Ever since I discovered that Wittgenstein and Ryle had shared a walking holiday in the summer of 1930 I have assumed that Ryle aired his ideas about the importance of mental dispositions, to Wittgenstein’s immediate disapproval, but to which, as I discovered from the manuscripts, Wittgenstein slowly granted assent. When *The Concept of Mind* was published in 1949 I understood from Elizabeth Anscombe that Wittgenstein had at first taken offence that he was not acknowledged in it, but that she had acted as intermediary in forwarding Ryle’s assurance that he was indeed grateful but that public acknowledgements of academic indebtedness were not his style. Wittgenstein, she said, accepted this. I now think that one reason for Ryle’s reticence was his awareness of how much Wittgenstein owed to him. (1)

This account is sandwiched between two passages in which Denis Paul precisely identifies the exact locations of source material from the Wittgenstein archive which he is quoting, and illustrates the kind of interesting aside that just occasionally, and sometimes a little abruptly interrupts what to many readers may on the whole have the appearance of a fairly dry narrative. What makes the passage interesting is that it only too obviously points in a number of different directions. There is the suggestion that Wittgenstein had taken offence, and that he was given perhaps too easily to taking offence is something with which we are only too familiar from other sources. Here, for example, is Ayer, talking about Wittgenstein’s having objected to the idea that John Wisdom’s philosophical outlook could be taken as a pointer to his own, a suggestion
resulting from Ayer’s 1946 radio broadcast about Contemporary British Philosophy, published in *The Listener* under the title ‘The Claims of Philosophy’ and forming the basis for a further article in *Polemic*:

In particular, he did not admit any kinship between the practice of psychoanalysis and his own method of dealing with philosophical confusions. He made an attempt to get one or other of his pupils to publish a reply to me but none of them would undertake it. No doubt they distrusted their ability to do him justice. The result was that he himself sent me a letter of rebuke, by registered post. It began with his saying that he had every reason to believe that I was not so ignorant of his recent work as I had pretended to be in my broadcast and in my article in *Polemic*, and ended by asking me whether, if I was ashamed to acknowledge that I had received many valuable ideas from him, it would not be more in accordance with elementary decency to refrain from mentioning him than to spread misleading insinuations about his teaching. (2)

The second interesting suggestion relates to Dennis Paul’s insinuation about the interplay of ideas between Wittgenstein and Ryle. The extent to which one might take Wittgenstein to have been influenced by Ryle is going to depend at least partly on how closely their methods are seen to coincide, no matter how superficially their philosophical standpoints may in other obvious respects appear. Peter Hacker, for example, remarks that Wittgenstein is reported to have looked at *The Concept of Mind*, only to say that ‘all the magic has vanished’, the implication being that Ryle’s account of the ‘Cartesian Myth’ lacked the depth of Wittgenstein’s exploration of the *pictures* to which philosophers only too easily become captive. (3) Hacker also remarks that if Ryle is the Oxford figure who had learnt most from Wittgenstein, then Austin is the one who was influenced by him the least: ‘Some people like Witters’, he said, ‘but Moore is my man.’ (4) The reference to Moore is significant, for the way in which Ryle regarded Moore can be a pointer
to significant differences in approach between Wittgenstein and Ryle. Here is Ryle giving his
assessment of Wittgenstein’s work in relation to Moore’s:

What had, since the early days of this century, been the practice
of G.E. Moore has received a rationale from Wittgenstein; and
I expect that when the curtain is lifted we shall also find that
Wittgenstein’s concrete methods have increased the power, scope
and delicacy of the methods by which Moore has for so long
explored in detail the internal logic of what we say. (5)

If this seems to any degree puzzling to us today, this can only be because there is
a tendency to take to heart Wittgenstein’s expressed opinion of Moore as someone who shows
how far a man can go who has no intelligence whatsoever, and who would not recognise a
solution to a philosophical problem if presented with one (6), someone who took the task of
the philosopher to consist in providing ‘a general description of the whole of the universe’,
in which there are ‘enormous numbers of material objects’, and that ‘we men, besides having
bodies, also have minds’ which ‘perform certain mental acts or acts of consciousness’. In addition,
these ‘acts of consciousness are attached to some material objects’. (7) In this light, the tendency
is to see Moore espousing a form of ‘Common Sense Metaphysics’ in which the beliefs to which
Moore refers, beliefs which are integral to our perfectly ordinary experience with language, are
uncompromisingly understood to express philosophical commitments of ordinary discourse. A
further and important feature of Common Sense is that for Moore ‘we believe that we do really
know all those things that I have mentioned.’ (8)

If this were all there were to Moore’s philosophical position, then from the standpoint
of Wittgenstein in the Investigations he would be just another philosopher who was prone to
misunderstand the logic of our language in the course of thinking that he was ‘tracing the
outline of the thing’s nature over and over again’, whilst really doing no more than ‘tracing
round the frame through which we look at it’. (§ 114). Moore’s outlook, however, is made more
complex by the fact that whilst he undoubtedly took himself within a *philosophical* context to know certain propositions of this kind to be true, he never did find a wholly satisfactory account of their analysis; and although he did take himself to be certain that a correct element in that analysis could be expressed by claiming that a proposition like ‘this is a human hand’ is made true because there is a true proposition about a sense-datum which is not *itself* a hand, it may be argued that he never conclusively decided to his own satisfaction that sense-data are not, for example, part of the surface of a material object.

