Dear reader/ BWS Member,

Welcome to the BWS Newsletter

Our aim is to ensure that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy continues to play a fertile and creative role in 21st century thought.

The British Wittgenstein Society aspires to provide, through its annual conference and biannual lecture series, a British focal point for research and exchange of ideas among Wittgenstein scholars and students throughout the world.

It also seeks to address, in its conference themes, the many other disciplines (psychology, anthropology, sociology, education sciences, aesthetics etc.) that Wittgenstein’s work has impacted and will continue to impact.
An exciting Newsletter! Brimming with reports of 2016 conferences and lectures, and news of others to come. The highlight has to be our forthcoming 10th Anniversary BWS conference -- 'Wittgenstein in the 21st Century' -- which will be held at the University of Hertfordshire on 30-31 July 2017. I find it hard to believe it's been ten years since I founded the BWS, determined to get Wittgenstein back on the UK map. I certainly think we came a long way in doing that, and I'll join our guest speakers at the conference in saying how. So I do hope many of you will join us. I know there are Wittgenstein-sceptics out there and Wittgensteinians especially need to be in the know about the nature and scope of his impact on philosophy and other disciplines. I can't resist telling you that a special feature at the end of the conference will be Ray Monk introducing and chairing a debate on 'Wittgenstein's place in 21st century thought'.

It's been a tremendous pleasure working with the BWS executive committee -- Ian, Constantine and Chon -- in making all this, and much more, come about. We all want to warmly thank you for your participation and continuing support in the BWS mission of making clear the continuing and growing relevance of Wittgenstein's thought.

A joyous festive season to all!

Danièle
The British Wittgenstein Society was founded in 2007 in an effort to rekindle what seemed a waning interest in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. To mark the success of this endeavour, and the Society’s 10th anniversary, the 2017 BWS annual conference will be devoted to celebrating Wittgenstein's contribution to thought across philosophy and other disciplines. Our guest speakers will be:

Louise Barrett (Lethbridge, Canada) on primatology

Michel Bitbol (CNRS, Paris) on philosophy of science and mathematics

Peter Hacker (Oxford) on philosophy of mind

Edward Harcourt (Oxford) on ethics and aesthetics

Richard Harper (Swansea) on philosophy of information

Peter Hobson (UCL) on psychology

Sandra Laugier (Sorbonne, Paris) on social philosophy

Ray Monk (Southampton) on Wittgenstein's place in 21st century thought

Paul Standish (UCL) on philosophy of education

The conference will take place at Beales Hotel, Hatfield. We look forward to your participation in making this an exceptional event – both intellectually and convivially!

A registration website will be available early January.

Full conference registration: includes refreshments and a 2-course lunch on both days: £95 / student: £65
Conference Package 1: includes full conference registration; 30 July bed/breakfast at Beales Hotel 4* (single occupancy); conference dinner (3-course; coffee/tea; wine): £219 / student £190

Other options will be available on the registration website.

Read more.

Reports

CONFERENCE REPORTS ON THE 8th BWS ANNUAL CONFERENCE


After the sad departure of D.Z. Phillips in 2006, some have predicted that Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and indeed the interest in Wittgenstein and Religion as a topic will (finally) more or less fade away. The Eighth BWS Annual Conference – Wittgenstein, Ethics and Religion has demonstrated that such predictions were premature and misguided. Wittgenstein’s relevancy for understanding religion(s) and theology was approached at the conference from both philosophical and theological perspectives. There were fresh engagements with both early and later Wittgensteinian thought. The conference enabled the participants to discuss some of the best recent work in the field and, as it has become a custom at BWS Annual Conferences, very different points of view were represented, including those not sympathetic to Wittgensteinian approach but engaging with it.

