenstein, as well as other philosophers inspired by his works, have fiercely tried to refute.

I would like to conclude my paper on a more positive note, offering a tentative reconciliation between Wittgenstein and Tomasello. Specifically, I would like to suggest that an alternative reading of Grice's theory of communication, such as that championed by Richard Moore and based on a functional rendering of communicative intentions, is still Gricean in the relevant sense, and compatible with the later Wittgenstein's conceptions of mind, language and linguistic abilities.

### **2.3a Stephen Burwood (Hull University) – Wittgenstein’s naturalism and conceptual change**

In his response to Paul Smeyers’ discussion of Wittgenstein’s apparent conservatism in *A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education*, Paul Standish speaks of the possibility of ‘dredging’ the river-bed of thought and that this needs to be done continuously if the river is to be navigable (2018: 272). Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the river-bed in *On Certainty* (§§95-97), with relations altering between ‘fluid propositions’ and the ‘hardened propositions’ that form the channel and the consequent shifting of the bed, clearly expresses the dynamic nature of our *Weltbilder* and the possibility of conceptual change. But it leaves open the question of conceptual revision, which Standish’s extension of the metaphor suggests.

It is clear in this passage that Wittgenstein regarded the process of conceptual change as an organic and gradual evolution, with the status of propositions altering “with time”. We may be legitimately sceptical of the prospects for anything more deliberate, let alone revolutionary, as fond as philosophers sometimes are for this possibility. Although Standish further suggests that alongside change that occurs ‘naturally’ there can be shifts in the river-bed that occur through ‘human intervention’, it is not clear that these are different processes—depending on what we understand by ‘intervention’. In our *Weltbild* (at least), philosophy itself may be one source of change for, as Standish earlier argues, it doesn’t actually leave everything as it is (2018: 263), but so too—and arguably more influentially—is empirical investigation; but neither are directive and neither can guarantee their positive results.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein blurs the boundary between the conceptual and the empirical in a way that pre-figures but is substantially different to Quine. Yet this blurring of the boundary not only allows the possibility of change, it also introduces constraints on what we can consider those changes may be and how they come about, so that the negative results—in terms of such constraints—of empirical investigation seem clearer. Thus, although empirical investigation is an important engine of conceptual change, when taken along with holism regarding our *Weltbild*, it may also be an important source of epistemic conservatism.

In this paper I suggest that the upshot of these Wittgensteinian reflections could lead to certain conclusions with which Wittgenstein himself may not have been entirely comfortable: where there is a hardening of his soft, Humean naturalism. This would be a different direction to that suggested by Standish elsewhere in the volume, when he entertains, “a recasting of the idea of the natural, such that our nature is understood as conventional” (2018: 563). Although Wittgenstein does sometimes speak as if our practices are unconstrained, nature also provides an intelligibility condition with which our practices fit. In addition, we must not forget that the existentialist Wittgenstein Standish alludes to in this latter contribution is not a different philosopher from the naturalist Wittgenstein that emerges in *On Certainty*. In fact, they are both of a piece.

### **2.3b Matteo Falomi (Essex University) – Conformity and attunement: Cavell and McDowell on Criticizing One’s Culture as a Whole**

Can one criticize one’s culture as a whole? A significant strand in contemporary virtue ethics, drawing on McDowell’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, rules out this possibility: according to this line of argument, rational requirements can only be grasped from a standpoint of immersion in our culture; but since criticism presupposes a grasp of

rational requirements, criticism must always rely on at least some region of our inherited outlook. Every critique of one's inherited outlook, in other words, must be Neurathian in shape.

In this paper, I claim that Wittgenstein's vision of language can account for the idea of a wholesale critique of one's culture. I show, following Cavell's reading of the *Investigations*, that our linguistic capacities establish a relation of *attunement* between speakers: my calling something, for instance, a "red square" immediately contains the thought that this is *what we call* a "red square"; in this sense, in using words, I speak for every other member of the linguistic community, and every member of the community speaks for me. One of the tasks of education (of being initiated to a culture) is the achievement of this kind of relation with one's linguistic community: one's capacity to think for oneself (arguably, the *telos* of education) is presented, in this perspective, as internally related to one's capacity to speak in mutuality with others.

The relation of attunement, however, can fail in the case of specific linguistic communities: as I argue, a community characterized by *conformity* is a community in which mutual representativeness of speakers does not hold. In such a community, in fact, the individual's speaker relation with her community is asymmetrical: while the community speaks for the individual, the individual does not speak for the community (even though the culture may conceive itself as governed by mutuality). Those initiated into a culture of this kind don't really receive an education, but only a mimicry of one: their education aims at stifling, rather than enabling, their ability to speak for themselves.

I argue that this failure of attunement provides the ground for criticizing, within Wittgenstein's perspective, one's culture as a whole: a culture whose language is not, in general, governed by attunement is a culture that fails *qua* culture, and should therefore be criticized in its entirety. Since I take McDowell and Cavell to be essentially in agreement in their reading of Wittgenstein, I submit that McDowell and his followers, in denying the possibility of a wholesale critique, are misjudging the implications of their own position.

### 15.30-17.00 Parallel Session 3

#### 3.1a Alexis Gibbs (Winchester University) – No such thing as a private education

Philosophical arguments debating private education tend to centre on concerns to do with social justice more broadly (Brighouse, 2003; Swift, 2003), as well as matters of parental choice (Colburn, 2012; Exley & Suissa, 2013), social mobility (White, 2015), and the relationship between competitive standards and social class (Ball, 2006). These assessments of private schooling take as given the nature of the 'private' in this provision, in that it refers to an institution for which one pays. The ordinary sense in which we use the term 'private school', however, does not carry the same grammatical complications as calling someone's *education* private. Here the coherence of arguments concerning privacy are challenged not on grounds of economic advantage or quality of provision, but on the grounds of an *attitude* towards one's own education. The matter becomes one of psychology rather than normative morality.

The paper traces the psychology of privacy in education back to the invention of the printing press and Descartes' introspectionist intervention in Western thought. These events are seen to have contributed to a form of life in which knowledge consumption and intellectual solipsism are the conditions for perceiving of one's education as private. Modes of literacy and individual examination that have passed into schooling as a result mean that,

in fact, *all* schools are in some sense 'private'; therefore, a *particular* relationship to this privacy must be cultivated in fee-paying schools that advantages their students within academic assessment.

The paper revisits Wittgenstein's (2009) critique of Cartesian solipsism and private language to examine the psychological fallacy of holding one's education to be private. Stanley Cavell interprets this conceptual investigation as one that reveals privacy as "an impression of necessary secrecy", and that "secrecy and privacy share the idea of excludedness or exclusiveness" (Cavell, 1979:366). Following Wittgenstein and Cavell, I will argue that education shares with language a fundamental shareability, or publicness. Whilst a (fallacious) attitude of privacy could condition measures of confidence and performance that ensure success on the basis of individual worth within a given society, the paper concludes that sustaining this fallacy disadvantages both those that buy into it and those that are excluded from doing so, albeit in different ways.

Ball, S. (2006) 'Education Markets, Choice and Social Class: the market as a class strategy in the UK and the USA'. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 14:1, 3-19.

Brighouse, H. (2003) *School Choice and Social Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cavell, S. (1979) *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Colburn, B. (2012) Responsibility and school choice in education. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 46(2): 207-222.

Exley, S. and J. Suissa (2013). "Private Schools, Choice And The Ethical Environment." *British Journal of Educational Studies* 61(3): 345-362.

