When we look at Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, however, it turns out that he is committing himself to something different from, and much stronger than, the claim that there cannot be logically private languages. What the rule-following considerations entail is that language is essentially public. The argument for this, to recapitulate, is that language use is a rule-governed activity, and that rules are constituted by agreement within a language community...But then if language use is a rule-following activity, and such activity is essentially a matter of public agreement, as Wittgenstein argues, it follows that language is essentially, that is logically, public. (1)

If A.C. Grayling had said this specifically about Kripke’s Wittgenstein, rather than in the context of his elementary introduction to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it would still have been an equally appropriate thing for him to say, for he goes on to argue that on the view to which he is objecting, there cannot be a ‘Robinson-Crusoe-from-birth’ since this would be a denial of Wittgenstein’s claim that it is only within a linguistic community that an individual could be said to be capable of using a language at all. But since there is on Grayling’s view nothing in this notion of a born-Crusoe with which he would care to disagree, he understandably concludes that there must be something wrong with any claim of Wittgenstein’s that would deny its obvious legitimacy. Furthermore, in the absence of the public setting in which Wittgenstein’s tyro is introduced into the rule-following practices of his community, Grayling argues that there could on Wittgenstein’s assessment be no justification for saying that language learning for any child could even commence.
Grayling is not the only philosopher who has found it perfectly natural to object to what Wittgenstein might appear to be implying about the possibility of a born-Crusoe. Here is Ayer, providing a forceful appraisal of the Kripkean viewpoint he takes to be self-evidently absurd:

The propositions which we endeavour to express are no longer accorded truth-conditions with which their meaning might be equated. How could they be if all the facts of the matter have been done away with? What is put in their place is conditions of assertibility. And these are a matter of social agreement. The teacher judges that his pupil has mastered the rule of addition if he obtains enough of the same results as the teacher is himself disposed to reach. I am on the right semantic track so long as my verbal uses agree with those of my community. (2)

With this kind of perspective on what community agreement amounts to, it remains only for Ayer to issue the *coup de grace*:

The practice of the community is supposed to bestow meaning on my utterances. But what is the community except a collection of persons? And if each of those persons is supposed to take his orders about meaning solely from the others, it follows that none of them takes any orders. The whole semantic house of cards is based upon our taking in each other’s washing, or would be if there were any laundry to wash. On this interpretation, Wittgenstein’s argument, so far from proving that private languages are impossible, proves that they are indispensable. (3)

But this interpretation, partly shared by Grayling, is based entirely on taking the notion of *community agreement* to be internal to the constitution of the language-game, when it is instead - on the view with which we are only too familiar from Baker and Hacker - part of the framework of responses within which people speak a common language. (4) But this framework reading is one that Martin Kusch would evidently take even Kripke himself to be
espousing, one which Kusch also adopts in his evident desire to conclude that Kripke’s *sceptical solution* cannot be regarded as a *denial* of anything that we might normally wish to say about any individual who boldly chooses to disagree with the conclusions of his community. On the Kusch-Kripke view, Wittgenstein is denying only a philosophical *misinterpretation* of ordinary discourse espoused by the *meaning-determinist* philosopher; and this is not to deny our right to do anything we would say that we ordinarily do:

Note also that according to the sceptical solution there is no onus on us to agree with our community: it is part of our very language game of arithmetic that I can reach - and legitimately deem correct - one result, even though everyone around me reaches another. The sceptical solution is *descriptive* about normativity: it tells us how we operate with normative concepts and what their proper location is. But it does not tell us how we ought to respond when our own calculations - or meaning attributions - differ from those of others. (5)

This would appear to be veering towards Hacker’s view that it is the rule, and nothing but the rule, that ‘determines’ the way to go. Kusch feels free to follow this line without committing himself to any version of the low-brow or high-brow *meaning-determinism* which he sees as the main target of Kripke’s - and so of Wittgenstein’s - sceptical challenge. Yet to adopt this view *is* to narrow the gap between Kripke on the one hand, and Baker and Hacker on the other, for it provides one less reason for saying that there is anything of substance to separate them. Kusch finds his justification for adopting this standpoint in a well-known passage from Kripke:

Wittgenstein’s theory should not be confused with a theory that for any *m* and *n*, the value of the function we mean by ‘plus’, *is* (by definition) the value that (nearly) all the linguistic community would give as the answer...The theory would assert that 125 is the value of the function meant for given arguments, if and only if
'125’ is the response nearly everyone would give, given these arguments. Thus the theory would be a social, or community-wide version of the dispositional theory, and would be open to at least some of the same criticisms as the original form. (6)

The point echoed in *Investigations* §§240-242, to which Kripke gestures at this stage of his argument, is precisely that community agreement has to be seen as an agreement in *form of life*, an agreement in responses on which a language game may be based, but which cannot itself be internal to the constitution of the game - the Grayling-Ayer response so easily shown to be inadequate - and this is the answer Wittgenstein gives to the question in §242 whether it is human agreement that decides what is true and what is false.

This is not to say, however, that there are *no* aspects of Kusch’s presentation of the Crusoe question that fail to give rise to suspicion, and these arise because he has set himself the justifiable task of answering Colin McGinn’s challenge that making reference to the community is *not* an essential feature of supplying criteria for meaning addition by ‘+’, a point with which it has just been shown that Kusch would actually agree. Yet that it *is* an essential feature of Kripke’s claim that no sense can be made of someone’s following a rule ‘considered in isolation’ is one that Kusch must find room to accommodate:

I believe that both problems are real. And it is not easy to deflect them from within the ‘official road’ to intersubjectivity.

Fortunately, though, there is an alternative to the official road. (7)

Kusch’s alternative is an ‘improved road’ that makes Kripke’s sceptical solution a *well-nigh corollary* of the sceptical argument against meaning determinism’. For Kusch, the argument against meaning-determinism supplied by Kripke in Chapter 2 of his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* is one that shows how there can be no intrinsic mental state - no fact of the matter - that could support the *meaning-determinist* requirements for meaning something by a word. On Kusch’s view, all those philosophers who have introduced the concept of a
born-Crusoe as a means of proving the possibility of so-called contingently private languages of the kind described and supported by Grayling, therefore fall victim to the charge that they are inherently cleaving to a version of meaning-determinism which Kripke - and so Wittgenstein - has already shown to be untenable.