Consequently, whilst Moore’s distinction between knowing the meaning of propositions like ‘this is a human hand’ and knowing their proper analysis may itself seem to us today to embody a certain obscurity, it is already obvious on this view that Moore’s approach is so remote from Wittgenstein’s that it is hard to see how Ryle could possibly have taken them to be allies with a common purpose. Indeed, the very idea, which one might assume to be a consequence of Moore’s Common Sense position, that his hands persist unperceived in the way that they do when he looks at them, would for the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* have been the kind of misleading picture in which, when doing philosophy, we are only too readily prone to take our understanding of Moore’s ‘material object’ statements to consist. Like the picture of the pain going on in him in the way it goes on in me, it embodies the kind of confusion - leading in this instance to a characteristic ‘problem of other minds’ - that results from viewing these pictures in isolation from the circumstances in which the relevant statements are actually used. This is quite apart from the question whether Moore as part of his Common Sense outlook really did take material objects to persist unperceived in the form that we perceive them, for he does appear to imply that this is a question the answer to which could be obtained only through the proper *analysis* of the propositions of Common Sense.

But if Moore and Wittgenstein are really at this many removes from each other in their philosophical approaches, how is it that Wittgenstein can later appear to find something really interesting in Moore’s apparent proof that he has two hands in his famous lecture ‘Proof of an External World’? (9) The answer is most likely that although Wittgenstein did indeed think that
Moore was pointing to something extremely important, there is nothing to show that Moore himself would have been aware of what this might be; or even that if this fact had been clearly pointed out to him, he would have been able to agree that what was really at stake is the notion that certain propositions can stand fast for him. Wittgenstein captures the point at issue in On Certainty § 37, in his remark that ‘this assertion, or its opposite is a misfiring attempt to to express what can’t be expressed like that’, and it is a characteristic feature of On Certainty that it contains a great many propositions which have the appearance of empirical propositions but which are really being used to point towards something else - towards the framework against which these propositions are actually used - and this is not a role that they are normally employed to fulfill. It is a consequence of this that the kinds of examples Wittgenstein attempts to use to show that in certain circumstances one cannot be making a mistake, can always - when interpreted literally as claims to know with certainty whatever may be in question - be shown to rule out quite possible contingencies that might have been the case; and this only serves to confirm that what he is really endeavouring to reveal here - and what he takes Moore to be pointing towards - is employing a method that in his own words is ‘a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that’.

This helps to explain why Denis Paul, towards the end of his book, and a propos of § 675 expressing the claim that someone who believes he has flown from America to England in the last few days cannot be making a mistake, is not given to share the enthusiasm with which he claims that this, and § 676, the final passage of On Certainty, has generally been received:

I have never understood why everyone else, from Elizabeth Anscombe in 1952 onwards, has always seen this paragraph as an appropriate final masterpiece. (10)

The basic problem is that so long as one insists on taking these passages literally as attempts to show that in certain cases mistakes are in practice impossible, counterexamples can always be provided. Consequently, if one wishes to side with Wittgenstein here, then one will do so only on the understanding that what in this instance cannot be a mistake, is so subject, say,
to the proviso, mens sana in corpore sano, which appears to rule out clear exceptions. Wittgenstein is here attempting to point towards the kinds of situations in which one might wish to claim that if I am wrong about this, then I might as well be wrong about everything and my whole world will collapse round about me. The real difficulty here is that there can be no ‘propositions of the form of empirical propositions’ (§§ 401-2) which could do the required job of acting as foundations, and which could only in very exceptional circumstances be false. This serves to explain Paul’s evident dissatisfaction, echoed by Wittgenstein in his statement that the very use of the phrase propositions of the form of empirical propositions, is thoroughly bad. It is for this reason that if I am tempted to say that I cannot be wrong about having flown from America to England in the last few days, this suggestion if literally interpreted has to rule out the possible discovery that I actually flew the Atlantic in a drunken stupor - so making my recollection of this episode and its date decidedly hazy - and that I have not, say, been seen in the company of a hypnotist who has implanted in me a false memory of the actual flight.

But exactly the same holds true of Moore’s own proof of an external world, which was not originally intended to provide an example which in Wittgenstein’s sense stands fast for him, because in Moore’s case this performance with his hands is the embodiment of a claim concerning the philosophical commitments of ordinary discourse, one with which we know that the Wittgenstein of the Investigations would entirely disagree. This is why, when interpreted literally in its new context as making a claim which cannot be false, the tale about his hands holds good only if we rule out the possibility, say, that unknown to Moore, his hands were actually removed surgically under anaesthetic whilst he was asleep before the lecture, making his later presentation of them the result of a carefully projected illusion of which Moore remained completely unaware. In the same way, although we might naturally assume that in the course of displaying them for examination, there can be no normal - as distinct from philosophical - use for the statement ‘I am certain that these are my hands’, this would nevertheless be the kind of reply a surgeon might elicit if assessing the degree of his patient’s recovery after a stroke, or which a doctor might wish to receive as proof that his patient does not have dementia. Like the well-known example ‘I know for certain that I am in pain’, a claim that in the right context
might count as a suitable reply to an exceptionally sceptical nurse, these examples have uses in quite ordinary circumstances where no philosophical significance would normally be granted to them.