Swift, A. (2003). *How Not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent*. London: Routledge.

Wittgenstein, L. (2009) *Philosophical Investigations*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

### **3.1b Siu-Sing (Kenny) Huen (Fiji National University) – "Education as initiation into practices" reconsidered**

This paper aims to review the position of Paul Smeyers and Nicholas Burbules (in particular, their 2006 paper) on education as initiation into practices. Queries arise concerning the conforming and reproductive tendencies of the concept of practice (which covers activities, games, rituals, etc.). They propose to reconceptualise it as a relation in which practitioners influence practices, apart from being influenced by them. In their view, "interpretation and adaptation is always a potential within [practices]." Besides examining their understanding of some Wittgenstein's remarks on interpretations (in rule-following, especially PI, §86, and those in aspect-seeing), I probe into their examples through which they unravel the many possible ways, both complex and varied, wherein a learner or practitioner is mutually related to her practice: learning and practising looking "cool," playing piano, being a chef, and the transformation of practices into mere rituals, etc. The first overall problem I raise is how to deal with conflicting interpretations and to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable ones, even though practices might allow some improvisation. When disagreements occur in practical judgments or grasping a rule, we would have to debate on the practice's purpose, spirit, basic function, etc. in justification and/or attribution practices. I contend that unacceptable interpretations are recognized, not through interpretations, but the practitioners' will, and sensitivities/sensibilities, as Alice Cray maintains. Related to this point is Wittgenstein's deeper, widely neglected, insight that what I *must act* in following a mathematical rule "is one of my foundations" (RFM, VI-46). Applicable also to moral, cultural and communicative practices, among others, it sheds light on normativity in

general, and specifically for education. Accordingly practice itself contains an internal relation with practitioners. In contrast, Smeyers & Burbules' reconceptualisation of practice highlights the practitioner's independent role, which suggests an external practitioner-practice relation (i.e. something other than the practice itself). That is the second problem. Admittedly their perspective seems promising in the context of change: When an aspect-dawning practitioner "interprets and adapts" a rule in a novel or subtle situation, or radical uncertainty, she may be said to become detached from the rule. And yet practices are not evolving with unsettled interpretations, but my taking some action as an instance of a modified or new *rule*, which I let it guide and/or compel me (see RFM, VII-66 where Wittgenstein considers normative force and normative freedom). Finally I respond to their thoughts on the part that narrativization plays in the reciprocal relation between self and practice. For them one's narrative can deepen one's engagement with a practice, revitalize and liberating it. I argue that self-narration being itself a reflective practice is evaluated in a higher-level practice in which people attribute truthfulness to it. There can still be an additional level of critical practice where people scrutinize whether the (method of) evaluation is sound. Our disclosing and resisting the "pictures" that held us captive are embedded in a web of practices.

### **3.2a Ian Munday (Stirling University) – Wittgenstein and the arrogation of philosophy**

The idea that philosophers are inclined to arrogance is familiar enough. In educational research this is felt more keenly on the grounds that philosophers seem to speak on the strength of no empirical data whatsoever. "What are the grounds for your view? Where is the evidential basis for your claims? Without that base all your claims are merely subjective." – these are complaints one hears, often advanced in the name of rigour and objectivity. Such complaints are certainly not peculiar to educational research, and in some ways they are promoted in the wider culture by spurious notions of accountability and transparency.

Yet philosophy's relation to arrogance admits of a quite different and more philosophically challenging response. A starting point is image of the philosopher as the sage. The sage has deep powers of thought and insight into things, and a kind of mystique is developed. Hagiographical approaches to Wittgenstein collude with this. It is true that there is widespread lack of understanding about what it is that philosophers actually do, and this in some respects adds to the mystique. The philosopher-as-sage is at some distance from the technically specialised professional philosopher of today, but the cultivation of the latter image may also contribute to opacity about what philosophy is.

A sharper focus is achieved in Stanley Cavell's pondering of the arrogation of philosophy. Two kinds of arrogation come to light. The first does indeed have connection with the tendencies in philosophy alluded to above – that is, its tendency to speak as if from on high, to issue pronouncements as if from a position of authority, even where there is nothing to show how that authority has been earned. It would be reassuring in a way if philosophy were simply a matter of the unfolding of logical arguments, but there remains an intractable aspect to the work where this will not suffice, as Wittgenstein's later work clearly shows. The philosopher who fails to see this may indeed be holding to a position that blocks the *Übersicht* that greater familiarity with the landscape might provide. Philosophy lacking such humility is apt to talk down.

Arrogation, however, cannot be left there. The second kind is found in the ordinary language philosophy that Cavell inherits from JL Austin and, in a different form, from Wittgenstein. The procedures of what-we-say-when depend upon a testing of expression, in

which the speaker turns to her sense of what sounds right and makes sense. That this is what “we” say is crucial in that it is an attempt to speak for others and to achieve community; that it is first person reveals that she must speak for herself and not, say, merely describe the usage of others. Reliance on her own response may appear unwarranted, but in fact there is nowhere from which warrant could come without sacrificing her responsibility to words, a responsibility upon which our democracy depends.

I develop Cavell’s ideas in relation to Wittgenstein’s method of leading words home.

### **3.2b Edward Guetti (Universität Leipzig) – Possessions and losses: what Joyce displays about the Wittgenstein scene of instruction**

Paul Standish, among others, has attempted to clarify the notion of a Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophy of education by pointing to the apparent dead-ends of understanding the philosophy of education either *as* a proper branch of philosophy or as the practical application of theoretical posits. His work seems to point to a third option independent of either of these options which attempts to avoid the pitfalls (i.e., the “installation or reinforcement” of an instrumentalized behaviorism) attached to this “latter day verificationism” by bringing to the fore questions about the relationship between the inner and outer in capacities which are gained by an “entry into language” and which are not subject to verification by overt behavior. Standish’s point is well-taken as are his motivating worries concerning the “dominance of technical reason,” but I think that the jump to focusing on the relationship between the (theatricality of the) inner and the outer elides important Wittgensteinian considerations.

If we take up the well-known Cavellian motif of philosophy as an “education for grown-ups” and the various relevant philosophers within the Wittgensteinian line identified by Cavell (especially Plato, Augustine, and Rousseau), we can then promote a sense in which Wittgenstein *does* contribute to a theory-practice model (broadly speaking) but with some obvious caveats and fine-tunings. There are identifiable ways in which Wittgenstein’s clarifications both invite and refuse a comparison against features of the pedagogical principles at work in these names from traditional philosophy, and the refusal as the specific failure to understand learning (or recollection) as bringing a learner to an awareness of *something* which presides over our normative behavior (as we discover in the traditional philosophical model), rather Wittgenstein’s readers are *brought to an absence of explanation*. This lack of an external governing feature of our learning certainly should draw attention to what it means to gain ‘entry’ into ‘language’ or our ‘form of life.’ This entry is unstably present in Cavell’s writing and (I would argue) in Standish’s account (among others) as a kind of acquisition that is both subject to verification by rote mechanical display but *also* seems to provide *something in excess* of that display. This *excess-to-be-possessed* is stationed somewhere beyond verification and highlights a kind of idling confusion, a node which seems to bear the weight of several aspirations for recovering a platform for philosophy of education in a similar location beyond mere verification. But rather than lay up hope in a beyond which is somehow sanitized and immune from the dominance of the instrumentalization of pedagogy, Wittgenstein’s difference from this lineage of thinking of philosophy as the education of grown-ups suggests a reconception not only of the theory-practice model which seems abhorrent to Standish but also invites what I regard as a healthy lack of confidence *toward* that verificationist model *without* re-introducing a repressed skepticism. At the center of my portrayal of a Wittgensteinian scene of instruction

is a scene from Joyce's *Ulysses* which displays this Wittgensteinian balance in a pitch-perfect way.