Many philosophers would regard this as a very controversial claim, but in Kusch’s estimation Kripke’s Wittgenstein demolishes claims to the effect that just because we behave in certain ways when following rules, and we can imagine born-Crusoes behaving in these ways, we can justifiably conclude that social isolates like Crusoe can follow rules. Using three well-known examples, one from Hacker and Baker on a repeated pattern of dots and dashes, one from Blackburn on Michael Dummett’s Rubik’s Cube, and finally Colin McGinn’s Romulus, Kusch argues that they all implicitly rely on that possession-of-a-mental-state meaning-determinism that Kripke has already repudiated. Using as a further example an argument from Norman Lillegard in which he claims that he cannot imagine, conceive, or make sense of a born-Crusoe finding a solution to the Rubik’s Cube, and (8) that he could do so only by forgetting that he is a born-Crusoe, Kusch concludes that ‘whatever a born Crusoe does, he is too different from us for us to be entitled to regard him as a rule-follower’.

But whilst Kusch may appear to be on reasonably strong ground with his claim that it is quite wrong to argue that because one can conceive of born-Crusoes inventing languages for themselves, this has to be regarded as a possibility - and here perhaps on Kripkean grounds he ought to have referred to epistemic rather than metaphysical possibility - the arguments he provides to support Kripke’s contrast between a physically isolated individual and an individual considered in isolation, are incredibly weak, even when clarified in terms of his distinction between physical and social isolation. Referring to Kripke’s claim that in thinking of Crusoe as a rule-follower we can think of this as a way of taking him into our community and applying our criteria of rule-following to him, he goes on to explain this in terms which to many readers must seem question-begging in the extreme, and which for this reason must appear to give rise to many more puzzling questions than answers:
Unless the community (or its representatives) actually confers the status - perhaps by saying something like ‘we hereby declare you to be…’ - Jones does not have it. We might put this point by saying that one of the criteria of Jones having the status is that the community (or its representatives) has imposed the status on him. Applied to rule-following; if being a rule-follower is a social status, then Crusoe cannot be a rule-follower merely by fitting the rough and ready criteria on the basis of which a community decides who should be a rule-follower. Crusoe is a rule follower - he has this social status - only if a community has actually conferred this status on him. (9)

Remarking that this explanation of ‘taking into the community’ immediately helps to resolve an objection from Baker and Hacker, it is difficult for the reader not to suspect that there is something evidently wrong here because Kusch’s explanation sounds far too like our conferring on someone the status of a member of the Golf Club or the Philosophical Club because in our eyes he happens to meet the appropriate social (or other) criteria; and one must surely wonder how this act of conferring a title on an individual can be of any use at all at the more fundamental level at which Kusch is attempting to apply it. As it is, the objection to which he refers from Baker and Hacker about the muddled idea that we take the cat hunting a mouse into our community in a similar way, is not of much significance, and neither is the answer to it that Kusch provides. The more serious question is why his argument at this point is so fundamentally weak.

To explain why it must be so weak we can first of all utilise a distinction which Baker and Hacker (10) actually draw between the source and the exercise of an ability, which they illustrate through examples of Robinson Crusoes available from Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. In these cases, the meanings of Robinson’s words are readily discovered by studying Robinson’s behaviour. How the language is learned or acquired is from this point of view irrelevant. Another and rather more serious objection from an opposing perspective is that Wittgenstein would find the very idea of a
born-Crusoe a classic example of a misleading picture: Crusoe is a re-incarnation of Augustine’s child from *Investigations* § 1 and § 32 who can ‘think, only not yet speak’. But it is a central feature of Wittgenstein’s method to see our attraction to Crusoe when doing philosophy as a symptom of the recurring tendency to become party to a picture which is doing no real work, one which has no genuine application, and which encourages the philosopher to talk at a more sophisticated level about innate conceptual capacities underlying the child’s ability to name those objects in the world around him which have already attained the status of objects of particular kinds quite independently of the acquisition of a public language.

It is not, therefore, a sceptical challenge that leads Wittgenstein to draw our attention to the circumstances in which a language is actually learned in a community. Instead, and in the course of overcoming the evident appeal of that Platonist (Kusch’s meaning-determinist) picture in which it appears that we were surely right to take our understanding of what it is to mean something to consist, the description of the day-to-day circumstances in which a language is learned in practice is the expression of a methodology with distinctly anthropological resonances: it helps to draw our attention away from the picture of the born-Crusoe by providing a reminder of familiar truisms that are intended to lessen its often paralysing hold.

It is a consequence of this perspective on Wittgenstein’s achievement that although we can quite rightly draw the conclusion that what sense the notion of the born-Crusoe has for us is gained from the circumstances in which we do in fact learn a language in a social context, circumstances allowing us to imagine a Crusoe-from-birth as a fantasy seen in isolation from the quite ordinary surroundings in which a language is learnt, it would be wrong to draw from this observation any conclusion to the effect that - with Grayling - language is ‘logically public’. It would equally be misleading to claim, with Malcolm, that Wittgenstein is in the business of actually denying ‘that if a human being grew up, by some strange chance, in complete isolation from any human society, this human being could, in his solitary existence, have many thoughts; and could devise a language, a system of signs, which he used to record observations, make predictions, set down rules of action for his own guidance. Wittgenstein rejects this natural assumption.’ (11) But it is not at all clear what
kind of proposition Wittgenstein is supposedly denying here to be true. Malcolm then continues in an interesting way to describe what he thinks Wittgenstein is denying in *Investigations § 32:*

Wittgenstein is certainly holding that it makes no sense to attribute those concepts and that thinking to a child before it has learned any language. This rejection of Augustine’s account is, *a fortiori*, a rejection of the assumption that a human being, who had lived a solitary existence from birth, could have any conception of what a rule is, or a system of signs, or a language - or could invent a system of signs that he employed according to rules. (12)

But that is not what Wittgenstein says: what he says is that when doing philosophy, we can become party to what is a misleading *picture*, a picture that is doing no real work. The problem with Malcolm’s presentation is that the content of his proposals would appear to have the characteristics of, on the one hand, an empirical hypothesis, and, on the other, those of some *special* kind of philosophical or conceptual claim, almost as if our very *concept* of a child who is *in fact* born and raised in a community rules out the *possibility* that Malcolm takes Wittgenstein to deny. But if that *really* were so, the idea of the born-Crusesoe would not make *sense*; and part of the problem, as Baker and Hacker indirectly imply in providing the distinction between the *source* and the *exercise* of an ability, is that this idea only too readily serves to stimulate our imagination. Indeed, as Wittgenstein suggests, it is because it *has* sense that when we come to think about it philosophically we are often overwhelmingly inclined to give it the wrong kind of emphasis.

Yet the same kind of emphasis is also evident in Kusch’s concern to deny that the three born-Crusoe examples which he repudiates, can be taken to establish genuinely *philosophical* conclusions in favour of private rule following; because he takes Saul Kripke, and by implication Wittgenstein, to satisfactorily demolish these claims with a *sceptical* argument: *WRPL contains a convincing and strong argument against*
the possibility of private rule-following (or private meaning, or private concept application).

According to WRPL, ‘rule-follower’ (and cognate terms) are social statuses. Someone occupies a social status when a community actually imposes the status on him. WRPL undermines the intuition according to which private rule-following must be possible. Hence one cannot appeal to the intuition without taking on the sceptical argument. (13)

What Kusch is claiming here is correct only insofar as Wittgenstein would question the notion of private rule-following as illustrated in those born-Crusoe examples; but his reason for doing so is that although the notion certainly makes sense, it is the expression of a picture that has no genuine application, one that can lead only to an infinite regress. It can from this perspective play no role in a proper philosophical understanding of what it is to follow a rule. Yet this rejection is hardly the result of a sceptical argument, because Wittgenstein from the beginning of the Investigations treats the meaning-determinist picture Kusch identifies to underlie the born-Crusoe proposals as the primary element in our thinking that misleads us when in doing philosophy we are given to reflect about meaning. But a philosopher can only be genuinely sceptical about a concept that he takes to encapsulate our thinking about following a rule, yet which to his horror he finds he cannot apply. He cannot be said to be sceptical in this sense about what from the beginning he takes to be a highly misleading characterisation of what following a rule really is. Yet Kripke’s sceptical challenge begins with precisely the kind of characterisation that Wittgenstein would regard as an expression of the captivating picture from which we require to be released:

By means of my external symbolic representation and my internal mental representaion, I ‘grasp’ the rule for addition. One point is crucial to my ‘grasp’ of this rule.

Although I myself have computed only finitely many
sums in the past, the rule determines my answer for
indefinitely many new sums that I have never seriously
considered. This is the whole point of the notion that in
learning to add I grasp a rule: my past intentions regarding
addition determine a unique answer for indefinitely new
cases in the future. (14)

This is the very meaning-determinist proposal discussed by Kusch that Wittgenstein,
far from espousing as a proper representation of our understanding of what it is to follow a
rule - but one which we have every right to be sceptical about - recognises from the beginning
of the Investigations to be no more than the kind of highly attractive picture that when doing
philosophy we can only too easily take to direct the course of our investigations. But the
sceptical challenge only gains what grip it may appear to have if this picture is already taken
to underlie our understanding of what it is to ‘grasp’ a rule. Without it, there is nothing to be
sceptical about. As Peter Winch puts it in his original 1983 review of Kripke’s book:

I think it is important that Kripke shows no sign of regarding
this characterisation of what is involved in grasping and applying
a rule as in any way philosophically tendentious or questionable.
It is supposed to express the common understanding of what
following a rule is. This is an essential element in his thesis that
‘Wittgenstein’s main problem is that it appears he has shown all
language, all concept formation to be impossible, indeed unintelligible’ (15)

On Winch’s view, Wittgenstein is not agreeing with the sceptics that there is no
‘superlative fact’ (§ 192) about my mind that constitutes my meaning addition by ‘plus’ and
determines in advance what I should do to accord with this meaning. He is clarifying from the
outset that it is only because - when doing philosophy - we can be so wedded to the idea that
there either is or is not such a ‘superlative fact’ that we fail to realise that it cannot play the role in
our investigations with which we are only too keen to invest it. Yet unless it is initially given that *role* in our thinking, the sceptical response to it with its consequent anti-realist ‘sceptical solution’ can have no application. Winch in his assault on Kripke’s orientation towards the rule-following passages, emphasises the point succinctly in a Wittgensteinian way:

> What makes us suppose that we have ‘a concept of true and false, which we could use to determine what is and what is not a proposition’ is that a certain form of words may conjure up an immediate picture (a picture, as it were, of the truth conditions) the having of which we take to constitute our understanding of the words in question; and we overlook the complexities in our use of the words which have to be attended to if we are to know in what circumstances we are in fact entitled to say that the truth conditions are or are not satisfied. (16)

But this for Winch is not to replace *truth conditions* by *assertibility conditions* in the explanation of meaning; it is, in Wittgenstein’s terms, to comment on the *grammar* of truth conditions. Indeed, the very notion of *assertibility conditions* only gains what sense it has in this context from our inability to *apply* the picture determining what we take to provide the *truth conditions* resting in the ‘superlative fact’ that seemed forever to be beyond our reach. Kusch’s *meaning-determinist* picture for which it seems we can have no *application* because of the ‘sceptical challenge’ is yet another instance of what Wittgenstein refers to in *Investigations* §295 as that ‘full-blown pictorial representation of our grammar’ that we often discover that we are party to when doing philosophy. It is reflected again in §426, where it is said that our forms of expression appear to have been designed for a god, because they seem like the pontificals that we may put on but cannot do much with. The straight highway before us that is permanently closed is the route provided by, in this case, the meaning-determinist *picture* that has no application.
Although Kusch states plainly at the very beginning of his Introduction that Kripke’s ‘Postscript: Wittgenstein and Other Minds’ lies outside the scope of his study - and it is interesting to note that the secondary literature in general has paid scant regard to this equally absorbing part of Kripke’s book in comparison to the attention devoted to the sceptical paradox - this is to be regretted, for Wittgenstein applies the same principles to his treatment of this question as he does in discussing Kusch’s picture of meaning-determinism. Indeed, if anything the anti-realist orientation on Kripke’s part in these thirty pages or so is rather more pronounced, almost as if Wittgenstein is really taken to be denying what we all know to be true in terms of our understanding of the meaning of our day-to-day utterances: these utterances in Kripke’s common-sense world have certain metaphysical implications which it seems that Wittgenstein implicitly denies. This passage provides the general flavour of Kripke’s treatment:

We cannot ask whether - in some sense given by ‘imagining the sensations of others on the model of my own’ - he really ‘feels the same’ as I. Nor ought we to worry whether our statements about the sensations of others make it obscure what facts we are looking for. But in no way is the lack of such ‘corresponding facts’ fatal to the conception of an attribution of sensations to others as meaningful. To see it as meaningful, we look, not for ‘corresponding facts’, but for the conditions under which we introduce this terminology, and what role it plays. (17)

It is worthwhile comparing this with a comment Peter Winch makes about Kripke’s treatment in this part of the book, because it helps to explain not only how subtle the difference in orientation here can often appear to be, but also why this subtlety enables Kusch towards the end of his book to interpret some philosophers who see themselves to be opposing Kripke, as in reality fellow travellers who are actually walking hand-in-hand with him in the same direction:
Wittgenstein’s point is not, as Kripke seems to think (on page 136 for instance) that when we say of someone else that he has a headache there are no ‘corresponding facts’, the obtaining of which makes my statement true and the non-obtaining of which makes it false. His point is rather that there is no short cut to understanding what these facts are which by-passes an understanding of how expressions like ‘He has a headache’ are used. (18)

Whilst from one perspective Kripke’s viewpoint is wholly determined by his adherence to the misleading picture in which he takes our understanding of what it is to have a headache to consist, a perspective which allows Winch to criticise him because he is party to that picture, from quite another perspective it is not at all difficult to see why a critic like Kusch might be tempted to see both Kripke and Winch saying exactly the same thing. The difference in orientation appears to stand on a knife-edge, as if Kripke’s sceptical anti-realist stance and the genuinely confusion-resolving Wittgensteinian approach of Winch were both elements in a strategy pointing in exactly the same direction. In order to illustrate that this is not really the case, the overtly anti-realist stance revealed in the following passage from Kripke can be used to illustrate the point in question:

..Wittgenstein would reject any attempt to ‘explain’ my attitude and behavior towards a sufferer by a ‘belief’ about his ‘inner state’. Rather, once again the order is to be inverted: I can be said to think of him as having a mind, and in particular as suffering from pain, in virtue of my attitude and behavior towards him, not the reverse. (19)

The problem here is that Wittgenstein would not have denied that there is a perfectly ordinary sense in which we do indeed ‘explain our attitude towards a sufferer
by a belief about his inner state’, and in which the relevant references to ‘explain’, ‘belief’ and ‘inner state’ would have had no need to be presented within quotation marks. The reason for this is that in providing this form of explanation in an ordinary context, we know precisely in what circumstances and by what criteria we determine that he is suffering. But that we do understand that he is suffering is not determined by having an (incidental) philosophical picture of his suffering, one in which his pain belongs to a quite distinct ontological category. That, indeed, is the point Wittgenstein is really making in the example Kripke quotes regarding the nurse and the doctor who say that if the patient groans, he requires more analgesic. By asking whether the nurse and doctor are really suppressing a middle term concerning the patient’s inner state, and pointing to the service to which they put this description of the patient’s behaviour, Wittgenstein is not asking an ordinary question about the patient’s suffering which can be answered using perfectly ordinary criteria: he is really questioning whether the tempting yet misleading philosophical picture of what it is for him to be in pain as an ‘inner state’ within a philosophical context can have any application.

This is a further expression of Wittgenstein’s methodology, for in this case as in others it is as if we believed when doing philosophy that we could penetrate to the essence of phenomena (§ 90), where this is encapsulated here in having a picture of his pain; and this is a further allusion to the tendency when doing philosophy to think that one is ‘tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.’ (§ 114). Wittgenstein would say that Kripke’s tendency to put certain words in quotation marks is a reflection of the philosopher’s desire to ask a special philosophical question about whether someone is really in pain which one can continue to ask interminably when all the ordinary criteria by which the doctor and nurse judge that the patient is suffering are actually satisfied. Yet Kripke almost inevitably takes this example to be a further expression of Wittgenstein’s anti-realism:

I think that in these passages Wittgenstein does reject any attempt to explain or justify our behavior in terms of a belief about the ‘inner
state’ of the other person. Such an ‘explanation’ would raise all the problems about other minds rehearsed in the present postscript, as well as all the problems about private rules discussed in the main text. (20)

He then continues with his famous discussion of Vorstellung and Bild which ends with further expressions of anti-realist sentiments. Yet Wittgenstein’s approach towards the so-called sceptical paradox is exactly the same as it is towards the anti-realist sentiments espoused by Kripke in his discussion of ‘Other Minds’: it is only because we are party in the first place to the misleading picture directing the course of our investigations that there could even appear to be something which the philosopher could become sceptical about.

But there is a positive aspect to Wittgenstein’s view of both the concept of the born-Crusoe and the rule-following paradox if we look upon them as two opposing poles, each of which provides a source of philosophical misunderstanding in relation to the ordinary circumstances in which we acquire and employ a language. At one extreme, the rule-following paradox treats the ordinary application of a rule apart from its context in those practical affairs in which it finds its normal expression, and at the other the concept of the born-Crusoe takes the exercise of the rule to be pre-determined (in terms of Kusch’s meaning-determinist picture) by Crusoe’s possession of a capacity operating in isolation from the social background against which we come to understand its actual application. But if in the attempt to abandon this Platonist picture of the born-Crusoe magically encompassing within himself the capacity required to master a rule in an infinite number of applications, the temptation is to retreat to a single instance of falling a rule, one then becomes victim to the rule-following paradox.

But this retreat to a single instance of following a rule immediately takes what one has to do at this point in following the rule out of context. It becomes severed from the background in which (§ 201) our grasping a rule is exhibited in practice in the quite ordinary way in which we talk about ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases. The emphasis Wittgenstein places in Investigations § 199 on what Colin McGinn once called ‘the multiple application thesis’
and which led to his puzzlement over what Wittgenstein could possibly be getting at in suggesting that it is not possible that there be only a *single* occasion of rule-following, is no more than a reminder that if we *insist* when doing philosophy on taking our understanding of what it is to follow a rule out of its ordinary context within the framework of shared - and on occasion unshared - responses in which we obey rules and go against them, then the sceptical paradox will be unanswerable. Indeed, it *is* unanswerable on Wittgenstein’s assessment if we insist on staring at the *picture* in which it seems that we can give ‘one interpretation after another’, almost as if ‘each one contented us for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it.’ (§ 201) The way forward lies in turning our eyes away from the picture, for if we fail to do so then it will seem that we are caught in a classically insoluble dilemma, continually oscillating between an unacceptable Platonistic *born-Crusoe* at one extreme, and a single *instance* of following what has inevitably become *no-rule-at-all* at the other.

In these circumstances it might very well seem that only Kripke’s ‘community view’, performing a quite specific role as a ‘sceptical solution’, can save the day and prevent this continuing oscillation from one unacceptable extreme to another. But Wittgenstein’s appeal to the ordinary circumstances in which we in fact follow a rule is not intended to provide an *answer* to a ‘sceptical paradox’, when it is quite clear that adherence to a misleading picture cannot allow of the kind of *philosophical* answer the solution to the paradox would appear to require. Yet the idea of training into a practice provides a new way of countering the born-Crusoe - by drawing our eyes away from the picture - just as a call to return to the contexts in which a rule is actually applied (§ 198 and § 201) is intended to show how in a philosophical context it is so easy to become victim to a way of looking at things it seems impossible to relinquish. Seen in the right light, this has the consequence that the distinction between language as *essentially shareable* - presented by Baker and Hacker and Grayling in support of the concept of a born-Crusoe - and language as *essentially shared* - presented in different ways by Kripke and Malcolm in their suggestion that in some sense language is ‘essentially social’ - ceases to have the importance

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that it has continued to assume in the debate surrounding the sceptical paradox and its solution. Here is David Stern:

The two main camps are known as ‘individualists’ and ‘communitarians’.

‘Individualists’, such as Baker and Hacker, Robert Fogelin, Colin McGinn and Simon Blackburn, maintain that a single individual could, at least in principle, provide the resources for a solution. In other words, the practices involved in following a rule may be the practices of an isolated individual, often referred to as a ‘Robinson Crusoe’... ‘Communitarians’ such as Peter Winch, Norman Malcolm, and David Bloor, hold that answering the sceptical problem is only possible if one is a member of a community - a group of a certain kind - and so the practices in question must be social, if not community-wide. (22)

But if we study what Wittgenstein is doing and why he does it as an expression of his quite distinct methodology, his procedure fails to support the ‘logically public’, the ‘necessarily social’, or the ‘contingently-private-from-birth’ philosophical proposals surrounding language acquisition, associated with the Crusoe question and which have been, and even now remain, a regular feature of the literature surrounding Wittgenstein and Kripke on private language. His method is much less obviously ‘philosophical’ than these debates would imply. Indeed, on reflection it is not at all clear just what kind of propositions claims like the ‘necessarily social’, which seem at one moment to suggest empirical hypotheses, yet at another to point to special kinds of philosophical /conceptual proposals, are really intended to support. Yet when Wittgenstein appeals to what is the case - the circumstances in which we follow a rule, or learn a language in practice - he is doing so, not because in some sense he is claiming that this must be the case, but because this helps to draw our attention away from the misleading pictures which are directing the course of the philosophical investigation. The role of this appeal to the ‘everyday’ in his thinking is not to support a philosophical claim, the very nature of which with
Wittgenstein’s encouragement can come to seem ever more puzzling to us. His approach is of course itself philosophical in a rather wide sense, but it has also gained the label ‘therapeutic’ through the employment of the methodology. But that methodology gains its significance only to the extent to which the philosopher can come to agree with Wittgenstein’s standpoint that certain misleading ways of looking at fundamental philosophical questions have become endemic in our thinking; and the real meaning of ‘therapy’ in this context is captured in the thought that it is only when these habits of thought can be seen for what they really are that the landscape can begin to be viewed from a new and revelatory perspective.

So far, the primary question under discussion here has been the one which in the final analysis is the most important of all: how close does the Kripke-Kusch approach come to providing a reliable account of what Wittgenstein on rule-following - and ‘Other Minds’ - is really about? In the course of answering this main question one can also begin to assess how reliable a portrayal of Kripke, Kusch really provides. Whilst the first question really answers itself if we see Wittgenstein’s methodology from the proper perspective - from which the ‘sceptical problem’ with its ‘sceptical solution’ fails to capture the significance of Wittgenstein’s notion that a picture holds us captive - the second question is actually rather more complex, because the full measure of Kripke’s thinking cannot really be grasped without looking upon Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language in its entirety, and this is not something that Kusch has actually decided to do. At the same time, it has also been shown here why what we can come to regard as the rather ‘sanitised’ reading of Kripke’s Wittgenstein provided by Kusch, especially towards the end of his book, in which any overtly ‘sceptical’ overtones all but disappear, can gain currency just because the dividing line between the sorts of things that philosophers as diverse as Winch and Kripke actually say, can sometimes seem to stand on a knife-edge.

The final chapter of Kusch’s book deals primarily with the important though - from the perspective of his work as a whole - ultimately subsidiary question of how far Kripke’s reading provides a correct rendering of Wittgenstein. This is a question which he answers positively by
taking on what he assumes to be the ‘most important of the opposing views’, Baker and Hacker in their *Scepticism, Rules and Language* (23). At this point he indirectly reminds us of something he had occasion to say in his Preface:

> And having spent the last five years of my philosophical life reading, and thinking about, dozens and dozens of criticisms of *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, I have come to the conclusion that none of them are decisive. Many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke’s reasoning; many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke’s position; and many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Needless to say, it is disconcerting to find oneself disagreeing with so many established and outstanding philosophers writing so near to, or even within, their area of specialisation; but there I stand.

Kusch’s position is not quite so radical as it may appear from this passage, because it turns out on the ‘sanitised’ reading already referred to, that Kripke and Baker and Hacker are really much closer than may at first sight appear. Yet that reading is the result of an inherent ambivalence in Kusch’s presentation: in so many passages this underlies the claim that Kripke can be read in a more traditionally ‘Wittgensteinian’ way than Baker and Hacker make out. Occasionally, this procedure seems to gain success, particularly so on the question of how the notion of ‘agreement’ is to be interpreted: Kripke does not really appear to adhere to the Grayling-Ayer line that ‘agreement’ is to be regarded as what Kusch refers to as a constitutive criterion of rule-following. Kusch also takes note that whilst Kripke’s account of his assertibility conditions is sketchy and vague, he makes a point - one made in an early review of the Baker and Hacker book by Jane Heal long ago - that what they say on the issue bears a surprising resemblance to Kripke:
But the same sketchiness and vagueness characterizes existing accounts of defeasible criteria. And thus the real puzzle arising from Baker and Hacker’s critique is this: why is it wrong to speak - in Kripke’s loose way - of the later Wittgenstein as suggesting a ‘picture’ of meaning in terms of assertibility conditions, when it is right to talk - in Baker and Hacker’s manner - of the later Wittgenstein as proposing a ‘picture’ of meaning in terms of criteria? (24)

This general line of approach is extended to Kusch’s assessment of the ‘sceptical solution’ itself, which ends on this kind of reading by being rather less ‘sceptical’ than we might originally have taken Kripke to propose, for it is only within a specific framework that the ‘sceptical paradox’ gains its meaning, and without this framework the paradox dissolves together with any distinction there might be thought to have been between Wittgenstein himself and Kripke’s interpretation of him:

......rather than being a defence of blatant scepticism, WRPL tries to show that scepticism is unavoidable only given a meaning-determinist understanding of rules and meaning. The sceptical solution is sceptical in so far, and only in so far, as it preserves this negative point about meaning determinism. The sceptical solution is not sceptical about our ordinary talk of meaning in everyday life; in fact, it provides this talk with a new form of justification. (25)

But Wittgenstein’s answer to this would have been that the very idea that our ‘ordinary talk’ might require this kind of ‘justification’ is itself a symptom of philosophical confusion. Indeed, if we take this ‘sanitised’ reading far enough, it would be open to us to conclude that when Wittgenstein says that we are being confused by a picture of a ‘superlative fact’ in which we cannot help taking our understanding of what it is to mean something to consist, then a denial that there either is or is not such a ‘fact’ can be construed as the claim that he
is adopting a ‘sceptical’ stance towards a meaning-determinist outlook; when what he is doing is rejecting the framework within which this debate can even take place.

This provides a link to Kusch’s further charge, shared by Jane Heal in her review, that ‘It is astonishing to note that Kripke’s critics’, including Baker and Hacker, have failed to note ‘the constitutive-ontological character of the scepticism invoked in WRPL’, a charge based on the assumption that ‘Wittgenstein is sceptical about the existence of meaning-determining facts, not about the idea of justification or knowledge regarding such facts’. (26) But whatever we may be inclined to say here about Baker and Hacker - who on this point can probably be interpreted rather more charitably - it would be difficult in the extreme to apply this charge to a Wittgenstein who in reality rejected the framework within which the very idea of the existence or non-existence of a ‘superlative fact’ gains whatever significance it is thought to have. Kusch also comments at this point on Wittgenstein’s ‘epistemological contextualism’ in On Certainty: he suggests that Wittgenstein always addresses epistemological rather than ontological scepticism. But this is difficult to reconcile with the thinking of someone who rejects scepticism - about an external world and about ‘other minds’ - as the result of an adherence to a misleading picture; for in doing so he is also implicitly rejecting the idea that the existence or non-existence of what one is being sceptical about makes sense. The issue is neither ‘epistemological’ - suggesting that we cannot know about the existence of x, where talk of x makes sense - nor ‘ontological’ - where the existence of x as something that makes sense is being denied - but semantic, where the very terms of the debate assuming either the existence or non-existence of questionable entities is given a wholly negative assessment.

Kusch comes ‘face to face with one of the most important divides in Wittgenstein scholarship’ when he asks in his Objection 5 of this chapter who is right in the debate between the ‘individualists’ and the ‘communitarians’, a question which ties in with his later Objection 9 about the Baker and Hacker lone-Crusoe examples from the Nachlass. But in answer to the first question he is content to argue in general terms from common examples of ordinary usage that the notion
of rule-following is connected in practice with our ideas about social customs and institutions - a point which is surely not in dispute - and in answer to the second he takes Baker and Hacker to task for using examples of Robinsons from the Nachlass that were not finally used in the Investigations: the not uncommonly drawn implication here is that Wittgenstein might very well have changed his mind. But that is not in dispute either, and the classic example is the now well-known passage from page 12 of the Blue Book where it is suggested that it seems rather paradoxical to say that a person might actually exercise an ability to speak a language without its ever having been taught to him. But the question is not whether we can introduce a genuine distinction between the source and the exercise of an ability, but what we think we can do with it; and it has already been argued that from Wittgenstein’s methodological perspective, the questionable debate between individualists and communitarians has assumed an importance in our thinking that in the final analysis is the result of a philosophical misunderstanding. This helps to explain why it is irrelevant to his genuine concerns.

The position is rather different with the placing in its new context - a discovery for which we have to thank Baker and Hacker - of Investigations §§ 201-202, the subject of Kusch’s Objections 6 and 7, and here it can certainly be argued that, following hard upon § 200, the point of these remarks in this context is precisely that ‘privately’ is to be identified with ‘taken out of context’ and so with the idea that ‘every action according to the rule is an interpretation’. But if it really were the case that we ‘gave one interpretation after another; as if each one....’ there would be no following a rule at all, so that the point in question is really incidental to a distinction between individual and social practices.

Kusch’s criticisms of Baker and Hacker, which for the most part turn on attempting to show that Kripke can be successfully read as rather more ‘Wittgensteinian’ in their terms than they would perhaps wish to make out, gain a proportion of their force from the ambivalence reflected in his claim that scepticism is unavoidable only on a meaning-determinist understanding of what it is to follow a rule, because this can so often appear to be indistinguishable from Wittgenstein’s claim that it is only because of our adherence to a misleading meaning-determinist picture which we are tempted
by when doing philosophy, that we can come to think that ordinary rule-following practices require any form of *philosophical* justification. On Kusch’s ‘sanitised’ reading, in which it appears that there is really nothing that the sceptic is denying - and here it really is worthwhile having a look at Kripke’s treatment of ‘Other Minds’ to feel the full force of his *own* underlying adherence to the metaphysical implications of ordinary discourse - the sceptical leanings seem almost to disappear altogether. Kusch extends this procedure to ‘Four of the most influential commentators on *WRPL*, Boghossian, McDowell, Pettit and Wright’, in his Chapter 7, whom he regards as presenters of ‘semantic primitivism’ - ‘straight’ responses to Kripke’s sceptic - and he again has no difficulty (on his assessment) in showing that at least three of these authors are ‘really’ adherents to Kripke’s viewpoint. His general strategy is to conclude, on the assumption that *direct* or *straight* responses to Kripke’s sceptic are by definition meaning-determinist responses, that because these authors largely misinterpret key elements of the Kripkean ‘sceptical solution’, they end by being much closer to Kripke’s view than they realise. This is a strong claim to make, especially if it is interpreted uncharitably to be a way of saying that these authors are not fully aware of what they are doing; but on a more liberal reading we are free simply to see Kusch as adopting a rather restrictive view of what a ‘straight’ solution is. To take only one example of how Kusch’s method applies, he concludes in response to John McDowell - based on Kripke’s assumption that blind action *qua* rule-following is part of a communal custom or practice - that McDowell is wrong to claim that Kripke is at fault in neglecting the second paragraph of § 201 because custom and technique are already an integral feature of the Kripkean sceptical solution:

In light of this textual evidence I am puzzled by the fact that McDowell cites the second paragraph of § 201 as telling against Kripke. McDowell suggests that Kripke overlooks Wittgenstein’s insistence that ‘there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in
what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases’ (PI: §201). Does not the sceptical solution try to elucidate precisely our normative practice of assessing instances of rule-following - and without making any assumptions about the interpretable mental states of either the rule-follower or the rule-attributor? (27)

This goes against what Crispin Wright refers to as the common reaction to Kripke’s sceptical paradox as presented by ‘almost every commentator’ (28), that Wittgenstein rejects the paradox in paragraph 2 of §201, on Wright’s assessment not because the content of one’s former mental life really is sufficient to determine meaning as Kripke presents the paradox, but because the grammar of the verb ‘to mean’ is different from that of ‘to think’ (§693). But this can be just another way of saying that if one insists on staring at a single occasion of ‘following a rule’ in the course of providing ‘one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it’, one will only succeed in taking the rule out of its context in the practice of ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases. Certainly, Wright believes that a satisfactory response can be provided to Kripke’s sceptic, because he sees Kripke asking how philosophers should conceive of ‘meanings’ and intentional states generally as items of non-inferential knowledge; but that is at least partly a reflection of the fact that Kripke’s sceptical paradox and Wittgenstein’s are pointing in different directions: there is nothing in §201 to indicate that Wittgensein wishes to do anything more than draw our attention away from a picture in the course of showing that adherence to it leaves us with an interminable problem that can never at this level be resolved. Certainly, he concerns himself with understanding, thinking, intending, hoping and expecting in other contexts, but when he does so it is not specifically with the intention of resolving what is at stake in §201.

Kusch actually makes play here with a point that is not really in dispute. Although Baker and Hacker do object to Kripke that he misconstrues Wittgenstein’s problem in the matter
of rule-following, Kusch has no difficulty in treating what he refers to as ‘Wittgenstein’s patient’ in Objection 2 of Chapter 8 as an obvious sufferer from a dose of meaning-determinism; and with the help of 21 quotations from the *Investigations*, all of which reflect the point made in § 188 that we are inclined to use expressions like ‘the steps are really already taken...’, he quite easily demonstrates that if these sections are seen as a dialogue between ‘patient and therapist’, Kripke’s interlocutor and Wittgenstein’s patient bear strong resemblances to each other. The irony, of course, is that if Kusch really were taking his notion of a ‘therapist’ seriously here, the idea of a Kripkean ‘sceptical solution’ would not even arise.

Kusch’s notion of meaning-determinism is initially introduced in detail in his Introduction, summarised under 17 main headings in terms of ideas like ‘grasping’, ‘guidance’ ‘normativity’, ‘justification’ and so on, which help the reader to obtain an inkling of what lies behind the low-brow notion, a notion which, provided with some added systematic theoretical underpinnings, leads to the high-brow version, instanced in its most refined form by semantic reductive dispositionalism, with its ontology of Kusch’s ‘spooky’ entities like meaning, capable in theory of being reduced in terms of non-normative notions acceptable to the physicalist. Together with semantic primitivism and Platonism, these sum up the high-brow forms of meaning-determinism rejected by Kripke.

Kusch’s next step is to first of all demolish all forms of meaning-determinism prior to defending in detail the sceptical solution, in the course of which he addresses in turn all of Kripke’s major critics whilst refining and strengthening his interpretation; and here familiar figures including Paul Coates, Donald Davidson, Simon Blackburn, Carl Ginet, Paul Horwich, Scott Soames, Alex Byrne, David Davies, George Wilson, Colin McGinn, Christopher Peacocke, Neil Tennant, Jerrold Katz and Penelope Maddy are paraded before the reader to have their views either demolished, partly agreed or disagreed with, or shown to be surprisingly rather more compatible with the Kripkean viewpoint than one might initially have been disposed to believe. It is in the discussion of at least some of these authors that one comes to realise the extent to which
the secondary literature has pretty much taken on a life of its own, in which its direct relation to Wittgenstein, and even to a lesser extent to Kripke’s Wittgenstein, can sometimes appear to have become more and more tenuous. Kusch displays an impressive command of this literature, and there are times when one is given to surmise that it is not merely the dozens and dozens of papers relating to Kripke’s Wittgenstein already referred to that he has studied, but the work of all of those authors now totalling 600 or so he states at the beginning of his Preface to have found Kripke’s work more than sufficiently intriguing to reflect upon. From this perspective, Kusch is probably correct to say at the end of this Preface that his book is relatively light weight in relation to the large number of authors he finds time to discuss, even if it does succeed in being at least three times the length of Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.

The inevitable danger with this plethora of responses to Kripke is that the reader may find himself unable to see the wood for the trees, so that returning to Kripke’s original work, thankfully free of the jargon accompanying some of the secondary literature, forces one to return to two very important questions: how good an interpretation does Kusch provide firstly of Wittgenstein, and secondly of Kripke’s interpretation of him? Here we are reminded of the ambivalence that surrounds a great deal of Kusch’s presentation of the ‘sceptical solution’, and in bringing this assessment of Kusch’s substantial achievement to a close, it will be worthwhile looking firstly at the extent to which his very idea of what a sceptical solution is, succeeds in misrepresenting the philosopher who is supposed to be its most important historical representative:

A sceptical solution to a sceptical challenge consists of three elements.

First, it accepts that - under the original understanding of justification - the sceptic wins. Hume thinks that the sceptical conclusion is inevitable as long as one assumes that a justification of causal inference must be based on a demonstration. Secondly, a sceptical solution holds that - on a different understanding of justification - we can defend the propriety of the practice in question. Hume does not think that we are wrong to engage in
the practice of drawing causal inferences. Thirdly, and finally, a
sceptical solution dismisses the original understanding of justification
as a philosopher’s chimera. To replace it by the ‘different understanding’
is to champion common sense over philosophical speculation. (29)

But the role of Hume’s rather weak psychological explanation, used to account for our
tendency to draw causal inferences as a result of ‘custom’ and ‘habit’, and operating through
the principles of the Imagination - which Kusch treats as part of Hume’s ‘sceptical solution’ - is
clearly not that of a solution to anything except perhaps to a separate problem posed within the field
of natural philosophy, a field in which Hume believed himself to be bringing to bear the Newtonian
mechanical method upon moral subjects. Hume’s contrast between Reason and Nature is indeed
central to a Naturalism which recognises that philosophy is impotent in the matter of our ‘Natural
Beliefs’, because we have no choice but to ‘believe’ in the existence of Body, and perhaps even of Other
Minds. But the ‘Sceptical Solution of these Doubts’ as Hume presents it, a phrase from the Enquiry to
which Kusch draws our attention, is tinged with a hint of irony, because the philosophical doubt felt in
the study, cannot in any sense be said to be resolved just because it evaporates in the street. Kusch’s
reference to Hume’s ‘championing common sense over philosophical speculation’ is anachronistic.

Hume’s scepticism was based on a preconceived idea of rationality, and it would be
highly misleading to think of Wittgenstein’s Naturalism as falling into the same category as Hume’s.
Wittgenstein’s ‘Naturalism’ is an expression of a methodology with a distinctly anthropological
thrust: the kinds of rational considerations leading to Hume’s denial of the existence of Body, for
example, on Wittgenstein’s assessment are only elements in a procedure that attempts to ratify the
misleading, incidental pictures which accompany our practices. Yet when doing philosophy we are only
too inclined to take our understanding of the meaning of our expressions to rest in the attempt to provide
these pictures with an application. Wittgenstein’s originality within the analytic tradition rests in
discovering our understanding of the meaning of these expressions to lie within the practice of talking
about Body and about Other Minds, insofar as these expressions may be taken to innocently describe
the persons and items of furniture which inhabit the common world of human experience.
The reference to Berkeley in this context is relevant only insofar as it reveals
Kripke’s own philosophical commitments, in his claim for example, that ‘Personally I can only
report that, in spite of Wittgenstein’s assurances, the “primitive” interpretation sounds rather
good to me...’ (30), echoed in his familiar remark that ‘Had Wittgenstein - contrary to his
notorious and cryptic maxim in § 128 - stated the outcomes of his conclusions in the form of
definite theses, it would have been very difficult to avoid formulating his doctrines in a form
that consists in apparent sceptical denials of our ordinary assertions’ (31).

But Kripke can only treat Wittgenstein in this way because he himself believes that
‘our ordinary assertions’ embody philosophical presuppositions, otherwise he would be far
less inclined to see Wittgenstein as the provider of a ‘sceptical solution’ denying something we
hold to be true. Kusch does not find this element in Kripke’s presentation easy to reconcile with the
innocent way in which he often regards Kripke’s ‘meaning scepticism’, and this explains the
ambivalent flavour of his account, from which any real hint of ‘scepticism’ often disappears:

Unfortunately, the dogmatic interlocutor’s philosophical interpretation
of ordinary talk has been extremely influential. Indeed, so much so that
this talk and that interpretation have become almost inseparable. Ordinary
talk is ‘heard’ by many of its (philosophical) users as expressing the
dogmatic interpretation directly; it is as if it were not just an interpretation
of that talk but its very meaning. The sceptical solution is, of course, the
denial of the dogmatic interpretation. But how can this denial be stated? (32)

Kusch suggests that we state it by saying things like ‘meaning does not determine
use’ as a way of presenting the sceptical solution, or perhaps, to take more blatant examples, we
might say that ‘there are no material objects’ or ‘there really are no other minds’. These difficulties
explain, according to Kusch’s Kripke, why Wittgenstein wrote aphorisms and avoided ‘the form of
definite theses’ referred to above. The alternative, of course, is for his sceptic to claim that he is not
really providing a denial of anything we would ordinarily say, as distinct from a misleading ‘realistic’
philosophical interpretation of what we say. But this apparent dilemma over how the sceptical viewpoint should be expressed is a result of an inherent ambivalence over the question whether ordinary discourse does or does not embody philosophical commitments. Wittgenstein’s method is to treat a belief in the philosophical commitments of ordinary talk as a misunderstanding, so that the very idea that there could be ‘sceptical denials of our ordinary assertions’ is something that for him could not make sense. Yet that Wittgenstein can be so easily misrepresented on this matter is something that Kusch implicitly recognises in the following extraordinary passage towards the end of his Introduction, where it would seem that he is making an attempt to reconcile his ‘sceptical solution’ - even at the risk of subverting the Kripkean view - with Wittgenstein’s claims in §§ 126-7 of the *Investigations* that he is not providing philosophical theories and explanations, as distinct from reminders for a particular purpose:

These passages suggest not that Wittgenstein was seeking to avoid advancing

‘definite theses’, but that there are no definite theses for him to advance. The

bulk of the work of a meaning-sceptical philosopher is negative or therapeutic:

it is to remove confused philosophical ideas that obscure our view of our practices.

Once these obstacles have been taken out, we see our practices as they are, and as not

needing the confused ideas as their interpretation, explanation and justification. (33)

But this inevitably leaves the reader wondering whether Kusch has abandoned Kripke’s Wittgenstein in favour of a newly introduced figure of his own, a Wittgenstein who is now all but rejecting the ‘meaning sceptical interpretation’ in favour of a claim based on ‘anthropology and sociology’; and in spite of saying that ‘The meaning-sceptical interpretation is something with which “everyone would agree” ’ - Kusch’s attempt to illustrate a compatibility with *Investigations* § 128 - it is clear that this reference to ‘meaning scepticism’ is to a doctrine which has now lost any claim to genuine (sceptical) significance. This inherent ambivalence, whilst indicating that Kusch is aware of an alternative way of reading Wittgenstein’s methodological approach in the rule-following passages of the *Investigations*, hardly favours the sceptical Wittgenstein he is so keen to promote.
(5) Kusch, 200.
(8) Kusch, 187 et seqq.
(9) Kusch, 188.
(13) Kusch, 206.
(19) Kripke, *Op. cit.*, 138. Passages like these led Roger Scruton to surmise that Kripke seems genuinely puzzled by Wittgenstein’s ‘solution’ to the problem of other minds, as if ‘we are to understand pain in terms of pity, rather than pity as the natural response to pain’. Critical Notice of Kripke’s book in *Mind*, October 1984, 592-602.
(25) Kusch, 240.
(27) Kusch, 227.
(29) Kusch, 44.
(32) Kusch, 47 et seq.
(33) Kusch, 48 et seq. Kusch provides a useful summary of the contents of each chapter at its end under a Conclusion, a genuine help to those who are trying to find their way through the maze of interpretation and misinterpretation.
As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH.