CRITICAL NOTICE

Wittgenstein *Key Concepts*
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Kelly Dean Jolley has collected 16 papers from 12 authors, each of whom is advertised as contributing towards a book which introduces both students new to Wittgenstein, and readers interested in developing their understanding of his work, to a number of key concepts said to be involved in his thinking (cover blurb). Two of the papers have joint authorship (Hutchinson and Read, Long and Jolley) and, in addition, two of the authors individually contribute two papers each (Jolley and Fox). Jolley also supplies a fairly short Introducion of 14 pages, which contains a couple of biographical paragraphs, an account of how the *Tractatus* was followed by the *Philosophical Investigations*, what these works are about and the extent to which they exhibit a continuity of thought and approach. The Introduction ends with an extremely brief synopsis of the content of the essays which follow. It is inevitable in a book of this length that some of these essays are very short (*e.g.*, 6 pages for the Long and Jolley effort on 'Grammatical investigations'). Yet in the course of discussing an author who himself is often believed to have altered the course of philosophical thought in only a few paragraphs, this in itself need not be regarded as a drawback.

It must be said nevertheless that Jolley in his Introduction provides himself with a difficult task in his attempt to define what underlies the Discontinuity *v* Continuity readings of the *Tractatus* *vis-a-vis* the *Investigations*. The former traditional reading is neatly explained *via* an opposition between sense and nonsense integral to the Picture Theory and to which the distinction between saying and showing is internal. Sentences that *show* but do not *say* are philosophically extremely interesting. By contrast, the 'later' Continuity readings rest on a sense-nonsense distinction which is *prior* to the Picture Theory, with the consequence that the saying-showing distinction collapses into a mere shadow of its 'former' self, a reflection of the mistaken human ambition to 'set a limit

to thought'. On this view, sentences which say and show, both make sense and can be represented in a symbolic language, whereas those that do not make sense can 'no longer' be said to *show* but do not *say*. They are now what Jolley calls 'goobledygook', otherwise referred to in the literature as 'gibberish' (Diamond). On the Continuity reading, therefore, Wittgenstein's aim is always to wean thinkers off *theories* of sense (*Ibid.*, 5), and we are to take the main difference between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* to be one not of aim, but of method. This fact is importantly reflected in the relative lack of an important role allocated to symbolism in the latter as opposed to the former. In the later work, the omnipresence of 'language-games', played within a distinctly anthropological context in which human affairs take precedence, serves for Jolley to explain why on the Continuity reading Wittgenstein can be understood to be correct in believing that his old and new thoughts should be published together, the new being understood in contrast with and against a background supplied by his old way of thinking (*Investigations*, Preface). On Jolley's assessment, the present range of essays, which emphasise the *Philosophical Investigations*, intend in so doing not to slight the earlier *Tractatus,* but to make it accessible.

Whilst it is an open question how much any of this would aid the appreciation of someone coming to Wittgenstein for the first time, Jolley's succinct account is certainly accessible to those already versed in the texts, who are trying to keep up with the relatively recent Diamont-Conant reading of the *Tractatus*. The *Philosophical Investigations* raises different questions, and here Jolley regards the main problem with this book not as one of understanding what it after all expresses in clear down-to-earth prose, but of grasping the *point* of Wittgenstein's remarks. He does not make things easy for himself by picking as an example § 202, surely one of the most difficult passages he could have chosen, with its distinction between 'obeying a rule' and *thinking* that one is obeying a rule, let alone what the inability to do so 'privately' means. This cries out for proper exegesis, a fact that helps to explain why this passage has given rise to highly divergent interpretations. It is surprising that Jolley should be found stressing the point that 'where there is no possible check on my obedience except my own check, then it becomes difficult to see how to cleave obedience from

believed obedience' (*Ibid.*, 8), for this has at least the appearance of suggesting that the inability to obey a rule 'privately' is intended to turn on the point that there is in this case no *public* check in principle on the private following of a rule. For it would now be generally agreed that this cannot be the point of § 202, given that *if* this is a valid objection to someone who has gained linguistic mastery 'privately', then it applies equally to the rule-following abilities of a community taken as a whole.

Yet the main issue that Jolley would appear to wish to explore is why the notion that obeying a rule is a *practice* should be so important, and why it should give rise to a philosophical problem. The question he raises is whether 'a person can understand a proposition only if she is acquainted with each of its constituents' (*Ibid.*), and if this form of acquaintance is understood to be 'private' in the sense proposed, we are invited to draw the conclusion *either* that understanding a proposition is immune to error because no *real* practice is involved, *or* because it is impossible to go wrong in following this practice 'privately'. Russell is introduced as a suggested proponent of what on this account has the appearance of a view which may be thought to be manifestly absurd, in which case it cannot be difficult to understand why Wittgenstein should have found something wrong with it. Jolley's main claim is that in presenting the matter in this way he has pressed a worry which reveals why the comments made by Wittgenstein might matter, and which help us to understand other things that he says about privacy and rule-following (*Ibid.*, 9).

Jolley next notices two formidable obstacles that Wittgenstein faces within *himself* before he can formulate a strategy to overcome them in the public arena, and he presents these as the problems of deciding which easy-to-understand remarks he must make, and how he can get the philosopher (in us) to pay attention to them. Whilst philosophical problems are usually understood to require the delicate handling of questions of supreme subtlety, Jolley's Wittgenstein instead wishes to persuade us that what is really required is a clear vew of something that we can only too easily miss *because* it is so ordinary that it escapes our attention. Philosophical problems arise and are framed *within* our common language, so that our responses to them must be expressed *in* that language - a point reminiscent of aspects of the (early) thinking of Stanley Cavell - and this explains why Jolley should

take the difficulty of understanding Wittgenstein to lie not in the letter of what he says, but instead in *why* he says it. Drawing a further distinction between the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*, though in this case one which on the face of it is far from obviously valid, he sees the former recording 'the product of (previous) thinking', whilst the latter initiates 'a process of (contemporay and subsequent) thinking'. This is a distinction, moreover, which he wishes to use as a means of illuminating the method employed by the authors of the essays which follow:

> The aim of this collection is of the same sort as the aim of
>
> *Philosophical Investigations*: to initiate a process of thinking
>
> - about Wittgenstein's writings. It is not to record the products
>
> of thinking about Wittgenstein's writing. The essays are 'undefined
>
> in front', to borrow a phrase from Henry David Thoreau. They are
>
> greenwood sites for growth in understanding Wittgenstein, not a
>
> greenhouse exhibit of fully ripened understandings of Wittgenstein.
>
> (*Ibid*., 12)

It would hardly be surprising if this assessment were found difficult to verify, for we are left to guess what criteria Jolley is employing to distinguish a 'greenwood site for growth' from a 'fully ripened exhibit'. In the course of reading the following papers it will prove interesting to select which papers ought find a place in one category rather than the other. Whilst, for example the exploratory approach manifested in the reflections offered by Avner Baz on 'Aspect perception' seem custom made for the 'greenwood site' category, it is difficult not to understand the standpoint of Hutchinson and Read in 'Therapy' as manifesting anything less than a 'fully ripened exhibit', whether or not one is disposed to think highly of the evidence produced in its support. Furthermore, when one comes to what is arguably the finest paper in the book, Roderick Long's 'Wittgenstein on rule-following', one revealing full command of its material and exhibiting a sureness of approach that captures a distinctly Wittgensteinian point of view, it would be difficult to see it as no more than 'work in progress'. One suspects that Jolley has been tempted here to employ a distinction - no matter how

valid it may appear to him when applied to Wittgenstein's two major works - outwith the proper framework in which it may be reasonably expected to perform a useful role.