### **3.3a Nimrod Matan (Beit Berl College) – Pedagogical influence in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations***

That the famous *following a rule* sections of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* constitute "scenes of instruction" (in Cavell's terms) is well discussed among interpreters. Cavell's reading emphasizes the centrality of teacher-pupil relations to the elaboration of the grammar of rule expressions. In my paper, I will take one step further in the attempt to tie up the grammar of rule following with that of instruction by way of offering an analysis of the concepts interplaying in the language game of rule following, to reveal their diversity in terms of types of pedagogical influence. I will claim that if construed as cases of *following a teacher*, the scenes depicted in the so-called rule following sections present various modes of pedagogical influence. Thus, the distinction between mechanical following, limited to repetition, and following with understanding, becomes more tangible and can be described as a distinction between two modes in which a pupil can be influenced by a teacher. Understanding construed this way can be described as a special mode of being influenced by someone, whereby the person who understands is at the same time *following* (doing *the same* as the teacher) and *producing an original case*, not presented by the teacher.

I will claim that Kant's discussion of genial influence and canonical succession in the third critique is helpful in providing a conceptual framework for regarding rule-following as teacher-following, and in particular his distinction between emulation (*Nachfolgen*), imitation (*Nachahmung*) and replication (*Nachmachung*).

Kant's framework further brings in the notion of *exemplarity* as a key constituent of the original work. I will claim that the equivalent of exemplarity in the realm of understanding (of a rule) is one's possibility to become a teacher or to allow others to follow one, as stressed by Cavell.

Wittgenstein's perception of his own philosophical work is another example of what I claim to be the conception of the notions of understanding and meaning in terms of pedagogical influence. In the preface to the *Philosophical Investigation* he thanks Ramsey for criticizing his ideas (idees), thus helping him realize his mistakes, and to Sraffa for criticizing his thoughts (*Gedanken*), providing "stimulus (Ansporn) for the most consequential (*folgereichsten*) ideas" of the book.

I will propose that by distinguishing between Ramsey's mode of contribution to his work and that of Sraffa's, Wittgenstein can be read as sketching an outline for two models of influence – one aiming at the correction of mistakes in one's work (or action in general), and another on making one's work (or action) fruitful and potentially influential on others, i.e. for those who take it as an example to follow.

### **3.3b Desiree Weber (Wooster College) – A pedagogic reading of Wittgenstein's later work: an overview**

In this paper, I establish elements of a pedagogic reading of Wittgenstein's later work, which explores the significance of teaching and learning themes through close textual analysis and archival work on his *Nachlass*. I provide evidence for the prevalence and importance of Wittgenstein's references to teaching, learning, and training by giving an overview of the role these references play in the structure and central points of his later works. The initial



discussions of how we learn language that open the *Philosophical Investigations* and the *Brown Book* are not just a jumping off point but a framing device for arguments later in the texts – Wittgenstein returns to learning and teaching again and again at crucial junctures in the texts. For example, learning is the process that weaves together our experiences and their expected outcomes (*PI* §197), which in turn shapes and reshapes in each iteration the norms by which we operate in shared forms of life. Reading Wittgenstein with sensitivity to the pedagogic themes thus undermines interpretations that rely on rule-following as the explanatory mechanism by which linguistic use generates meaning. Instead, we learn to use language that carries meaning by being taught the patterns, norms, and judgments that come with particular uses. In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on learning – and rejection of rule-following as holding explanatory weight is even more apparent. In this text, his reliance on pedagogic themes is central to understanding how we make judgments and how we come to have ‘agreement in judgements’ at all. I thus argue that these references to learning and teaching are far from incidental or sporadic and are instead central to understanding major concepts such as rule-following, experience, and judgment.

Through this close textual analysis, I also show that the extent of Wittgenstein’s reliance on teaching and learning themes may be underestimated by some English-language scholars because both the Anscombe and Hacker & Schulte editions systematically translate the original German reference to *lehren* [learning] or *lernen* [teaching] as showing or telling. Recuperating the full extent of Wittgenstein’s references further underscores their centrality in his discussions. To substantiate this argument, I have relied on the original German versions where applicable, but also analysed Wittgenstein’s notebooks and other materials in his *Nachlass*. As early as his 1930 return to Cambridge, Wittgenstein drafted numerous specific passages in his notebooks that eventually made their way into the *Philosophical Investigations* and other works: many of these bear out his continuous return to teaching and learning as vital examples and cornerstones of his ideas.

### **3.4a Eran Guter (Max Stern Yezreel Valley College) and Craig Fox (California University of Pennsylvania) – Preserving the verifying phenomena**

Wittgenstein’s forays into aesthetics, from 1930 onwards, are a mark of his quest to imbue philosophical thinking with an ability to get to know human beings. These efforts gradually transition from periodic explicit discussions of aesthetic reasoning in his middle-period to a sort of undercurrent of philosophical sensitivity, which permeated his later writings through and through. In this paper we argue that aesthetics for Wittgenstein is deeply related to the humanistic quest of education to better prepare one to come to understand the significance both of specific features of the world in which one finds oneself, and indeed also of others in that world. Our discussion focuses on a singular early moment in this trajectory of Wittgenstein’s thinking about aesthetics and its purposes. In 1933 Wittgenstein attempted in a lecture to explicate the uniqueness of aesthetic discourse by means of contrasting between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. His claim, which is the focus of our study, is that “aesthetics like psychoanalysis doesn’t explain anything away.” In this paper we attempt to flesh out this positive account of the relationship between aesthetics and psychoanalysis as distinctively suggested in that 1933 lecture. Wittgenstein’s discussion of the difference between psychology and psychoanalysis is couched in terms of a duality which he finds in Sigmund Freud’s explanation of jokes. In psychoanalysis, the therapist and the patient discuss the specifics in order to arrive at a characterization of their significance; in psychology the patient’s experiences are instances of generalized psychological facts,

which in this way explain why she's had them. We argue that, over and above the confusion between reason and cause, the crux of Wittgenstein's distinction between psychology and psychoanalysis is his distinction between hypothesis and representation. Hypothesis transcends the particular cases, which the general laws, posited by the hypothesis, cover. Representation, on the other hand, is un-hypothetical in the sense of affording a mere picture as a useful device, which enables one to overlook a system at a glance. It inheres in the particular case by means of paraphrasing, giving good similes, which result in a collective arrangement of (often surprisingly) similar cases. The dialogical, un-hypothetical, humane immanence of psychoanalytic explanations sets them sharply apart from the hypothesis-driven, mechanistic causal cranking out of psychological explanations. The emphasis on the specificity of the particular mode of characterization, as well as on the context of practice, turn ideals into facilitators of aesthetic discourse. Ideals enable us to arrive at useful descriptions, allowing us to see things in a way which can assist us in finding a solution to an aesthetic puzzle. We conclude that for Wittgenstein, "Aesthetics like Psychoanalysis doesn't explain anything away", because, like psychoanalysis, aesthetics preserves the verifying phenomena in their fullness. In aesthetics, the very particular details are what we talk about and what we're sorting through—aesthetic conversations invite each party to play the role of both teacher and of learner.