Wittgenstein therefore recognises in the constant repetition of the claim that in this or that circumstance one cannot be making a mistake - in what is after all a collection of unfinished notes - that these kinds of examples will simply not work to express the point he is getting at because there is no limit to what one might have, empirically, to rule out if they are to do the job required and not simply be ‘a misfiring attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that’. In § 616 he asks whether it would be unthinkable that he should stay in the saddle however much the facts bucked, and in § 617 he gestures to the possibility of events which, were they to occur, would tear him away from the sureness of the game. So what is it that makes these examples unsuitable to his purpose, encouraging Paul’s natural scepticism? He points to the answer again in § 618, where it seems as if the language game must ‘show’ the facts that make it possible, only to once again reject this formulation. Yet in the background constantly lurks the thought that if this were to happen, then it would tear apart the sureness of the game and bring everything down with it.

The point towards which he is gesturing is in fact one with which we are only too familiar from perfectly common examples in literary contexts: a philosophy professor returns to his university from a sabbatical only to discover that his name is no longer displayed on his office door, that he is unrecognised as a member of staff, and that no one has any recollection of who he is - even his colleagues find it impossible to acknowledge him. On returning to his home, his house is occupied by an unfamiliar family who say they have lived there for years. In the attempt to withdraw money from his bank, he discovers that his bank books and cards relate to accounts that have never existed. Stories of this kind are very familiar, and in themselves have little philosophical significance, because it is taken for granted that there is some external standpoint from which these unusual phenomena can be explained. In this case, for example,
it turns out that there is a government conspiracy, aided and abetted by the secret services, to reduce political opposition within the academic, and particularly the philosophical community. The hero in exposing it saves the day and in doing so emphasises the importance of democratic values. Without this external standpoint, the story would be regarded as nothing more than the expression of some form of nihilism. Its significant feature for present purposes, however, is that this tale points to the fact that what has become familiar as the brain in a vat hypothesis loses all philosophical significance if there is some external standpoint from which the person whose brain it is can recognise that he is in fact a brain in a vat. It may be surmised, for example, that there is some feature of his perceived environment enabling him to differentiate between an imposed artificial reality, and the genuine one that his captors are preventing him from enjoying. But if this is so, the philosophical problem evaporates.

There is a final twist to Denis Paul’s account of those last pages from the Nachlass, and pertaining to On Certainty, for in closing his narrative he expresses astonishment that Moore was never allowed to become aware of the existence of these notes prior to his death:

The notes on knowledge and certainty were written so directly in response to Moore that it astounded me that Elizabeth never sent him a copy of them. I shall be very happy to be proved wrong if biographers find evidence that she did. The fact, which Elizabeth must have known, that Wittgenstein went twice to talk to Moore in the last weeks of his life, almost certainly about knowledge, makes her failure even more perplexing. In 1953 at the Dartington Summer School of Music I met Moore’s younger son, Timothy Moore the composer, and was itching to tell him about the notes, thinking he could ask his father to ask Elizabeth to show them to him, but I had been given such a drubbing for showing my translation to Iris Murdoch that I gave up the idea and stuck to small talk. On top of my astonishment, already
expressed, that Malcolm knew nothing of the notes either, I can only
wonder at this disturbing manifestation of trustee psychology. (11)

This is surely the kind of gossip and tittle-tattle that is the very stuff of biography, although
it would be quite wrong to think of Denis Paul’s book as primarily a contribution to Wittgenstein
biography, any more than it is a work of Wittgenstein exegesis, though very occasionally there are
passages within it which taken in isolation might be a contribution to one or the other. It is best
described as an account of Paul’s relationship with the Wittgenstein archives, that extraordinary
volume of material his scholarly study of which is said by Denis’s son, Aaron, in a biographical
addendum, to have occupied his father for fifty years, to the extent that it was truly his life’s work,
an achievement for which the Wittgenstein community in Aaron’s opinion owes his father an
immense debt of gratitude.

In fact, the beginning of the book’s composition is dated by Denis Paul in his Introduction, to
1976, twenty years beyond the period in the 1950’s when, after having learned to speak German in
Berlin at the end of the war, he became an undergraduate at New College, Oxford and had his head
turned by Wittgenstein’s work. At that time he met both Isaiah Berlin and Elizabeth Anscombe,
with whom he was to form lasting friendships. This led eventually to his becoming an editor,
according to Aaron, and also a translator with Anscombe of On Certainty.

It is Denis Paul’s belief that, following his return to philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein’s
work from then until his death in 1951 exhibits ‘a general and fairly well ascertainable order’, (12)
the details of which, albeit extremely complex, it is Paul’s express aim to unravel, via his study of
the source manuscripts, revealing ‘the manner in which he wrote his thoughts down’ (13):

On the 2nd of February 1929, full of doubt and mistrust, he began
what was to become a new work of art. The end of it is the full stop
that he set down on the 27th of April 1951. It consists of many strands
of thought and has a structure of extraordinary complexity. It has a main
melody line, formed by the principal manuscript books, but it becomes
near to being polyphonic, for composed side by side are also
preliminary notebooks, revised notebooks, loose manuscripts,
typescripts, lecture notes, lectures, discussions, dictations of
different kinds and even, at one stage, a proposal that someone
else, Waismann, his Thesen abandoned, should write a book
expounding Wittgenstein's new ideas. (14)

The initial period covered here between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations
has already been given detailed and scholarly attention in the literature, particularly, if somewhat
idiosyncratically in David Pears’s The False Prison, Volumes I & II (15), and by David Stern in his
concise Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (16) describing the by now very familiar adoption and
final rejection of a ‘phenomenological language’ during the period from February to October 1929.
This subject is also treated in a new study by James M. Thompson: Wittgenstein on Phenomenology
and Experience: An Investigation of Wittgenstein’s ‘Middle’ Period (17).