Jolley further explores his understanding of Wittgenstein's method in the first essay, 'Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks', claiming that some of these remarks are or contain aphorisms, 'maxims, precepts, dicta, apothegms, adages, proverbs, epigrams or truisms'. (*Ibid.*, 17) Quoting Ryle's reference to the 'solicitious sheperdings' that are said to characterise Wittgenstein as mentor of his reader, Jolley introduces us to the notion of Wittgenstein as a *teacher* of philosophical remarks which are made whilst observing the actions of an *apprentice*, one struggling towards mastery of the arts of 'conceptual disentanglement' (*Ibid.*, quoting Ryle). Following Stanley Cavell on the voices of temptation and correction that are to be found in Wittgenstein's writings, he takes issue with Ryle over the familiar question whether the style and presentation of the remarks in the *Investigations* is ultimately exterior to its philosophical content, arguing against Ryle's view that the 'expositing of its content can be separated, and really should have been separated, from its modulating of its content'. (*Ibid.*) Here Ryle is presented as the traditional philosopher who finds Wittgenstein's adoption of the role of mentor mildly embarassing, a role which he assumes to be strictly irrelevant to the philosophical message that Wittgenstein is using the *Investigations* to convey.

Whilst this can just as easily be expressed by saying that the *apprentice* (voice of temptation) and the *master* (voice of correction) are two aspects of a Wittgenstein who regards philosophy as a way of working on himself (*Ibid.*), Jolley sees Wittgenstein's ultimate aim as the achievement of the freedom that the disciplined master acquires, one necessitating a measure of docility on the part of the apprentice. Not everyone will be happy with Jolley's ensuing reflections concerning a distinction he wishes to draw between thinking of the philosophical problem of meaning and thinking of the concept of meaning, although most readers will not be unhappy with the conclusion that 'Making progress through Wittgenstein's remarks requires achieving clarity not only about the concept of meaning but about all the things that shape our philosophical questions about meaning'.

(*Ibid.*, 22). Convinced, quite correctly, that Wittgenstein's methodology is directed by his wish to tackle philosophical *problems*, Jolley sees 'technical' terms like 'language-game' performing their genuine roles only insofar as they contribute towards our understanding of their nature.

As against Ryle, however, Jolley understands Wittgenstein's art of conceptual disentanglement to be a matter not merely of the disentangling of concepts *one from another*, but as a matter of the philosophically puzzled person's disentangling of *himself* from concepts or from conceptual confusion (*Ibid.*, 24). This introduces a *subjective* dimension to the philosophical sphere that he believes to be of deep concern to Wittgenstein, a concern that would place Jolley in the camp of those who adopt an extreme person-relative conception of philosophical therapy. On Jolley's view, the need for Wittgenstein to affect this *how* of the puzzled person requires him to be particularly attentive to style and force of expression in his writings, even if his discovery of the *liberating word* that might release one person from his puzzlement might not have the same effect on another puzzled soul. Thinking of Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks as *sui generis*, he draws the conclusion that their uniqueness is a measure of the extent to which Wittgenstein's achievement is not only philosophical but literary as well.

What makes Jolley's approach here particularly interesting is that everything he has to say is quite compatible with a Wittgenstein whose message is not person-relative in *this* sense at all: even if the extent to which people find themselves *persuaded* by, say, some aphoristic remark is inevitably going to vary from case to case, this does not mean that the problem he is addressing does *not* finally disappear, that the puzzle does *not* become clearly resolved, *only* when it is seen in the *right* light. In *that* sense there is nothing *person-relative* about his method. What one perhaps misses in Jolley's treatment is the realisation that Wittgensteinian therapy, insofar as this term has a meaning in his work, does not exist in a vacuum, and gains its raison-d'etre from a methodology with a distinctly anthropological thrust. This new way of looking at things treats as central the *fact* that human beings exist in a social world. Yet this *fact* does not enjoy any kind of *transcendental* status in his philosophy. This can lead to puzzlement about its role, and about what Wittgenstein

is really up to in his apparent 'questioning' of the philosophical tradition.

If the first impression provided by Craig Fox's 14 page 'Wittgenstein on meaning and meaning blindness' is that it is rather slight, a paper in which its 37 footnotes quoting from and commenting on the work of other authors, would appear to convey more of interest than the rather banal content of its main text, this conclusion seems confirmed by Fox's final paragraph:

> In his discussions of meaning, Wittgenstein has essentially
>
> called to our attention the ways in which we talk about the
>
> meanings of our words. In so doing he undermines assumptions
>
> one might make about the nature of meaning. He does not leave
>
> us with a replacement account, but this in no way hinders our
>
> capacity to make meaning-claims. (*Ibid*., 37)

Yet if Wittgenstein's avowed aim is to remind us of our failure to recognise the significance of platitudes that when doing philosophy we can so easily be tempted to overlook, then Fox may be performing a very useful role in directing our attention to Wittgenstein's thoughts on meaning. In common with some other papers in this book, it begins in earnest with Augustine's 'picture of the essence of language and the idea about meaning' as the object for which the word stands (*Ibid*., 28). Fox provides a workmanlike description of the content of §§ 1 - 43 and §§ 560 - 568, pointing out in connection with the meaning-blind person, for example, that 'it is only the use of words that matters in the end, and so the meaning-blind person still means what we mean. Feelings are not essential to meaning.' (*Ibid*., 35) This is not *unconnected* with the important point that the *pictures* which often *accompany* our use of terms when doing philosophy can be understood (wrongly in Wittgenstein's assessment) to encapsulate the *meaning* of the expressions in question (*e.g.* the idea of *consciousness*). Yet whilst admitting that the meaning-blind person still means what we mean, given that the meaning of a statement is to be discovered *via* its use, albeit that the 'feelings and experiences we have while using words *are* typically important to us' (*Ibid*.), Fox has earlier made a claim with which this is simply difficult to reconcile:

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Just as we come to see character as embodied in structural

facial features by having experiences with that person (and

not by something like a 'science' of phrenology), we come to

know something about the meanings of our words by having

experiences with them. But having 'experiences with our words'

just means 'using them' (and seeing others use them etc.). So,

again, this is what 'meaning is use' comes to. (*Ibid*., 34)

But this is clearly not what 'meaning is use' can possibly come to, even on Fox's own admission, given how *experiencing* meaning-blindness is described as manifesting itself, so there is evidently some confusion here. There are also other passages in the paper, *e.g.*, the end of Footnote 36, page 40, with its reference to the possibility that a theory of meaning in (positively?) changing our lives would 'be fine' for Wittgenstein, which surely require clarification. On the other hand, that 'Wittgenstein's writing can engender frustration in the reader if the reader has come to the work with certain preconceptions', (*Ibid*., 36) is quite correct given that his new method was found by him and can be discovered by anyone else to be liberating, a point so often neglected by those who see his philosophy as entirely *negative*. The minor shortcomings of Fox's essay are compensated for by its more positive aspects. On balance, it would appear to deserve Jolley's classification as a 'greenwood site for growth'.

If 'Language-games and private language' by Lars Hertzberg seems even a little disappointing, the reason in this case does not lie in any inherent weakness in his paper. The problem is simply that he has set himself a very difficult task by attempting to adequately cover The Augustinian Picture, the shopkeeper, the builders' language with its increasing variations, language-games and the private language passages - notably § 258 and § 260 - within only ten pages. Nevertheless, he does have some very interesting things to say. Reacting, for example, to Wittgenstein's claim that the seemingly robotic shopkeeper affords us an example of 'how we operate with words', his immediate reaction is to claim that this remark is outrageous (*Ibid*., 42). Hertzberg, however, reminds us that the highly complex skills involved in coming to make even the most basic pronouncements about objects, colours and numbers

are easily overlooked. This explains why the shopkeeper has the distinct appearance of someone who has serious memory lapses, or who is only *beginning* to learn how to master a language. (*Ibid.*) He could just as easily be seen as a shell-shocked soldier who has returned from the front to take up his civilian occupation, someone who is being gradually rehabilitated through training. His complex rehearsals have the sole aim of returning him to the linguistic mastery he has temporarily lost as a result of battle-weariness. Whilst this is all pointing in the direction of those now familiar Mulhall-Stern and Hutchinson-Read interpretations of the robotic shopkeeper which would attempt to convert him into a refugee from the theatre of the absurd (1), Hertzberg's down-to-earth approach reminds us of those more prevalent conventional accounts in which 'each of the words on the slip of paper is linked to the end result, the bunch of apples he hands over to his customer, by a different type of relation, mediated through a different way of proceeding'. (*Ibid*. 43) Herzberg nevertheless echoes Mulhall and Stern in his suggestion that Wittgenstein's shopkeeper is being used to liberate philosophers from tacit assumptions - about mental mechanisms - that they seem unable to avoid.