### **3.4b Lawrence Nixon (University of Sunderland) If 'Nothing is hidden' is there anything still to find? Wittgenstein and the education/further education of teachers**

The recent mapping of paths from Wittgenstein's later work to the discipline of education (2017) has made available new ways to evaluate practice. The complexities of Wittgenstein's treatment of the subjective and objective, "Nothing is hidden" (#435), are made more accessible to educators through the idea that signs are the element of expression (Standish, 2018). Further, the use of examples from liberal education and a child's entry into language through drama helps us to see this expressive 'subject' in the classroom. In combination these ideas invite and inform new ways to reflect upon continuing professional development (CPD). They help us to identify elements of CPD curricula that deserve careful consideration if we are to move from activities that seek to put 'good' practice into teachers toward helping teachers come to an understanding of education that is their own.

The paper is in three parts. The first part offers a brief survey of recent CPD activity in England. This overview gives an idea of what has been happening in England before focusing in on Dylan Wiliam's account of tacit 'good' practice in formative assessment and how this can be transferred by making practice explicit in order for it to be transferred between settings (2009).

Part two, uses the idea that signs are the medium of expression through which human experience is realised (Standish, 2018) to re-evaluate CPD practice. It is argued that the idea of expression needs to be supplemented with a consideration of context and background, via the Dreyfus McDowell (Schear, 2013) debate. The troubles with Wiliam's account of transfer are identified. The ideas of sign-expression, context and background are then used draw attention to what is distinctive about the adult seeking further education. The final part of the paper looks at three aspects of CPD practice that deserve attention if the grip of the inner picture is loosened and we begin with the idea that signs give us experience through expression. In each case examples from the literature/contemporary practice will be used to illustrate the discussion. First, CPD curricula should be shaped by an

awareness of the potential of signs to refine expression and open up new possibilities. Second, if a warm welcome is to be given to criticism, fractional dispute and the avant-garde then thought must be given to the kind of CPD site, duration and support offered. Finally, Standish's account of the young person's first-hand experience of signs in the drama session, acts of imagination and pretence, is suggestive of the kind of work it takes to find one's own way with signs together with others. How to arrange things so that there is both the time and space so that an understanding that is one's own to emerge in consultation with difference is well worth discussion.

It is argued that 'if nothing is hidden' the curricula for continuing professional development must attend to the fact that people speak because they have something to say and this is harder work than it might first appear.

## **Tuesday 31 July**

### **09.00-10.30 Parallel Session 4**

#### **4.1a David Garner (University of the Arts London) – Aspect-seeing in art & design education**

Aimed at exploring connections between the later Wittgenstein's protean comments on 'aspect seeing' (Wittgenstein, 1953) and dynamics of art & design education. The central educational artefact for review is a workshop activity, designed by the author and reported by Brookfield & James (2014), that attempts to model some of the ambiguous dynamics of learning in art and design contexts using the same type of bi-stable duck-rabbit image that attracted Wittgenstein's attention. The purpose of the workshop itself is to help new students to encounter and operate with the 'pedagogy of ambiguity' (Austerlitz et al, 2008:130) that has been identified as both an issue in, and a feature of, art & design higher education (Orr & Shreeve, 2017). Wittgenstein's philosophical concerns may seem at first to be rather remote from such an applied educational project. However, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein often focuses on practical examples for his elucidations, so a likewise practical example should at least be a compatible objective for discussion – perhaps the more so when locating relationships between Wittgenstein's philosophy and education is of interest.

Nonetheless, a central task is to locate what common concerns might traverse both the philosophical and educational terrains. The role of concepts seems paramount where in a primary case the concept for a duck or a rabbit is deployed in order to make sense of the image (Schroeder, 2010, Mulhall 2010); Mulhall extends this analysis into an essentially conceptualist account in which all seeing is seeing-as (see Mulhall *Seeing Aspects*). Schroeder, however, has argued that Wittgenstein may have been dealing with two different issues, the first fitting to Mulhall's explanation, and the second in need of closer scrutiny:

- (1) Are visual aspects (resemblances) actually seen or are they only thought of in an interpretation?
- (2) How (or in what sense) is it possible to experience an aspect (a thought, the meaning of a picture) in an instant? (Schroeder, 2010: 357).

Now it is perhaps not immediately necessary to adopt a position in relation to these categories to recognise that Wittgenstein was dealing with a paradox that calls for it to be

experienced first-hand – and this, in a practical sense, is exactly what the educational workshop task tries to do. Recent critical readings of Wittgenstein on aspect seeing (Day & Krebs et al, 2010), have found analogies with aesthetics (Batkin, 2010), understandings of the self (Hagberg, 2010, Krebs, 2010), the experience of agency (Eldridge, 2010) and the life of pictures (Mulhall, 2010) – all of which are commonly regarded as important in arts education, though they are more often understood in psychological, empirical or practical modes of explanation.

Of course duck-rabbit workshop participants do not necessarily engage questions of any philosophical importance when responding to the duck-rabbit image, but they may nonetheless be encountering the texture of such issues. It is perhaps implicit in the workshop design that participants must find resources for dealing with the question of meaning and applicable concept-use as they encounter the peculiarities of the duck-rabbit image.

#### **4.1b Britt Harrison (University of York) – Film: education for grownups?**

Stanley Cavell invites us to understand the activity of philosophizing as nothing less than “the education of grownups” (1979, 125). If it’s also the case that fiction films can philosophize might they, too, be – or be a source of – education for grownups?

It’s around fifty years since Cavell launched his pioneering investigations into the ability of films to philosophize, and so educate us. In the context of contemporary analytic philosophy of art, however, the view that we can learn from films is one of the central claims of cognitivism. According to cognitivist theories of art, works of art can and do deliver truths about what it is to be human and, as such, the arts (particularly the literary arts) are deemed a source of knowledge. Furthermore, given the non-triviality of truths to be found in some novels, poems, and plays, cognitivist theory holds literature (at least) to be cognitively valuable. This cognitivist characterisation of literature is often extended to fiction films using the same arguments and theoretical framework.

In this paper I show that Cavell’s insights concerning the relations between philosophy, education and film are to be distinguished not just from cognitivism but from the very notion of the philosophically ‘theoretical’. To do this I present a number of points (reminders, observations, and discriminations) prompted by Wittgenstein and the writings of Cavell himself, Peter Hacker, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Paul Standish. These points include: (i) the importance of distinguishing between understanding and knowledge, (ii) the value of the imagination as a cogitative, not cognitive, faculty; (iii) the relevance and certainty of action as the non-epistemic (ie. non-propositional, non-truth-evaluable) place where the spade of justification turns; and (iv) the questionable assumption that education is some kind of transmitted commodity.

I bring these points to bear on, and through, a close examination of the 1985 film *Come and See*, directed by Russian filmmaker Elem Klimov. *Come and See* dramatises the story of a young Byelorussian teenage boy most of whose family and fellow villagers are killed by advancing Nazi forces during World War II. Determined to join the resistance he must first find the price of entry: a gun. Though fictional, the film draws on Klimov’s own childhood experiences during the Battle of Stalingrad. “As a young boy, I had been in hell... Had I included everything I knew and shown the whole truth, even I could not have watched it.” (Bergan, 2003) The philosophical value of this film is, I propose, not only inseparable from its aesthetic and artistic merit but it requires our sensitive, reflective and critical engagement. And therein lies its educational value, and our educational reward.

