Rather belated in its appearance, this paperback selection of Oswald Hanfling’s collected essays, originally published in hardback in 2002, provides an excellent opportunity to appraise his methodology, and to provide a retrospective assessment of his already recognised contribution to Wittgenstein studies. Oswald Hanfling died in 2005, and as mentioned by Hans-Johann Glock in his Guardian Obituary (Tuesday 28th November), he made a very important contribution to the Open University’s philosophy courses. Yet he was not a native speaker of the English language, and arrived in this country only in 1939 as a child refugee from Nazi Germany. Said to have taught himself English through reading comics like the Beano whilst in hospital with scarlet fever, and seemingly undergoing a rapid conversion to Anglophilia, he gradually came to command, in tandem with his developing admiration for Wittgenstein’s work, the kind of pellucid English style Glock believes to have been achieved quite often by similar ‘Germanophone immigrants’.

The book contains 11 papers, originally published either in familiar outlets like the Philosophical Quarterly and Philosophical Investigations, or as contributions to a number of the many collections of scholarly essays appearing during the last few decades, including Critical Essays on Wittgenstein ed. Stuart Shanker from Croom Helm in 1986, and Wittgenstein - A Critical Reader ed. H. J. Glock from Blackwell in 2001. Covering a period of just over 20 years, and revised and rewritten by the author for publication in this collection, the essays form a very revealing introduction to Oswald Hanfling’s style and method. The content of one or two of them, e.g., the essay on Wittgenstein’s ‘Private Language Argument’, was extracted later on for use in his separate volume on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations with its Chapter about On Certainty, Hanfling’s 1989 Macmillan publication, Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, which contributed to the ever increasing number of responses to the Investigations which have continued to appear until the present day.

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In a separate Introduction, Hanfling sets the scene for his understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy by drawing attention to the notion of a ‘form of life’. This expression occurs three times in Part I of the *Investigations* and twice in Part II, and Hanfling stresses that *Investigations* § 23 should be understood as capturing the idea that speaking a language is essentially a human activity, and that the different language-games Wittgenstein goes on to list in this passage - from giving orders and obeying them to asking, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying - are all intimately associated with complex human activities of countless kinds, a point which Wittgenstein hammers home by contrasting the kinds of things that logicians, including the author of the *Tractatus*, have said about the structure of language. As Hanfling puts it, ‘language is not, as he thought in his earlier work, a system of propositions that “picture” or “correspond to” states of affairs “in the world”’. (*Ibid.* 1)

Hanfling then draws our attention to Part II, Section i of the *Investigations* (page 174), where a separate occurrence of the expression ‘form of life’ occurs in connection with the emotions of hope and grief, which we understand to be distinctly human phenomena. For even if there are, *contra* Wittgenstein, circumstances in which we may be tempted to say that a dog is hoping for, or anticipating its daily meal, or grieving over the death of its master, this behaviour would be understood here on analogy with our primary understanding of these emotions as they are ascribed to human beings. Wittgenstein emphasises an important characteristic of grief here by making a contrast with feeling violent pain for only a second, something which in comparison to grief as an emotion which can serve to colour over time one’s entire outlook on life, has no application.

Hanfling next points to a third occurrence of the expression ‘form of life’ in relation to *Investigations* §§ 240-242, where his reference to ‘agreement in judgements’ is a reference to an agreement expressed through the language people use, and for this reason is part of the background against which they participate in their activities, as distinct from an agreement or disagreement in ordinary opinions which takes place against this already established framework. Reference is also made in passing here to *Investigations* Part II, xi (page 225) and the environmental stability (*e.g.*, the
reliability of ink and paper) surrounding successful calculation, leading to the claim that what has to be accepted as the given are forms of life (page 226). This serves to echo the peaceful agreement that is part of the surroundings of the word ‘same’ (Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, page 323). This is all leading towards the important point made in Investigations Part II, xii, that differences in the general facts of nature would enable us to realise differences in our concepts, and this for Hanfling is Wittgenstein’s way of counteracting the assumption that our concepts are ‘absolutely the correct ones’ (Ibid., 4). Nevertheless, Hanfling does wish to make the distinction here between ‘strange ways of going on, and ways of going on that could not be recognised as measuring or reasoning at all’ (Ibid.) This leads to the idea of the ‘arbitrariness’ of our concepts, an idea rejected by Hanfling in favour of the notion that Wittgenstein is a ‘humanist’ thinker, who treats language as part of what Hanfling calls ‘the human form of life’.

At this point Hanfling introduces the division of his essays into two main groups, the first 6 of which express one of his primary concerns as it relates to a number of different problems, e.g., private language, criteria, rule-following and scepticism. This concern is over the widespread tendency in Wittgenstein interpretation to ascribe to him standpoints which go beyond what can be gleaned directly from the spirit, if not always the letter of the primary texts. In this respect Hanfling agrees with David Stern (1). The second part of his book contains the remaining 5 essays devoted for the most part to philosophy of mind, and to the notions of thinking and consciousness: there is an intimate relationship between these notions and the human being at the centre of our understanding of them. Hanfling is very much a member of that group of philosophers who see Wittgenstein as opposed to any form of ‘scientism’, and it will come as no surprise that he recognises in his own way Anthony Kenny’s ‘homunculus fallacy’ (2), in which thoughts and feelings are erroneously ascribed to the human brain instead of to the human person.

The first essay in the book, ‘Questions and Answers in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy’, elaborates on these various ideas, drawing the reader’s attention to the sheer difficulty often encountered in reading Wittgenstein, a difficulty put down to the unfinished state of some of
his writing, e.g., in *On Certainty* and in some of the middle-period works, or instead to the extreme compression of his ideas often encountered, say, in their mature expression within the *Investigations*. At this point Hanfling again refers to tendencies in recent years within the philosophical community to a regression into a pre-Wittgensteinian outlook, in which cravings for generalisations and theory-construction become inimical to the more wholesome perspective that Wittgenstein adopts, a point reflected in his having said that the difficulty of understanding him can often be attributed to the will rather than to the intellect.