Whilst Wittgenstein presents the builders' language as a complete primitive language, one for which 'the description given by Augustine is right', Hertzberg sees even their initial language as extending beyond Augustine's account because builders A and B are involved in an *activity* of fetching and carrying the correct stones, one which goes beyond the mere *association* of a word and an object: 'B will not learn what it is he is supposed to do simply by having the building-stones pointed out to him and hearing their names, since that would require that he gets more out of the teaching than is contained in the act of pointing' (*Ibid*.) Here the important conclusion to be drawn is that Wittgenstein's 'ostensive teaching' is effective only insofar as it encourages the learner to act in the *right* way as a consequence of the *proper* training (§ 6).

Hertzberg's treatment of the extension of the builders' language in § 8, § 15 and § 21 follows conventional lines, as does his discussion of Wittgenstein's following remarks concerning meaning, existence and particulars. The more or less explicit criticism of the *Tractatus* and of Frege's requirement that a concept have sharp boundaries if it is to be a 'real' concept lead on to

a discussion of what games have in common, and here Hertzberg stresses the open-ended and open-textured associations of the language-game metaphor, so that what for him is basic to our speaking is not *knowledge* of certain rules as distinct from *acting* in certain ways. This leaves barely four pages in which to discuss the private language passages, yet Hertzberg provides an example which greatly helps us to grasp his own fundamental understanding of them:

> Suppose a solitary individual starts up a diary, and then later
> she comes into contact with language-speakers and learns to
> explain her notes in their language. Would not that be sufficient
> to show that her notes had meaning to begin with; that there was
> a way of distinguishing right from wrong even before ? But then
> the question is: what is she supposed to explain to them ? She
> could not explain the point of the 'diary' since the diary did not
> have a point. There would be nothing to appeal to in order to
> provide a space for the question whether her explanations were
> correct or not. So the idea that the language might already be there
> before it comes to be shared is unintelligible. (*Ibid*., 50)

Whilst for some readers this passage will involve an only too obvious begging of the question, the more important issue it raises is why it should appear to do so. The answer is clearly that someone who is introduced as a private diarist in the extreme sense of § 258 is also, paradoxically, presented as being in possession of a public language which can be translated into the public language of other 'language speakers'. The assumption is that this private diarist has invented for herself a public language, presumably on the grounds that she possesses the conceptual resources allowing her to *label* her sensations. Hertzberg then *appears* to argue that Wittgenstein has already shown that this cannot be done, because undertaking to use sign 'S' for a sensation in the *private* case initially envisaged and already discussed (*Ibid*.,48), is to undertake to *correctly* use this sign in circumstances in which no standard of comparison can possibly have

been originally provided by the 'private ostensive definition': the act of concentrating one's attention on a sensation, as Wittgenstein reveals, cannot initiate a standard of application which would allow the diarist to *correctly* judge later on that this sensation is *the same,* wholly independently of the diarist's *inclination* to judge one thing rather than another. 'Whatever is going to seem right to me is right'.

But this is to conflate two entirely diverse strands that can be detected in the argument Hertzberg provides, and the first concerns the initial supposition that the diarist can be seen to invent a 'public language' with which to talk about her sensations. Yet this is not a claim that Wittgenstein would have denied, insofar as our ability to *imagine* a solitary individual inventing a language in these circumstances is not in question. His point is that this supposition is empty, because it can only lead to an infinite regress. Baker and Hacker echo the principle at stake here when they distinguish between the genesis and the exercise of an ability. The second point, one bearing directly on the notion of the *private* language of § 258, is that Wittgenstein *defines* this notion of privacy, one which incorporates the notion of a private *object* and which requires identification of sensations according to *criteria*, in such a manner that it can have no possible application to our *ordinary* talk about our sensations. Consequently, if the sensation of § 258 is already *defined* as having no 'representational content', then it clearly provides nothing that could serve to create a 'standard of comparison' allowing for reidentification of *the same* over time. This is in complete contrast to Wittgenstein's account of our first-person criterionless sensation ascriptions, reflected in the claim that I know that this is red, and can pick out red *again*, because I have 'learnt English' (§ 381). The *stage-setting* requirement of § 257, capturing the circumstances in which sensation language is *actually* acquired as described in § 244, then acts as a *reminder* of what *is* so, but not as a *philosophical* stipulation about what *must* be so. This reminder, whilst important, is entirely separate from the central point expressed in § 258, yet it is only when these twin approaches are seen in tandem, however uneasily they may appear to support each other, that we can fully grasp how the relevant passages are being used by

Wittgenstein to achieve their ends.

In his second paper, Craig Fox in 'Wittgenstein on family resemblance' provides what he regards as an overview of the *Investigations*' treatment of family resemblance, with the particular aim of disassociating this concept from its assumed connection with the famous historical debate between realists and nominalists. This connection is central to Renford Bamburgh's now classic 'Universals and Family Resemblances', a paper in which he clearly states that Wittgenstein has solved the problem of universals (2). Fox on the other hand wishes to draw our attention to § 65 in which Wittgenstein raises the question of the *general form of propositions*. Far from apparently letting himself off the hook over the problem that once gave himself 'most headache', Wittgenstein says that instead of producing something that is *common* to all that is called language, he now wants to say that the relevant phenomena are *related* to one another in many different ways.

Fox sees the principle at stake here as one central to the *Investigations*: Wittgenstein is constantly working against the idea that language has an essence of any kind, and Fox once again relates this claim to the rejection of Augustine's account of how he came to acquire a language (*Ibid.*, 52). Although the points being made in these passages (e.g. § 71 'Stand roughly there') have become excessively familiar, Fox does manage to draw them together in providing a central role in the *Investigations* for the treatment of family resemblance, raising once again the question of how frustrating must seem Wittgenstein's 'quietist' approach to those philosophers intent on theory construction. In this case, he provides rather more than a 'greenwood site for growth'.

In his 'Ordinary/everyday language', Rupert Read adopts a rigorous *therapeutic* approach, opposing what he regards as the still prevalent tendency in what he perhaps a little contemptuously calls 'Wittgenstein studies', to look upon 'ordinary everyday language' as a bastion incorporating some sacrosanct body of rules which the naughty philosopher attempts to disobey at his peril. This would turn Wittgenstein into an 'Ordinary Language Philosopher' of the *worst* kind. Drawing his inspiration from Gordon Baker in his 'Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use' (*Ibid.*, 64), he believes, surely correctly, that to look upon everyday language as 'some secure area of language

that we can look to for forceful guidance as to how logic will "permit us to speak" ' (*Ibid*.) is to misrepresent the genuine role that this notion of the 'everyday' *may* be playing in Wittgenstein's work. Gordon Baker is certainly justified in his scathing reference to a common understanding of 'everyday use' in § 116 as referring to nothing more than 'the standard speech-patterns of the English-speaking peoples', for this makes it look as if the wayward philosopher is attempting to give the relevant words a 'metaphysical use' by in some way *breaching* the limits set by these speech-patterns, when this does *not* make it at all clear just what it is that he is doing wrong (3).

In short, the notion of 'everyday use' has *no* clear role except insofar as it is being used in *contrast* to the 'metaphysical use' that Wittgenstein describes so often as a *bogus* use, the kind of 'use' that he identifies with the philosopher's attempted 'application' of some misleading *picture* (§§ 422 - 426). In his reference to the philosopher's attempts to grasp the *essence* of the thing (§ 116), the essence, for example, of dreaming, consciousness (*Zettel* §§ 395 - 403), or of a private sensation (§§ 271 - 276), he is pointing towards his alternative method of rooting out the misleading picture that may certainly *accompany* the practice of talking about our dreams or about when we are or are not conscious. But the philosopher exhibits the tendency to take the *meaning* of the concepts of *dreaming* or of *consciousness* to consist in his attempt to *apply* the picture, and it is in the nature of this *metaphysical* 'application' that it be attempted in complete isolation from those ordinary circumstances in which the relevant concepts have their 'everyday use'.