Bergan, Ronald (2003) 'Elem Klimov Obituary' *The Guardian Newspaper* 4 November, 2003. Downloaded on 30.3.18 from <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/nov/04/guardianobituaries.russia>  
Cavell, Stanley (1979) *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* Oxford: Oxford University Press

#### **4.2a Georgina Edwards (Oxford University) – Language games in the ivory tower: comparing the *Philosophical Investigations* with Herman Hesse's *The Glass Bead Game***

In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein is concerned with negotiating the balance between theory and practice, describing how to teach philosophy and actually attempting to teach. Wittgenstein hopes to *train* his readers to think for themselves, and he realises that he cannot do this by simply offering dogma or theories. He prefers to teach through practice, getting his reader to perform exercises, in order for them to experience a greater degree of agency during the learning process. In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein remarks that he has no desire to found a school of philosophy. However, he is aware that his attempts to help others learn may inevitably set him up as a figure of authority.

Written during the same period as the *Investigations*, Hesse's novel *The Glass Bead Game* brings Wittgenstein's concerns to an institutional level. While Wittgenstein employs analogies which mostly occur between individuals in very localised circumstances, Hesse's novel raises similar questions of the best way to educate people within the setting of the fictional province, Castalia, where state-funded institutions educate young people from primary school to postgraduate level. There is an unspoken expectation that investment in these institutions will eventually produce school teachers for other regions, although Castalians increasingly commit themselves to academia rather than leaving the institutions in which they were trained. One of the central disciplines in Castalia is the Glass Bead Game – a discipline which trains its players in the skill of connecting and comparing across disciplines, with the help of a notation which is thought by some players to be an ideal, universal language. The Game is intended to maintain rigour in academic practice. However, centuries after being institutionalised, it has become merely formal sophistry to demonstrate one's own mastery to peers, rather than as a way to think as an individual.

In *Culture and Value* Wittgenstein often compares philosophical training with solitary activities or conversations between individuals, though his continuation with philosophical writing with the intention of publication implies that he did want his ideas to have a broader impact. Hesse's novel has sometimes been misinterpreted as expounding an academic utopia, although reading it alongside the *Investigations* helps us to see how it is in fact concerned with the flaws and benefits of institutions, and of tensions between accessibility and difficulty when teaching others. Practices which are too difficult may become exclusive; tasks which are too accessible will not enable the learner to become independent of the teacher.

Hesse's novel therefore raises the question of whether the kind of training Wittgenstein has in mind can be institutionalised. If it is important to train people to think for themselves (as opposed to sparing them the task of thinking) then can this style of teaching be reproduced to benefit a wider audience through institutions? Or would the institutionalisation of such practices detract from Wittgenstein's focus on independent thought and self-reliance? Might teaching methods stultify over time, or does the institutionalisation of teaching leave open the possibility for productive criticism of the system to develop internally, as Standish (2018) suggests?

#### **4.2b Rebeca Perez Leon (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) – On teaching a form of life**

This paper analyses the challenges to *teaching* a form of life in contexts where there are other forms of life already established, and drafts a way to tackle them. I do so from a Wittgensteinian understanding of forms of life and Wittgenstein's saying/showing distinction. Two main challenges are under focus: first, the meaningfulness and justification of forms of life are holistic in the sense that it is only in the context of a form of life that propositions and practices are significant and can be supported by related beliefs and practices (*On Certainty*, 1979). This means that a form of life could not be *taught* piecemeal. Instead, whatever forms the teaching of forms of life should take they should reveal a holistic or organic character aimed not at imprinting one isolated belief or practice, but rather at cultivating a total way of *seeing* and behaving. The question that arises here is how to *teach* a form of life as a whole? Tightly intertwined with this challenge, the second challenge Wittgenstein confronts us with is that the meaningfulness and justification of a form of life cannot be said without producing nonsense, or non-meaningful uses of words (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 1961; *On Certainty*). If this is the case, it is reasonable to conclude that the teaching of a form of life could not consist in explaining it, for explanation would not be significant unless there is understanding of a form of life, and it would not make sense if there is understanding of a form of life. The question here is, then, how to undertake the *teaching* of a form of life starting from the challenge that its meaningfulness and justification cannot be said. Wittgenstein himself points toward a way of overcoming these challenges through his understanding, and practice, of what he terms *showing*. *Showing* has the sense of indicating the total meaning and justification of a form of life through the way things are done and said in that form of life. *Showing* operates indirectly in that it presents a form of life by indicating the difference it makes in practice. The question at this point is how to use *showing* as a teaching approach. I delineate some of the contours of a Wittgensteinian-inspired teaching approach by drawing from Temelini's take on Wittgenstein's method of showing through examples ("Learning Politics by Means of Examples", 2017). The use of examples appears to overcome both challenges to teaching a form of life, for they are aimed at providing a vivid model of what it means to see things from within a certain form of life. As such, an example can show both the totality and singularity of a form of life while emphasising its practical character and, thus, avoiding attempts to justify it propositionally.

#### **4.3a David Anderson (Texas A&M University) – Catching the snark: A Wittgensteinian overview of philosophy for children**

In my paper, I examine the extent to which the philosophical/pedagogical practice of Philosophy for Children (P4C, sometimes called Philosophy with Children – PWC) is compatible with Wittgenstein's methods and view of philosophy. P4C began in the 1970s in the United States under Matthew Lipman who wrote the foundational novels that served as the original curriculum. While Lipman's novels and manuals are no longer universally used, all P4C practices involve developing a "community of inquiry" in which children are presented with a stimulus and discuss philosophical questions. Since Wittgenstein held that philosophical questions are like illnesses (PI §255) and that the real discovery is that which enables one to stop philosophizing when they want to (PI §133) it is worth interrogating whether one should "inflict" philosophy on children. Curtis (1985) argued that despite P4C's focus on philosophical questions, P4C might be a sort of "preventative

treatment” for the philosophical “illnesses” that can develop in the course of children’s language development. More recently, Šimenc (2014) has also defended the practice of P4C against critics by appeal to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as therapy, but also concludes that P4C would benefit from adopting a therapeutic self-criticism of the movement’s own foundational suppositions and the convictions that children and teachers have inherited from their cultural environment. This is important since, as Chetty (2018) has shown, the centrality of values like “reasonableness” in much of P4C is not culturally neutral or apolitical, and can function to keep the community of inquiry “gated” by ignoring issues of race and class as well as fostering a certain kind of ignorance. In my paper, I agree that P4C has immense therapeutic and even transformational potential, but suggest certain Wittgensteinian approaches whereby some features of P4C might be improved. Most importantly, I find problematic the underlying assumption in much of P4C that philosophy is a normative endeavor (Lipman, 2011) by which children’s thinking and reasoning should be “improved.” Since for Wittgenstein, philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (PI §124) and only “puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything” (§126), I argue that less emphasis should be put on getting children to reason “correctly” than on facilitating a deeper understanding of the language games and forms of life in which they are growing. Because of the multiplicity of language-games and their uses, including potentially oppressive uses, more space should be given for children to express and examine negative emotions and uses of language. More attention should also be paid to indirect (including non-verbal) forms of communication in P4C. Furthermore, in order for P4C to become more genuinely multi-cultural and applicable in non-Western contexts, less emphasis should be put on developing Western norms of reason. Rather, the stimuli and exercises can be viewed in their differing aspects as “assemblages of reminders” for comparisons and contexts (PI §130). I conclude with a brief speculation on what value this “contemplative,” as opposed to normative, approach to P4C might have in examining questions of ethics and religion with children.