Yet this tendency for Hanfling afflicts even his admirers, and at this point he reiterates his claim that sympathetic interpreters of Wittgenstein only too often succeed in reading into his writings ideas that are not really there. Commenting that Wittgenstein has been seen as a phenomenalist, physicalist, conventionalist, relativist, sceptic, or even as a presenter of a ‘social theory of knowledge’, referring to interpreters as diverse as John Cooke, Crispin Wright, M. & J. Hintikka and David Bloor (*Ibid*. 12), and reflecting that it is hardly likely that all of these standpoints could have been adopted either simultaneously or at different periods during a long life by one and the same man, Hanfling regrets a widespread craving for proofs and refutations when ‘description alone’ is intended, and for answers when Wittgenstein is often disposed to ask only for more relevant questions.

The first example from Wittgenstein’s writing that Hanfling uses to illustrate the open-ended exploratory approach he attributes to him comes from *Investigations*, Part II, v (page 179): the tale of the nurse and the doctor, where the doctor’s query how the patient is feeling is answered by the nurse’s ‘he is groaning’. Is the patient’s groaning really the expression of anything genuine behind it? Or, in deciding to give him analgesic, are they suppressing a middle term (the pain), if the important point after all is the service to which they put the description of the behaviour? Hanfling’s answer, comparing the example to *Investigations* § 307, is that Wittgenstein is not expressing behaviourism in this passage, as he may appear to be doing, a point he emphasises by referring to Saul Kripke’s proposal that Wittgenstein rejects any attempt
to justify our reactions in such cases by a belief about the ‘inner state’ of the other person. By contrast, Hanfling sees Wittgenstein adopting an open ended approach in which we ought not to take it for granted that he is asking only rhetorical questions, and that we should not merely assume that there is no issue at stake over whether there is really any pain behind the behaviour, a point he illustrates by drawing our attention to those kinds of circumstances in which we would genuinely talk about a belief that another person is in pain.

But if Hanfling may appear to miss an important point here, it is that any question whether the patient is or is not really feeling pain in this example, over and above the question of what criteria the nurse and doctor are employing in order to arrive at the right answer, is a philosophical question that is wholly distinct from their ordinary enquires about the patient’s condition. Yet it is that superflous question which Wittgenstein is rejecting, and insofar as he is, there is no issue whether the patient is really feeling pain over and above what is revealed via its ordinary expression. On the contrary, the belief that the patient is really feeling pain, insofar as this can be understood to form the answer to the kind of ordinary question that the nurse and the doctor daily encounter, can be understood to follow naturally here from the fact that these ordinary criteria are frequently satisfied. On this assessment, the question whether there is really something going on behind the behaviour becomes the misleading picture that is directing the course of the philosophical enquiry. The picture, seen in the right way, is a harmless accompaniment to the practice of attributing pain to others, but it is doing no real work; and that is the point Wittgenstein is using the example to express.

Hanfling next discusses whether Wittgenstein is a conventionalist, instancing *Zettel* §§ 357-8, and referring to Wittgenstein’s claim in *Zettel* § 331 that there is a temptation to ‘justify the rules of grammar by sentences like “But there really are four primary colours”. And the saying that the rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification.’ Consequently, on this reading the claim that there are four primary colours is a grammatical statement: that there either is or is not anything behind the statement serving to ‘justify’ it, is a misleading picture directing the course of the philosophical investigation. Hanfling again sees Wittgenstein adopting
a tentative, exploratory approach, comparing the phenomena of language with conventions, games and arbitrary rules, but without trying to force language into any particular straightjacket. Yet here again Hanfling exhibits a tendency to see Wittgenstein as rejecting certain philosophical standpoints in favour of a more open-ended methodology, as distinct from rejecting the pictures underlying those temptations that often occur when doing philosophy, to adopt what presents itself as one horn provided by the (philosophical) dilemma in preference to another.

Hanfling next expresses his rejection of any idea that Wittgenstein employed a so-called ‘Criterial Argument’ as a means of once and for all providing a solution to the vexed ‘Problem of Other Minds’, where this argument is intended as a third way which bypasses the embarrassments of both the deductive argument - leading to behaviourism - and the inductive argument - proving to be insufficient to justify the required conclusion. The notion of criteria on this assessment is sufficient to yield knowledge concerning another’s private experiences, whilst allowing for the so-called defeasibility of knowledge-claims: pain-behaviour, say, is not always accompanied by pain. The topic is taken up in more detail in his paper, ‘Criteria, conventions and the problem of other minds’, but his account in this earlier chapter forms a useful resume of the longer, and at times rather long-winded, discussion about various notions of criteria occurring in the later.

The reason that this discussion quickly becomes long-winded is that although detailed accounts of how the term ‘criterion’ is used in different contexts, and how these uses bear little relation to the discussion about pain in the Investigations, are no doubt interesting in their own right, they fail to get to the heart of Wittgenstein’s treatment of other minds. Yet an important aspect of that treatment has already been encountered in the example of the nurse and the doctor. Hanfling, on the other hand, wishes to stress, surely correctly, that there is no ‘Criterial Argument’ in the Investigations of the kind already outlined. Yet he does this by arguing that Investigations § 580 - ‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ - has been wrongly seized upon by philosophers as having a relevance to pain, when it is really about confidence, expectation and
hope. Yet that pain is attributable to persons other than one’s self according to the application of behavioural criteria - in an ordinary non-technical sense - and that § 580 can be roped in as a further expression of this general claim, seems wholly unobjectionable. Here Hanfling’s distinctly ‘Ordinary Language’ approach, insofar as it takes Wittgenstein to be offering any solution to this problem at all, provides a perspective on Wittgenstein’s achievement which to some philosophers may make his position seem unnecessarily weak:

Wittgenstein’s main concern is about meaning rather than knowledge....

In the course of his lengthy discussions of the concept of pain, he disposes of the sceptical problem in a brief remark: ‘If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?) then other people very often know when I am in pain ’ (PI 246).....

The reader who has taken in the remarks about meaning and use will hardly expect him to supply a detailed refutation of the sceptic’s denial. If, as Wittgenstein argues, there is no more to the meaning of a word than its use, what is left of the sceptical problem ? Assuming that the word ‘know’ is being used in the normal way, how can we question whether we sometimes know that another person is in pain ? (Ibid., 50).