The conference opened with Chon Tejedor’s exposition of the austere kind of ethical religiousness which the Early Wittgenstein found appealing, and according to which ‘ethics cannot be put into words’. Tejedor offered an ethical-transformational interpretation of a controversial aspect of the Tractatus, namely Wittgenstein’s solipsism and his dissolution of the subject, especially in relation to the supposed causal control over the consequences of our actions. Tejedor’s paper was followed by Michael Scott’s critical interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious language. Refusing to treat Wittgenstein’s work as methodologically different from the standard analytic philosophical approach – that is, as therapeutic and/or pyrrhonist – Scott argued that Wittgenstein in his remarks alternated between various theories of religious language which all reject the so-called face value theory of language, such as expressivist, minimalist and reductionist theories. Not surprisingly, Scott’s paper caused a lively discussion over the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s approach to the distinctiveness of religious language, and more surprisingly perhaps, even on the nature of theistic God-talk as such.

The talks by Genia Schönbaumsfeld and Gabriel Citron, while different in their approach and in what they tried to
achieve, covered notably similar terrain. Schönbaumsfeld presented a Wittgensteinian critique of, both, any philosophical attempt at Theodicy and the Problem of Evil. Building on Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the difference between God-talk and all ordinary talk of human beings, she argued that the abandonment of an idea, inherent in all Theodicy arguments, that God is a member of our moral community, enables not a solution to, but a dissolution of, the Problem of Evil. Gabriel Citron, on the other hand, explored the exact meaning of Wittgenstein’s notion ‘the problem of life’, which stems from the fundamental insecurity of life, the threatening possibility of a complete loss of meaning. Citron focused on Wittgenstein’s hint that the solution to the problem of life is not philosophical but ‘religious’ (in a particular Wittgenstein’s sense of the term), which can find its expression in ‘loving the perfect One’. It is tempting to make a connection Schönbaumsfeld’s and Citron’s talks by taking a Wittgensteinian dissolution of the Problem of Evil as leading, not to a problem-less vision and enjoyment of life, but to a confrontation with the ‘real thing’, namely the Problem of Life for which, according to Citron’s Wittgenstein, only a ‘religious solution’ and no explanation can be offered.

The first day of the conference was concluded by a dense theological critique of Wittgenstein’s rejection of Cantor’s set theory, or rather, of the ‘allegiance to the traditional ontology of number’ that is implicit in Cantor’s work. John Milbank offered a dizzying defense of a full-blown Catholic-Platonist metaphysics of numbers, arguing that Wittgenstein, among other things, imposes the intension/extension duality on the ontology of numbers which does not tolerate it. The vast distance between Milbank’s highly speculative and unapologetically metaphysical mode of philosophical-theological critique on the one hand, and any, even remotely Wittgensteinian interpretation of mathematics reflected in the questions during the discussion on the other, was remarkable – even if at times it threatened the very intelligibility of this discussion.

Arguably, the highlight of the conference happened on the morning of the second day, with two cutting-edge thinkers, major contributors to Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and theology, respectively. The first of these was Stephen Mulhall, whose recent book The Great Riddle offers a new perspective on how the so-called Wittgensteinian-Thomistic theology can be read fruitfully together with Cavellian perfectionism on the one hand and Cora Diamond’s nonsensicalist reading of Wittgenstein on religious language on the other. In his talk, Mulhall extended this philosophical-theological exploration into a critical but appreciative reading of Rowan Williams’ (also) recent book The Edge of Words (Williams is the second of the two thinkers I mentioned). In his book, engaging with Cavell and Wittgenstein, Williams touches on some of the same themes (also) as Mulhall (for example, the Cavellian notion of the inherent projectability of language). What Williams offered in his own talk, however, was a close reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Christianity in Culture and Value which some call ‘personal-devotional’ (although a strict separation between philosophical and personal has limited applicability in the Later Wittgenstein). Interestingly, the strongest point of contact between the two talks was not in their reading of Wittgenstein with Cavell or Aquinas, but in their emphasis on the naturalness of the impulse to talk of God, as Mulhall phrased it, or the ‘space between necessary and arbitrary’ in which one can be summoned by God and to talk of God, as Williams put it. The difference which appeared to remain between Mulhall and Williams revolved around the amount of emphasis on the intrinsic nonsensicality of God-talk: while for Mulhall the nonsensicality of God-talk must be kept austerely before one’s mind at all times (as the beginning and the end of all God-talk) as one attempts to ‘refuse to make sense religiously’, Williams seems content that, as gradual absorption into biblical religious language summons a response to the ‘imperative of the Gospel stories’, the nonsensicality remains the beginning (linguistically speaking) but not necessarily also the end of all God-talk (since the end of it is better describable within eschatological-theological framework).

In the afternoon of the second day, Mulhall’s The Great Riddle remained in focus, as Wayne Proudfoot offered his own reading and critique of it. Proudfoot’s appreciative critique focused on what he saw as a notable difference between Wittgensteinian Thomist understanding of perfections and Cavell’s account of perfectability. Critiquing Mulhall’s synthesis of these two different philosophical approaches, Proudfoot argued that Cavell’s is a much more immanentist ethics than Mulhall’s transcendental one, particularly in that Cavell doesn’t see the need to extend perfections into a final, theological step, i.e. towards the Divine kind of ‘Perfect’. The question that came out of the discussion was therefore whether – and if so to what extent and how – Cavell could be combined with theology.

The final two talks connected Wittgensteinian themes with two quite different conceptual spaces and philosophical
concerns. Sophie-Grace Chappell asked the question, inspired by the work of Iris Murdoch, whether love is, or at least can be, knowledge. For Chappell, this question can be meaningfully asked against the background of Wittgensteinian critique of scientific interpretation of knowledge, and with a help of Adam Smith’s reflections on the moral relevance of empathy, of becoming ‘in some measure the same person’ with another, especially a suffering other. It is in such empathic imagination that love and knowledge can meet. In the final talk of the conference, Duncan Richter offered an interpretation and a particular application of Wittgenstein’s idea of linguistic clarity as an end in itself. Richter contrasts an ethical understanding of language-use which undergirds a Wittgensteinian view of clarity with a consequentialist-ethical view of language according to which a chosen conceptualization is used for extrinsic ethical purposes. According to Richter, Wittgensteinian sensibilities caution against this kind of ‘ethics’ of language-use, for the price of unclarity and of the bad language produced can often be too high.

Contrary to the common perception according to which Wittgenstein scholars live in their own, somewhat narrow ‘sectarian’ world within the wider world of Western philosophy today, the Eighth Annual British Wittgenstein Society Conference enabled an interesting and interdisciplinary platform of contemporary scholarship on Wittgenstein, religion and ethics, bringing together philosophers of different philosophical styles, theologians, and even some religious studies scholars, reflecting a broad spectrum of reception and relevancy of Wittgenstein work in today’s scholarship. There was plenty of great food for thought, high-spirited discussion and, I am sure, inspiration for taking the research on the topic(s) further and in new directions.


BWS Conference Report

After a very early start and a long train journey, I arrived bleary-eyed at Hinsley Hall in Leeds, for the eighth annual conference of the British Wittgenstein Society. This year’s theme, “Wittgenstein and Religion”, intrigued me because I am studying Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Cambridge, and I had not (yet) come across much writing about Wittgenstein’s views on religion. I wasn’t sure what to expect. Surely Wittgenstein didn’t have much to say on religion? Wasn’t he much more concerned with the Philosophy of Language?

I was surprised to find that Wittgenstein had quite a favourable attitude to religion, even going so far as to claim that he wished he could be religious and genuinely hold religious beliefs. I was fascinated by the lectures and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on religion that they uncovered. I was also really pleased that, far from always being out of my depth as I had feared, I could understand most of the speakers’ arguments. That’s not to say that there were no lectures that confused me - indeed, I was quite baffled by a lecture on the subject of the relationships between Mathematics, Religion and Wittgenstein’s thought. This served as a reminder of how many years of study it takes to become completely fluent in philosophical discourse! One highly interesting lecture was Rowan Williams’ on Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Gospels, which uncovered many unexpected connections between these topics. However, my favourite talk was by Duncan Richter, which was on “Wittgenstein and the Value of Clarity” and discussed the problems which contemporary efforts to manipulate language pose for clarity of meaning. For example, does “pro-life” carry implicit meanings that “anti-abortion” does not? Terms recently introduced in the name of political correctness or social justice, such as “white privilege” instead of “racial inequality” were also scrutinized. This area of Wittgensteinian study is highly relevant to the
increasing use of politically correct new terms such as “white privilege” and “cultural appropriation” at American and British universities today - and so this talk helped clarify how one can discuss these ideas. In addition to the lectures, I also enjoyed meeting other delegates, ranging from other undergraduates to an Australian couple who were attending the conference as part of a whirlwind tour of academic events at British universities. They all had interesting stories to tell. And of course I heartily enjoyed the free, delicious meals!

I’d like to thank the British Wittgenstein Society for sponsoring my visit to the conference. I’d also like to thank Daniele Moyal-Sharrock for nominating me as the society’s conference guest for this year and Mik Burley for organising the event - I had an excellent time and learned a lot.

Anshel Cohen

Anshel is currently doing a BA in Theology and Religious Studies at Cambridge.

Read more.

8th British Wittgenstein Society Annual Conference - Videos

The BWS is delighted to tell you that videos of all the papers from our last annual conference are now available.

Read more.

Report on Sixteenth British Wittgenstein Society Lecture

Report on “Scientism as a Threat to Science: Wittgenstein on Self-Subversion” by Katja Alice Behrens
In her paper on “Scientism as a Threat to Science: Wittgenstein on Self-Subversion”, presented on the 17th October 2016 at Bloomsbury Institute London, Tejedor put forward a reading of Wittgenstein’s early remarks on scientism that understood them as a threat to science, as opposed to the dominant interpretation of them as a threat from science. Wittgenstein’s position towards the natural sciences as discussed in the *Tractatus* has so far been chiefly seen as the threat of scientific principles illegitimately encroaching into other areas. Despite acknowledging the appeal of this dominant reading, Tejedor warns that a too narrow focus on Wittgenstein’s treatment of scientism rests on a misrepresentation of his thoughts on science and the nature of his concern with scientism.

On her reading, Wittgenstein is better understood as drawing an analogy between his task as logician and that of a scientist, as well as asserting that logic is a scientific matter (“A Lecture on Science”). Positing this analogy casts doubt on any reading in which Wittgenstein is portrayed as being hostile to science as such. Either it seems, he commits a basic mistake in confusing the nature of the task of the logician, or his understanding of science is considerably different from the position presented in the dominant reading.

Wittgenstein’s discussions of the natural scientific principles in the *Tractatus* allow for further query into the interpretation of the dominant reading, for the latter takes all propositions which are neither senseful nor senseless to be nonsensical. This, so Tejedor argues, is a misrepresentation. Rather, a proposition is nonsensical when it fails to fulfil a purpose. True nonsense to Wittgenstein is where scientific principles are used to discover purpose. This is also a central problem of philosophical practices in the fields of Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Ethics, etc.

Tejedor’s reading proposes that if by scientism we mean a merge of scientific and other *a priori* approaches, the manners are self-subverting and thereby nonsensical. She lays out three case examples to back up her thesis that it is the nonsensical methodologies that Wittgenstein promotes as a threat:

First, she suggests another dimension of Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer’s *The Golden Bough*, as being a threat to anthropology as a social science. Distorted by *a priori* commitments, rather than rendering encountered practices of magic and religion intelligible, Frazer discounts such practices as stupidity resting on false physics. His methodology fails from fulfilling its own purpose. This makes for bad science and thus leads to self-subverting nonsense.

Second, Tejedor highlights Wittgenstein’s response to Russell’s queries over the constituents of a thought (Gedanke) and its relation to un-elementary facts (Tatsache). Wittgenstein answers by pointing out the misguided nature of the question, which is to be answered by a different discipline, namely psychology. He reminds Russell that his question does not serve a philosophical purpose, but rather a natural scientific one. This view is protective of both philosophy and, in this example at least, psychology.

Finally, Tejedor presents Wittgenstein’s disgracing of popular science that is intellectually dishonest. In comparing Faraday’s work on candles and Eddington’s popular science, he despises the latter for its grandiose claims as presenting a self-subverting quality, purposelessness, and dishonesty. The semi-metaphysical purpose but a cheat.

Tejedor proposes understanding Wittgenstein as evoking a threat from science emerging when scientism is illegitimately brought into other areas of life, but also as a threat to science when science is executed in a self-subverting, nonsensical manner.

The talk was followed by a discussion focusing mainly on two areas of questioning. The first focused on whether self-subversion is necessarily a bad thing. Tejedor rebutted this, emphasising that only when it generates or promotes confusion, or arises from a confusion about the nature of the investigation, is self-subversion bad. The second queried the nature of Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with scientism and whether it resides in science or philosophy. Tejedor reminded us of Wittgenstein’s interest in countering the impulse of scientism particularly in philosophy, but stressed that he equally criticises scientism arising in other areas, for instance as discussed in his remarks on popular science.

For a more detailed discussion of the points raised in the talk, see:

**About the Reporter**

**Katja Alice Behrens**

is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire funded by Microsoft Research, Cambridge. Her research interests are the Philosophy of Action by means of which she investigates actions performed online and social media use.

Read more.

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**CONFERENCE REPORT ON VON WRIGHT AND WITTGENSTEIN IN CAMBRIDGE**

**Von Wright & Wittgenstein in Cambridge: G.H. Von Wright Centenary Symposium**

**Strathaird, Cambridge,**

**September 20th - 23rd 2016**

*Report by Ian Ground – Vice-President - British Wittgenstein Society*
Organised by the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archive at Helsinki University, this conference addressed the historical, scholarly and philosophical legacy of George Henrik von Wright's relationship with Wittgenstein. No venue for such this event celebrating the centenary of von Wright's birth could be more appropriate than his elegant Cambridge house, Strathaird, now part of Lucy Cavendish College. The von Wright family lived in here in 1949-1950, with Wittgenstein as a frequent guest. The symposium talks, discussion and conversations took place in the room and gardens that were the location for the famous pictures of Wittgenstein and Von Wright sitting in deckchairs.

The conference was a carefully crafted synthesis of Wittgenstein studies, scholarship and history, the philology of Wittgenstein's nachlass and reflections on Wittgenstein's legacy and contemporary philosophical impact. A dominant focus of the conference was of course the role of Von Wright and his fellow literary executors, in shaping the early reception of Wittgenstein's thought.

With some twenty presentations over four days, and some fifty or so present, there is far too much to summarise but, for this participant, there were the following highlights.

A number of speakers took remarks by Von Wright as a prompt to examine and contribute to contemporary philosophical debate. Alberto Emiliani offered a subtle and, as many thought, rather beautiful account of puzzles about the concept of seeing, taking as an example the visual impairment of macular hole in which sufferers report "a strong feeling of uneasiness near the centre of my visual field". Emiliani contrasted Wittgenstein's and Von Wright's responses to the apparent nonsensicality of perceptual reports of this kind. Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen surveyed the progress made to fulfil Von Wright's 1963 remark that virtue ethics of "a subject awaiting further developments" and the extent to which he anticipated contemporary discussion of the dangers of relativism in virtue ethics and the problem of the particularity of the virtues. Hanne Appelqvist examined Wittgenstein's remarks about Culture and Value in relation to issues in aesthetics and the philosophy of music. Nuno Venturinha, well known for his work in Wittgenstein scholarship, produced a wide ranging presentation with impressive metaphysical ambitions whilst James Klagge challenged the Von Wright denial that goodness cannot be a family resemblance concept, with the wider aim of raising questions about Peter Hacker's account of conceptual change in Wittgenstein's approach. Lars Hertzberg, Lassi Jakola and Friedrich Stadler offered further reflections on von Wright's interpretation of Wittgenstein and his points of agreement, development and disagreement whilst Susan Edwards-McKie examined the relation between von Wright and Rush Rhees.

Amongst presentations with historical themes, Jonathan Smith, Archivist at the Wren Library, gave a fascinating account of the long range background to Von Wright's work on induction, detailing the Baconian inheritance, the way in which peculiar features of the Cambridge examination system, which led students of mathematics to take moral science examinations, produce a focus of interest in problems of philosophical logic and the critical role of Johnson and Venn. André Maury, who worked closely with von Wright, gave a wry account of this relationship and the editing process. Joachim Schulte examined Von Wright's role in the early decisions of Wittgenstein's first editors in deciding what and how Wittgenstein's work should be presented. Though Wittgenstein's editors were not professional philologists, Schulte thought that they nonetheless made clear the need for the highest standards for contemporary scholars in the field which was especially praiseworthy given the onerous and time consuming demands of the work they first carried out. This, as well as the need for re-evaluation of that work, was confirmed in Christian Erbacher's survey of the correspondence amongst the editors and conference organiser Thomas Wallgren's account of just how the first editors shaped the Wittgenstein that entered the mainstream tradition. As well as the well known issues about "Part 2" of the Investigations, the rather arbitrary character of the selection that resulted in Culture and Value was a particular theme.
for several speakers. This issue came to the fore in Josef Rothhaupt and Volker Munz's proposal to publish a new treatment of the Wittgenstein's remarks selected by von Wright. Martin Pilch gave a painstaking account of the precise place of MS 104 in the development of the Tractatus, comparing dating hypothesis and offering a new account. David Stern made the case for a hypertextual reading of the Tractatus, reading it horizontally across the numbered levels. Alois Pichler gave an impressive demonstration of the features of the Bergen online nachlass and outlined the structure of the semantic ontology that underpins this extraordinary resource (see http://www.wittgensteinsource.org for news about work in progress).

Discussions amongst participants were at once courteous and robust though, as ever, there were always more hands up than could be called by the chairs. A recurring theme of the conference was the extent to which, despite the enormous progress made, we have still yet to fully digest and understand all the dimensions of Wittgenstein's thought and methods in a way which takes an objective view of the decisions of Wittgenstein's literary executors. It is to be hoped that the final workshop on future tasks for editors in creating the conditions for addressing the many questions that remain to be resolved.

The team at Helsinki deserve rich congratulations for bringing together world class Wittgensteinian philosophers, scholars and philogists in a fitting tribute to Von Wright's contributions to philosophy, both in his own stead and in the evolving understanding of Wittgenstein's thought.

Read more.
Rule-Following and Reflective Judgement
Dr Hanne Appelqvist

May 22nd, 2017
@ 6:15 pm - 8:00 pm
The Bloomsbury Institute, 50 Bedford Square
London WC1B 3DP

Hanne Appelqvist is Docent of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki and a Fellow of the Turku Institute for Advanced Studies. She received her PhD degree from Columbia University in 2007. In her dissertation *Wittgenstein and the Conditions of Musical Communication* (Acta Philosophical Fennica 85, 2008) she defended a formalist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music. Since then, she has worked on Wittgenstein’s ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of language from the viewpoint of the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein philosophy. Her work has appeared in journals such as *the British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, *the British Journal of Aesthetics*, and *Metaphilosophy*. Appelqvist is currently preparing a book manuscript on the relevance of aesthetic judgment for Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.

See more BWS Lecture Series videos

Read more.
The site is built around a pair of subway-style maps of the numbering system used in the Tractatus and the Prototractatus, with the aim of displaying their overall structure. Clicking on the individual numbered stations, each of which stands for a remark in the text, or the lines connecting the stations, each of which stands for a series of connected remarks, brings up a panel containing the associated text. The default text is the German original, but a dropdown menu in each text panel allows you to choose either of the canonical English translations. You can also zoom in on any part of the map, and then move around in it, or zoom out to see the whole. It is the first Tractatus website to provide a map of the book's overall structure, and the only one that provides parallel access to the earlier versions of the text in the Prototractatus. The site is still in the early stages of development, and there are plans to improve and extend it in the future. There is a little more information about the map project on the site's front page; links to the two maps are at the top of that page. While the site's designers envisage the map as a tool that we would like a wide variety of readers to find helpful, they also contend that their website offers a radically new edition of Wittgenstein's early masterpiece, with far-reaching implications for the interpretation of that text. In particular, they claim that their visually compelling presentation of the book's overall structure delivers on Wittgenstein's cryptic claim in a letter to his publisher that it is the numbers that “make the book surveyable and clear”. A more detailed discussion of the Tractatus map, which reviews previous work on the numbering system and provides further information about the rationale for the map project, is available online in the December 2016 issue of Nordic Wittgenstein Review:

www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/

Read more.

Launch of Dr Andrejč's book 'Wittgenstein and Interreligious Disagreement: A Philosophical and Theological Perspective' (2016), with responses from Ed Kessler MBE and Alban McCoy.

http://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/2360566

Audio Lecture

Jointly organised by the Von Hügel Institute for critical catholic inquiry (VHI) and the Woolf Institute, this event was part of the VHI 2016-17 series of lectures and events on Dinamics of Dis/Agreement. For more details visit http://www.vhi-st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/events

Read more.
Welsh Philosophical Society Meeting

The next meeting of the Welsh Philosophical Society will take place at Gregynog Hall and will run from Friday 28th to Sunday 30th April 2017. Papers will be presented by Katherine Morris (Oxford), Chon Tejedor (Hertfordshire), Roger Teichmann (Oxford) and Neil O’Hara (postgraduate Hertfordshire). There will also be a session devoted to discussion of a piece (still to be decided) by Stanley Cavell. Further details will be available in early February. If you would like to be added to the Society's e-mail list please contact David Cockburn: cockburn.david@gmail.com.

The conference is organized with the support of the British Wittgenstein Society

Read more.

WITTGENSTEIN’S NOTEBOOKS 1914-1916

Université Du Québec à Montréal and Université Du Québec à Trois-Rivières (Montréal And Trois-Rivières, Canada)

The aim of the colloquium is to encourage a more systematic study of Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916, hoping to achieve a better understanding of his earliest philosophy, and to understand how they prefigure or differ from those expressed in the Tractatus. The hope then is to reach, on a broad range of topics, a better understanding of the Tractatus itself and the originality of the Notebooks.

INVITED SPEAKERS:

Guido Bonino (Università degli Studi di Torino)
Pasquale Frascolla (Università degli Studi della Basilicata, Potenza)
Sébastien Gandon (Université Blaise-Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand)
The colloquium is organized with the support of the British Wittgenstein Society

Philosophers interested in submitting book reviews should contact the BWS Editor.

Please include a brief CV or a link to your web page. Specify which book you would like to review and give your postal address so we can send the book to you.

Although we can usually provide only a single copy of each book, we encourage more than one book review of the same book. Please feel free to send us your reviews of Wittgenstein-related books whether or not the book is offered by, or obtained from, the BWS website.

Reviews should be between 1,500 and 2,000 words.


More books..

BWS Website

Our website is at www.britishwittgensteinsociety.org

Recent Changes
Since the launch of our new website:

- Video page now showing talks from the 8th Annual BWS Conference
- The front page now shows the current entry from John Preston's Wittgenstein day by day Facebook page.
- 90 new members have joined us via our online application form.
- We have integrated our book review process into the site.

The BWS Facebook Page, for informal discussion of Wittgenstein related issues and news has more than 2400 members.

Please follow the BWS on Twitter @BrittWittSoc.

Your BWS Membership

We are always happy to receive news of Wittgenstein related events, publications and resources.
Please let us know about events by emailing events@britishwittgensteinsociety.org
Please let us know about publications by emailing editor@britishwittgensteinsociety.org
Please let us know about Wittgenstein related links

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