This point is central to Wittgenstein's method in the kinds of cases described: the tendency when doing philosophy to stress the extent to which our dreaming and waking expereriences may appear to be qualitatively indistinguishable, at the expense of the ordinary circumstances in which we recount our dreams; the tendency to look upon consciousness as an *accompaniment* of purely physical behaviour at the expense of the circumstances in which we say that someone is conscious or unconscious, awake or asleep; and the degree to which we stress the sensation as an inner private *object* of which we are immediately aware, at the expense of the circumstances in which we both learn how to apply sensation-terms, and how to apply the third person criteria we employ in the

course of attributing these sensations to others in the public arena.

This aspect of his method does indeed have the appearance of issuing 'reminders' of *facts* which the philosopher in the course of being waylaid by misleading *pictures* may easily forget, and the *role* played by those reminders directly reflects the *meaning* of *therapy* as a concept that can be applied to Wittgenstein's methodology. Yet the *kind* of therapy applied is a consequence of the methodology, which provides its raison-d'etre, and that method is revealed through the *way* in which the philosophical *problem* is resolved, or is able to be removed. Whilst the therapy is not *totally* divorced from what we would normally consider to be philosophical *argument*, it gains its main impetus from this *new way* of looking at things. This underlies Wittgenstein's belief that any stumbling block to realising this perspective on the part of the philosopher must rest with the will rather than with the intellect. Consequently, this *therapeutic method* does not exist in a vacuum.

How far does this enable us to understand the role played by therapy in Rupert Read's account of the distinction between metaphysical and everyday use ? Up to a certain point, there is a clear similarity of approach:

> Thus, once we get clear on the contrast-class that Wittgenstein intends,
> our task in philosophy instantly becomes a lot clearer - and a lot harder.
> What *we* do, then, is to try to 'bring words back' to their 'everyday uses'
> by means of trying to get others (and ourselves) to think - to see - that they
> (we) do not need anything other than those 'everyday uses' in order to do
> all that one really can do with language. (And: to think that the idea of it
> being possible or necessary to do anything other than what these words are
> after is in fact only the fantasy of an idea....)....For the contrast-class to the
> everyday is *only*: a lived delusion. (*Ibid*., 69)

Furthermore, as an example of the way in which Wittgenstein explodes a certain misleading way of looking at things, Read discusses Freud's use of 'wish-fulfillment'. One could equally take any *unconscious* motive or desire. Wittgenstein regards these uses as bogus insofar as they have only

the appearance of *extending* the *ordinary* application of these concepts into a new area, whereas they are actually *conflicting* with the original use in a fairly obvious way. Indeed, it is hard to believe that Freud himself could not have been only too well aware that what he was doing consists in redescribing the phenomena to be 'explained' without actually providing genuinely verifiable hypotheses. There can be no circumstances in which a patient could be discovered *not* to be suffering from an 'unconscious desire' if every time he *behaves* in a particular way, he satisfies the criteria for applying a description that enters into the very framework in terms of which the relevant phenomena are to be understood. The value of psycho-analysis must be seen to lie elsewhere, in which case Read may be a little hard on Freud in claiming that he introduced a 'persuasive and potentially dangerous mythology' which he wrongly believed to be scientific - the substance of Wittgenstein's critique - when it was not (*Ibid*., 67).

Yet despite this criticism of Freud, it may be thought a little ironic that Read uses the credentials he attaches to psycho-analysis *via* a well-known quotation from the *Big Typescript* (§ 410) to support his adherence to an extreme person-relative assessment of Wittgensteinian therapy. Yet this assessment cannot be justified solely by looking at the kind of method employed in uprooting the sorts of misleadng *pictures* already considered. Nevertheless, quoting Read: 'In other words: the ultimate *criterion* of a successful effort to criticize something as a departure from "everyday" language must be: the subject's own consent.' (*Ibid*., 66) Yet if we study the kinds of examples in which we see Wittgenstein successfully uprooting the misleading *pictures* to which the philosopher often succumbs, the value of this method has really got nothing at all to do with whether or not someone finds himself disposed to favourably respond to it. On the contrary: it stands or falls according to whether it can genuinely be shown to illuminate and resolve the philosophical *problem* in question. Yet *that* is not a genuinely *subjective* matter. In the final analysis, the purpose of issuing a 'reminder' to the philosopher is to show *why* adherence is to be withdrawn from the misleading *picture* that is insidiously at work.

Towards the end of his paper, which 'is designed to serve a therapeutic purpose', Read asks twice (*Ibid*., 75) why he has supplied so few 'examples' of ordinary or everyday language, when the question he surely ought to ask is how Wittgenstein's method is put into practice in the resolution

of the philosophical *problems* he was keen to overcome. Read is perhaps correct to answer his question by saying that *everything* is ordinary, and this brings him to consider whether he ought to have instead provided 'examples' of metaphysical uses of language, only to say that *there are none.* (*Ibid.*, 76) Metaphysics is 'nonsense', and this helps to explain why in echoing a recent use of this term as it has come to be applied to the *Investigations*, he includes amongst those philosophers who, on his assessment, genuinely understand the 'powerful myth-breaking and liberating effect of the terms "ordinary" and "everyday" ', Gordon Baker, Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Katherine Morris and (newly resurrected) J.L. Austin. (*Ibid.*, 71)

Read is equally certain which philosophers hold viewpoints he is *against*, those whom he categorises as the 'word-policemen' of the *everyday* who mistakenly believe that *it* can be mined, explored and made explicit: 'Oxford' Wittgensteinians including Peter Strawson and Peter Hacker, together with other philosophers who have genuinely believed themselves to have inherited the work of Wittgenstein but have really failed to do so: the logical positivists, Carnap, Schlick, Anthony Kenny, Hans-Johann Glock and many more. (*Ibid.*, 70 *et seq.*)

Not only can this collecting of individual philosophers into camps ostensibly with rigidly opposing outlooks be highly misleading, but in quoting § 402 in defence of his position - because it is a passage in which Wittgenstein reveals 'language on holiday' - Read fails to say that what Wittgenstein is actually pointing towards here are the *pictures* which often *accompany* our quite ordinary ways of speaking, but which are playing no useful role in supplementing the expressions of ordinary language 'which are only performing their office'. Yet it is because of the *roles* that the philosopher almost cannot avoid attributing to these *pictures* that, whether he be an idealist, realist, or solipsist, he is irresistibly inclined to see fundamental *metaphysical* presuppositions *lying behind* or even *in support of* our *everyday* talk. But the idea that 'everyday use' might require or demand presuppositions of these kinds is, of course, one that Wittgenstein would strongly reject. It is primarily for this reason that 'the one party attacks the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement ; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every

reasonable human being.' (§ 402) But what they are attacking and defending are 'houses of cards' (§ 118), theoretical constructions which are incidental to the 'everyday use' which neither utilises nor requires these kinds of *metaphysical* underpinnings. We are to thank Rupert Read for perhaps the most *stimulating* paper in the book, a worthy candidate for the 'fully ripened exhibit' category.

Also deserving to be included in this category is Roderick T. Long's 'Wittgenstein and rule following' which manages to say more on this subject in 11 pages than some writers have achieved by allowing themselves the length of a short monograph. Beginning with a description of the rule-following paradox which is often wrongly understood to constitute the moral that Wittgenstein wishes us to draw from it, Long takes it to show that any rule that a person follows when he acts, is radically underdetermined by anything in either his actions or in his thoughts *a)* because every actual sequence of behaviour is finite and is capable of being extended in different ways, each way compatible with a *different* rule and *b)* because no matter what may lie behind the agent's mind's eye, this cannot count as a *rule* until it is applied. Yet in being applied it once again becomes underdetermined by any finite sequence of behaviour. Furthermore, no *combination* of interior mental item and bodily behaviour, nor anything the agent *says,* will do either, for these all reduce ultimately to yet another something or other which can be variously interpreted.

But 'the waves subside' (*Cf.* § 194) or at least partly subside when we consider that the *paradox* arises *because* we do in fact succeed in meaning, intending and in following rules, so that Long's Wittgenstein has no wish to cut the ground from under our feet. The point of the paradox 'is not to undermine our confidence in our ability to understand ourselves and one another, but rather to liberate us from a muddled picture of what such understanding is like'. (*Ibid*., 82) Long's Wittgenstein reminds us that the problem arises from thinking that in the mind of the agent, for example, there exists something that *cannot* be interpreted or applied in different ways, something that carries its own interpretation or application along with it. But the *thought* 'add two each time' *can* only depend on how it is in practice applied. The problem rests with the misleading *picture* of the *self-interpreting* or *self-applying* rule, the concept to which Wittgenstein draws our attention in

§ 188 when he talks about the *act of meaning* that traverses all those infinite numbers of steps. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not that grasping a rule is impossible or mysterious, but that there *is* a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an interpretation, but which is in fact exhibited in practice in the perfectly ordinary way in which we do talk about someone who either is, or is not following a rule. (§ 201). In short, the tendency when doing philosophy is often to view the following of a rule in the abstract, in isolation from some day-to-day context of practical affairs in which it finds its normal expression; or, with Long's self-interpreting rule, it is to take the exercise of the rule to be *pre-determined* (*Cf.* Kripke's *meaning-determinist* picture) by the agent's possession of a capacity operating in isolation from the social background against which we come *in fact* to understand how it *is* acquired and how it manifests itself in practice.

With such excessively familiar material, there is always the danger of doing no more than stating yet again what has so often been said before. But at the risk of repeating what for many may have become rather stale, one has to balance the fact that there is still far from general consensus on the matter of the rule-following paradox, and that there is nothing wrong with providing a succinct account of Wittgenstein on rule-following especially if a writer succeeds, as Long does, in providing it with a fresh twist of his own. He stresses that in failing to find the magical meaning-determining item in either the agent's *thought* or *conduct*, there has been a tendency to find it in the agent's *behavioural dispositions*, or in the practices of the agent's *linguistic community* (*Ibid.*, 83). But neither of these can function as *independently specifiable* determinants of the agent's meaning: the agent's *bodily movements* inevitably underdetermine which rule is being followed, just as the community's *noises and movements* are consistent with an infinity of possible practices.

Yet in pointing out that a description of the agent's disposition or of the community's practice *as* the disposition to *add two each time*, or to *intentionally add two each time*, allows the underdetermination problem to vanish, Long argues that this *is* the 'answer' to the paradox, insofar as it reflects a Wittgensteinian principle *not* to seek to identify any factor above, beyond, or *distinct* from rule-following itself that *determines* what rule-following is. The fundamental error

which Long takes Wittgenstein to identify rests in 'the assumption that in order to make sense of such rule-governed activities as understanding, meaning, intention, action and the like, we must be able to analyse them in terms of something more basic - an assumption that leads us to make a mystery out of the ordinary and then to generate further mysteries in a vain attempt to dispel the first one.' (*Ibid.*, 85)

Long then draws the conclusion that a philosopher earns himself the right to think of this understanding of following a rule as a *banality* only when he has ceased to regard thought and action as *independently* specifiable, an insight which the philosopher must work towards precisely by overcoming the rule-following paradox. Wittgenstein's 'human body as the best picture of the human soul' (Part II, *iv*. 178) is compared to Aristotle's soul as the form of the organic body, and the organic body as the body informed by the soul. In calling attention to Aristotle's *hylomorphic unity*, in which soul and body are distinct but inseparable *aspects*, as distinct from ingredients, Long discovers a comparison with a Wittgenstein who distances himself from the thought that human action is the gluing together of a ghostly mental image and a mere bodily movement. Quoting § 339, in which Wittgenstein is understood to stress the organic unity of action against 'mentalistic or behaviouristic alternatives' (*Ibid.*, 89), Long brings his account of rule-following to an end with a discussion of Wittgenstein and metaphysics. If Long's paper stands out above the crowd, it is because it discusses over-familiar material in a fresh and informative way. It succeeds admirably in welding together in a relatively short compass those various aspects of Wittgenstein's thinking that are particularly relevant to his central theme.

Like the earlier paper by Rupert Read, Phil Hutchinson's 'Thinking and Understanding' has a similar avowedly *therapeutic* intent. Hutchinson's Wittgenstein concentrates on attempting 'to relieve us of our temptation to theorize inner mental processes, a temptation that seems grounded in the hope that such processes will serve as the "thing corresponding to [the] substantive" (cf. *BB* 1, 5). He pursues his therapeutic goal by reminding us that such mental terms might not refer to any *thing*.' (*Ibid.*, 93). This therapeutic, non-philosophical goal is also succinctly captured in the

following passage expressing Wittgenstein's non-theoretical purpose:

> Wittgenstein is not providing us with a new *account* of (the grammar of)
>
> thinking but is suggesting to his interlocutors a *way of thinking* about
>
> 'thinking' that might relieve us of our current prejudice and help guard
>
> against certain temptations to produce metaphysical theses. (*Ibid.*, 101)

Hutchinson's Wittgenstein practices therapy by *relieving* the philosopher (in us) of 'the desire to make realist claims or sceptical claims or produce cognitivist or behaviourist theories' (*Ibid.*, 106). Our practices of ascribing the terms 'thinking' and 'understanding' are what he calls 'satisfactory' - surely not the best term in *this* context - and the yearning for theories of mental processes beyond our practices can never be more satisfying than the practices themselves (*Ibid.*). Beginning with a reference to Matt Cartmill's paper in which college professors who are reluctant to grant mental lives to animals are denounced because they adhere to Wittgenstein's stated belief that 'thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs', Hutchinson naturally suggests that the issue at stake here for most readers would be whether Wittgenstein holds that thinking is essentially linguistic. Yet Hutchinson would rather say that Wittgenstein *qua* philosopher does not hold *any* views on thinking at all. What he means, of course, is that Wittgenstein does not adhere to any philosophical *theses*; and yet there are philosophers who would argue that he is expressing *views* constantly. The *real* issue here - although this is not immediately obvious - turns on what one understands the nature of Wittgensteinian therapy to be. Take the following passage:

> Indeed, where no language is used, why should one speak of
>
> 'thinking' ? If this is done, it shows something about the *concept*
>
> of thinking. (*Zettel* § 109)

But the question at stake in *this* particular passage is whether people who can arrive at arithmetical conclusions without speaking or writing, may lead us to conclude that calculating can be done without signs. The answer Wittgenstein provides is that in the absence of the ordinary surrounding circumstances in which the concept of *calculating* is actually used, it is not at all clear

whether these people could be said to *calculate* at all. Similarly, the reason for questioning the testimony of the deaf-mute Ballard (also *Investigations* § 342) that he had thoughts about God and the world even before he could speak, is *not* that it breaches a Wittgensteinian principle that there can be *no thought without language*, but that in the absence of the surrounding circumstances in which people do normally *think* about God and the world, it is difficult to understand what Ballard's statement can be taken to mean.

This does tend to support Hutchinson's claim that if the (philosophical) question 'what is thinking ?' is to be answered in a conventional way by pointing to some *process* to which the term 'thinking' is thought to correspond, then this question cannot be understood to have any genuine meaning because it is being asked outwith the ordinary circumstances in which the term 'thinking' is used. The following answers might be provided to the question 'what is thinking ?':

> *a)* Thinking is an ethereal activity of the human soul
>
> *b)* Thinking is a physical process in the human brain
>
> *c)* Thinking is a certain movement of the human larynx
>
> *d)* 'Thinking' is a widely ramified concept

But d), from *Zettel* § 110, would on Hutchinson's outlook constitute a rejection of the question in its philosophical guise. This does not mean, however, that Wittgenstein refuses to tackle what may be regarded as *philosophical* problems about the thinking of animals or of machines. It is just that he answers them from the standpoint of his particular methodology. A classic example lies in §§ 359 - 360, where the question whether a machine can think is provided with the answer that only of a human being and what is like one do we say that it thinks. The reason for this is that outwith the ordinary circumstances in which the concept of *thinking* is used, it has no proper application. Yet we say uncontroversially that animals think, animals like the dog that believes its master is at the door (Part II,i, 174), because we quite naturally attribute thinking to animals in appropriate circumstances on analogy with the attribution we make of this concept to human beings. The *metaphysical* 'usage' which he condemns lies elsewhere. It is the one based on the *apparent* use of

a misleading *picture*, the one connected with Cartmill's example: the temptation to ask whether

all thinking is essentially linguistic arises from the assumption that since human beings think in

language, it must be an open question whether creatures who do not have language can think at

all (3). If the thinking that *goes on in us* is linguistic, how can animals possibly be said to think ?

 Yet this makes it look as if there are *two* different processes to be considered, thinking *with*

and thinking *without* language, and the question is whether one process can *go on* without the other.

But it would be Wittgenstein's aim to illustrate that our concept of *thinking* is not *used* like that. If the

executive committee of the local Philosophical Society were to make it a condition of joining the club

that applicants be able to 'think without language', then prospective members would seriously doubt

whether they ought to apply, not because they were unsure whether this is something they were able

to do, but because they would be justifiably puzzled over what this 'requirement' could be taken to

mean. When 'thinking without language' takes on the appearance of a special kind of ability, it has

already become severed from the circumstances in which we would *recommend* saying that the squirrel

is attacking the bird-feeder with a great deal of thought, or in which the lioness is thinking intently on

how to catch her prey: in relation neither to humans nor to animals (*Zettel* § 101) would we conclude

that the thinking is an *accompaniment* of the activity, since it is integral to our understanding of the way

in which these performances are to be described. Consequently, by far the most puzzling aspect of

Hutchinson's paper lies not in what may be described as its general philosophical exposition of

Wittgenstein on thinking and understanding, but in the conception of therapy it clearly expounds:

> It is, therefore, important to note that the 'grammatical investigation'
>
> comes late in the therapeutic process, after much of the work has been
>
> done. It is, however, part of that therapeutic process. It is not a positive,
>
> constructive add-on to Wittgenstein's negative therapeutic practice....
>
> Neither is it a central or primary tool in the armoury of the 'Wittgensteinian'
>
> philosopher.....We need to have been relieved of some of our confusions and
>
> yearnings so that we might be in a position to see the worth of the investigation

of the grammar of a term. (*Ibid*., 107, Footnote 8)

But if Wittgenstein's therapy gains its raison-d'etre and its sense from the investigation in this case of how the word 'thinking' is *used*, then this is to put the cart before the horse. Once again, this person-relative concept of therapy implies that it has an application to his philosophy *prior* to the kind of method he actually uses to explore the roles played by those misleading *pictures* to which Hutchinson draws our attention when reflecting on bogus process-interpretations of thinking and understanding. But the therapy then exists in a vacuum: there is nothing to the philosophy beyond its method. Whilst there are other interesting aspects to his paper, including a further appearance of the robotic shopkeeper as the 'purveyor' of 'inner mental processes', this concept of therapy certainly constitutes its most problematic and puzzling, and for that reason its most stimulating aspect.

Kelly Dean Jolley appears again in 'Psychologism and *Philosophical Investigations*', a very short paper in which he sees Wittgenstein combatting the 'radical vice' of psychologism not merely as a false theory but as a failure to recognise *logic.* Jolley's Wittgenstein in his own way inherits the Fregean distinction between concepts and objects when he asks his reader to carefully distinguish between conceptual and empirical problems: 'Wittgenstein not only has to struggle against certain beliefs in his reader but also against his reader's philosophical character' (*Ibid*., 109). Of particular interest is § 314, where Wittgenstein states that it shows a fundamental misunderstanding to study the headache he is having now in order to get clear about the philosophical problem of sensation. The conception we almost inevitable succumb to of what is 'inner' only gains its *sense* from the fact that we employ a language in which meaning is a public phenomenon, and this has nothing to do with any form of behaviourism. Jolley takes the earlier publication of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* to have engenered a common misinterpretation of the *Philosophical Investigations* because the appearance of some form of latent behaviourism in the former - even if this interpretation is open to question - was held to apply to the latter. But Jolley's Wittgenstein with his concern with human behaviour and outer criteria, is emphasising only his resolution not to confuse *logic* with psychology.

Avrum Stroll decides to take another look at 'Moore's Paradox' concerning belief in his short paper, 'Moore's paradox revisited', adopting a relatively novel way of answering it with the conclusion that because he says that it is raining it does not follow that he *believes* this to be the case. The conventional wisdom would be that whilst 'It is raining but I do not know that it is raining' would be a logical contradiction, 'It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining' would be a contradiction of a pragmatic kind, because it would normally be assumed that no one would state in the *first person* that it *is* raining if he has evidence which leads him to *believe* that it is not. It follows that 'It was raining but I did not believe that it was raining' entails no contradiction because a person *at that time* might have had no reason to believe *then* what he *now* knows to have been the case in fact. It is of course possible to imagine circumstances in which the claim that it is raining but I do not believe it, is a way of conveying the fact that Smith says it is raining but *I* do not believe what Smith says because I lack evidence, but cases like these are beside the point.

What Stroll wishes to argue is that in saying that one believes, one is not so much making a *lesser* claim than one would be making in claiming to know, but a claim which is only applicable in certain particular circumstances. Consequently, in the kinds of circumstances in which there can be no doubt about whether it is raining, my stating that it is raining but that I do not *believe* that it is, ceases to be contradictory because these are cases to which the concept of *belief* does not apply. I would say that I *believe* that it is raining, for example, only when the landscape outside my window is so obscured by mist that I but hesitantly decide that it *is* actually raining. On this view, the assertion that I *know* it is raining but I do not believe so, is to be understood as a way of claiming that my lack of belief follows from the fact that whilst in this case there is every justification for making a claim to *know*, there is no justification for saying that I can do no more than *believe*. Stroll argues that notions like *belief* and *assertion* are context-dependent, and it is only because this fact is ignored that Moore's Paradox should be thought to convey any apparent contradiction. This to many may appear rather disingenuous, on the assumption that belief is always *belief* in the *truth* of an assertion, with the consequence that stating something to be true and claiming that one does not

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then believe in its truth is to invite a contradiction that *cannot* be avoided. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Stroll has managed to add his own particular twist to the debate, even if his stand is at odds with the differing approaches to the matter that Moore and Wittgenstein themselves can clearly be seen to adopt.

Of all the papers in the book, Avner Baz on 'Aspect perception' deserves inclusion in Jolley's 'green site for growth' category: it is a mainly exploratory essay on the characterisation, significance, difficulty and phenomenology of 'aspects', and for that reason is not one that every philosopher might find it easy to assess. This is partly because many traditional philosophers who adopt a rather restricted view about what philosophy is, may still harbour a tendency to wonder why the Wittgenstein whom they may admire in other areas of his work, is getting himself involved with what they may take to be a form of psychological mumbo-jumbo. Far from enlightening us about *genuine* philosophical problems like 'other minds' or an 'external world', these considerations only serve to muddy the waters. But as Baz would no doubt argue, there is nothing to be gained from adopting the perspective of a philosophical *Colonel Blimp* if the argument rather points the other way:

> One could even go a step further, following the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and argue that our ability to see aspects shows that we are neither Cartesian (nor for that matter, Kantian) egos or minds - altogether outside of the world, observing and intellectually organising it as if it were a mere 'spectacle'... - nor mere machines that may fully be characterized and explained by the mathematical sciences. Rather, this line of thought continues, we are normally always already engaged with a world that *matters* to us in various specific ways; we always find ourselves in this or that *meaningful situation*.......(*Ibid*., 134)

We are not to imagine that this passage, with its continuing references to the things of the world as we 'pre-reflectively' experience them, things which have 'style, physiognomy, significance', a passage incorporating an increasing use of italicised phrases and scare-quotes, contains viewpoints which Baz would *wholeheartedly* endorse. In fact, if one would prefer more sober presentations of a

viewpoint in which an individual acts *in* the world, one could go to *Thought and Action* by Stuart

Hampshire or even to *Individuals* by P.F. Strawson - both from 1959 - works which quickly come to

mind on reading Baz's exposition. But Baz is arguing only that whilst Merleau-Ponty has no

hesitation in saying that he is indulging in a *theoretical* enterprise, Wittgenstein remains entirely

at the level of what we might or might not *say,* and what the philosophical significance of this

may be: 'the concepts Wittgenstein investigates have their natural home not in scientific, objective,

reflection, but in the hustle and bustle of everyday existence and experience' (*Ibid*., 134). For Baz,

aspects may reveal something of importance about human perception, just as they almost certainly

have a role to play in aesthetics; and they may even have a contribution to make when we consider

'our acquisition and employment of language' (*Ibid*.). Baz in any event finds them important as

an illustration of Wittgenstein's overall philosophical approach. This file remains very much open

for further investigation.

Heather Gert says a number of interesting things in 'Knowing that the standard metre

is one metre long', but it is not always easy to reconcile them, and as a result the claim conveyed

by the title of her paper remains very much open to question. Her description of what she calls

'the usual interpretation of § 50 ' is on the whole sound:

> So the reason that we cannot say that the standard metre is a metre long
>
> is not because there is anything special about the stick itself. It is simply
>
> a by-product of the role the stick plays in the language-game of talking
>
> about things being a metre long....Similarly, so this interpretation goes,
>
> Wittgenstein agrees with his interlocutor that...it is impossible to say of
>
> an element that it exists. But, as with the standard metre, this is not because
>
> there is anything special about the object. Actually, being an element is
>
> nothing more than playing a particular kind of role in a given language-game -
>
> more or less the role of the most basic thing mentioned there. (*Ibid*., 138 *et seq*.)

If this is understood to be capturing the claim that what is acting as a means of representation

cannot be measured in terms of the standard that it itself represents, so that the standard metre bar *qua* standard cannot be used to measure *itself*, then it can correctly be understood to reflect what Wittgenstein means when he says that there is *one* thing of which one can say neither that it is, nor that it is not one metre long. But that would not stop someone who insisted on taking either an imperial or a metric tape-measure to the standard metre bar with the aim of measuring how long it is, and in doing so he could make the startling discovery that it is 39.37 inches or 100 centimetres long. This simple observation could very well lie behind what is often regarded as the common-sense conviction, referred to by Gert, that what Wittgenstein says is false on what may be understood to be at least one of a number of rather superficial readings. Gert interestingly draws our attention to commentators including Saul Kripke, Nathan Salmon, Eric Loomis and Robert Fogelin, all of whom in their own ways have expressed puzzlement over what Wittgenstein states in passage § 50.

But what does this observation prove ? Only that it is possible to measure the length of the physical bar that is *in fact* playing the role of the standard metre. But in carrying out this measurement, it becomes incidental to the bar that it is performing *this* role in our system. This is consistent with Heather Gert's claim that 'sympathetic interpreters almost always agree that if that stick stops being the standard, and something else becomes the standard instead, it can be measured' (*Ibid.*, 140), the only difference being that once the standard is up and running, it is conveyed for practical purposes, however imperfectly, by all the rulers and tape-measures that there are, on the proviso that we continue to agree on how these tools are to be *used* : the greater standards of accuracy gradually required through time for scientific purposes, *have* resulted in defining the length of *one metre* in terms which require less and less reliance on some outdated physical object of comparison. In that respect, the *philosopher's* hypothetical standard metre bar, for all practical purposes, need not exist at all. So how does this square with Gert's claim that not only is the standard metre one metre long, but that Wittgenstein himself *genuinely* believes this to be true ? Indeed, on her view it is extremely important for him that it *is* true. Speaking of the role of § 50:

He is using his example to show his interlocutor what is wrong with her

idea that it is impossible to say of any particular element that it exists.

He wants her to see that if she is committed to this, then she is also

committed to the claim that we cannot say that the standard metre is

one metre long. But the standard metre obviously is one metre long, so

the interlocutor must be making a mistake. Thus the metre statement

serves Wittgenstein's purpose only if his interlocutor can easily see

that it is false. (*Ibid*.)

This is, as one might expect, completely at odds with her account of 'the usual interpretation'. On this (correct) view, Wittgenstein sees the primary elements aright only if they have a *role* in the system. Yet as presented, her account also neglects the central point of § 50 that the indestructible simples of the *Tractatus*, to which 'we can attribute neither being nor non-being', are compared to the standard metre in Paris, only *because* what Wittgenstein says about this standard metre does *not* consist in his ascribing any *extraordinary* property to it.

The *sample* in § 48, on the other hand, which Gert treats ambivalently in order to draw the conclusion that it can *simultaneously* act as something described *and* as a means of representation, is not regarded by Wittgenstein in *this* way. He says that it is a means of representation, a part of the language, so that what from the *metaphysical* perspective of the *Tractatus* looked as if it *had* to exist, sets the standard by which comparison can be made, in order that we can represent colours in the way that we do when we ascribe them in ordinary discourse. Wittgenstein accordingly is *not* agreeing with Gert that '"sepia " can be used to describe the object that was used to give that name meaning', (*Ibid*., 148) - which is a way of saying that it *can* be used to *describe* the *standard* patch of sepia - since that would be to neglect the distinction between a *means of representation* and *something represented*. Yet *if* the word 'sepia' were used to *describe* the hermetically sealed colour *sepia* to which Wittgenstein refers, all that would follow is that the *role* of this colour *as* a standard would *in this case* be incidental to the fact that the *observed* colour of this patch happens to satisfy *this* description rather than some other. In short, one cannot *simultaneously* treat a sample both as a means of representation and as

something represented. But this implies that just as the standard metre cannot be used to measure *itself*, Wittgenstein *does* believe - *contra* Gert - what he *is* saying in paragraph § 50.

Having each contributed a paper extolling the virtues of an extreme person-relative conception of Wittgensteinian therapy, Rupert Read & Phil Hutchinson join together in presenting 'Therapy', a fuller account of the historical background to the *therapeutic vision* that they find in his writings, particularly the writings from around the early 1930's when, in several passages, an explicit comparison between *his* method and psycho-analysis is actually drawn. But what do these passages actually prove ? The answer is that unless one is *already* committed to a *picture* of Wittgensteinian therapy in which it serves as 'a genuinely effective way of undoing the suffering of minds in torment' (*Ibid*., 150), then when compared to a study of how Wittgenstein's method is revealed *via* the way in which he actually deals in practice with specific philosophical problems, it really proves nothing at all. (4) The difficulty for the Hutchinson-Read approach is that they interpret Wittgenstein's working-method in the light of a vision of therapy that it is very difficult to find in his day-to-day treatment of the problems of philosophy. Their vision remains at some remove from the way Wittgenstein actually *works*, so that it is only by turning one's eyes away from his method in the *Investigations* that one could come to be persuaded that 'the therapeutic method, is concerned with bringing to consciousness similies or pictures that have hitherto lain in the unconscious, constraining one's thought.....Similar to Freudian psycho-analysis......the very act of the bringing of the simile or picture to consciousness, of articulating and acknowledging it as a simile (aspect of things) breaks its thought-constraining grip'. (*Ibid*.) Stripped of the psycho-analytic gloss and the rather dramatic references to 'mental torment and disquiets', 'cravings', 'revulsions', 'angst' and 'irresistible temptations' (*Ibid*.) this account might nevertheless prove acceptable as far as it goes. Another passage, however, provides a deeper insight into this conception of therapy:

> our inability to acknowledge other pictures of how things might be
>
> stems from certain pathologies. Put another way, Wittgenstein saw
>
> philosophical problems as (took them to be) existential problems;

thus their treatment was to take the form of therapeutic treatment of

the person and that person's mode of engagement with the world: his

or her mode of being in the world. That is, it is not to take the form of

dealing with the problem in abstraction from the person who manifests

it (*Ibid.*, 153)

This passage points to a wider problem about the extent to which Wittgenstein ought to be seen as a philosopher of culture, and this is not a question to be answered solely by studying the text of the *Investigations* alone. But if we do look at this text alone, there is little warrant for concluding that Wittgenstein wished to wean us off one misleading *picture* at the expense of other 'equally viable' (*Ibid.*, 151) pictures - since it would be better to say that he wanted to dispense with *pictures* altogether in favour of concentrating on how expressions are *used* - just as it is difficult to take the reference to the *disquietudes* relating to the *depth* of philosophical problems (§ 111) to involve the 'mental torment' that Hutchinson & Read are disposed to find in the same passage. Whilst there are other interesting things in their paper, including a description of how Wittgenstein moved, *e.g.*, from the slogan 'thinking is operating with signs' to ideas like 'the world's weirdest grocer' in the development of his method (*Ibid.*, 152), its real value rests in the way in which it manages to present, along with its two companion pieces, perhaps the most extreme version of a person-relative assessment of therapy to be found in the current literature. This alone would make these papers worth reading. Certainly, not everyone will enjoy being told that the philosopher must become his own physician, that 'It is thyself that can help...*You have to want to get well. And you have to be prepared to struggle, to achieve such wellness ongoingly*' (*Ibid.*, 157), with its further reference to *courage*. Yet if we are disposed to understand this charitably, it may be regarded as no more than an illustration of how far an interpretative stance can be, and perhaps ought to be taken if it is to be explored in the detail and with the level of commitment that Hutchinson and Read evidently wish to devote to it.

Eric Loomis in 'Criteria' reminds us of the important role that the concept of *criteria* performed in those early interpretations of the *Investigations* that followed its publication in 1953. During the

1960's and 70's, the role of criteria in Wittgenstein's work was discussed in extraordinary detail, often with a view to showing how important it is in the resolution of 'the problem of other minds' : if claims about the experiences of others can be established *via* the application of criteria with *certainty*, then surely the problem must evaporate ? Alas, these heady days are long gone, and the significance of any role that might have been allocated to *criteria* has diminished considerably since then. Most commentators began their discussions by distinguishing between 'symptoms' and 'criteria' as discussed in *The Blue Book*, and Loomis reminds us of the standard attempts to think of criteria as 'being "grammatically good evidence" - evidence that is conceptually or grammatically tied to certain expressions, but whose presence does not entail the truth of any statement containing these expressions.' (*Ibid*., 166)

If, in recent years, the pendulum has swung very much away from this kind of outlook on Wittgenstein's *criteria*, this is largely because, as Loomis puts it, 'the notion is not introduced by him as part of a hypothesis or theory about what is behind our actual use of language'. (*Ibid*., 167). Or, to express it another way, this concept only gains the significance that is has from *within* a methodological framework in which there already exists the *practice* of attributing mental states and sensations to ourselves and to others. It is in this sense that it might be said to be internal to the *grammar* of *criteria* that appropriate criteria can appear to be satisfied even when a person is not *really* suffering pain. Yet to use this observation as a means of developing a problem about 'other minds' is to be at the mercy of the misleading *picture* that would require criteria to 'bridge the gap' between *outward behaviour* and the *inner sensations* that lie 'behind' it. Consequently, any thought that criteria could be used to 'solve' the problem of other minds is an illusion.

In 'Grammatical Investigations', Roderick T. Long and Kelly Dean Jolley join in confronting the distinction between the *grammar* of love and that of pain as discussed in *Zettel* § 504. This is but a preliminary to their more important treatment of a distinction between an *imaginary* and a *real* Wittgenstein over the point that 'the rules of our language simply do not allow anything to count as a meaningful challenge to our awareness of our own pain' (*Ibid*., 173). Whereas this is a matter on

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which both the *imaginary* and the *real* Wittgenstein may be said to agree, they differ over the point that whereas the former regards this truth to be a question of the operation of our linguistic conventions, *as if* it might in some sense have been otherwise, the latter claims that any denial of what we are inclined to see as the 'incorrigible' nature of our first person access to our own pain - otherwise the *criterionless* aspect of first person sensation ascription - is something that does not make *sense*. (*Ibid*., 173) Every time a philosopher is inclined to say that it is in the very *nature* of our first person awareness of our own pain, that it should form the *foundation* for our ability to apply a meaningful term to this potentially repeatable item of a particular *kind*, he is only pointing misleadingly towards the *grammar* of pain language. What he thinks of as the object of a wholly metaphysical *discovery*, results from confusing conceptual and empirical investigations. This is intimately connected with a vital feature of Wittgenstein's methodology: the tendency he identifies to look upon first person sensation-ascription in isolation from the everyday circumstances in which sensation-terms are acquired and applied. By drawing our attention to a fundamental feature of Wittgenstein's method, this paper once again deserves, on what one may surmise to be Jolley's own criteria, to fall into the 'fully ripened exhibit' category.

Arata Hamawaki in 'Teaching and learning' once again points out the limitations of the Augustinian Picture, stressing the importance of a practice in our understanding of what happens to constitute a linguistic act: 'And we have the practices we have only because, as it turns out, human nature is such that children can be initiated into these practices through the right kind of training' (*Ibid*., 182). No doubt this can be explained (empirically) in more detail, but no explanation of this kind can provide what the philosopher wants, 'an understanding of what makes it the case that someone is using an expression meaningfully (*Ibid*.). If this leaves us dissatisfied, then for Wittgenstein this is something we have to learn to live with. This seems more than unduly negative with its failure to capture what Wittgenstein found so *liberating* in his method.

David Finkelstein in his 'Expression and avowal' brings this collection to a close with his claim that many philosophers have totally failed to understand Wittgenstein's remarks about the

expressive dimension of avowals, thinking, for example, that statements about a person's

private experiences are neither true nor false. But Wittgenstein concentrates instead on the

salient point that people do not *learn* about their sensations insofar as no question of epistemic

justification is involved (§ 246). First-person sensation ascription is criterionless, and this is

a feature of his work that has important implications for his treatment of private language.

Certainly, many self-ascriptions of psychological states fall outside this category, like cases

of harbouring secret resentments of which other people may be more aware than one is one's

self, but these are not germane to the central point of Finkelstein's paper. Like most of the

other papers in this collection, Finklestein's illustrates how good a job Jolley has performed in

putting together a collection providing considerable more than a little food for thought.

ENDNOTES

(1) The relevant works are: Rupert Read and Phil Hutchinson: 'Whose Wittgenstein?' Review in
    Philosophy, 80, July 2005; Stephen Mulhall: *Inheritance and Originality Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
    Keirkegaard* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43; and David Stern *Wittgenstein's
    Philosophical Investigations An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 85.
(2) Available in the classic collection *Wittgenstein The Philosophical Investigations* ed. George Pitcher
    (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966).
(3) Gordon Baker: *Wittgenstein's Method, Neglected Aspects* , ed. by Katherine J. Morris
    (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 93.
4) This is quite apart from the available historical evidence showing that whilst Wittgenstein may
    have in principle regarded any published interpretation of his work as an instance either of
    plagiarism or of misrepresentation, he did in the 1940's denounce any comparison of his
    method to that of psycho-analysis. See A.J. Ayer: *Part of My Life* (Oxford: Oxford University
    Press 1977) 304.

> *As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of
> his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to
> worry whether Gilbert Ryle's comment that "the matter is stated well and
> almost interestingly" referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to
> Ryle's aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have
> appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
> RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the
> 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, with a further
> in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010.*