Critical Notice

Wittgenstein After His Nachlass
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The title of this latest addition to Macmillan’s History of Analytic Philosophy series, would appear to allow for wide-ranging assessments of the kinds of treatments that contributors might provide in capturing what it means, so it is perhaps understandable that these essays collectively view the Nachlass from many different perspectives. In practice, they range from using the Nachlass to answer specific philosophical questions (Hacker), to understanding the place of the Nachlass in the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas (Venturinha), to emphasising the importance of providing proper scholarly editions of his ‘works’ (Pichler), to offering down-to-earth descriptions of certain specific manuscripts and their contents in the course of entering them into the Nachlass itself (Gibson, Muntz), and even to exploring the role played by a concept in the work of Wittgenstein (Schulte). There are also a few variations on these themes. In contrast to what, say, in the 1960’s or 70’s would have been more likely in a collection of this kind, it hosts a truly international gathering of authors.

In a ten page Introduction, Nino Venturinha quickly nails his colours to the mast by referring to the ‘peculiar editorial methodology’ and the lack of any ‘real concern among the Wittgenstein editors to be faithful to the sources’ (Ibid., 2) that he discerns in Rhees’s publication of the Philosophical Remarks in 1975 and in the von Wright - Anscombe publication of the ‘pastings’ of ‘Anscombe’s husband’ P.T. Geach as Zettel in 1967. The controversy over Rhees’s treatment of the ‘Big Typescript’ (TS 213) is well-known. Together with Kenny’s 1970’s demand for a proper edition of Wittgenstein’s philosophical remains, the story of the Tubingen Archive under Michael Nedo and his failure to come up with the goods, followed by his Vienna Edition of works from the 1929 - 1933 period, will also be familiar to most readers. For Venturinha, the crowning glory of this tale lies in the production in the year 2000 of the Bergen Electronic Edition of Wittgenstein’s papers.
which, rather than reveal further unknown ‘works’ of Wittgenstein including even the Investigations as we know it, succeeds finally in gathering ‘multidimensional texts into a one-dimensional medium’. The success of this task is possible in an electronic age, so that scholars can finally obtain an accurate picture of ‘Wittgenstein’s extremely complicated reformulations and revisions of his thoughts’ (Ibid., 3).

The picture that Venturinha is presenting here is one in which the Bergen edition allows philosophers to see ‘what Wittgenstein was trying to do in philosophy after his return to Cambridge in 1929’ (Ibid., 4). Venturinha is hinting that there is a unity in the development of this work which is ‘obscured by the classical editions’ already published, and among these he intends to include familiar titles like On Certainty, Remarks on Colour, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology (Ibid. 9 and Endnote 13). He argues, in fact, that the distorted picture of a ‘later Wittgenstein’ that these ‘works’ have provided, has allowed ‘the vast majority of Wittgenstein scholars’ to regard the Nachlass ‘as something that can only be of interest to philologists’ (Ibid., 4). His hope is that this latest volume of essays will help to challenge this common way of thinking.

Whilst it is not strictly true that all of the book with its ten chapters explores ‘the rich and tangled threads that characterize the Nachlass and examines their relation to Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy’ (Ibid.), Venturinho develops his case for a new perspective on the significance of the Nachlass for our understanding of Wittgenstein’s ‘later work’. In his contribution ‘a Re-Evaluation of the Philosophical Investigations’, he begins by taking issue with Daniele Moyal-Sharrock over the existence of a third Wittgenstein who is to be clearly distinguished from, and who went beyond what he had already achieved in the Investigations. It can therefore be taken to be consistent with his criticism of the idea that we can readily discern ‘works’ within the Nachlass that can be easily removed from their contexts, that he should disagree with her wider view that the post-1946 corpus moves in a new and illuminating direction that justifies the ‘third Wittgenstein’ title she wishes to confer.

In support of his claim, Venturinho points, for example, towards the fact that it would be quite untrue to think of On Certainty as a ‘work’ concerning matters which, as its editors propose, he had taken up only at separate periods during his last 18 months, as a ‘single sustained treatment of the
topic’, for this topic is notably discussed in Volume II of *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Furthermore, *certainty* is also the subject of the well-known 1937 remarks contained in ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’ (*Ibid.*, 148). Venturinho also suggests, following van Gennip, that the ‘work’ is far from being as clearly ‘marked out’ in its context as its editors make out, and that the editors applied their own demarcations (*Ibid.*) This, on his view, removes any remaining doubts that *On Certainty* might be a ‘masterpiece’. By appearing to imply that it is not, however, it should perhaps be stressed that he is clearly intending to refer, not so much to the lack of any inherent philosophical significance in the relevant Nachlass passages, but rather to their status in comprising a self-contained book. Similar comments can be made about *Remarks on Colour* as a ‘work’ torn from context.

This forms part of a general thesis that, ‘contrary to what is commonly assumed’ (*Ibid.*) Wittgenstein was still working on what we have come to know as ‘Part I’ of the *Investigations* in the final years of his life, and that this was the *psychological* part, distinguishable from, but linked with his work on the philosophy of *mathematics*. This fact is indicated by his entry for the new *Chambers Encyclopaedia* from 1950. Venturinho consequently agrees with Dennis Paul’s claim that the *entire* corpus written between 1929 and 1951 is ‘a consummate work of art’ (*Ibid.*, 150), no matter how many different treatments of individual subjects may be discerned within it.

Yet, for philosophers whose main concern is with these individual treatments of particular philosophical problems, and with how Wittgenstein attacks them in the course of re-orientating his - and perhaps our - way of thinking about philosophy itself, the behaviour of earlier editors like Rhees and Anscombe will seem less problematic, just because they importantly succeeded in publishing his writings in one form or another. The same holds true about applying a title like the ‘third Wittgenstein’. To them, the question at stake will tend to become that of how much unity one might be inclined to allow for within diversity - or vice versa as Venturinha would have it - and this to some degree can be seen as a matter of individual choice. He concludes his piece by pointing out that much remains to be done in providing a complete map of Wittgenstein’s later work, and asks, among a number of other things, how we ought to see the content of *Zettel* in relation to the ‘planned book’ Wittgenstein was
still in the process of writing at the time of his death (Ibid., 38). Once again, the implication is that this - at least in any final form - is not the Philosophical Investigations as its editors presented it on publication in 1953.

Venturinha has stressed the significance for Wittgenstein scholarship of the presentation of 20,000 pages in what he describes as ‘normalized and diplomatic transcriptions, as well as in facsimile’ (Ibid., 3). But the Bergen Electronic Edition is now ten years old, and Alois Pichler in ‘Towards the New Bergen Electronic Edition’ discusses the kinds of improvements that will, if gradually, be made to it during a forthcoming second, and even in further editions. These will include, for example, the results of discovering missing items, or mistakes in the transcription of items from the Nachlass, better facsimiles with higher resolution, and the use of better software. Pichler is very much in favour of the implementation of what is known as semantic enrichment, even if this should be regarded by some philosophers as impinging on questions of interpretation. He also discusses projects aimed at linking the Nachlass with Wittgenstein’s correspondence, and with other sources including lecture-notes, recollections and notes of conversations, all of which already form well-known aspects of Wittgenstein literature. Pichler also favours biographical and historical-cultural commentary which would make explicit all relevant references. This demands a stable system of reference for each unit of text, so that Wittgenstein’s ‘remarks’ as currently referred to can be uniquely identified. According to Pichler, this has in fact been achieved under a project named ‘DISCOVERY’ (Ibid., 164). Given that each of Wittgenstein’s ‘remarks’ throughout the entire Nachlass can now be uniquely identified, this allows for the addition of ‘metadata’ to each remark including date, where published, whether in code, where it originates and where it may have been transcribed to etc. Pichler also regards it as advisable to supplement his existing ‘diplomatic and normalized’ versions of the text with a ‘typescript version’, which would have all handwritten revisions removed. He is also very much in favour of ‘interactive dynamic editing’ which can filter texts according to the marks and numbers often assigned by Wittgenstein to his ‘remarks’ (slashes, asterisks, backslashes etc.) Alois Pichler in this paper reveals himself to be a
child of a new digital age, one which allows us to look forward to a future in which ‘new perspectives and technologies will be available for which we must first develop a culture and methodology before we can implement them’ (Ibid., 170).

As the last paper in the book, Pichler’s is followed by two Appendices, the first entitled ‘The Ramsay Notes on Time and Mathematics’, edited by Nuno Venturinho with a translation by James Thompson. It is surmised that because these remarks can be found in von Wright’s catalogue for 1929, Wittgenstein actually dictated them to Ramsay with the object of translating them for a presentation to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society in July of that year. The paper’s interest lies partly in the fact that it is the one which replaced the famous ‘Some remarks on logical form’, and it is clear from Wittgenstein’s comments in a letter to Russell that he had little confidence in the capacity of his anticipated audience to understand what he would be talking about, given that ‘it may be all Chinese to them’ (as quoted, Ibid., 173). The paper is three pages long, and comprises twenty remarks of varying degrees of difficulty. At least the first seems clear enough in its import:

Is primary time infinite? That is, is it an infinite possibility?

Even if it is only fulfilled insofar as memory reaches, that in no way means that it is finite. It is infinite in the same sense as the three-dimensional visual field, even if I, in actuality, can only see to the walls of my room. For what I see presupposes the possibility of seeing into a larger space. That means I can only represent that which I see correctly by means of an infinite form (as quoted, Ibid., 177).

The second Appendix, ‘Wittgenstein’s 1938 Preface’, presents a previously unpublished typescript said to have been a translation by Wittgenstein himself with some assistance by Theodore Redpath of the intended Preface to a pre-war version of the Philosophical Investigations. Edited by Venturinho, this is taken to be a translation by Wittgenstein himself partly because ‘the
punctuation and style are so German-like’ (Ibid., 185). Dated ‘Cambridge August 1938’ and presented by Venturinho with four pages of accompanying historical background, its main interest for most readers will lie in comparing its content with that of the actual ‘Cambridge January 1945’ Preface attached to the Investigations as we know it today. The two Prefaces generally cover very similar ground, and at certain points are very close indeed, e.g., with their references to Sraffa and Ramsay, to the aim of stimulating readers to thoughts of their own, and with the ‘dark age’ of 1938 replaced by the ‘darkness of this time’ in 1945.

The seventy-odd pages of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as we know it from the C.K. Ogden translation (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922) has generated many thousands of pages of commentary over the succeeding decades, and Luciano Bazzocchi begins his treatment of ‘The “Protractatus” Manuscript and Its Corrections’ by reminding us that in this earlier version the propositions of the finished work appear in disarray, so that there are in fact three ways of reading this text, comprising firstly a ‘physical’ one which follows the order of the notebook pages themselves, a ‘sequential’ one based on the strictly numerical order of the passages the notebook contains, and lastly a ‘logico-heirarchical’ one based on what he calls ‘the top-down structure of the decimal numbers’ (Ibid., 11). The order of composition that the notebook reveals, is its all-important feature, and Bazzocchi argues from the study of this original manuscript that Wittgenstein composed the work in layers, beginning with the first main 6 propositions (with a 7th to be added later), then sequentially through the decimal numbers with each layer building to saturation point before moving to the next. With coherence as the main logical, aesthetic and ethical principle of Wittgenstein’s thought (Ibid., 12), we are on this interpretation to see the work as in one respect ‘complete’ at the conclusion of each stage, so that had Wittgenstein died during the War a ‘completed’ version of the book at some stage would at least have been available to Russell for publication. This means for Bazzocchi that the Protractactus Notebook is not merely an ‘early version’ of the Tractatus itself, because it includes potentially infinite versions of the final text, each one nestling inside another: each layer of text builds upon the one preceding it, and in
this way gains its own specific place in the hierarchy. It is therefore possible for the reader to ‘rebuild’ the work to any particular phase, each to be seen in terms of the three ways of reading it already proposed. Bazzocchi therefore wishes to regard the Tractatus as a work of continuous evolution from the ‘extreme synthesis’ of its first page to the ‘complete’ work at its last.

The Protractatus, in being a rendering of the Tractatus itself, thus contains within the original manuscript all the material of the final typescript, with the exception of only five propositions, which Bazzocchi lists as 4.01, 4.0311, 3.22, 3.221 and 3.251, mentioned in the date order in which they were added to the work (Ibid. 12, and 26, Endnote 4). The remainder of the paper raises a number of issues of scholarship. It continues with a discussion about the Brian McGuinness observation that page 70 of the Notebook that ends with ‘6.131 Logic is transcendental’ was reached in March 1916, followed in the autumn of that year with two final propositions ‘6.3. All propositions are of equal value’ and ‘7. Whereof one cannot speak, therefore one must be silent’. But since this leads to a numerical leap, leaving a missing 6.2, Bazzocchi goes into considerable detail in following through the very complex threads used to weave the final text as we know it, favouring at one point McGuinness’s chronology, for example, and differing from Geschkowski on points of detail. In an appendix entitled ‘Hermine’s List’ - a copy of a list of five documents including the as yet uncompleted Protractatus from January 1917 given to his sister by Wittgenstein - Bazzocchi nevertheless reconstructs Wittgenstein’s method and the relevant dates in a way which on his account differs slightly from McGuinness. In any event, by January 1917 the Protractatus was regarded by Wittgenstein as complete, so that any loose working sheets used in its ‘final’ composition became obsolete (Ibid., 24). However, new insertions and fine tuning of the book using further working papers were undoubtededly a feature of its composition until it obtained its final form during the summer of 1918. Bazzocchi uses the Nachlass intelligently to tell a highly complex story about the writing of the Tractatus, that he believes is still in proper need of further elaboration.

In ‘Wittgenstein’s Coded Remarks in the Context of His Philosophising’, Ilse Somervilla explores what she calls the riddle that lies behind his coded remarks, undertaking to provide at least
some preliminary results regarding, for example, what characterises those in code from those made in normal script. First appearing during the First World War, the coded remarks amount to 447 in number following her exploration of the diplomatic version of the Bergen Electronic Edition, and when they do occur, range from individual remarks to several sentences and passages, even extending over a few pages. She notes that the ease with which Wittgenstein apparently used the code would indicate, following McGuinness, that he had become familiar with it prior to 1914. Yet the code itself is rather transparent, and generally consists of a simple inversion, ‘a = z’, and ‘b = y’, etc., so it can hardly have been regarded by Wittgenstein as something which would have kept the meaning of his remarks hidden from prying eyes for any considerable period of time. It would therefore be inappropriate to regard a wish to retain secrecy as a prime motivation for using it at all.

Since the remarks themselves are characterised by their personal, autobiographical nature, and often refer to ethics, religion, or ‘the meaning of life’ etc., the simple answer to the general question why a code of this kind is used at all may lie in nothing more than his wish to demarcate the truly philosophical from the personal, a point confirmed by Somavilla’s reference to the fact that ‘before transferring his notebooks to volumes, starting in Cambridge in 1929, he wrote the coded remarks in normal script but in brackets’ (Ibid., 49). However, Wittgenstein did occasionally write philosophical reflections in code and what she refers to as quite banal comments about the weather or about his physical well-being in normal script (Ibid., 33), and the reasons for this apparent inconsistency are not at all obvious. Consequently, on her assessment, there is no ultimate scholarly consensus on the criteria used to distinguish coded remarks from uncoded, or even on how their purely personal and autobiographical aspects are related - or are intended to be related - to their cultural, ethical or religious significance.

Somavilla regards the Notebooks 1914 - 1916 as the most comprehensive source of coded remarks, although many are also familiar from Culture and Value. She suggests, reasonably, that Wittgenstein did not want to treat the subject matter of ethics and religion in the same way as he
would treat genuinely philosophical questions (Ibid., 36), since ethics and religion relate to what can be shown and not said or explicated. This leads her to the suggestion that these matters are ‘ineffable’, and that if expressed in uncoded script would be revealed to be ‘nonsensical’, where this is understood to be equivalent to the ‘unsayable’. In the Notebooks 1914 - 1916, for example, she discovers the expression of a Christian attitude to a personal God that is closely associated with Wittgenstein’s high regard for Tolstoy’s Gospel in Brief, and this can hardly be unconnected at that time with his wartime experiences and his nearness to death on the battlefield. In a notebook discovered in 1993 with the English title Movements of Thought (Denkbewegungen as published) she also finds that Wittgenstein has coded entries relating to his fear of madness, and to his attempt to endure spiritual tortures by means of prayers for enlightenment. The same kinds of passages occur elsewhere in the Nachlass, notably where reference is made to his solitude in Norway, where he abandons his fate into the hands of God and refers to his cowardice, vanity and ‘indecency’ (Ibid., 47). Whilst Somavilla admits that there is still much to be discovered about the coded remarks, she surmises that the ultimate reason for their existence will continue to constitute an enigma, much more difficult to unravel than the code itself.

In one of the shorter papers in the book, Josef G.F. Rothhaupt succeeds in weaving a highly complex story about the Philosophical Remarks edited and published by Rush Rhees and its relation to a typescript 209. He also discusses a newly discovered ‘Kringel-Book’ project and, amongst other things, the selection of remarks for the ‘Proto-Big Typescript’ 212 and the actual ‘Big Typescript’ 213, and how these relate one to another. According to Rothhaupt, 212 is actually much more important than 213, which is in fact a great archive of philosophical remarks which provides the material for composing a philosophical work. 212, however, forms a foundation that allows the scholar to reconstruct the Nachlass from 1932-33 onwards. In an accompanying endnote (Ibid., 60 and 63, Endnote 18), he argues that a similar system of numbering to that used in 212 is employed in 228, one of the base typescripts dictated for the composition of 227, the late version of the Philosophical Investigatons, a version which itself is achieved via two distinct stages,
an ‘early late version’ from 1945-46 and a ‘late late version’ from 1949.

Rush Rhees once again comes under fire for publishing a Philosophical Remarks which in an ‘Editor’s Note’ in the second 1984 edition is claimed to have been derived from a typescript that G.E. Moore gave to Rhees soon after Wittgenstein’s death. This is said to have been the typescript that Russell sent to the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1930 with an accompanying report supporting a renewal of Wittgenstein’s research grant. According to Rothhaupt, however, what Wittgenstein gave to Russell was not Philosophical Remarks 209, but a typescript 208 drummed up in March/April 1930 for the specific purpose of providing a summary of his latest philosophical thinking. But Rothhaupt argues that Russell’s report to the Council, intentionally or not, had at least the appearance of being ambivalent in suggesting that there may be an issue about the ‘truth’ of Wittgenstein’s proposed ‘theories’, leading them to seek new advice from J.E. Littlewood, who in June 1930 produced a favourable report. It is partly for the purpose of satisfying Littlewood that Wittgenstein produced 209, and in the course of his detective work Rothhaupt interestingly quotes in full Littlewood’s final report, recently unearthed from the Trinity archives. We are also advised that Littlewood was a personal friend of Wittgenstein, and as such must have felt some embarrassment at being placed in this position by the Council.

Also described by Rothhaupt as recently unearthed, is a project dating between 11th October 1929 and 13th September 1931 which he refers to as the ‘Kringel-Book’, an extraordinary concoction which - said to be unique in the Nachlass - comprises remarks on music, literature and culture, together with personal and biographical comments, some of which are in code. Also in this collection are remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough which are more extensive and complete than those in Rhees’s 1967 edition of Wittgenstein’s Remarks’s on Frazer’s ‘Golden Bough’, partly because they include references to Ernest Renan’s Histoire du Peuple d’Israel. On Rothhaupt’s assessment, the ‘Kringel-Book’ is an extremely important project within Wittgenstein’s life and oeuvre. Not only did he select a motto for the book, but he produced a Preface (‘To a Preface’ MS 109) specifically for it which has become famous in referring to the spirit in which the book is written, one which
is out of step with that which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation.

Yet this is the very Preface which Rhees, as Rothhaupt now sees it, quite erroneously attached to the Philosophical Remarks, in which context it performs no useful work, and, indeed, loses what power it can certainly be argued to regain in the more appropriate setting of the ‘Kringel-Book’. Rothhaupt reasonably argues that this project demands further discussion, evaluation, and research. One can but surmise why Wittgenstein never took it further towards publication. But at a time when his ideas were rapidly changing and developing, it may have been no more than one more ‘project’ to be consigned to the back-burner. In any event, Wittgenstein, who it is fair to say abhorred the idea of wearing his heart publicly on his sleeve, may have come to think that this kind of treatment for certain ways of thinking, provides quite the wrong kind of impression, or is simply inappropriate for inclusion in the ‘finished’ corpus by which he might in the long run wish to be known. Rothhaupt’s engaging paper, ‘Wittgenstein at Work: Creation, Selection and Composition of “Remarks”’, which incidentally calls upon the work of Denis Paul in Wittgenstein’s Progress 1929-1951 in order to reinforce some of its conclusions regarding Rhees, offers a generally enlightening and up-to-the-minute look at what can be gleaned from a close study of the relevant parts of the Nachlass.

Newly discovered material that deserves a place in the Nachlass is the subject of Arthur Gibson’s ‘The Wittgenstein Archive of Francis Skinner’. This archive was resurrected in 2002 prior to being deposited in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge for identification and assessment. Trinity’s invitation to overview the material has resulted in a forthcoming book: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dictating Philosophy: the Wittgenstein Archive of Francis Skinner, with Gibson as editor.

Yet the story behind the sudden appearance of this body of work in the 21st Century is itself quite extraordinary. Francis Skinner and Reuben Goodstein studied together at St. Paul’s school in London before going up to Cambridge to read mathematics, and both graduated in the same year, which we are advised in an endnote was 1931 (Ibid., 65 and 75, Endnote 3). Goodstein became quite well-known as a mathematician in his own right, and published Constructive Formalism, Essays on the Foundations of Mathematics in 1951. Gibson also advises that he was Mathematical Association
president during a period when he had to oversee the relocation of the Association’s HQ from Reading to Leicester. However, Goodstein was apparently an intensely private person, and did not let on to anyone that among the material shipped from Reading was the Skinner archive that Goodstein had very much wanted to have in his possession following Skinner’s death in 1941, and which Wittgenstein had offered to send to him at that time. Goodstein, however, suffered a stroke in 1976, and was unable to continue in office, so that the unrecognised archive which, we are advised, was at one point provisionally destined for disposal, languished at Leicester until re-discovered in 2002.

What would appear to be particularly perplexing about this tale, however, is that in a 1941 letter (quoted in full) to Wittgenstein following receipt of the archive, Goodstein plainly remarks that should his study of these papers unearth material worthy of publication, he would make contact on the matter. Yet it is apparent that Goodstein had no real intention of doing any such thing, but for reasons that Gibson does not go into in any detail. Indeed, in his 1951 book Goodstein remarks of Skinner that he left no record of his work and of his gifts other than resides in the recollections of those who knew him (Ibid.,77 Endnote 25), a fact which, given his retention of the Skinner archive that he had surely read, must be manifestly untrue.

Regarded by Gibson as one of the most exciting discoveries made in Wittgenstein studies since the von Wright Nachlass Catalogue of 1969, the Skinner archive is composed of dictations by Wittgenstein to Skinner, ‘meticulously drafted’, with regular corrections and additions made in Wittgenstein’s own hand, a fact which alone raises these papers to the level of Nachlass material. Fitting into the period 1933 - 1936, they provide an important insight into Wittgenstein’s thinking and methodology at that time. Gibson cites eight manuscripts dealing with a range of varying topics, including mathematics, philosophy, personal experience, and the perception of visual phenomena in a Norwegian Notebook; but perhaps the most interesting for most readers will be an extended version of the Brown Book, the only hand-written version in existence. Since this is described by Gibson as replete with Wittgenstein’s own hand-written
revisions and additions, frequently differing from published, printed and typed versions, its importance for our understanding of this work in relation to the early development of the Investigations is unquestionable. Gibson has provided an extremely interesting paper which will leave readers eagerly awaiting his finished book.

In ‘The Whewell’s Court Lectures: A Sketch of a Project’, Volker A. Muntz expresses his intention of editing for publication hitherto unpublished notes by Yorick Smythies, of lectures mostly given by Wittgenstein during the late 1930’s. Most of the notes were actually written between the second part of the academic years 1937-38 and 1939-40. Some notes refer to sessions held in 1936-37, and some held as late as 1947. Munz would also like to produce audio versions of the notes accompanied by facsimilie of the handwritten manuscripts on DVD. Apparently the original notes were taken at speed during the lectures, usually - though unusually - with Wittgenstein’s permission, but in a difficult and barely legible shorthand. Munz reasons that his best modus operandi in these circumstances is to produce a workmanlike typescript of the entire project and then correct where required from the difficult-to-decipher originals. In any event, there is the intention to produce electronic facsimilies allowing researchers to compare final printed versions with first drafts.

The remainder of Muntz’s paper describes Smythies’ method of producing the clean versions of his first drafts during the late 1930’s and 1940’s, to be followed by typescripts 40 years or so later, the latest shortly before his death in 1980. Smythies actually took his clean copies as the basis for dictating the notes on audio cassette tapes, and the typing was done by a secretary unfamiliar with either the subject matter or with the names of individuals attending the lectures, so that spelling errors etc. were almost inevitable. The lectures themselves cover a very wide range of subjects, and the handwritten material alone lists Similarity, Belief, Description, Necessary Propositions etc., Lectures on Godel, Reply to Smythies on ‘Understanding’, Knowledge, Volition, Colours, and remarks by Smythies on Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. The total number of manuscript pages is said to amount to 1238. The typescript versions cover similar ground but include additional pieces by Peg Smythies, Rush Rhees
and D. Z. Phillips.

According to Muntz, the great value of Smythies’ notes rests in the fact that they reflect systematic and focussed discussions of subjects which are not captured in Wittgenstein’s written work in quite that level of detail, and as one example amongst others including Volition and Necessary Propositions, he instances the ten lectures on Knowledge in which he discusses Russell, ‘knowing sense-data’ and ‘knowing physical facts’, ‘knowing’ and ‘believing’, with connections to the familiar Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness. The unpublished corpus is said to have a continuity that is not found in his published writings in any similar way (Ibid., 89), and whilst there may indeed by those like Smythies who do obtain ‘more pleasure from these notes, than from those more compressed, more deeply worked upon, more tacit remarks, written and selected by Wittgenstein himself, for possible publication’ (Ibid., Smythies as quoted, 90) the spontaneous impromptu utterances made by Wittgenstein himself during these lectures were always regarded by him as first attempts at expression which would require intense reflection and consideration later on. History has shown, nevertheless, that notes on Wittgenstein’s lectures already published have proved a valuable resource for researchers on the assumption that they elaborate upon particular points of view expressed more concisely in the written work published by his editors.

Although Venturinho remarks in his Introduction that Peter Hacker, in the one wholly philosophical paper in the entire book, ‘engages with communitarians in an innovative way’(Ibid., 6), readers will find, as Hacker freely admits, that his well-known ‘Individualist’ stance is unchanged in ‘Robinson Crusoe Sails Again: The Interpretative Relevance of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass’. A recent close study of the latest Bergen Edition of the Nachlass, which has allowed him to assemble all the material regarding solitary cavemen etc. which bear on the Individualist/Communitarian issue, do not alter his belief that the Crusoe question is regarded by Wittgenstein as ‘trivial and unimportant’ (Ibid., 92). The fact that it is not so regarded by Communitarians he takes to be highly significant.

Yet there is something not quite right, something which Wittgenstein himself might have had occasion to call ‘fishy’, about this entire debate, and in order to acquire a better grasp of
what this is, one ought to study Hacker’s use of the expressions ‘essential’ and ‘logically necessary’ which freely occur throughout his overview of the debate as he understands it:

(1) The following paper makes full use of the Nachlass to shed light on Wittgenstein’s conception of following rules, on private languages of Crusoes, cavemen and monolinguists, and on whether Wittgenstein thought that language is necessarily a social artifact (Ibid., 93).

(2) As we have seen, it has been suggested that Wittgenstein’s use of the term ‘Institution’ in Investigations § 199 plainly commits him to the view that following a rule is essentially a group activity, since an ‘institution’ is always ‘of a group’ (Ibid., 96).

(3) ...it would surely be premature to conclude without more ado that he was arguing that following a rule as such is essentially, logically a social custom, or that one cannot imagine language-using creatures that play language-games only by themselves, give orders to themselves and so forth (Ibid., 97).

(4) This drift of thought may seem startling to someone who conceives of language as essentially, logically, a social artifact of mankind, transmitted through training and teaching, and sustainable only through the availability of an objective standard of correct use consisting of shared reactions and behaviour of others (Ibid., 98).

(5) And if our Martian friend averred that he, like all Martians, had never learnt his language from others, but was born with the ability to speak, would we insist that this is logically impossible? It is evident that the genesis of the ability is irrelevant to, and does not enter into, the criteria for its possession (Ibid., 99).

Those familiar with Hacker’s work will know that the final principle, one which he repeats
on several occasions in his latest paper, regarding the distinction to be drawn between the
genesis of an ability and its exercise and possession, is central to his theme. For Hacker’s
Wittgenstein, a language need not be shared, but it must be shareable, and although it may be
private insofar as it may be employed in fact by only one person, it must be possible for it to
be public (Ibid., 109).

Most philosophers would agree that on this point, Hacker is quite right. For particular
purposes, we are perfectly free to distinguish between the genesis and the exercise of an ability, so
that discussions about ‘speakers with an innate knowledge of a language, or about speakers who
speak a contingently private language’ (Ibid., 106) gain what import they have from the Humean
principle that whatever is conceivable is possible, where what is ‘possible’ is what we can freely
imagine independently of what may be causally explicable as a matter of empirical fact. After all,
even the most ardent ‘individualist’, on Hacker’s schema, would normally be willing to admit that
as a matter of empirical fact a wolf-child would probably not be capable of inventing a language
for himself. This is an empirical question, so that language acquisition may require a community
upbringing; although, as philosophers like Ayer naturally argue (1) a wolf-child’s invention of a
‘contingently private language’ would at most be a causal and not a logical impossibility.

It is significant that the only conception of a private language that Ayer considers
throughout his entire career is that of a ‘contingently private language’, and this is relevant to an
aspect of Wittgenstein’s thinking about the route taken by a number of philosophers of a broadly
empiricist persuasion who are prone to believe that they can invent languages for themselves based
on assumptions about what human experience provides for them: what experience presents by way
of its representational content (Soames), of a similarity metric (Ahmed), or via an individual’s primary
recognition (Ayer) (2) all have a bearing on Wittgenstein’s criticism of a certain aspect of what for
want of a better term has been called (Hacker) the ‘Augustinian Picture’, and that aspect concerns
the child described by Augustine who could already think, only not yet speak (§ 32). This relates to
the apparent ability of Crusoe as an individual to effect a pre-linguistic division of the items of the
world around him into *kinds*. What may seem even a little paradoxical is that this is an aspect of Wittgenstein’s criticism of the ‘individualism’ inherent in the ‘born-Crusoe’ concept which Hacker may appear to neglect when he is given to emphasise the distinction between the genesis and the exercise of an ability.

Yet that distinction, properly understood as performing a legitimate function, is perfectly alright. There need not be any genuine inconsistency here, however, so that what Wittgenstein is actually implying when he emphasises ‘the relevance of a community’ can be interpreted in a way which serves to undermine the ‘Individualistic/Communitarian’ dichotomy. To show this, however, requires the removal of the Humean spectacles which, throughout his paper, colour Hacker’s outlook. This involves a re-assessment of what this debate is about, and what questions it can properly be understood to raise. It may *seem* that one of them concerns the apparent lack of any discussion in the *Investigations* of Hacker’s cavemen who are born with inherent linguistic abilities. Does this mean, as Hacker asks, that Wittgenstein did, after all, change his mind and admit that following a rule is essentially a social practice?

Yet if we look closely at what Wittgenstein actually says, the idea that following a rule could be essentially a social practice is not one that Wittgenstein could have adhered to, *not* because he adopted Hacker’s Individualistic point of view, but because it is not at all clear what this proposal could even be taken to *mean*. There is no genuine conception of what ‘essentially’ is doing here, although it may seem from the Humean principle that whatever is conceivable is possible - used by Hacker to distinguish between the *genesis* and the *exercise* of an ability - that this *ought* to reveal that following a rule is *not necessarily* communal and therefore essentially (logically) an individualistic phenomenon.

But it reveals nothing of the kind. When we are tempted to harbour even the slightest suspicion about the claim that language is an essentially social phenomenon, this is because it hovers between two quite different paradigms, that of an empirical hypothesis which can be shown experientially to be valid, and that of a mathematical theorem whose truth can be demonstratively proven. Yet the main intention Wittgenstein harbours when he draws our attention to the circumstances in which we do *in fact* learn a language, is not to stipulate that something *must* be so, but to draw our eyes away from the
misleading picture that is determining the course of our thinking. In the Crusoe case, this is primarily that of Augustine’s child who can think only not yet speak. We assume, for example, that sensations are intrinsically meaningful and merely require to be named, an idea that draws its inspiration from the background of prior language acquisition that underlies our normal propensity to claim that we do occasionally have new sensations and experiences for which we may require to invent new names (sortals). It is a ‘reminder’ of what is so, not because there could be any sense in which it could not have been otherwise - on this point Hacker’s Wittgenstein is correct - but because it relieves a temptation to look at things in a certain light, according to a picture which we find it difficult to relinquish.

If discussions of Crusoes are largely excluded from the Investigations, then, this is not because Wittgenstein is adopting a position on one side of the individual/communal divide, but because this divide itself results from misconstruing his intentions. In fact, there is a hint of the self-made Crusoe still remaining in these early Investigations passages, and this occurs in § 6 when he remarks that what he calls ‘ostensive teaching’ will form part of the training because it is so with human beings, and not because it could not be imagined otherwise. But what can be imagined here are any number of possibilities allowing a child to acquire a language in quite other ways, including, if required, its being born already armed with linguistic abilities. But, of course, that as a means of coming to understand how linguistic competence might be acquired, can only lead to an infinite regress.

Yet for the purpose of pointing out that what is so, should not be thought to be something that must be so - ultimately because this makes no real sense - these Humean possibilities can serve a useful role. In this respect, and in this respect alone, what Wittgenstein says here concerning ostensive teaching is the sole residue in the Investigations of what he also says in that famous passage in the Blue Book, quoted by Hacker (Blue Book, 12, Ibid., 97) in which he implies that all the training through which the child had in fact come to understand, obey, etc. might have occurred without his having been taught the language. (But Cf. Investigations § 495 as quoted by Hacker). Peter Hacker succeeds in presenting a clear account of a point of view central to his thinking throughout his period of acquaintance with the relevant texts. The importance of his contribution lies in the extent to which
it really does capture an important element in Wittgenstein’s thinking, even if it is combined with certain misleading ideas of a broadly empiricist (Humean) kind. It is arguable that the story he has to tell is not only incomplete, but importantly fails to capture Wittgenstein’s real intentions.

David Stern in ‘Tracing the Development of Wittgenstein’s Writing on Private Language’ discovers that the vast majority of the remarks §§ 243 - 315 derive from manuscripts dating from the second half of 1944. Whilst this is not entirely at odds with Peter Hacker’s claim in the third volume of his commentary that these passages are the precipitate of many hundreds of pages of notes running from 1932 onwards, Stern is keen to draw our attention to the striking fact that Wittgenstein evidently found a more satisfactory means of expression in the later period. The vast majority of §§ 240 - 421 were written towards the end of 1944. According to Stern, they reveal a much less didactic procedure in which a fantasy of uncovering a truly private realm of transparent concept application, is combined with a recognition that the words with which an attempt is made to express that fantasy are pure nonsense. This contrasts with the 1930’s writing as straightforwardly providing an apparent refutation of idealism (Ibid., 113).

Stern advises that the current Bergen electronic edition of the Nachlass presents us with a colour photograph of each page of manuscript, a normalised transcription showing the final revision of the text, and a diplomatic transcription, revealing as much as possible about each stage of revision. There is also an experimental edition of part of the Nachlass allowing researchers to choose just how much editing data they would like to see. This leads him to the conclusion that future digital editions might take the totality of possible links between remarks as its organising principle, although this approach is primarily philological. For those whose main concern is with the philosophical approach of the author, the evidence of whose intentions is presumably to be found within the relevant texts, this is not always as unproblematic as we may tend to assume. We may, for example, have to choose between treating an apparently rejected passage because crossed-out either because it is genuinely superseded or because it is actually used elsewhere.

On a wider front, Stern considers the author’s intentions from the standpoint of the
number of different approaches, expressed in different periods, which one might discover in his work, and as an example instances the dispute between those who maintain a clear distinction between an earlier and a later Wittgenstein, and those who maintain that the continuities are much more important than the discontinuities. However, even here he discovers that the idea of a clear confrontation between different groups can be misleading, because it neglects the fact that there are evidently important criteria involved in deciding just where, and for what reasons, these distinctions between ‘earlier and later’ are actually drawn.

Stern expresses the idea that if Wittgenstein is viewed as a philosophical grammarian along the lines of Peter Hacker as he describes him, then the task of the ‘Wittgensteinian’ will be to provide arguments revealing where the traditional philosopher is attempting to ‘break the rules’. On the other hand, if we relinquish the idea that we can clearly demarcate between sense and nonsense, then attention will turn to the fantasies or illusions that motivate the philosopher to say what he does. Stern’s own inclination, also expressed in a number of other contexts with which those readers who know his work will be familiar, is to see Wittgenstein constantly moving back and forth, throughout his life, between a kind of proto-philosophical theorising and Pyrrhonian criticism of this kind of theorising.

The most interesting part of Stern’s essay concerns his treatment of Peter Hacker on the Individualist/Communitarian debate, for he argues that the assessment of Hacker’s claim that there is no conceptual incoherence in imagining that an individual might follow a rule in an asocial context, requires great caution. This is largely because we first of all must distinguish between ‘a number of subtly different monological scenarios’ (Ibid., 124), which can range from the ‘entirely conceivable’ Robinson Crusoe found in the fiction of Defoe to the absurd idea of the child genius of § 257 who, with no prior linguistic knowledge, is able to invent a name for his sensation entirely by himself. Interested readers will remember that a similar survey of cases was carried out by Colin McGinn (3). Stern nevertheless concludes that the field can be narrowed considerably because the cases considered by Wittgenstein in his manuscripts are not those of
‘completely socially isolated language users that would be needed to lend support to individualism, but merely cases of people who are not currently part of a speech community, such as Defoe’s shipwrecked mariner’ (Ibid., 125). According to Stern, it is the possibility of a completely solitary language, and not just a monological one that is crucial for an Individualist reading of Wittgenstein, and there is no evidence in the Investigations that he would think a language of this kind possible.

But Hacker has already conceded that in the Investigations solitary cavemen etc. make no appearance, precisely because Wittgenstein did not think that our ability to imagine completely isolated individuals who are, say, born already armed with a language, has any philosophical import. Yet these are the kinds of individuals whom Stern would presumably regard as relevant to a wholly Individualist claim. Hacker’s main concern is that the languages of these entirely solitary cavemen, if they have to make sense to us, and no matter how these individuals might have acquired them, should at least be public in principle.

It has already been argued that there are powerful reasons for concluding that this entire debate is misconceived. Yet the genuinely Wittgensteinian conclusion towards which it actually points is, if indirectly, echoed in a further case which Stern goes on to discuss, that of William James’s deaf-mute Ballard who wrote (§ 342) that he had thoughts about God and the world long before he could speak. Stern correctly directs our attention to the salient point that Wittgenstein ‘does not categorically assert, as a card-carrying communitarian would, that such a case is impossible, nor does he insist, as a full-blooded individualist would, that it is entirely possible’ (Ibid., 125). This clearly suggests that a full-blooded individualist on Stern’s reckoning, would adhere to that aspect of the ‘Augustian picture’ that Wittgenstein captures, and implicitly rejects, in the child of § 32.

But what is really at stake here is Stern’s use of the terms ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, which seem to hover between what might be the case empirically on the one hand, and what can be proven demonstratively on the other. Yet Stern is concerned with what opposing parties regard as conceivable, and this usually ends as a matter for individual intuition, a sign that a fundamental confusion underlies the entire debate. This is consistent with the point that what Wittgenstein finds puzzling about the
Ballard case is *not* that it breaches a Wittgensteinian principle that ‘there can be no thought without language’, but that in the absence of the surrounding circumstances in which people do normally think about God and the world, it is difficult to understand what Ballard’s statement can be taken to mean. Similarly, when Ballard occurs again in *Zettel* § 109, it is accompanied by a case about which Wittgenstein asks that when no language is used, why should one speak of ‘thinking’? As if to indicate that ‘there can be no thinking without language’. But the question at stake in *this* particular passage is whether people who can arrive at arithmetical conclusions without speaking or writing, may lead us to conclude that calculating can be done without signs. The answer Wittgenstein provides is that in the absence of those ordinary surrounding circumstances in which the concept of calculating is actually *used*, it is not at all clear whether these people could be said to *calculate* at all.

Stern mentions yet another case, § 348, in which we are invited to imagine that these deaf-mutes who have learned only a gesture-language, nevertheless talk to themselves inwardly in a vocal language. ‘But this supposition surely makes good sense!’ (§ 349) But this is a *picture*, and although there are circumstances in which we can in practice imagine a deaf-mute (although, empirically, not from birth) writing and attempting if highly imperfectly to speak, an application with which we might be familiar, once we remove these ordinary surrounding circumstances we become aware of the nakedness of the picture.

The general point is that when doing philosophy, the tendency is to isolate what we believe we can *imagine* from the surrounding circumstances in which certain activities find their natural homes. Once again, Wittgenstein supplies ‘reminders’ of what is so, not because it *must* be so, but because in the absence of these circumstances the *picture* becomes more and more difficult to *apply*. Stern draws a comparison between two cases, that of Ballard, and that of Super-Crusoe as someone who, one can presume, is born armed with a language: ‘we cannot simply say that grammar rules them out’ (*Ibid.*, 127). It is rather that for Stern they fall apart. That is probably nearer the mark. Yet insofar as it is, it helps to reinforce the charge that the debate between
Individualists and Communitarians as commonly understood, would be seen by Wittgenstein to rest on a confusion.

The last paper in the book to be considered, Joachim Schulte’s ‘Concepts and Concept-Formation’, is speculative and exploratory. It ranges from considering the fact that in his 1940’s manuscripts Wittgenstein mentions notions like conceptual confusion, conceptual world, and the formation of concepts, to looking at the relation between concepts and general facts of nature. It also considers the comparison of a concept with a style of painting, a style which is not arbitrary, and also studies a tension found in Wittgenstein’s thinking between the idea of naturalness associated with instinct and primitiveness as part of the natural history of mankind, and the necessity associated with certain features (music, mathematics) of human culture. It is a paper which in its approach stands very much apart from the others in the book.

It can hardly be in question that Venturinha has managed to bring together a formidable collection of essays which contribute to a scholarly understanding of Wittgenstein, independently of the role that at least some of them may serve to play in revealing his continuing relevance to current philosophical thinking. At a time when the general standard reached in volumes of essays about Wittgenstein’s work is already fairly high, this book can only help to reinforce the status that it would surely not be wrong to claim that Wittgenstein has already gained as one of the great philosophers alongside familiar figures like Hume and Kant.
ENDNOTES

As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, with a further in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010.