Although the sceptic may claim, on Hanfling’s view, that according to his usage of ‘know’ we cannot know it, what the sceptic cannot claim is that he has command of the ‘real’ meaning of the word ‘know’, for this would imply, contra Wittgenstein, that there is a standard of meaning beyond, and superior to that provided by ordinary use. But if this is Hanfling’s final reply to the sceptic, then even if it is on the right lines, it nevertheless has all the characteristics of an argument from the paradigm case that fails to capture Wittgenstein’s ultimate challenge to other minds scepticism. This occurs in Investigations § 300, where the sceptic is charged with being subject to a temptation affecting everyone who does philosophy: integral to our understanding of the language-game in which we attribute pain to others, is not merely our acquaintance with
the behavioural criteria allowing us to talk about their pains, but our understanding that in
making this attribution we really do mean that there are internal processes going on in them
which correspond to those that go on in ourselves when we are in pain. But, according to
Wittgenstein, if that really were so in the philosophical guise that is here in question, any doubts
about whether persons other than ourselves really feel pain would become interminable, insofar
as they would outstrip the ordinary criteria which finally determine the application of the concept
on any particular occasion. Yet in practice, doubt comes to an end. The conclusion Wittgenstein
draws from this is not that there are no internal processes going on in other people when they
feel pain, but that from a philosophical perspective the question whether there either are or are
not any processes of this kind is incidental to the practice in which we attribute pain both to
ourselves and to others. In this way, this picture accompanying the practice is alright, but it is idle
and is doing no real work in our understanding of third-person attributions of pain; yet that we
cannot avoid providing it with that role in our understanding of the practice, is what gives rise
when doing philosophy to the Problem of Other Minds.

Hanfling’s treatment of ‘The Private Language Argument’, the next subject for discussion
in the first Chapter of his book, and one which he explores in more detail in his essay ‘What does
the private language argument prove?’, expresses the same kind of strategy he has committed
himself to in his approach to other minds. Yet in this case his approach is even less successful, and
the reason for this is that he is only too prone to take the so-called private linguist of § 258 - in the
passage with which he is mainly concerned in these pages - to be an ordinary human being faced
with the difficulty of ‘putting a name to his sensation’. Beginning with the supposition that the
force of this and surrounding passages gain their main impetus from § 242, and the claim that
‘agreement in judgements’ has the implication that ‘language is an inter-personal activity’, he
cautions the reader that although Wittgenstein was fascinated in various manuscripts with the
idea of private meanings in their own right, the idea of a private language which would manage
to overturn the claim about interpersonal agreement is decisively rejected at § 261. Wittgenstein
reminds us here that the very things that philosophers wish to say about a private language only make sense when expressed within the context of a language that is not private, so that the very use of terms like ‘sensation’, ‘has’ and ‘something’ gain what sense they have from this ordinary perspective; and this leads to his asking what philosophers think they can be talking about in even raising the question of a private language. Whilst this in its own way is a very powerful form of argument, it is nevertheless far from being the whole story about the passages under discussion. Hanfling, however, sees Wittgenstein once again indulging her here in the kind of tentative probing and investigating that is part of his exploratory approach, as opposed to being directly concerned ‘with the refutation of privacy and the vindication of the point about inter-personal agreement’ (Ibid. 18). This leads to a reading of § 258 that at best is not helpful to our understanding of what this passage is really about:

Does it follow that the sign ‘S’ is no sign at all, that it is in no way akin to a use of language? These conclusions are not drawn in the text; nor are they required by the position, reached earlier, that ‘if language is to be a means of communication, there must be agreement not only in definitions but also...in judgements’ (242). In the private diary passage it is not proposed that the sign ‘S’ is to be a means of communication - a fully fledged use of language in that sense. The idea is, rather, to compare the example with normal uses of language, drawing attention to its shortcomings and resisting any temptation to think that this is a normal use of language....

We might be tempted to introduce a major premise to the effect that something is a sign or a use of language only if we can talk about ‘right’, and this would exclude the sign ‘S’ from being a sign. But there is no reason why this further step should be taken, and it is not taken in the text (Ibid.)

It will come as no surprise on this reading that Hanfling’s final conclusion is that,
referring once again to Wittgenstein’s statement in § 261 that when doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would just like to emit an empty sound, ‘if my argument has been correct, this desperate point is not yet reached in the example of PI 258’ (Ibid. 37).

This may partly help to explain why, throughout his discussion, Hanfling can move from conclusions which are valid to others which are invalid without fully realising that some of those he has just carefully argued for actually rule out others he later happily accepts. This comes for the most part from adopting a far too literal reading of Wittgenstein’s text. Take, for example, his doubtful claim that the ‘relation between the situations described in PI 258 and PI 270 is one of continuity: there is no abrupt leap from meaningless to meaningful.’ (Ibid. 33) This follows a valid objection he makes to Kenny’s statement that in § 270 the sign ‘S’ has a genuine use, and is tantamount to ‘sensation which means my blood pressure is rising’. But, as Hanfling correctly argues, if one can discover a correlation between the occurrence of a particular sensation and a rise in blood pressure, then the meaning of the sign ‘S’ must already be wholly independent of whether any correlation of this kind can be established. Yet he combines this with the awkward conclusion, clearly inconsistent with this claim, that Wittgenstein shows his own reference to a particular sensation in § 270 to be unjustified - because it is indifferent whether it is identified right - without realising that Wittgenstein is referring here to two quite different sensation-models:

But (as he goes on to point out), this reference to ‘a particular sensation’ is a deficient one, given that there is no right or wrong to it. As far as the ‘useful result’ is concerned, ‘it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognised the sensation right or not’ (PI 270). In view of this, it may seem as if we might as well forget about ‘the sensation’, and speak rather of a correlation between

the writing of ‘S’ and the rising of the blood pressure. (Ibid. 33)

But as Hanfling once again correctly points out, following Robert Fogelin’s view that in § 270 the sign ‘S’ loses all connection with a particular sensation, what the so-called private diarist then ought to report here is an occasional inclination to write down the letter ‘S’ for no reason
whosoever, a report which in the context of this example would really be unintelligible. Hanfling concludes, surely rather weakly, that Wittgenstein’s reference to a ‘particular sensation’ in § 270 is a way of drawing attention to the peculiarity of these words in this context although he ‘does not deny that they have a place there’ (Ibid., 34).

But the point of § 270, a point confirmed if we take Wittgenstein’s reference to a particular sensation here to be a reference to a sensation of a particular kind, is that the ability to correlate the occurrence of this sensation with a rise in blood pressure clearly indicates that this is already taking place within a context of use in which the language is in principle a public one. But then it does follow that it is indifferent whether the sensation is identified rightly or not, where this means, not that it is indifferent what kind of sensation is correlated with the rise in blood pressure, but that in talking correctly about the occurrence of our particular kinds of sensations we do not properly identify or recognise them at all. Wittgenstein’s implicit reference here is to the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription, with the consequence that the private object - capable of being identified only in terms of its own individual criteria of identity - drops out of consideration altogether. It is in this respect that it is quite indifferent whether it is identified right or not because its very existence is irrelevant to the correlation of the occurrence of the ordinary sensation with the blood pressure rise.

§ 270, therefore, is yet a further example of the kind of methodological strategy often employed by Wittgenstein (Cf. §§ 271-2) where something initially presented as an apparently viable picture of how our sensation language functions, is undermined in the presentation of the example itself. This refers back to the real point which is being made in § 258, that the task of the private-linguist here can only be that of conferring meaning on his own private world, for we cannot assume from the beginning that what comes before the private-linguist is a sensation of a particular kind. For if we do, we are already presupposing that this sensation is ascribed to it owner criterionlessly, and therefore within a context of use where the language is already in principle public. The private linguist of § 258 is presented with a dilemma: if we presume that he is no longer in a position
to play the role of Anthony Kenny’s ‘solipsistic metaphysical self’ who confers meaning on his intrinsically private Tractarian world by pure will (3) - and it is never entirely clear exactly what this can be taken to mean - then the very idea of conferring meaning on his own private world is already incoherent, because this is something he must already presuppose. Yet if he presupposes that he can utilise a private object model for his sensation talk, it follows that because there can be no circumstances in which he could identify a sensation as an individual sensation of a particular kind - since there are no available criteria in terms of which this could be achieved - then ‘whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about “right” ’ (§ 258).

Consequently, either the private linguist - as in this example - employs the wrong model for his sensation talk, in which case this model - in terms of which privacy is defined - has no application, or he employs the correct model, in which case he is already within the confines of a language which is in principle public. But then the sense that this model has for the philosopher is already parasitic on the use of the public language which he employs every day. This is the methodological point Wittgenstein stresses from §§ 260 - 265, that our understanding of this public language is pointing all the time to the background against which we come to employ it, and that our ideas of what is correct or incorrect are indeed parasitic on this already established use. This is not a logical reductio, but a reminder of familiar facts which philosophers tend to forget when they argue, for example, that our sensations can be intrinsically meaningful in isolation from the kinds of contexts in which we came to acquire our language of sensations. That our first person sensation talk is criterionless, whilst a point central to Wittgenstein’s thinking, remains one that must be kept quite separate from the question of how our sensation language is acquired.

Hanfling ends his introductory chapter with a section entitled ‘The Investigations versus the Tractatus’, where he argues for the general point that it would be quite wrong to think that Wittgenstein’s later rejection of the Tractatus, expressed especially in the earlier part of the Investigations, should be treated as a refutation of the standpoints which he repudiates. It is rather
that Wittgenstein adopts a different attitude of mind in his later work, rejecting any idea that such and such a way of thinking must be so, that language and reality must be structured in a certain way, for example, or that there must be something common to everything that we call a game, the kind of presupposition which was pretty much taken for granted in his earlier work and which constitutes one of the ‘grave mistakes’ he refers to in the Preface to the Investigations. Hanfling refers to a more detailed discussion of these matters in his own last major work (4).

Hanfling’s next Chapter, ‘Does Language Need Rules ?’ is largely another exploratory paper raising the question whether the general belief amongst philosophers that language is a rule-governed practice, is really justified, and his general answer is that Wittgenstein’s main concern ‘was not to establish that the use of language is a case of rule-following, but to bring out the limitations of rules in explaining linguistic and related behaviour’ (Ibid., 62) However, in spite of its once again going over the earlier question about the arbitrariness of grammar among other things, taken up in his Introduction, the overall impression provided by the essay (revised from a 1980 original) is that it is rather slight. The paper ends, for example, with the conclusion that although different societies can display over time vast cultural differences which can sometimes make mutual understanding between them very difficult, these differences should not be exaggerated because, ultimately, ‘there must be a background of fundamental agreement between such a language and ours, for otherwise we would not be able to recognise it as a language.’ (Ibid., 65) Hanfling concludes with the suggestion that the differences he refers to are ‘also not arbitrary. They reflect different “forms of life” and different ways of seeing the world, and are not subject to choice in the way in which games and the rules of games are.’

‘Wittgenstein on the use of “I know” ‘ from 1984 is another piece that, whilst providing a cogent assessment of Wittgenstein’s reaction to Moore’s knowledge claims in his famous essay ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, and in his later ‘proof’ provided in his British Academy Lecture from 1939, that there really are material things, a proof consisting in his holding up his hands for display, may nevertheless appear to suffer a little when compared with the more sophisticated
treatments available mostly since the new millennium. Yet Hanfling’s account stands up rather well in spite of this vast explosion in the secondary literature about On Certainty, a literature often illustrating aspects of this work that many earlier commentators may have tended to overlook.

Hanfling begins by faithfully following Wittgenstein’s account in Investigations Part II, xi, that a claim to knowledge makes sense in a context where it is related to the degree of evidence available to substantiate it, and where in the absence of this evidence one might instead be inclined to report only that ‘I believe’ or ‘I suspect’ until more information is forthcoming to properly justify what one presumes to know. Consequently, a claim to knowledge makes no sense in contexts where doubt is logically excluded, the kind of context to which Hanfling refers in Investigations § 246 where only as a joke would one claim to know that one was in pain: the criterionless nature of this claim about feeling the sensation reveals that it is not based on available evidence, and for that reason can never be subject to doubt. As Hanfling expands the point at the end of his paper:

The Cartesian interlocutor thinks that perfect knowledge is possible only where doubt and error are inconceivable; Wittgenstein holds, on the contrary, that in typical and straightforward cases of knowledge, doubt and error are conceivable. This, he points out, is how the word ‘know’ is ordinarily used (Ibid., 74)

Hanfling, however, directs our attention to a separate usage of ‘to know’ On Certainty, when he states that ‘What we find Wittgenstein saying here is not that “I know” is senseless when applied to Moore’s propositions, but rather that the latter enjoy a special kind of certainty and a special role in our system of knowledge.’ (Ibid., 67) He is then given to recite examples from the innumerable list of propositions in the truth of which Wittgenstein claims to believe, and with which connoisseurs of On Certainty have become only too familiar, e.g., that the earth existed long before his birth, and that he has forebears etc. (On Certainty § 288) where he has no hesitation in saying that these are things he knows. Yet this form of ‘knowledge’ belongs to the scaffolding of our thinking (§ 211). It is a form of certainty which is ‘groundless’ (§ 253) insofar as it forms the background against which our ordinary claims to knowledge are verified or falsified. These
reflections lead to the idea that propositions of this kind can be compared to ‘hinges’ insofar as they are exempt from doubt. To put them in question would be to bring down the entire edifice which depends on this foundation for its existence (§ 341 & §§ 291-2).

This is now very familiar territory to students of Wittgenstein, but that does not mean that the issues surrounding it are entirely unproblematic. Indeed, the most significant feature of these so-called ‘hinge’ propositions is that the philosophical role they are evidently playing in this context is one which, in the kinds of ordinary situations with which we are familiar, no one would remotely think of attributing to them. It would from this point of view be (ironically) a kind of (traditional) Wittgensteinian point they do not play any role in our (conscious) day-to-day thinking at all. That someone has two hands, or parents, that he has a brain etc. etc. are not considerations that occupy us during our day-to-day routine, insofar as it is only in a strictly philosophical context that they can be understood to have any point. Ought we then to conclude that these statements can have no ordinary use? The answer is that although it may involve quite a stretch of the imagination, we can usually come up with a day-to-day situation in which a statement like ‘I am certain that I have two hands’ has an ordinary application, e.g., I have just been involved in an accident in which the question of my losing a hand has actually arisen, or a doctor has decided to test my mental state following a traumatic experience, or I have been raised in a community close to a chemical works known to be responsible for genetic disorders in local residents, some of whom may have been born with only one hand, or even three. In the same way, that I have parents may be a claim worth making in a brave new world in which it has become commonplace for children to be artificially bred in the laboratory, in which case they could not properly be said to have had any parents at all.

But it may be argued that this only serves to prove Wittgenstein’s point, one made for example, in § 96 of On Certainty, where he indirectly suggests that developments in technology (Cf. § 111 about the Moon) could very well play an active role in allowing us to differentiate between these statements which form part of the inherited background against which we judge what holds fast for us, and what for this very reason is therefore not open to question, and those ordinary statements which
are allowed to be true or false based on our application of available empirical criteria. Indeed, why should we even so much as assume that these ‘hinge’ propositions have to be formulated in order that they can have the role Wittgenstein wishes to grant to them? As he points out (§ 159), the claim that I have great-grandparents, or that I know who my parents are, are claims that in this respect do not need to be expressed or even thought about in order to be true.

But whilst this is undoubtedly a valid argument, its consequence is to weaken the status of those ‘hinge’ propositions which Wittgenstein constantly brings to our attention, and this weakening is integral to the fact that it is only when doing philosophy that there is any reason for Wittgenstein to manufacture artificial examples illustrating his point. Indeed, his requirement that there be certain circumstances in which a person cannot be making a mistake (§ 155) does occasionally lead him to introduce statements which on the face of it meet the criteria for being exempt from doubt, yet which he finds himself forced to retract because a counterexample suddenly occurs to him. In § 659, for example, he cannot be making a mistake about just having had lunch, only to realise that he might have dropped off immediately after the meal without knowing it and, having slept for an hour, awakened to believe that he has only just eaten. But this suggests that these statements when intended to capture a philosophical point, inevitably serve to play an ambivalent role: on the one hand, they serve to express an ordinary empirical claim - a friend reminds me that I am wrong to think I have just had lunch because he has seen me fall asleep after it for an hour - and another in which there is supposed to be nothing that could conceivably show them to be false.

The central problem is that with sufficient imagination it has been shown that there is nothing that could allow any statement manufactured for special philosophical purposes to exclusively play this special role: counterexamples can always be envisaged, even with simple examples like ‘I am sitting at my desk and writing’ where, no matter how certain I may be in my claim, external evidence may be used to reveal to me later on that this statement was made during a period when I was in my bed and under the influence of a hallucinatory drug, and not
at my desk at all. This point is confirmed again in §675, where it is said that a person cannot be mistaken in his claim that he has just flown from America to England in the last few days. What here is clearly a form of subjective certainty - one no doubt parasitic on the thought that this experience must be so fresh in his memory that he could not possibly be wrong about it - remains compatible with the discovery of his having totally forgotten that he was actually intoxicated for most of the journey - which really took place weeks ago - or that a stage hypnotist can be revealed to have recently implanted in him a false memory of the actual flight. Yet what Wittgenstein is attempting to point to here is a form of objective certainty that is not epistemic (5) and the issue is whether any of these ‘hinge’ propositions can ever be used to properly convey this general idea.

Certainly, none of this invalidates Wittgenstein’s main point, that somewhere along the line doubt must come to an end, but the question at stake is to what extent one can legitimately present this in terms of propositions which are not themselves in question, and in that sense are immune from doubt. For it becomes difficult to discover propositions which can be used to play this role exclusively, a point Wittgenstein recognises when he refers to the very expression ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions’ as one that is thoroughly bad. (§402) Neither does it invalidate the claim, captured succinctly in §292, that when we come to consider scientific equations, like water = H₂O, the role they play within a system of related propositions which hang together like the links in a chain, is much more amenable to an account in the terms Wittgenstein employs within On Certainty, to the extent that were these equations individually to be put in question this would make the entire explanatory framework unworkable. Although Hanfling does not explore these questions in the kind of detail that they require following the recent explosion in the secondary literature - indeed, he sees On Certainty in a later book, and partly in view of what he regards as its inconsistencies, to be open to a number of objections (6) - he reminds us of the kinds of considerations we ought to be constantly bringing to mind if we are properly to investigate the wide ramifications surrounding Wittgenstein’s various uses of ‘I know’.

The next and final Chapter in the first part of his book sees Oswald Hanfling provide his
(almost obligatory) answer to Saul Kripke’s ‘meaning scepticism’ as espoused in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, and here Hanfling’s response consists for the most part in pointing out, quite correctly, that it is only because Kripke is mesmerised by the meaning-determinist picture in which he takes our ordinary understanding of what it is to follow a rule to consist, that he can possibly see Wittgenstein’s rejection of that picture as a claim that there is no ‘fact of the matter’ about what it is that someone means when he uses the term ‘plus’, or indeed any meaningful term whatsoever. Kripke’s anti-realist response to this ‘sceptical challenge’ then consists in replacing this inapplicable meaning-determinist picture with a more acceptable ‘justification’ for making our assertions based on their ‘warranted assertibility’ within the ordinary surroundings of their application. The following passage with its down-to-earth presentation provides a good example of the flavour of Hanfling’s response:

Wittgenstein is not denying something that everyone believes. (He is not a sceptic.) In particular, he would have no objection to saying that there are facts as to what we mean and do not mean; this being a perfectly normal use of the word ‘fact’. What he does object to are the interpretations that philosophers (and ordinary people when led up the philosophical garden path) have been tempted to place on these familiar facts. He denies, in particular, that when someone means X by Y, there has to be some mental state or event, past or present, that constitutes this fact. But this denial is offered as a ‘reminder’ - an invitation to ‘look and see’ things as they really are...Someone who follows this invitation should see for himself, if Wittgenstein is right, that the supposed mental state is a myth and that the quest for it involves a misunderstanding of the concept of meaning. (Ibid., 80)

A further positive aspect of Hanfling’s response to Kripke lies in his correctly drawing
our attention to the important Postscript ‘Wittgenstein and Other Minds’, where he provides a useful commentary on the famous Investigations §§ 300 - 1, illustrating the usual difficulties with Vorstellung, and offering an answer to them by suggesting that ‘although to imagine something is not to have an image, “an image can correspond to it”’. And the point of 302 is to question whether this is so in the case of “imagining someone else’s pain”: whether one might do this by using one’s own pain as a model (“Vorbild”)’ (Ibid., 81). Or, to put the point differently, one’s understanding of, and therefore one’s ability to correctly apply the concept of pain to a person other than one’s self does not consist in having a picture of his pain based on our own first-person attributions of pain; although the ‘picture that corresponds’ to the application of the concept in this case could of course be a picture of pain-behaviour as an expression of the other person’s pain.

Hanfling continues by criticising Kripke’s anti-realist response to Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘other minds’, captured in his idea that Wittgenstein rejects any attempt to justify our behaviour in terms of a ‘belief’ about the other person’s ‘inner state’. But, once again, Hanfling’s way of presenting this point is indicative of his retaining the realist v anti-realist model that he has already shown Wittgenstein to have rejected in §§ 300 - 2. Referring to Kripke’s anti-realist response, he questions it by returning to Wittgenstein’s text:

But how is this supposed to follow? There is no suggestion in this passage, or any other, that one’s behaviour could never be explained or justified by reference to a belief about the inner state of another person. Suppose, for example, that the nurse had actually expressed a belief that the patient was in pain (perhaps she was not quite sure.) Such a belief could obviously serve to explain or justify suitable action by the nurse or doctor. Why should Wittgenstein want to deny that such cases could ever occur? (Ibid., 84).

But the point of §§ 300 - 302 is precisely that although Wittgenstein would indeed have
had no wish to deny that we ordinarily justify our reactions to another’s pain by citing the belief that he has an appropriate ‘inner state’, what he would wish to deny is that the notion of an ‘inner state’ which we derive from our first-person attributions of pain can play the role in our understanding of what it is to attribute sensations to others that, when doing philosophy, we almost inevitably cannot avoid granting to it. For that picture is an idle accompaniment to the practice in which we attribute pain to others, insofar as it has no role to play in any proper philosophical understanding of its nature. Here Hanfling’s response to Kripke has a distinctly ‘realist’ flavour insofar as it has all the hallmarks of affirming what Kripke takes Wittgenstein to deny. Yet Wittgenstein has implicitly shown that both Kripke and Hanfling are here granting a role in our understanding of the practice to a picture that is doing no real work. It is hardly surprising on this reading that the difference between Kripke and Wittgenstein can seem to turn on a knife-edge depending on the significance one attributes to the role of this picture, for that role when fiercely repudiated, opens a yawning gulf between their respective philosophical outlooks on the question of ‘Other Minds’.

‘Wittgenstein on language, art and humanity’, the first Chapter in Part II Language Art and Mind, is perhaps the most disappointing in the book, largely because it attempts to cover far too much ground in its 16 pages with the kind of subject-matter that is discussed sometimes more adequately in other chapters. Divided into 6 sections (Language; Language and Mind; Human Beings; Art; and Art and Philosophy), and guided throughout by the principle that Wittgenstein was a ‘humanist’ writer concerned with what lies open to view when he supplies anti-theoretical ‘reminders’ of how language is ordinarily used, Hanfling contrasts Wittgenstein’s outlook with the scientific view of the world, concerned with revealing what is hidden beneath the surface of things in the course of providing theoretical law-like explanations of phenomena:

Wittgenstein was interested primarily in questions of language, but the rejection of theory is present also in his discussions of art and of human beings. In each of these, he was concerned to do justice to the humanity of these things and activities (Ibid., 87)
If this sounds even a little vague, what follows it is no more than a resume of material 
sometimes covered elsewhere in the book, e.g., the *Tractatus* or the *Investigations* on what *must*
be the case, explanations of human action by reasons rather than causes, meaning and mental 
processes, consciousness and the brain, causal and psychological (Clive Bell on aesthetics) 
explanations of art as against Wittgenstein’s concentration on drawing our attention to 
features within works of art, and all ending with a discussion of Socrates in Plato’s *Meno*. 
Along the way, Hanfling interestingly comments on Wittgenstein’s shopkeeper in § 1 of the 
*Investigations*. This comment points towards the limitations of Hanfling’s *Common Sense*, 
Ordinary Language approach, for the very fact of his making it implies that if the issue he raises 
here really were at all relevant to the example as Wittgenstein presents it, Wittgenstein has 
signally failed to tackle an only too obvious discrepancy:

Wittgenstein’s example is marred by the choice of ‘red’ as the colour 
in question, for it is hardly likely that someone who speaks English 
would need a colour chart to identify this colour. But it would be easy 
to invent an example using a less familiar colour, where a colour-chart 
would be needed. (*Ibid.*, 94).

‘Wittgenstein and the problem of consciousness’ revised from 2001 and the longest chapter 
in the book, expresses what Colin McGinn as quoted by Hanfling refers to as Wittgenstein’s 
‘totally deflationary treatment of the problem’ (*Ibid.*, 127). Poking gentle fun along the way at 
philosophers like Searle, Nagel, Chalmers, Dennett *etc.* who reveal an occasional willingness to 
refer to consciousness as a property of the human brain in defiance of Wittgenstein’s dictum that 
only of a human being and what resembles one could one say that it is conscious or unconscious 
(*Investigations* § 281), Hanfling nevertheless ends with a statement which seems altogether too 
conciliatory if what Wittgenstein has to say on this matter is as important as it surely is:

Between those who endorse the ‘deflationary treatment’ and those who, in 
one way or another, are disappointed with it, there may be differences of
temperament; but this should not interfere with the evaluation of
arguments. I hope I have shown that arguments of the kind put
forward by Wittgenstein are, at least, worthy of consideration, and
that the almost total disregard with which they are treated by mainstream
writers today is quite unjustified. (Ibid., 127)

Once again, this makes Wittgenstein’s reactions to these problems seem almost too weak.
The most relevant passage in which Wittgenstein discusses the questions at stake here is § 412
in the Investigations, where attention is drawn to ‘the feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between
sensation and brain-process’. It is only, however, in quite particular circumstances, especially
when doing philosophy, that a recognition of this gulf is accompanied by what he refers to as
a slight giddiness when, turning one’s attention, as it were, into one’s own consciousness, one
is led to say with characteristic puzzlement: ‘THIS is supposed to be produced by a process
in the brain!’ This reaction is what he often refers to as the consequence of staring at a picture
which has no genuine application. Yet, as he points out, it is only in quite unusual circumstances
that this reaction occurs. There is nothing at all paradoxical about participating, say, in an
everyday experiment in which a particular effect of light he experiences is shown to be the
result of stimulating a specific part of the brain.

In the same way, when two people look at a tree, there is not normally any reason for
saying that each person’s seeing of the tree is an experience unique to him which is not shared by
his companion, unless, of course, this is a particular way of pointing out that they are, say,
looking at the tree from slightly different perspectives, or that one of them is colour-blind.
But in this case there are objective criteria for determining just how far apart they are standing,
or whether one of them is subject to a form of defective vision. But there can be no objective
criteria for determining, in the absence of cases of this kind, whether one person’s ‘seeing of a
tree’ is an experience unique to him which cannot in principle be shared by his companion. That
is why Wittgenstein refers to this way of looking at things, which usually only occurs when doing
philosophy, as the result of staring at a picture. The position is slightly different when talking about my private experience of pain, say, because in this case there is normally a good reason for saying that this experience is something I am undergoing which you are not, something which I am perfectly free to keep to myself. This does not, however, rule out your experiencing the same pain, where this is a way of pointing to the fact that it is only when doing philosophy that there is the temptation to point towards my experience of this pain as something uniquely different from yours. But that is something for which we have no ordinary application.

Hanfling in his own way illustrates those characteristically Wittgensteinian ways of deflating the kinds of tendencies which keep arising during philosophical reflection, suggesting indirectly that the philosophical notion of consciousness seems almost custom-built to create exactly the kind of giddiness to which Wittgenstein refers in § 412. Another passage which Wittgenstein uses to illustrate this occurs in Part II, vii (page 184), where his reference to the evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening of consciousness at a particular level, illustrates a notion which is custom-built to create exactly the kind of picture that he goes on to suggest has no real application, in isolation from the quite ordinary circumstances in which we are given to describe, say in a scientific context, the gradual evolution of creatures who develop more and more sophisticated faculties in their reactions to the world around them. When Hardie describes Aristotle’s heirarchical division into animal, vegetable and mineral (7) with Man as a fourth kind, we can equally be fairly certain that Aristotle had no wish to foist upon us a notion of consciousness divorced from its expression in animal and human behaviour.

Yet it is a significant feature accompanying this notion of consciousness, a feature reflected in that well-known appeal to experiencing the unique ‘what it is like’ now common in the secondary literature, that it derives a good deal of its sense from ordinary applications with which we are familiar. If during a thunderstorm my dog scurries away to hide under a bed in an adjacent room, and a companion comments that she seems unduly frightened by the weather, my immediate reaction might be to declare that if the thunder seems loud to us, what must
it be like for an animal whose sensitivity to sound is so much greater than our own? So there is after all in cases like these ‘something that it is like’ to hear as the dog hears, or to have a sense of smell as acute as the dog’s, because there are objective criteria by which we determine what these degrees of canine sensitivity actually are. But if someone were then to argue that in appearing to apply these criteria we have no real idea of what it is like for the dog to hear as it hears, or to have the sense of smell that it has, then we would find it difficult to understand what he was getting at, for it is now clear that he has become party to a picture which has no genuine application. There can by definition be no criteria by which we could determine what it is like in this sense to experience another individual’s unique experience, for there is no such thing. We can together enjoy the unique aroma of Brazilian coffee, or the unique fragrance of an expensive French perfume, but there can be no criteria by which I could determine what it is like to experience your unique experience of the aroma of Brazilian coffee, not because this is forever beyond my ken, but because there is nothing in which an experience of this kind could even consist. As Hanfling argues in respect of Nagel’s ‘what it is like to be a bat’, the irreducibly subjective nature of these so-called unique experiences derives from the fact that once we leave the realm in which we can talk about the consequences for the bat of employing a sonar location system etc., what is left is a proposal about what it is like that is doing no real work, and for that reason is making no real sense. (Ibid., 119)

Having discussed at length Wittgenstein’s reaction to certain questions which still play an important role in contemporary philosophy of mind, Hanfling then turns his attention in ‘Could machines think?’ to the question whether creatures with all the outward appearance and behaviour of human beings would still be treated by us as we normally treat human beings in the knowledge that their internal constitutions were entirely different from our own. Given, for example, that these creatures were guided internally by electronic circuitry, we are being asked to decide whether this would make any difference to our reactions to them; and since, leaving aside the obvious factors which normally govern distinctly human reactions like
racial prejudice etc., this question pretty much answers itself - we are if anything overfamiliar with fictional examples presenting human beings who at some later stage are discovered to our surprise to be androids - this shorter paper again has the overall impression of being rather slight. Nevertheless, there are in the vicinity related questions about the logical possibility of zombies, etc., and whether our androids can ‘really’ be said to be conscious in the way that we are conscious, but since questions like these result from being subject to a picture of consciousness which succeeds in divorcing the concept from any normal surroundings of its application, they have already been adequately attended to in Hanfling’s previous chapter.

‘Thinking’ from 2001 shows Hanfling illustrating the extraordinarily wide ramifications of the notion of ‘thinking’ as it is used in everyday life. Hanfling points indirectly to the conspicuous failure in the literature on the mind-body problem as it is conventionally understood today, to realise what Wittgenstein refers to as the widely scattered phenomena of thinking and, consequently, the widely varying kinds of contexts within which this notion is used (Zettel § 110). This failure can lead to the philosophical temptation to regard ‘thinking’ as a kind of process accompanying speech, just as it may accompany physical processes in the brain. This in turn can lead to those problems attending ‘thinking’ as the activity of a ghostly ‘soul’ existing side-by-side with the human body (Zettel § 611), a soul which must be exorcised if we are to see the world aright and the mental life of the human being as the exclusive result of purely physical processes within the cerebral cortex. But this prejudice in favour of psychophysical parallelism (Ibid.) is itself entirely the fruit of a primitive interpretation of our concepts, one which underlies the very distinction between the mental and the physical giving rise to the mind-body problem as we now encounter it. Once this prejudice is abandoned, one will be far less inclined to think that there can be any process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking (Zettel § 608), not because our mental lives are not causally dependent on neurophysiological processes, but because the naive concept of ‘thinking’ which accompanies so much of the philosophical reflection that embodies the prejudice in favour of psychophysical parallelism, inevitably leads to an equally naive conception of how
the relationship between our mental lives and processes in the brain can manifest itself. One will similarly be much less inclined to ask whether computers can think if one has abandoned the picture underlying the apparent need to ask the question, for what appeared at first as a puzzle is transformed, as it must be, into a request for a recommendation, a recommendation we need not feel obliged to make.

Similar points hold true for thinking with or without language, for what at first sight may appear as an ability to do something without having to do something else at the same time, would be better illustrated in the kind of example in which thinking does not find its particular expression in any form of talking, or even in the use of any spoken language at all. This covers a wide range of cases, from the predator in the animal kingdom stalking its prey, to Wittgenstein’s example of the worker going through a routine involving comparison, trial and choice in the absence of his providing this procedure with any verbal accompaniment, one he could very well supply as a commentary to a film of his work later on. (Zettel § 100) Whether animals can think is not therefore a query over their possession of a special ability, but a request for a recommendation: does what their behaviour may be taken to express bear comparison with what we understand to be thinking on analogy with normal human activities? The answer would surely be in the affirmative. It would equally seem strange if an editor were to ask that a philosophical paper produced with a great deal of thought be resubmitted but without any accompanying evidence of thinking, for the thought (Ibid.) is not an incidental accompaniment of the work. Thinking without language is not a special kind of ability, and it is primarily for this reason, rather than because Ballard claimed to have exercised this ability in recounting that he had thoughts about God and the World prior to learning a language - in the act of achieving something that could not be done - that Wittgenstein questions the significance of his apparent recollections in both Investigations § 342 & Zettel § 109. The issue at stake is not whether Ballard has overturned our prejudices in managing to perform an unusual and unexpected feat. It is whether one has any right to regard Ballard’s testimony in this specific case as an example of any kind of thinking whatsoever.
In the final chapter of his book, ‘Secondary sense and “what they have in common”’, Hanfling reminds us of a range of questions which he presents in an order in which they gradually become more esoteric, from what do games have in common to what do light and dark blue have in common, to the tendency to wish to arrange the five vowels into an order from the darker to the lighter, and the even queerer tendency to think of Wednesday as fat and Tuesday as lean (from Investigations Part II, xi, 215). For those who do not have the remotest inclination to share this tendency, these questions will have little meaning, yet Hanfling goes on to argue that it would be a mistake to regard them merely as fanciful and idiosyncratic, relating only to the margins of language, a point he stresses by bringing to our attention the way in which words like deep, high, low, sharp, fat and lean take on for Wittgenstein what he refers to as a secondary sense when they are used in an extended metaphorical way (deep ravine, say, to deep sound and deep sorrow), like the widespread use of soft when applied to pillows, voices, hearts, colours and drinks.

Remarking that Gilbert Ryle’s explanation of the description of pains as stabbing, grinding or burning as resulting from their respective causes in a stiletto, drill or ember, whilst motivated by a reference to what perhaps may appear only too obvious, actually bears no relation to the facts, Hanfling continues by discussing ‘pins and needles’ and ‘butterflies in the stomach’, and whether we might similarly be tempted to regard these descriptions as having any relation to what it would really feel like if we were pricked by pins and needles etc. These issues are extended into aesthetics with reference to Bach’s music as mathematical, and the notion of a plaintive melody, where in this context plaintive obviously has a secondary sense. The paper draws to a close with a discussion of similar issues as they relate to mental processes, yet stressing that the metaphorical sense in which one may search for a word in one’s memory can if grossly misunderstood should it lead to the notorious non-physical ‘storehouse’ theory of memory as espoused by Augustine and Locke. The paper ends with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s understanding of calculating in the head as based on a prior understanding of calculating on
paper. Some may not find entirely clear Hanfling’s claim that ‘calculate’, as used in the context of calculating in the head, does not owe its appropriateness to a resonance with calculating on paper.

What Oswald Hanfling has presented us with here are the mature reflections of a philosopher very much orientated towards a Wittgensteinian outlook on philosophical problems, yet one which is mediated by an Ordinary Language approach that itself is not always distinctly recognisable as Wittgenstein’s. This explains why, occasionally, his too literal interpretation of the texts fails to come to grips with aspects of the kind of method Wittgenstein often employs, a point particularly relevant to his treatment of criteria, other minds and private language. Yet where Hanfling is dealing directly with questions which relate to the use of ordinary language, and where his answers connect closely to Wittgenstein’s thinking, his approach is for obvious reasons far more successful. This selection of essays is sufficiently wide-ranging to show how Hanfling is often willing to delve into aspects of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre which others, adopting a more conventional assessment of what is important in philosophy, may prefer to leave alone. On balance, Hanfling offers what never fails to be a stimulating and clear-headed approach to the questions he has decided to discuss. Sharing with philosophers like Kenny and Hacker the regret that Wittgenstein’s approach in his later work has signally failed to achieve the kind of influence on the practice of (analytic) philosophy that he felt it surely deserves, his contribution is motivated by a sense of how significant that approach can be both for our understanding of what philosophy is, and for its value in what he chooses to call ‘the human form of life’.
(5) The point is central to the thinking of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, and this way of expressing it is surely as faithful to what appear to be Wittgenstein’s intentions as any other. *Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).
As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, with a further in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010.