The Phenomenological Language episode is the subject of Dennis Paul’s second chapter,
but here he is careful to point out that it would be disastrous for any student to read Philosophische
Bemerkungen (Philosophical Remarks, 1964) without its manuscript sources, because this would
prevent his having any chance of understanding it. The reason for this is that a profound change
in Wittgenstein’s thought took place halfway through the three and a half manuscript books from
which the book was compiled, and Wittgenstein had re-ordered this material in the Remarks in
such a way that it served to disguise the fact that many passages relating to the phenomenological
period are included in this book with no indication that they were written prior to the abandonment
of his phenomenological stance.

But if the Remarks was not a book that Paul sees Wittgenstein as having
ever intended for publication, the same cannot be said for the Big Typescript, finally published in
a German-English edition in 2005 (18), and an expression for Paul in its sections concerning
Phenomenology and Idealism of the ‘wrong turning’ that became an object lesson Wittgenstein was
never to forget in his subsequent work (19):

Wishing, as many scholars do, that Rhees had published the Big Typescript complete, since it seems that for a short period Wittgenstein intended it to be ‘the book’ that he was always hoping to write, I cannot join with them in regretting that he published the painstaking reworking of the majority of its first four hundred and four pages, which he could properly have called Philosophische Grammatik. He could have included an account of its long development, from nine and a half manuscript volumes, through the TS12 ‘album’ culled from them, the Big Typescript made from that, the reworking of most of its opening four hundred and four pages in manuscript volumes and loose manuscripts, and then the editorial signs that Rhees had finally followed. That would have left him free to publish the entire Big Typescript as the next item (20).

In the continuation of his discussion about Wittgenstein on phenomenological language, Paul takes several pages in order to show, quoting material from both the original manuscript sources and from the printed pages of the Remarks, ‘how Wittgenstein confuses us with passages from different stages of his thought.’ (21) The detailed account of why Wittgenstein ultimately rejected his ‘sense-data’ language is left to Chapter 3, ‘Climbing Out of The Swamp’, and here it becomes quite plain that the ‘immediate appearances’, when Wittgenstein talks about them, do not enjoy the stability and coherence which those philosophers who have traditionally seen a reason for introducing sense-data, would normally wish to attribute to them. For Wittgenstein all is in flux, and ‘With the phenomenological language it is as if I came into a fen with a magic spell on it where everything that can be grasped vanishes.’ (22) We are treated to a description
by Paul of those small plaster models referred to by Wittgenstein ‘with their unseen portions coded in some way to show that they are not in consideration’, something which for Paul seems to have nothing to do with sense-data at all, although Wittgenstein insists in both manuscript and print that this is the most immediate description imaginable. What Paul finds intriguing about the mid-1929 notes is that in the Remarks they become a step towards what is repudiated in 1930 whilst in their original context they remain a clear statement of the position advocated at that time. Using the well-known analogy of the film moving through the cinema-projector, Paul points towards the phenomenological language as something which could describe only the individual fleeting images on the celluloid which pass through the projector, at which one could only gape and say ‘This!’ as distinct from the real world represented by the (moving) pictures on the screen. The description of immediate experience is a dead end, an attempt to capture something fleetingly present yet unconnected with either past or future, something childish yet significant because it entices everyone to walk into it.

But it almost goes without saying that those philosophers who have thought that sense-data can have a useful role to play in providing a description of the phenomena of experience would have argued that they need not have so restricted a role as Wittgenstein grants to them here; and on the assumption that a philosopher will only gain from his data of immediate experience what he is prepared to input to them, that is surely correct. If one detects a certain dissatisfaction here on Paul’s part, however, it is not actually on a point that is strictly philosophical:

What is too simple in the unprinted paragraphs at the beginning of Volume III is visually isolated phenomenological language, and I want to argue at the end of this examination of 1929-30 that stripped of its philosophical status as a desideratum it can still be a useful and exiting (sic) linguistic adventure (23).
The point relates to Denis Paul’s description of a sunset at the end of the chapter, the first of two examples in which he has occasion to use what he refers to as object-language words for purely visual experiences; and since what he chooses to call a visual experience or impression is describable here in a public language, nothing philosophical really turns on what he has to say. Paul reflects a deeper dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein, however, when he goes on to discuss Wittgenstein on privacy proper - a point which indirectly relates to those earlier passages about his brief foray into the field of a phenomenological language - for in this case Paul comes to question whether he has not set up an ‘Aunt Sally’ so esoteric that no philosopher could conceivably have become captive to the kind of ‘superstition’ Wittgenstein is wont to criticise. The point follows an earlier quotation from a passage dated 16th November 1937 (MS 119, page 125r) in which Wittgenstein complains about the deeply ingrained idea that one could ostensibly define or name an experience, a pain for example, entirely for one’s self, remarking that merely ‘attaching a name to a pain’ achieves nothing in isolation from the use that these sounds have in the game. So what is Paul carping about? For one thing, we may surmise that Wittgenstein’s explanation does not take account of the idea that has accompanied the tendency many philosophers have had to ‘name their pains’, viz, that a pain presents itself to an individual’s consciousness with its particular qualitative feel providing it with a quite distinct representational content independently of the acquisition of any public language. Yet Wittgenstein would have regarded this as a quite separate yet related question bearing on a natural tendency to say that sensations are intrinsically meaningful. Does this alone justify Paul in his dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein’s approach?

Next take the pain to be one for which there is no normal name, perhaps a few inches below his bottom left rib and a little inwards, and he says to himself ‘I am going to call this pain Sammy but I shan’t tell anyone.’ The fact still remains that he could give, to himself or his doctor if he chose to, a description
of its location, and so this is still a sewing-machine case. Then what should we have to suppose in order to achieve a contraband non-definition? The pain (or perhaps it would have to be called a sensation so sui generis that it could not even be called that) would have to be non-locatable for a start. There would have to be no possibility even of a preliminary description.....making way for a final, clinching private ‘of which this example is to be called Charlie’. (24)

Doubting that what Wittgenstein is rejecting here is even remotely a possibility, therefore allowing that Wittgenstein is justified in saying that it could have no part to play in language, Paul then makes his central point that it is unfair of Wittgenstein to accuse philosophers in general of being party to a superstition which on this account is certainly not likely to have ever occurred to them. Privacy, as he puts it, is all sewing-machine privacy, and anything that does not conform to this kind of privacy, could never be expressed in language. Emphasising that whilst this for Paul is not a criticism of Wittgenstein’s philosophical position as distinct from a criticism of his tendency to impute to others a superstitious notion of privacy to which no philosopher has ever adhered, he then refers again to an earlier comment from one Delia Macbeth, a pupil of F.R. Leavis, (25) who on reading copies - copies read by MacBeth, we are told, only with the once again grudging permission of Elizabeth Anscombe - made by Paul from a notebook (C Volume MS 151) of Wittgenstein’s, is said to have remarked ‘with her uncanny eye for style’ that Wittgenstein’s views on privacy were perverted by his entrapment in his own faulty English. This point is one with which it would seem that Paul is only too genuinely sympathetic, one he continues to hint at throughout his treatment of Wittgenstein’s various discussions about privacy.

That this criticism of Wittgenstein is not as important as it might at first appear, however, is revealed later on when Paul, in the course of referring to Delia MacBeth’s earlier conclusion that Wittgenstein’s poor English trapped him in phrases inclining him to a rather
superstitious mental ontology - the example given is called the non-English phrase ‘I have pain’ - reveals that MacBeth was probably not aware that Wittgenstein’s intention was actually to argue against this implication. It is in any event surely doubtful whether this accusation over Wittgenstein’s ‘faulty English’ could ever have had any substance, even if Paul is correct in making his claim that Wittgenstein’s extreme notion of privacy is one that philosophers have not always been keen to recognise. For if they had, then the tendency to reply to what has come to be known as the private language argument by saying that surely we can identify and reidentify our sensations would not have been thought to have the force that its proponents have often believed: this reply only reinforces a commitment to the principle that our sensations are intrinsically meaningful that for Wittgenstein gains what sense it acquires from the philosopher’s prior acquaintance with a public language. It does not actually come close to touching the separate question at stake in Investigations §§ 243 - 317, which turns on the inapplicability of a private object model to circumstances in which first person sensation ascription is, as we understand it in practice, criterionless. Yet Wittgenstein’s ultimate objection to the idea that our sensations are intrinsically meaningful, is based entirely on his methodology, a point that is not at all immediately obvious from the texts in which these questions are approached: a name only gains its meaning from its surroundings within the lives of those who participate in a common language. But this is hardly the conclusion of a logical argument, and those who have tended to assume that it is have only succeeded in begging the question over the issue of what Wittgenstein is really about. Paul at one point in his discussion quotes the following:

Isn’t the fundamental mistake everywhere this; as if one could point to one’s private experience for one’s own purposes. As if language had two kinds of meanings: a public one and a private one. The private one would only consist in giving vent to sounds in response to experiences, in making a to-do. For one cannot play a language-game with the ‘private language’. (26)
Remarking that what Wittgenstein is saying here is mysteriously missing from §§ 243-317 of the *Philosophical Investigations* - as distinct no doubt from what precedes it - unless it is argued to be the background message of all these passages, Paul then draws attention to the private sewing-machine reference from MS 166, in which the idea that one can point inside one’s self to an experience and name it is described as a form of superstition. But this means, not that one could not in a perfectly *ordinary* context give a name to a new and startling sensation, but that in a context in which there was no background whatsoever to this activity, and in which the sensation itself could not be thought to be ‘intrinsically meaningful’, the idea of ‘attaching’ a name to a sensation that was not itself *already* a sensation of a quite particular *kind* could make sense. The *first* question arising here is *how* our sensation terms *acquire* meaning, and Wittgenstein’s answer - insofar as it is an answer - is that they do so within the context of a social practice. This expresses a *methodological* principle. The *second*, and separate question - which Wittgenstein often treats as if it were indistinguishable from the first - is how we are to describe or account for the way in which we talk about our sensations, and his answer here is that we talk about them as sensations of quite particular kinds which we understand to be of these kinds ‘because we have learnt English’ (*Investigations* § 381), in accordance with the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription. But to provide *this* answer is already to reject what he sees as the *only* alternative, *viz.*, that sensations be regarded from the viewpoint of a certain *private object model* of sensation ascription in which sensations are identified, according to criteria, as ‘objects’ appearing to have ‘privately’ the properties enjoyed by objects within a public spatio-temporal context. It is possible, therefore, to understand the point Paul is quibbling about to be that no philosopher has ever really been party to the superstition involved in strictly adhering to this model. In this respect Paul does have a valid point to make, even if we understand Wittgenstein to be elaborating on the real consequences of thinking of sensations as internal *objects*. On this view, the philosopher who says he can *identify* his meaningful sensations really is looking for the best of both worlds.
Paul quotes further remarks about Wittgenstein on privacy, (27) and these date from the following year, 1938, where on the 8th of that month in MS 121 he is seen struggling with the idea that one has no justification for calling what he is feeling ‘pain’ - what will later appear in *Investigations* § 304 as not a *something* but not a *nothing* either - and the interest of passages of this kind rests in seeing how they contribute to the development of the thinking that found its most perfect expression later on. The subject of privacy is referred to again *via* an undated notebook, MS 179, where Paul describes further contributions to the ‘private language argument’ one of which ‘seems to me to put a finger on Wittgenstein’s failure to understand a particular aspect of consciousness’. The passage referred to here is worth quoting as Paul presents it on page 241:

> ....Private language for private experiences. Diary about sensations. Symbols connected with the natural expression of the sensation. In that case the diary can be understood by everybody. But what if there isn’t a natural expression of the sensation? How do I know then when I am having the same sensation?

Taken as it stands, this is clearly ambiguous between having a sensation which in practice has no natural expression, a point that has no philosophical relevance, as distinct from a sensation which is defined in accordance with Wittgenstein’s radical conception of privacy - where it cannot *already* be thought of as a sensation of a particular kind - and it is not at all clear whether Paul recognises that distinction here, for he goes on to take Wittgenstein to be arguing, *via* the assumption that understanding a language is understanding a technique, that in the kind of case Paul has in mind Wittgenstein is denying that one can simply mark a sensation with a chosen sign ‘as a job well done’. But that goes with an ability to properly talk about the sensation on its recurrence, so one would he hard put here not to see Paul as objecting to something Wittgenstein is (implicitly) claiming not really to be in dispute, *viz*., that *already* being master of a *public* language allows us to invent names for new sensations.
Most of Paul’s discussion of privacy occurs in Chapters 6 and 7 of his book, which cover respectively the genesis of *Philosophical Investigations* and later these manuscripts which help, in Paul’s terms, to demystify it. Consequently, in moving directly from Wittgenstein’s rejection of his phenomenological language in 1929 to Paul’s later reflections on privacy, two important chapters have been by-passed which are essential reading for anyone who wants to know about the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas during the early 1930’s. The following passage indicates just how complex are the details of Paul’s treatment of those questions he wants to answer:

In the case of *Philosophische Grammatik* there are three stages to consider: first, how Wittgenstein’s ideas grew towards the ideas of that book, second how he expressed them once he had arrived at them, and thirdly how he drafted the book - in an extremely complicated manner which I can only give an outline of. The present chapter deals with only the first of these three, and the reader needs to be warned that while we may feel at home with the ideas arrived at, the manner of arriving at them will often entail surmounting problems that we had assumed to be already well settled.

Of particular interest to those readers who are coming to the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas during this period for the first time, will be the information provided by Paul that whilst he began composition of the *Grammatik* on 20th June 1931 in Volume VI of MS 110, copied from a smaller notebook, the *true* genesis of the *Investigations* occurred on 15th July 1931 in Volume VII of MS 111. Yet even if the *Grammatik* is much closer in its thinking to the *Investigations* than is the earlier *Remarks*, the two books did not develop at the same rate: Paul sees the *Investigations* evolving only much more slowly *via* both teaching and the dictation of the *Blue* and *Brown Books*, with the Augustinian concept playing a central role at the beginning of the *Investigations* whilst having only a brief appearance in the *Grammatik*
in which it assumes no particular significance in comparison to the book’s other ideas. (28)

Another point on which Paul takes issue with Wittgenstein here rests on his claim, which he takes Wittgenstein to deny, that one can have wordless thoughts which can always be put into words if one is asked to do so. This follows a quotation from Wittgenstein in which he asks whether one can expect without language, and Paul’s point is that this ability to have thoughts which can later be put into words, an ability which can fail us if we are fatigued, for example - when we can lose a thought we believed we had - shows that the capacity to express wordless thoughts in words is something we quite normally take for granted. Remarking that ‘Ambivalence as to his question’s answer muddies this problem for him nearly a year later, just as he appears to have solved it’ (19), Paul returns to the matter later in the chapter when the question arises whether one can have an intention without actually expressing it; and Wittgenstein is presented as arguing that this is not the case:

....Wittgenstein is still unwilling to admit that we can, for a reason that anyone who has had a wordless intention, expectation, thought, wish or anything else will find spurious: it appears to open the possibility of objecting ‘How do you know that was what you intended?’ (29)

But even if we give Paul the benefit of the doubt here and allow that talk about clothing wordless thoughts with words, is rather more than one of Wittgenstein’s misleading pictures, the kinds of circumstances in which one might talk about having an expectation or intention without putting it into words can depend on how sophisticated the intention is. Fussing about in the kitchen as an expression of one’s expectation that someone is shortly arriving for tea is one thing, but the expectation that next year one will become president of the association is something else, an expectation one can surely keep to one’s self. My springer spaniel regularly expects her dinner every day at a certain time; and the zoo-keeper is only too well aware that the animals in his care know when to expect their regular meals. For animals are given to express these expectations in their behaviour. But whilst the butler is allowed to expect the arrival of his
master at the end of the month, it is a Wittgensteinian point that one would hardly say this of my dog, not because this is an expectation she always keeps to herself, but because in the absence of the kind of life with language endowing an expectation of this kind with meaning, this suggestion is one that would have no application: even if the master arrives on the same day every month, and my dog behaves on that day in a way which we would still express by saying that she is expecting him, this would be taken as proof, not that she had been expecting him throughout the month, but either that she had an exceptionally good long-term biological clock, or that she was in possession of extraordinary faculties that were quite beyond our ken. Either way, the notion of what can be (wordlessly) expected here is grounded in what we understand to be capable of being expressed in behaviour. The issue is perhaps a little different with having sensations which one can certainly enjoy without putting a name to them, which makes sense against a background of language acquisition; and it is different again with intentions one can have without either being obviously aware of, or of admitting to them, for here it depends entirely on what the intention is. A person can behave in such a way that he reveals an intention of going out for the evening which he can put into words if required; but it would seem strange to talk in the same way of my wordless intention, which can easily be put into words if asked, of taking the 10 o’ clock flight to London on the 18th of next month.

But whilst one may sometimes have occasion to question what underlies some of Paul’s strictly philosophical comments on the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas, his close familiarity with the original manuscripts equips him to point towards associations with which the vast majority of philosophers interested in Wittgenstein would simply be unaware. After referring to what he calls a Grammatik notebook, MS 154, he mentions two further sets of notebooks, MSS 156a-157a and what Wittgenstein called his C volumes, MSS 145-152. These latter Paul treats as essential reading for those who want to trace the development of his ideas from the Grammatik to the Investigations, and Paul describes how these volumes together with the Blue Book and the Ambrose lecture book form a bridge from one to the other. Written in Cambridge the C volumes include many
lecture notes written in English which in Paul’s opinion are often insensitive to English idiom, although MS 151 provides a long and fluent discussion of privacy. Just prior to this account in Chapter 6, Paul quotes a number of earlier passages about Wittgenstein’s notes on free will, remarking that whilst they are somewhat repetitious and not all equally good, they find a later expression in *Investigations* §§ 611-633.

Following Paul’s discussion of the later privacy sections from MS 119 occurring in Chapter 7, which he uses to justify his claim that Wittgenstein unjustifiably accuses most philosophers of being party to a ‘superstition’, he mentions certain private notes written before departure for Bergen on 11th December 1937. What is described here seems highly unusual:

There is a longer and quite extraordinary description of a misunderstanding with Anna Rebni, caused by his habit of shaking his fist or waving his stick in apparent threat as a gesture of friendship. He eventually asked Anna why she had been so distant towards him and she explained. He could not understand why, even when he had told her that this was a standard greeting among the sons of Austrian millionaires, she still remained cool. (30)

Paul then mentions interestingly that on the penultimate day in his hut Wittgenstein wrote what was to become the well-known *Investigations* § 414, about thinking that you must be weaving a garment because you are sitting at an empty loom and going through the motions of weaving, a passage Paul relates in this context to Wittgenstein’s evident doubt that his methods are actually achieving anything, when its eventual position in the book indicates that it can be taken to have much wider significance if treated as a characteristic of philosophical behaviour.

Paul is probably correct in saying that *Investigations* § 610 on describing the aroma of coffee suffers too much from having been excessively pruned, for in its final appearance the point
is clearly made that this description cannot be provided, whereas in a quite ordinary context there is nothing at all unusual, as Paul confirms, about describing the aroma of coffee. As the passage indicates in its original form, however, its salient point is that when doing philosophy the temptation is to succumb to a picture of what it is to describe the aroma of coffee that would give the content of this experience a distinctly ontological status:

We call ‘describing the aroma’ a particular application of language. For example: ‘The aroma of this coffee is similar to this one but more strongly roasted.’ If one believes that aside from such descriptions there is something else that might describe the aroma in a more distinguished sense, one is running after a philosophical chimera. (31)

Describing Wittgenstein’s typescripts in Chapter 8 as forming one of the main lines of his total counterpoint, a chapter in which he devotes some time to an account of the genesis of *Zettel* via Peter Geach, Paul completes the book with a long chapter on the Final Years after 1945. Early on in this the name of Ben Richards occurs several times in relation to personal diary entries, whilst at the foot of Paul’s page 260 he mentions a very bitter passage about the atom bomb, together with a further reference to care and anxiety, from another coded entry about Ben. Love from Ben occurs again at the foot of page 263, with a reference to the now infamous encounter with a poker and Popper at the Moral Science Club on 25th October 1946, the complicated chronology of which Paul has now successfully disentangled with the help of Professor Smiley of Clare College, Cambridge.

Perhaps the most interesting and extraordinary personal reminiscence in these sections relates to a request made to Denis Paul by Elizabeth Anscombe to oversee the ritual burning in around 1952-53 of a slip of paper cut from a foolscap volume 137-8 which she had felt entitled to remove because it referred to someone who was still alive. Later on in 1980, the story continues, Paul had occasion at the Wren to see the Nedo microfilms of MS 137, and
rediscovered the Anscombe cut, finding that not all of the coded passage had been removed, at which point he mentally congratulated Anscombe on her scruples. It was clear from what remained, accompanied in the microfilm by the impression of a dried pressed pansy, that the individual referred to in 137 was Ben Richards.

The tale continues with Paul’s checking the later Bergen facsimiles of MS 137 during 2003, when he found to his astonishment that the cut had been enlarged to the extent that it now not only obliterated any coded reference to Ben, but was accompanied by the message from Anscombe that it was originally made soon after Wittgenstein’s death as a help to two of his friends, and particularly to the one to whom the coded passage referred.

Paul quite naturally finds it almost incredible that no reference had been made to the fact that the cut had been made in two stages, separated by 30 years, and that the intended recipient had not, understandably, received it. Paul then mentions that the other friend he originally assumed to have been Roy Fouracre, only to surmise that it may have been one Barry Pink, a suggestion then discarded on the ground that the relevant dates for an emotional entanglement do not fit. The remainder of the story beginning with a reference to Pink, is worth quoting in full:

I used to call him Cavalry Twill because of a rather threadbare jacket that must have been made when genuine cavalry twill was somewhat cheaper than it soon became. His descriptions (to me) of conversations with Wittgenstein tallies perfectly with Monk’s on page 567.