#### **4.3b Yasushi Maruyama, Yoshitsugu Hirata, Takahiro Sugita, Shinichiro Yamagishi and Fukutaro Watanabe – How Wittgenstein’s philosophy has impact on educational research in Japan**

Wittgenstein’s philosophy has been discussed in educational research as well as other fields in Japan. Japanese educational researchers have mainly introduced, re-interpreted and/or applied the interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy made by philosophers, philosophers of education and sociologists in the Western countries. While the academic level of the discussions about Wittgenstein’s philosophy was high, the discussions rarely found connections between his philosophy and educational reality in Japan. Cavell, Hacker, Kripke, Peters, Smeyers and others were referred to around 2000, Yasushi Maruyama’s paper, “What is “the Other” in Education?: A Comparison of Hegel and Wittgenstein” (*The Japanese Journal of Educational Research*, 67(1), 2000) led a new reading of Wittgenstein in Japanese educational research, that is, an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a theory of otherness. It implied the ethics of schoolteachers responding to educational reality in Japan for diminishing the culture of violence in school. A number of original interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy have appeared in Japanese educational research since Maruyama’s paper had been published.

Our paper consists of two parts: one is to characterize the discussions about Wittgenstein’s philosophy in Japanese educational research in general; and the other is to

introduce a brief idea of each of five original studies in Japan in particular. Speaker A will characterize the development of the discussions and explain Maruyama's Wittgensteinian theory of otherness and how it forms a foundation of the ethics of schoolteachers. Speaker B will introduce Yoshitsugu Hirata's recent study, "The Way to Alter Your Worldview: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Education" and Fukutaro Watanabe's "The Latest Wittgenstein on Education: From 'Training' to 'Education'". The both studies show new readings of *On Certainty* in the way of seeing 'Education'. Speaker C will introduce Hiroataka Sugita's "The Role of Examples in Teaching: Wittgenstein's Methods for Changing Students' Aspect Perception" and Kenichiro Yamagishi's "Learning Language Games to Identify and Accuse Immoral Individuals: A Reconsideration of Moral Education". The former questions the power relationship between student and teacher by reconsidering Wittgenstein's methods. The latter explores a new understanding of Moral Education in Japanese schools by using Wittgenstein's "language game" approach.

Speaker A will play the role of chairing their presentation. Each of three speakers will also explain the connections between his own previous research topics and current topics as well as how his research topics relate to actual educational settings in Japan such as classroom teaching, subject matters, teacher education, child-adult relationship and others, as the way of introducing education in Japan to audience who are not familiar with it.

### 13.40-15.10 Parallel Session 5

#### 5.1a Mal Leicester (University of Nottingham) – Look and see

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein advises that when considering the meaning of a word or phrase we must look and see how it is used in practice, in actual speech acts. To look and see sounds more observational, and thus more empirical, than to reflect at one's desk about the conceptual distinctions marked by a word or phrase. To what extent can we go about observing actual speech acts as an approach to the clarification of meaning and remain philosophical— doing philosophy?

I will take two very different approaches to the question: what do we mean by 'higher education'. I engage in some armchair reflection about the meaning of higher education – The conceptual territory it marks out. I then consider how the phrase 'higher education' is used in actual speech situations. Significant differences emerge.

I will suggest that these approaches correlate with two theories of meaning which could be linked to the picture theory of meaning found in the *Tractatus* and the use theory of language discernible in *Philosophical Investigations* respectively. The picture theory of language sees words as gaining meaning by standing for objects in the world. A sentence pictures a state of affairs in the world. The use theory of meaning takes the meaning of the word to lie in its use within a human practice— a language game [ words and the actions into which they are woven]. There may be variable, shifting meanings in different contexts and we must look and discover these different language games and see how the word is used.

Analysing distinctions, underpinned by the real world, is nonempirical, essentialist and leads to ideas such as that of 'necessary and sufficient conditions'. Contrast this with an empirical injunction to look and see [ 'don't think']. There are no essential meanings, no key distinctions or necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead we find family resemblances. Wittgenstein demonstrates a look and see approach in considering the use of the word game. We see that there are no common elements to all uses of the word. Rather we see a family resemblance between the various uses. Investigating 'higher education' using each of



the two approaches in turn shows that the look and see approach generates a family resemblance concept rather than essential features.

Looking for uses of a word in language games allows for a diverse range of social contexts. It brings out the importance of a diversity of voices. It reveals Wittgenstein's injunction to look and see as having implications for how we approach the meaning of words which would lead to more inclusive thinking, to the benefit of the variety of social and cultural groups from which society is composed.

This talk thus touches on the nature of both philosophy and of higher education and also demonstrates that taking Wittgenstein's injunction to look and see seriously has implications for social inclusion

### **5.1b Christopher Joseph An – Learning as an intersubjective and joint attentional encounter**

In this paper I make a case for a notion of learning that derives from joint attentional and other intersubjective capacities that naturally occurs in the child. This notion of learning puts less emphasis on direct training and conditioning and more pedagogical weight on participatory and relational aspects of the child's encounter with the world. I maintain that such kind of intersubjective capacities offer an effective response to the explanatory challenge against social initiation models of learning posed by Michael Luntley who argues that a nativist and individualist model of learning (based on his non-traditional reading of the later Wittgenstein) is the only option that meets this challenge. In response to this explanatory challenge, I suggest that these intersubjective capacities provide a preconceptual and prelinguistic platform that scaffolds the child's entry into shared practices and forms of life. This socially-mediated attentional scaffolding I argue provides a kind of shared background pragmatic understanding which not only perceptually attunes the child to shared human practices and concerns but also grounds a socially-facilitated and preconceptual form of responsiveness which naturally occurs in her interaction with others around her. Through this socially-facilitated responsiveness, the prelinguistic child can be credited with a kind of primitive normative understanding. This primitive normative understanding arises primarily from the child's relational encounters with others and participation in shared activities without her necessarily exhibiting (at least at first) demonstrable conceptual competence. Even before the child learns to speak, she is already immersed in intersubjective encounters with others and is embedded in shared forms of life. This critical prelinguistic stage thus gives us a picture of the kind of primitive and preconceptual normative responsiveness that the child can achieve through her interaction with others around her. I muster support for this view from the developmental literature particularly Colwyn Trevarthen's notion of primary and secondary intersubjectivity. If this account is correct, this set of intersubjective and joint attentional capacities offer a non-individualist alternative to Luntley's account. The shared background pragmatic understanding arising from joint attentional capacities serve as a preconceptual platform or scaffold that facilitates teaching and the acquisition of full-blown conceptual capacities. These capacities motivate more social and interactive forms of cognition rather than individualist and nativist ones. Thus, I argue that the relevant notion of learning here is essentially (rather than contingently) an intersubjective rather than an individual affair. I further argue that support for this joint attentional and intersubjective account can be found in Wittgenstein's remarks on ostensive learning and aspect perception (or "seeing-as" as he calls it in the *Philosophical Investigations*). From these considerations I claim that the

child's encounter with the world exhibits an imaginative and playful dimension in which objects and practices acquire value and normative significance arising from the child's interaction with others and participation in shared forms of life.

### **5.2a Peter Schloegl (University Klagenfurt) – About friends and ways in education**

In 1977, von Wright, published a selection of remarks about philosophy, art and culture collected from a number of the manuscripts which Wittgenstein left behind when he died in 1951. A new edition of these remarks, called "Vermischte Bemerkungen" (mixed remarks), was published in 1978 (reprinted in Wittgenstein 1984). This edition was translated into English by Peter Winch and published as "Culture and Value" (Wittgenstein 1980). (see Pichler 1991, ii).

One of the remarks is a short parable about someone losing his or her way (MS 180a 67) dated approximately 1945. It tells about asking a passer-by the way home and being guided until existing, nice smooth pathways end. At that point the new friend asks to find the rest of the way home from here on for one self.

The immanent humor of this text, which could probably also come from Franz Kafka, its fairy-tale aura (see Rauh 2014, p. 28), should not obscure the fact that there is struggling to express existential thought. According to Hrachovec, two "short circuits" are to be avoided in the interpretation of this Wittgenstein quotation (see Hrachovec 1990): The first is that the approach that has been taken to rely on strangers remains the recipe for guidance, even if "the paint is off" and the second disillusionment in the sense of resignating: "nothing except expenses".

So it really gets exciting when existing paths end. At the moment when the clarity begins to cloud again, the friendly support ends. Now, one might wait for the next passer-by, accompanying another piece of probably a new path (=the first short circuit), or being incensed, about the inadequate performance that gives the impression of being basically catapulted back to the beginning (=second short circuit).

This short note can also be considered/read as an allegory of successful education. In any case, the role of the passer-by seems prerequisite rich. Because this demands in addition to the accompaniment also to pronounce the order for independence. To send on someone's own path that nobody else can go. What else is the mission of education, if it should not be reduced to training or instructing?

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Rauh, Horst Dieter. (2014). Wittgensteins Mystik der Grenze. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz.

Schlögl, Peter (2015): Von Freunden und Wegen. Eine philosophische Re-Lektüre von „Modernisierung der Erwachsenenbildung“. In: Magazin erwachsenenbildung.at. Das Fachmedium für Forschung, Praxis und Diskurs. Ausgabe 25, 2015. Wien.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1998). Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains. Translated by Winch, P. Edited by von Wright, G. H. in collaboration with Nyman, Heikki. Revised edition of the text by Pichler, Alois. Oxford: Blackwell.

### **5.2b Patrik Kjaersdam Tellús (Aalborg University) – Wittgenstein, problem-based learning, and higher education**

Wittgenstein's views on issues of learning and education are a source of inspiration for many philosophers and theorists. Evidently there is no comprehensive theory of learning, no applicable set of didactic tools and no scientifically valid perspective on education in his writings, but still his influence can be traced in the pedagogical language and theoretical concepts in existing scientific paradigms on education.

One such paradigm is labeled Problem-Based Learning (PBL). PBL is a cluster of different principals, methods and objectives, but there is a consensus on some issues: i) complex and authentic problems at the center of learning; ii) structured around student collaborative activity; iii) holds the assumption that knowledge is constructed by the learner; and iv) is assuming self-directed learning.

With principles like: "The problem emerges from real, concrete problematic situations" and "Student controlled projects"; and explicit warrants in experience-based pedagogic, especially the work of John Dewey, and (social) constructionist positions on cognitive development, such as Vygotsky's 'zone of proximal development', PBL emerge through concepts like problem-analysis, peer-learning, applied knowledge and facilitated learning environments etc.

It is quite easy to see how PBL can find philosophical support in Wittgenstein's writings. The collaborative approach, the focus on 'meaning in use', motivation through problems (anomalies), the anti-essentialism and the contextual perspective are all more or less recognizable (in parts) in Wittgenstein. The relationship between Dewey and Wittgenstein is also well documented and analyzed, as the constructionist perspectives in Wittgenstein is extensively explored and applied.

But when investigating PBL in the setting of Higher Education the inspiration from Wittgenstein can also take a different turn. Wittgenstein, precisely because he concurs fairly well with a general conceptualization of PBL, can work as a correctional guidance and conceptual deconstruction of some core elements of PBL, that in a university context needs a different interpretation than the general comprehension is normally claimed. Here I speak of concepts like 'based on authentic or real problems', 'exemplarity', 'student controlled projects', etc.

What I will demonstrate in my talk is that Wittgenstein's philosophical complexity can help educational researchers overcome some fundamental obstacles in comprehending the paradigm of PBL in Higher Education. These obstacles are caught in a dichotomy between practical and theoretical, subjectivity and objectivity and local and general, which pushes PBL into an unhealthy opposition to well acknowledged features of a university education. However, my claim is that Wittgenstein's writings can help us to stay within the PBL paradigm, and still adhere to such features and demands.

A more ad hoc use of Wittgenstein as inspiration or support for aspects of a pedagogical paradigm is one thing, and can have its benefits. But it also creates problems and paradoxes as we attempt to maintain the paradigm across a differential field of enactment. I hope to show that an in-depth use of Wittgenstein as inspiration and support can solve such problems and paradoxes.

### **5.3a Emma Williams (Warwick University) – Wittgenstein and the ways of thinking: changing the case for humanities education**

This paper develops a Wittgensteinian account of human thinking, in order to open a new way of arguing for the value of the humanities in secondary schools. Nicky Morgan's 2014 statement that STEM subjects (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) surpass

the humanities in terms of their relevance and value to life is indicative of a policy climate that has, at least for the past decade, put the humanities on the defensive, subordinating them to a logic of applicability determined by STEM thinking. Within this context, a new interdisciplinary field of humanities advocacy has arisen, often building on Classical and Victorian sources (Collini, 2012; Nussbaum, 2010; Small, 2013). I want to move debate of the humanities in secondary education forward (including Classics, History, Languages, Literature, Philosophy and Religion), and show why a Wittgensteinian account is instructive in this context.

I shall begin by explaining how Wittgenstein helps us to understand the differences between the sciences and the humanities. The humanities are not so much modes of enquiry to be 'applied', but are inherent aspects of human experience itself. They are refinements of our ordinary practices. I shall then consider Wittgenstein's sustained preoccupation with scepticism. Wittgenstein's later work is sometimes taken to be a refutation of scepticism. However, his response is rather to dissolve the threat posed by scepticism, only to let it surface again. Stanley Cavell's interpretation of this has shown how Wittgenstein is addressing a manifestation within philosophy of something that is inherent in the human condition: the tendency to call into question the conditions of our own lives. He has demonstrated the ways that this tendency is manifested in our lives as a whole, in their ordinary everyday anxieties and neuroses, as well as in extreme traumas of passion and desire – all this made apparent in so many works of literature and film. This provides an account of a human unsettledness that is internally related to the openness of interpretation that characterises so much of human life. I will show how these lines of thought extend understanding of the distinctive ways of thinking called for by the humanities. Crucially, this goes beyond 'critical thinking', and moves towards: a continually unsettled but creative sense of the nature of the thing being explored; humility in relation to one's judgements and, in consequence, a welcoming of interruptions to those judgements; awareness of the fact that a community of judgement is dependent upon multiple perspectives and not generally susceptible to linear processes of deduction; and a receptiveness to new areas of enquiry and unexpected ways of understanding. Drawing on my experience as Philosopher in Residence, I will show how these qualities relate to the humanities in secondary schooling, where the activity is, more obviously, not a meta-level theorisation on experience so much as an expansion of that experience itself. In this way, I hope to demonstrate how bringing Wittgenstein's ideas into connection with educational issues can prove mutually beneficial to both philosophical and educational thinking.

### **5.3b Matteo Rivetti (University of Padova) – Remarks on a Wittgensteinian education to ineducation**

The aim of this paper is to present the idea of an 'education to ineducation' in the light of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Considering ineducation not as a lack of education but as a critical suspension of education, I will explore the possibility of a groundbreaking use, action or habit, situated in the gap between ordinary practice and the chronic potential of a new direction. Every language game is governed by rules, but a rule is not an insuperable limit, it is rather the limitation of a practice. A rule that determines in advance its applications cannot exist since there is always an ineliminable *gulf* between the symbolic expression of a rule and the moment of its application. Normally, the presence of the gulf goes unnoticed and the river of language flows without a hitch. A *crisis* can happen when a subjective action insists on this precise gap or an event affects the everyday life. In these scenarios education

is at stake in two different ways. First, a groundbreaking action is efficient if it is preceded by a type of education that prepares the subject to be aware of these specific points of the practice. This is also related to an attention to the necessary presence of the contradiction at the heart of the practice (cf. *PI* 125). Secondly, the subject must be educated to suspend his/her assumptions, i.e. his/her education, to handle the consequences of a sudden event. In both cases there is a need for a 'taste education': a subject develops a mastery as a result of a deep experience in social practices, such as speeches, institutions, language games. The talent of questioning what is inherited can be grown together with the ability to face up a sudden change. Wittgenstein's philosophy shows how the act of blindly following a rule can unexpectedly be considered in a whole different light and the rule can be suspended or modified. All of a sudden some aspects of human experience can be seen from a critical perspective, but the ability to see aspects change can be gradually developed too. The second part of the *Philosophical Investigations* offers notions, e.g. the one of 'aspect seeing', that can help to understand the nature of the aforementioned mastery. It is this aesthetic education that opens up a space for a subjective action at the crossroads between rules and language use. Examples from Paolo Virno, such as his interpretation of Freud's *Witz*, and from Stanley Cavell, especially on the question of mythology, will be discussed.

#### **5.4a Jonathan Beale (Queen Anne's School) – What we can learn about teaching from Wittgenstein's time as a schoolteacher**

In 1919 Wittgenstein trained as an elementary school teacher and taught in Austrian schools from 1920-1926. His pedagogical methods were typically unorthodox and innovative. This paper offers an account of Wittgenstein's school teaching methods and general pedagogical approach (§1). Similarities between his methods and contemporary educational methods are identified (§2). It is argued that Wittgenstein's methods bear similarities with, and offer resources for developing research into, certain methods in contemporary educational research (§3). The similarities identified in §2 enrich the account in §1 and support the arguments in §3.

Three teaching methods of which we find similarities in Wittgenstein's methods are: (i) 'independent learning'; (ii) 'project-based learning'; and (iii) 'stretching and challenging'.

Concerning (i), Wittgenstein focused on pupils learning for themselves. Hermine Wittgenstein wrote that her brother would not 'simply lecture' but would lead his pupils 'to the correct solution by means of questions', in a manner akin to Socrates' leading a slave boy to geometrical answers in Plato's *Meno*. It is argued that Wittgenstein's interactive, dialogical method of encouraging independent learning offers an effective means of engaging pupils with certain subject matter and tasks than some orthodox approaches, such as teacher-led instruction. Although philosophy was not among the subjects Wittgenstein taught at schools, it's argued that this method is particularly useful in philosophical pedagogy. Evidence from educational research is offered to illustrate the effectiveness of pedagogical styles similar to Wittgenstein's which encourage independent learning.

Concerning (ii), pupils' tasks included creating models of architectural structures and locomotives. Their understanding was developed by going to see similar structures and locomotives in Vienna. It's argued that such projects offer useful case studies for educational research concerning the value of project-based learning and its relation to independent learning.

Concerning (iii), a day under Wittgenstein's tutelage typically began with advanced mathematics, significantly stretching some pupils but going over the heads of others. It was

therefore not sensitive to the needs of his pupils. It is argued that Wittgenstein's teaching of advanced mathematics is an example of how stretching and challenging can be employed inadequately and can subsequently have a detrimental impact on learning.

The three methods above are examined in connection with research in educational psychology concerning the phenomena of 'motivational' and 'emotional contagion', whereby motivational or emotional states spread among a group through behavioural influences. As Spencer Robins writes, Wittgenstein's didactic style led to some pupils becoming very emotionally engaged and highly motivated to work. Hermine Wittgenstein reported seeing her brother's pupils 'positively climbing over each other in their eagerness' to answer questions. Wittgenstein acquired committed pupils to whom he would provide additional tuition after school. 'To these children', Ray Monk writes, Wittgenstein 'became a sort of father figure'. Some methods, however, had quite the opposite effect. The paper examines ways in which Wittgenstein elicited emotional engagement and motivated pupils, and how his methods can be used to develop educational research concerning motivational and emotional contagion.

#### **5.4b Leon Culbertson (Edge Hill University) – “A psychological regularity to which no physiological reality corresponds?” – Some remarks on learning and understanding**

It seems tempting to think, at least many seem so tempted, that when we use the words 'learn', 'learning', 'learnt' and 'learned', there is some mental state or process to which those words refer, and that what those words refer to is always the same thing. *Those* thoughts have led to claims about machines being able to learn, and the claim that connectionist 'cognitive architecture' explains how human beings learn. Alternatively, classic computational accounts of learning are still alive and moderately well, even if they are no longer 'the only game in town'. Related to those developments in philosophy, psychology, and the wider project of 'cognitive science', a new way of talking, and therefore of thinking, about learning has crept into education research in recent years. It involves ascribing learning *to the brain*, rather than to human beings as a whole, and it results in talk of 'the learning brain'. For example, Churchland (2012: vii) claims that '[t]he learning brain, ..., very slowly **constructs a representation**, or "**takes a picture**," of the landscape or configuration of the *abstract universals*, the *temporal invariants*, and the *enduring symmetries* that structure the objective universe of **its experience**' (added emphasis in bold). Blakemore and Frith (2005: 7) tell us that 'the brain can *acquire information* even when you are not paying attention to it and don't notice it' (emphasis added). Goswami (2008: 390) claims that 'the child's brain can in principle *construct* detailed *conceptual frameworks* from watching and listening to the world' (emphasis added), and that 'the brain will **extract** and **represent structure** that is present in the input *even when it is not taught directly*' (added emphasis in bold). Before this trend emerged, it was *human beings*, not brains that learned things, constructed representations (and those were representations only for human beings), and had experiences (an *extension* of *PI* §281ff.). It was human beings that acquired information, and that information was only information *for human beings*. Conceptual frameworks were *human* constructions only employed and understood *by humans*, and it was humans, not brains that *identified* structure and *represented* structure *for other human beings*. Indeed, *despite* the trend to think otherwise, those things are still the case, as Bennett and Hacker (2003; 2007 and 2008) have demonstrated in great detail.

This paper considers one of many possible lines of criticism of the project of 'educational neuroscience' that can be elaborated from the work of Wittgenstein. It will

consider some inter-relationships between the concept of learning and that of understanding. In doing so, a slightly wider area of the conceptual scheme around learning will be sketched, such that interconnections between the concepts of learning, understanding, ability, knowing, and concept-possession (*PI* §§150 and 199) will be briefly described and employed as points of reference in making some more detailed observations about the normativity and occasion-sensitivity of understanding and its relevance to ascriptions of learning.