I must add a postscript to this story, having been told by a friend of the Geach family that Elizabeth came down with Alzheimer’s at the end of her life. It seems to me quite likely that her new anxiety to protect Ben Richards or his memory could have been set going by Alzheimer’s. (32)
Once again one is given to remark that this is the kind of tittle-tattle that can be the very stuff of biography. On the same page there is a quote reflecting on Wittgenstein’s last times with Francis, and two additional personal reflections, followed at the top of page 291 with what appears to be the first reference to knowing that one has two hands, dated below to 19th October 1948. Paul has now reached the volume eventually published with exclusions as Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, and he comments that whilst some of the cuts are tolerable, some are done without obvious reason; and where personal comments are cut, some at least would have been of assistance to the reader in the understanding of Wittgenstein’s psychology. The remainder of Paul’s book is taken up with the material which was eventually published as Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, ‘das Innere’, the Remarks On Colour, and On Certainty. Paul has occasion to remark that ‘Elizabeth’s haste’ to bring out the latter has led to deficiencies in translation which he wishes he could have had the opportunity to improve upon. (33)

Denis Paul has provided what is likely to remain a unique appraisal and assessment of Wittgenstein’s development from 1929 -1951. Seen here from the perspective of the general reader, as distinct from that of the scholar, no review could possibly take account of even a fair proportion of the material it contains, and whilst the work is consistently very interesting and absorbing, the writing can also - and almost inevitably - seem at times to the ordinary reader to be a little dry. Important as identifying descriptions surely are to the expert, only the most dedicated scholar of the Nachlass is likely to find his pulse racing at passages like the following:

MS 169 is a grey octavo volume with a dark grey spine, and it introduces a new numbering system, being called Notebook No 2 on a flyleaf (where that is also crossed out). MS 170 is a twin to it, except that it is hardly used. On a blank flyleaf and in Wittgenstein’s hand it is called Notebook No 3. I can find no rhyme nor reason in these numbers - the remainder seem higgledy piggledy. There is no notebook called Notebook No 4, which might be evidence for the
loss of a notebook that I knew in 1952. MS 171 has no number, being a cheap reporters’ notebook bought in America and described ahead where we meet it as part of ‘knowledge’. MS 172 is a set of lined loose-leaf sheets, contained in a brown folder and comprising, first Part II of the printed colour volume, and, second, §§ 1-65 of On Certainty. MS 173 is a red or reddish quarto volume and is called........(34)

For Wittgenstein enthusiasts, and for those who regard themselves as having had their philosophical agenda determined to some degree by his work, yet who would not regard themselves as scholars of Wittgenstein in any proper sense - and that must include well-known people like Kripke, Wright, and even McDowell etc. though excluding others like Hacker, Baker and Stern - the book’s main interest will lie in the way in which it often uncovers the gestation of remarks which find their more mature expression later on. Certainly, as more and more of this material is introduced into the public arena in the form of scholarly editions - when most of the real scholarship will already have been done - it may become as common to refer to what at one time might have been some remark in a remote notebook as it is now to refer to passages from the Tractatus or the Investigations, even if these as the most mature expression of certain ideas will remain the better known. It almost also goes without saying that detailed study of the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas helps towards a more balanced assessment of the role of therapy in his philosophical thinking. Paul’s treatment is almost bound to seem more stimulating when it raises strictly philosophical issues relating to Wittgenstein interpretation, for it is just at these points that the general reader is liable to take issue with what he is saying; and far from being an indication of its failure, that is one of the best criteria for judging the work’s success. Few scholars are likely to have had the intimate acquaintance with the Wittgenstein papers over such a long period of time as Denis Paul reveals here. Paul died on 21st December 2006, as his son Aaron tells us, just before the final proof version of his book arrived in its completed form. In this case one can truly say that we will not see its like again.
ENDNOTES

(1) Paul: 192 et seq.
(2) A.J. Ayer: Part of My Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977), 305 et seq. Paul has occasion more than once in his narrative to refer to disparaging remarks from the Nachlass that Wittgenstein made about Ayer and Wisdom regarding the misrepresentation of his work, e.g., 13. This is made all the more regrettable because Ayer began, as he reports, as something of a protege of Wittgenstein’s.
(4) Ibid., 172.
(8) Ibid.
(10) Paul, 335.
(11) Paul, 336.
(13) Paul, 19.
(14) Paul, 23.
(17) James M. Thomson, Wittgenstein on Phenomenology and Experience: An Investigation of Wittgenstein’s ‘Middle’ Period (Bergen: Publications from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen 2008).
(19) Paul, 120.
(20) Paul, 251.
(21) Paul, 52.
(22) Paul, 81.
(23) Paul, 86.
(24) Paul, 226.
(26) Paul, 224.
(27) Paul, 229.
(28) Paul, 125. We can surely take it for granted here that what Paul describes as the opening of the Investigations in terms of the first occurrence of any reference to the description of Augustine’s account of learning a language, is not intended to be a denial of the usual account in which the genesis of the book followed a later rejected attempt to translate the Brown Book into German.
(29) Paul, 151.
(30) Paul, 227.
(31) Paul, 237 et seq.
(32) Paul, 288 et seq. The reference is of course to Ray Monk’s Biography.
(33) Paul, 297.
(34) Paul, 299.

26
As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH.