CRITICAL NOTICE

Wittgenstein at Work
Method in the Philosophical Investigations
ed. Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2010, pp. 264, £ 23.50
Reviewed by Derek A. McDougall

Described by the publisher as ‘an indispensable methodological companion to the Philosophical Investigations, one which ‘considerably advances discussion of the therapeutic aspects of his approach that are currently a focus of debate’, this rather belated paperback edition of a book first published in 2004 is divided into two parts. The editors justify this division largely on grounds which are said to depend on the structure of the Investigations itself: in their 8 page Introduction they see the first 315 sections of the book discussed in their Part 1 as ‘carefully integrated into sustained stretches of argument’, whereas the remaining 379 sections ‘resemble more a structured collection of material, grouped into thematic blocks’ (Ibid., xvii). Invited contributors therefore explore 315 sections which are suitably grouped into familiar subject areas, like The Builders Language - The Opening Sections (Schulte), Puzzles about Rule-Following (§§ 185 - 242) (Ammereller), and The Demand for Synoptic Representation and the Private Language Discussion (§§ 243 -315) from Schroeder. Having provided this ‘most polished’ part of the book with its separate treatment, Part 2 is about ‘further core notions of Wittgenstein’s methodology’ (Ibid.). The book is dedicated to the memory of Gordon Park Baker, who was to have contributed a paper on §§ 65 - 108 had his premature death not intervened. There is a useful Analytical Table of Contents containing authors’ abstracts of the 12 papers which are to follow. The contributors are all very well-known in the field of Wittgenstein scholarship, and ought individually to provide powerful presentations of what Wittgenstein is really about.

Peter Hacker begins Part 1 with a characteristic piece on Wittgenstein’s recantation of his metaphysical predilections in the Tractatus, his turning-around of the entire examination through a repudiation of those structural elements of the ‘Augustinian Picture’ sketched in §§ 1 - 27. §§ 27 - 64 reveal Hacker’s understanding of the confusions of atomism, with its ‘misconceptions of logically proper names, simple objects and complexes, of a “connection between language and reality” ’ (Ibid.,3),

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whilst §§ 65 - 88 ‘investigate misunderstandings about vagueness and determinacy of sense’.

Although the Tractatus is mentioned explicitly only in § 97 and § 114, Hacker sees its presence on every page containing these famous methodological remarks running from §§ 89 - 133, which he divides into two groups: the chronologically later §§ 89 - 108a (1937) contain ‘Wittgenstein’s final reflections on the methodological sins of the Tractatus’. Since these misconceptions are exemplary and, for Hacker, are quite definitely anything but personal idiosyncrasies, because revealed via a successful diagnosis of highly general philosophical temptations and tendencies, it can be hardly surprising that Wittgenstein in his Preface reports that he had thought of publishing his old and new thoughts together so that what he is saying in the Investigations could be properly understood only against the background of his old way of thinking in the Tractatus.

Hacker nevertheless sees the requirement to turn the investigation around the pivotal point of our real need (§ 108) as a ‘dark remark’ (Ibid., 4) and takes this as his cue to explore in greater detail the crucial matter that underlies this radical transformation in his thinking, finding it, broadly speaking, in the abandonment of the ‘sublime’ conception of logic that characterised the Tractatus, and in the returning of words like ‘name’ and ‘proposition’ from their metaphysical to their everyday use. Consequently, even if the concept of language were not a family-resemblance concept, his later conception would still differ from the one he entertained in the Tractatus.

Hacker returns to this leitmotiv of his paper towards the end, when he locates the fundamental characteristic of Wittgenstein’s new way of looking at things in his realisation that only an illusion lay behind the earlier overpowering belief that an a priori order of the world could be disclosed by logical investigation into the deep structure of language. According to Hacker, Wittgenstein pushed much further than Kant his Copernican revolution, consisting in a demonstration of the dependence of ‘our’ phenomenal world on our cognitive apparatus, by revealing that what in the Tractatus had the appearance of an a priori knowledge of the objective order of things is no more than a shadow cast by grammar, by our norms of representation. Peter Hacker’s paper is an uncompromising presentation of a highly traditional outlook on the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking which
embodies its own unique notion of what philosophical therapy could possibly be.

Joachim Schulte, by contrast, discusses the opening sections of the *Investigations* and the language of the builders in a manner which, far from making it clear to us that Wittgenstein is boldly attacking his previous metaphysical self in these passages, serves only to emphasise what from one not entirely unfamiliar perspective may appear to be the enigmatic character of his entire enterprise. Having stated that the structure of § 1 is composite, opening with that famous quotation from Augustine’s *Confessions*, Schulte loses no time in reminding us that the section closes ‘with a shopping scene which reads as if it reproduced a skit written by Beckett or Ionesco’ (*Ibid.*, 22), so firmly allying himself to an approach echoed by Mulhall and Stern (1). Instead of adopting the conventional reading conveyed in most elementary accounts of this passage that the shopkeeper is being introduced by Wittgenstein in order to draw our attention to the many different ways in which, and the multifarious purposes for which words are used, to which one may add, following Marie McGinn, an emphasis on how he acts (2), Schulte concentrates on what he identifies as the wholly bizarre nature of the shopkeeper’s behaviour.

Many different interpretations could be given of this behaviour: it can be seen to echo, and so to embody an implicit criticism of an approach to the understanding of language that would compare it to the input/output manifestations of computer programming, as in Hutchinson, Read (3), or to be an equally implicit criticism, by means of a form of exorcism, of mental mechanisms philosophers are inclined to posit to ‘explain’ linguistic competence (Stern, Mulhall). Yet, following Mulhall’s more innocent suggestion, the behaviour of the *shopper* as distinct from the shopkeeper can be viewed in a more down-to-earth light: his slip of paper is handed over by a young child on an errand, by a deaf-mute who finds this a simple way to convey his shopping needs, or by a foreigner with no command of the native language. Yet the *shopkeeper* can also be seen to have all the hallmarks of someone undergoing a form of therapy enabling him to reacquaint himself with linguistic skills he has temporarily lost following a stroke; or perhaps he is a soldier who is undergoing rehabilitation after a mental breakdown consequent upon battle weariness: the
mechanical procedures to which he adheres are integral to a strict regime of Wittgensteinian
training enabling him to reacquaint himself with the arithmetical and linguistic skills that as a result
of his medical condition he is only slowly able to recover. Only with time and perseverance will
the exercise of these skills once again become second nature to him, to become manifested in the
performance of tasks that he will then undertake with unthinking confidence, and so blindly (§ 219).

Similar considerations can be seen to accompany Schulte’s treatment of the builders when
he draws our attention to Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the language consisting of the words
‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’ and ‘beam’ can be conceived as a complete primitive language (§ 2), a
language for which the description given by Augustine is said to be right. This is a language
consisting of names, and this, whilst inviting a comparison with the Tractatus, is nevertheless
problematic because we have no genuine conception of what a language of this kind in the setting
proposed could possibly be like. As Schulte puts it in describing Wittgenstein’s introduction
of this language as ‘absolutely outrageous’:

The impression of unfamiliarity arises because of the extreme
restrictedness of the vocabulary and its use as well as because
of the fact that the users of that language seem to pursue only
one activity........whatever understanding we may have of that
language derives from understanding our own. Only by perceiving
the language use of the builders as a fragment of a life similar to
our own can we imagine what they are doing (Ibid., 27).

It is worth reminding ourselves that this echoes Stanley Cavell’s various interpretations
of the builders, in which they can be viewed either as grunting, vacant Neanderthals using this very
limited and primitive language, or as busy individuals involved in a specific routine which has all
the surroundings of those normal activities which are part and parcel of a human life expressed (4)
through a highly complex language (Cf. Mulhall, Ibid., 52 et seqq.). Stephen Mulhall even presents
us with a third possible interpretation of the builders passage, one in which Wittgenstein is portrayed as a satirical commentator on the modern world, aspects of which he is often believed to have despised:

......here the culture as a whole must be thought of as pervaded by debilitating noise and distraction, as a collectivity that is stupefying itself by the poverty of its practices and conceptions, stultifying the human imagination and depriving it of a future' (Mulhall, *Ibid.*, 57).

But even if readers of a more prosaic cast of mind are bound to be sceptical of these supposed cultural resonances, the important point is that Wittgenstein himself makes reference in *Zettel* § 99 to the tacit assumption that the builders are actually thinking, and so are really like ordinary people after all, in which case their builder-talk would rather constitute a segment of a much wider language as it would do with ourselves. Consequently, if we do think of the builders as carrying on with a genuinely primitive language, they turn into Cavell’s vacant Neanderthals, in which case we would be reluctant to call this a use of a rudimentary language.

Wittgenstein famously responds that of course the life of the builders must be like ours in many respects, a fact to which he does not allude in the *Investigations*, so confirming that he cannot really have intended us to think of the builders as users of a primitive language after all. Yet their language may nevertheless be rudimentary in that even if it is used for particular and limited purposes within the confines of the builders yard, yet also within the much wider social context to which Wittgenstein alludes, it can nevertheless be regarded as a reflection of a form of ‘primitive thinking’ which it serves to express *via* what is a form of primitive *behaviour*.

Joachim Schulte importantly points out that the *Zettel* quote is in fact only one of three versions of a single manuscript passage, another of which he actually quotes in full (*Ibid*. 32), and he goes on to suggest that one of the possible difficulties involved in the notion that the builders of § 2 actually think, is that this could be construed as a form of thinking which is *prior* to language as conveyed in § 32, a form of thinking which precedes the mere *naming* of items (of
particular kinds) which are already present to Augustine’s child before he has learned a language. This important connection between § 1, § 2, and § 32 is also related by Schulte to points made by Rush Rhees in his paper ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ (1970) to which Malcolm famously responded. Joachim Shulte’s paper with its exploratory approach is an outstanding introduction to a range of puzzling questions concerning the opening sections of the *Investigations*, which rather more conventional, and elementary accounts of them are only too often inclined to overlook. This is closely connected to his use of the notion of *skandala* by Alois Pichler in a recent paper (5).

This subject is taken up again by Eike von Savigny in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s use of diagnosis and therapy in relation to the now familiar criticism of a certain metaphysical picture of *naming* which forms part of that sequence of passages §§ 38 - 64. Concerned to point out that even if readers agree ‘that what the theory purports to establish is that there is a guarantee for linguistic meaning thanks to “real names” of “linguistic objects” and that the latter exist in some preferred way’ (*Ibid.*, 56), it may remain unclear exactly what philosophical problems the theory is actually intended to solve. So von Savigny takes the ‘alleged fact’ the theory is intended to ‘account for’ to rest in the ability of a subject restricted to his own mental resources, who can by merely *attending to* or *mentally pointing* towards some object, ‘christen this object in such a way that its name is now a word with an unambiguous meaning’ (*Ibid*.). This is very much in keeping with von Savigny’s reading of the *Investigations* up to this point in the text, including amongst other things Wittgenstein’s implicit criticism of demonstratives as examples of ‘real names’.

Not only does this coincidentally hint at a feature of what lies behind ‘the private language argument’, but it connects with those aspects of Joachim Schulte’s paper which relate to the idea embodied in Augustine’s child that the meaningfulness of expressions derives from competencies which are possessed by a subject prior to or independently of actual linguistic mastery. So for von Savigny the idea that words have meanings *because* they designate objects, and that sentences have senses *because* they are combinations of such designations, as he describes them, is intimately connected with the point of § 32 that Augustine’s picture of language acquisition presents the child
as if he is a subject who already has a language prior to actually possessing one. In his own terms, the child is pictured as already availing himself of competencies in the very act of acquiring them.

We are free to regard this as involving an infinite regress of explanation, and as picturing the child as someone who is already acquainted with a world divided up into items of different kinds: the objects of his experiences can be said to be intrinsically meaningful, so that all he has to do is invent different names to apply to them. Ostensive definition is the means on this account by which ‘the meaning is correlated with the word’ (§ 1), where a form of mental pointing is integral to the origin of meaning. For von Savigny, this helps to explain why Wittgenstein turns to the idea of pointing in §§ 33 - 36, passages which reveal that the capacity to point quite unambiguously to the shape or to the colour etc. illustrate a sustained attempt on Wittgenstein’s part to bring it home to the reader that these abilities are not independent of the prior possession of a public language:

Isn’t it a kind of last resort if the opponent now falls back on a theory that would explain how an a-lingual subject can, in fact, point to something unambiguously, and can therefore christen it, and can thereby create linguistic meaning? There may be other reasons for inserting the sequence §§ 38 - 64 right here; but this one seems to be quite a good reason anyway (Ibid., 58).

This for von Savigny is an application of Wittgensteinian ‘therapy’, although he points out that the use of this term can be misleading because this therapy is ‘a completely rational, intellectual enterprise’ (Ibid., 42). But this inevitably raises the question whether Wittgenstein is arguing for some kind of philosophical conclusion to the effect that a subject’s talk about his world is dependent on the existence of a social context in which he does acquire and use a public language; or is he merely issuing a reminder that the circumstances in which we do in fact acquire a public language force us to reflect upon the vacuity of certain misleading pictures,
including that of Augustine’s child, to which when doing philosophy we are only too prone to adhere? (6) The latter is certainly more in accord with Wittgenstein’s methodological remarks, and one reason for being suspicious of the former is that it seems hard to disentangle it from some kind of empirical hypothesis which Wittgenstein had no interest in providing. It would seem that von Savigny veers more towards a Baker & Hacker theoretical response, although this is for the most part irrelevant to the value of the points he raises in what is yet another exemplary paper with a number of important aspects. In its very last paragraph, for example, von Savigny points out that demonstrative pronouns are precisely those linguistic expressions the use of which is dependent on unambiguous pointing, so that ‘there must be something that is pointed to, and this something must be simple for the pointing to be unambiguous’ (Ibid., 61).

Whilst this gestures towards the *Tractatus*, the implicit objections to Augustine’s child in those earlier passages of the *Investigations* would seem to be only indirectly connected to the *Tractatus* if at all. The reason for this is that Wittgenstein’s genuine complaint against philosophers who think that their ability to talk about the world around them as a world of different kinds of things, independently of their possession of a public language, is that they stare at this ability to identify new and hitherto unclassified items of particular kinds, as if it existed in splendid isolation from the normal surroundings in which it is exercised and acquired. Wittgenstein is therefore at the very least issuing a reminder of what when doing philosophy we may be only too inclined to forget about the actual background which surrounds linguistic acquisition, and this has no direct connection to a Tractarian notion of naming simple objects.

When reading Stephen Mulhall on *Philosophy’s Hidden Essence* (§§ 89 - 133), one finds one’s self immediately prompted to reflect on a point connected to Wittgenstein scholarship: had Wittgenstein lived in a digital age, in which like most of us he may very well be imagined to have revised, corrected and improved his texts with scant regard to what existed before, so that only the final versions of any of his ‘works’ would have been left to us, then he would inevitably have provided a whole lot less for the scholar to investigate. Mulhall begins by echoing the distinction
drawn by Peter Hacker in his paper between the chronologically earlier part of sequence §§ 89 - 133 (108b - 133) written in 1931, and the later passages §§ 89 - 108a written in 1937. But as this knowledge gleaned from the manuscript sources is not normally available to any ordinary reader of the *Investigations*, can we nevertheless detect differences in the tone of these two sequences of passages that might enable us to conclude that Wittgenstein’s writing in the 1937 sections had matured relative to what he had written in 1931?

This is effectively the question that Mulhall intends to discuss, and he finds his answer in the conclusion that ‘even the Wittgenstein of 1931 remained partially or episodically haunted or possessed by the false or inauthentic philosophical perfectionism he had begun to identify and criticize’ (*Ibid.*, 84). Expressed in Mulhall’s inimitable style, he discovers three reasons why Wittgenstein placed the chronologically later passages before the earlier. Firstly, he argues that because the later passages express a more concrete and genuine understanding of the nature of philosophical confusion, they help to overcome a tendency in some of the earlier passages to talk only in terms of abstract generalities. Secondly, he surmises that had Wittgenstein allowed the 1937 sections to follow those of 1931, he would have expressed a gradual progress from a partial understanding of philosophical perplexity to one which is deeper and more complete, instead of achieving the proper goal of revealing that what has been gained can always to some extent be lost even if it can always be recovered. Lastly, he finds that Wittgenstein allows us to participate in a false understanding of the true nature of philosophical confusion, one expressed in the generalities of the 1931 passages, in order that we may be enabled to discover our own confusions for ourselves. We may imagine, for example, that Wittgenstein is permitting us to realise that we have become subject to a tendency only to mouth certain therapeutic platitudes expressed in these 1931 passages, one that our gradual appreciation of the true value of the preceding 1937 sections will allow us to overcome.

Does Mulhall establish his case? This is not an easy question to answer. Many readers, for example, will not be inclined to agree that passages following § 108 express the abstract generalities he discovers in them. In his discussion of § 133, it is not at all obvious that the *complete* clarity
referred to in paragraph 2, points towards the unresolved tension he finds in this section as a whole, because a desire that the philosophical problems should completely disappear need not be taken to reflect those ‘absolutized conceptions of exactness’ he discovers in the sharp or clear gaze by which one might traditionally (and mistakenly) be thought to grasp the essence of the things (§ 113). Neither is it comparable to the ‘delineation of the super-order of concepts’ that he finds in § 132. Indeed, Mulhall may be thought to weaken rather than strengthen his case here when he goes on to emphasise that the ‘third and fourth paragraphs develop a perspective that is far more in tune with his best methodological pronouncements’ (Ibid., 79). It is arguable that there is little substance here by which to differentiate the first two paragraphs from what follows.

One can similarly quibble over the tendency Mulhall discerns for Wittgenstein to have both the first and the last word in these 1931 sections, because his own conception at that point of what it is to philosophise in a proper manner is presented as standing in direct opposition to, and as a systematic negation of what might appear to be an equally coherent ‘scientistic other’:

...explanation vs. description, hypothesis / theses vs. reminders, metaphysical vs. everyday usage....The two philosophical ideals appear to be polar opposites in every specifiable respect. It is as if an endless list of such distinguishing marks can be generated from the underlying essential difference between them, with every item on that list essentially uncontaminated by any trace of its other

(Ibid., 68).

Mulhall argues that this does not sit at all easily with Wittgenstein’s statement that he is doing nothing but destroy houses of cards (§ 118), so that there seems to be an internal incoherence in his entire strategy, a point Mulhall attempts to consolidate with his claim that Wittgenstein is led in these passages into repeated self-contradiction. Take, for example, the claim in § 126 that what is hidden is of no interest to us, whereas in § 129 the aspects of what are most important to us are said to be hidden. In § 119, the results of philosophy uncover plain nonsense, the importance of
philosophy lies partly in the invention of intermediate cases (§ 122), and the real discovery is what allows one to stop doing philosophy (§ 133); yet the name ‘philosophy’ is what might be given to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions (§ 126). Another clear contradiction arises for Mulhall when he looks at § 113 with its condemnation of fixing one’s gaze sharply on the facts, and of constructing ideal languages in place of our everyday one (§ 133); yet Wittgenstein looks towards the ‘complete’ disappearance of philosophical problems by constructing ‘clear and simple’ language games (§ 130 & § 133):

These difficulties, of which Wittgenstein gives no indication of being aware, let alone of having the resources to overcome, hardly encourage the reader to share his apparent conviction in the purity and self-evidence of his methodological vision (Ibid., 69).

Yet these contradictions are more easily resolved than Mulhall makes out. What is hidden in § 126 is of no interest to us if it cannot perform the appropriate role in our investigations, whereas what is important to us in § 129 is ‘hidden’ because we cannot see the wood for the trees, something so familiar that we fail to grasp its significance. This point is actually made in § 126 itself, where it is said that the name ‘philosophy’ might also be granted to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions. But this is to give the word ‘philosophy’ an entirely new role, one in which its use is compatible with the work, mentioned in § 127, of assembling reminders. But there can then be nothing pejorative about its meaning in this particular context. Lastly, it is hard to see why there should be thought to be an inconsistency in condemning the construction of ideal languages in place of our everyday one, whilst favouring the idea of constructing clear and simple language-games as a means of comparison that can throw light on our philosophical problems, since these procedures have really nothing at all in common. Mulhall has interesting things to say about sublimating the logic of our language, and about essence as what lies hidden as against what is open to view. On the other hand, these difficulties do tend to weaken certain aspects of his case that the content of §§ 89 - 133 is rather less uniform than we are usually inclined to suppose.
Eugen Fischer in *A Cognitive Self-Therapy* (§§ 138 - 97) wishes to investigate those considerations that give point and purpose to Wittgenstein’s comparison of his treatment of philosophical problems to the curing of an illness, and of his associated methods to different forms of therapy. Adopting Aaron Beck’s notion of *cognitive therapy* from the field of clinical psychology, he employs this model as a means of illustrating exactly what Wittgenstein is up to in providing what is in effect his ‘revolutionary’ approach to a certain kind of philosophical predicament. In what is actually the longest paper in the book, Fischer takes advantage of the space available to avail himself of a number of examples in which philosophers may be seen to go awry when they have an ‘automatic thought’ which they are inclined to treat ‘as a philosophical intuition to be honoured at all cost’ *(Ibid.*, 122).

The significance of these ‘autonomous habits of thought’ is that they give rise to perplexity because, in spite of the fact that they are from one perspective quite unreasonable in relation to the philosopher’s ‘stable, reflective beliefs’ *(Ibid.*, 121), they gain a hold on the philosopher by inducing in him a sense of wonder or confusion. On Fischer’s view, the resultant feelings are pathological, and in order to shed them, and to obtain peace, Wittgenstein exposes and weakens the relevant psychological/intellectual habits by employing the method Fischer describes as ‘cognitive therapy’. The proper significance of this approach for philosophy in general lies in the fact that on Fischer’s assessment, most ‘serious philosophers are driven by autonomous habits of thought’ *(Ibid.)*, forcing them into the treatment of pseudo-problems on which they waste their lives working. Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy can then be employed to rid them of the tendencies to which they are subject by allowing them to gain insight into their ‘clinical’ conditions.

The obvious question which arises here is whether the psychological gloss that Fischer uses to colour this therapeutic edifice, adds very much to Wittgenstein’s claim, with which we are familiar, that when doing philosophy, we become subject to certain misleading pictures that *accompany* our ordinary practices, yet which we are inclined to treat as capturing what is really
essential to the meaning of the practices themselves, what they are really about. To the Wittgenstein
of the Philosophical Investigations, the very idea that there could be a problem, for example, about
the existence of an ‘external world’, any more than there could be a problem about the existence of
‘other minds’, rests on a misleading picture of something that exists ‘behind’ or ‘on the other side of’
in the first case ‘sense-data’, and in the second ‘external behaviour’.

It is an interesting feature of Fischer’s account that he actually deploys A.J. Ayer’s
phenomenalism as presented in The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (Macmillan 1940) as a
classic example of the kind of delusion that arises from an automatic thought embodying a
‘philosophical intuition’ that requires to be weakened to the point that it need no longer be
‘honoured’. The formulation of the problem of an ‘external world’ by Ayer in terms, say, of the
‘Argument from Illusion’ usually proceeds by presenting a distinction between perception which
is veridical and perception which is delusive, through the introduction of an item which is
commonly ‘seen’ in both cases, an ‘appearance’ called a sense-datum that we are invited to consider
as the proper object of visual experience. Using Macbeth’s famous dagger, for example, we are
encouraged to draw the conclusion that because there is no perceptual distinction between cases
where we see a ‘real’ dagger and those in which it only seems that a dagger is present, this lack of
‘certainty’ over the existence of a ‘physical object’, is ‘resolved’ by postulating something common
to both cases whose existence is really ‘certain’, a sense-datum as the true object of perception.

The obvious answer to this argument, and one which would have been clear to a
philosopher like J.L. Austin (7), is that when Macbeth encounters an illusory dagger, there is no
justification for saying that it seems to him he sees anything in any relevant philosophical sense, so
that there need be no reason for introducing any kind of intermediary in cases of sight. Investigations
passages §§ 275 - 278 express a related view. Indeed, when we go on to investigate the kind of
criteria we employ in practice to determine whether or not a dagger is ever really seen in cases of
this kind, it turns out that the dagger should be amenable not merely to the sense of sight, but also
and primarily to that of touch, and no doubt also to the senses of taste and smell.
Strange as it may seem, Ayer may actually have regarded these various factors as counting in favour of his view (8), for the answer he provides to Austin in a considered reply is that the characteristic certainty which is said to accompany acquaintance with the sense-datum with which we are always acquainted, as distinct from the lack of certainty over the ‘real’ physical object never to be encountered in experience, is in the final analysis a simple matter of logic. So, although Austin may have ordinary usage on his side when he argues that we would have no reason for saying that the existence of a chair in our presence is less than certain when it is seen in the clear light of day, Ayer wishes to argue that the genuine lack of certainty here results from the principle that factual propositions are not conclusively verifiable: no finite number of observation statements could ever render certain - logically certain - any claim upon empirical fact. No matter how well established, a statement of this kind can always be subsequently discovered to be false.

But here Wittgenstein, and no doubt Austin too would surely have been inclined to retort that in the kinds of circumstances in which we do genuinely have the evidence of all the relevant senses for saying that a dagger in our presence is real, there is nothing that we can conceivably envisage that could later be shown to undermine this conclusion which did not also throw doubt on the very framework within which it had actually arisen. In short, if the notion of conclusive verifiability has an ordinary application, then justification must at some point come to an end. But Ayer’s use of this notion is far from ordinary. The question at stake is whether, with Fischer, we ought to see it as the expression of ‘a vision’s gentle madness’ which requires a ‘preference of duty over self-decept’ (Ibid., 125), or whether we ought to regard it in rather more conventional terms as embodying a kind of philosophical error. At least part of the answer to this question can be found by considering that the concept of therapy itself gains its raison d’etre only against the background of an accepted methodology, which in Wittgenstein’s case has a distinctly anthropocentric thrust. The notion of therapy does not exist in a vacuum. Yet many philosophers who adopt a wholly therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein often give the impression of believing that it does.
Erich Ammereller in his *Puzzles about Rule-Following* (§§ 185 -242) emphasises at the beginning of his paper that these passages provide a key to understanding Wittgenstein on the nature of language and meaning, whilst admitting that he finds himself in disagreement with the way they are often presented in the literature. Evidently agreeing with Fischer on the role he allocates to therapy, he finds that many conventional readings neglect or disregard their wholly therapeutic intent. Consequently, he spends the first few pages of his paper going over §§ 89 - 133 and the radically new vision of what philosophy is that they propound. To this he adds a discussion of Wittgenstein on imagination (§§ 370 - 371) and on thinking (§ 383). His aim is to bring home to those like Russell who took the later Wittgenstein to be shallow and superficial because concerned with mere words and, indeed, with the way silly people say silly things, that his intentions on the contrary were far more serious and profound.

These introductory pages (*Ibid.*, 127 - 133) are intended to explain why many commentators who neglect Wittgenstein’s methodological remarks, cannot avoid regarding the rule-following passages as the expression of substantial philosophical doctrines, at which point he introduces Saul Kripke as the classic exponent of a doctrine of this kind, *viz.*, in this case that Wittgenstein is propounding a (Humean) sceptical solution to a sceptical problem. The sceptical paradox supposedly expressed in § 201 is resolved with the ‘community’ sceptical solution presented in § 202. The inability to follow a rule ‘privately’ therefore rules out at a rather early stage the possibility of a private language that only its speaker could understand, a subject previously thought to be discussed only from § 243 onwards.

However, drawing our attention to the famous criticisms of Baker and Hacker, McDowell, Malcolm and Pears, which all go back to the 1980’s, Ammereller in common with many other commentators reminds us of Kripke’s surprising neglect of the second paragraph of § 201, where the proper resolution of the ‘paradox’ is provided with the recognition that the *practice* of following a rule does not involve *interpretation* where this allows that we can give one interpretation after another in isolation from the context of the practice itself. Ammereller
nevertheless finds that a number of commentators, e.g., Malcolm and McDowell, who together with him reject Kripke’s sceptical reading, still adhere to what he refers to as the claim that following a rule necessarily implies the existence of a community ‘whose agreement on what counts as “following” and “not following” a rule sets the standard of correctness against which the behaviour of an individual is measured’ (Ibid., 135).

Whilst it is not entirely certain whether Ammereller is presenting these philosophers as adherents to a naive, as distinct from a rather more sophisticated interpretation of community agreement - Kripke amongst others does not want to say naively that what the community says is by definition ‘right’ - the issue is to some extent irrelevant since Ammereller does not believe that whether or not following a rule ‘essentially requires a community’ is even one of primary concern to Wittgenstein at all. In this he is surely correct. Indeed, it is not at all clear what this proposal can be taken to mean, since it hovers between two unacceptable alternatives: as an empirical hypothesis on the one hand, in which Wittgenstein would have expressed little or no interest, and as a definition of what following a rule is which can always be conceived to have no application. Here Ammereller appears to favour, without saying so explicitly, the B & H distinction between the genesis and the exercise of an ability on which ‘Individualist’ readings often depend.

The remainder of the paper is taken up with Ammereller’s attempt to show that Wittgenstein’s intentions were ‘purely therapeutic’ (Ibid., 136), and this he largely does by providing accounts of those familiar passages in which Wittgenstein reveals that a certain Platonistic mythology surrounding our understanding of what following a rule is, has no genuine application. Wittgenstein ‘deflates’ a certain picture of rails stretching to infinity, for example, by pointing out in § 197 with its expression ‘It’s as if we could grasp the whole use of a word in a flash’, in what way that kind of talk can be alright, yet how it can also be misleading in appearing to point in the direction of the entire unlimited future development of a series which is already present to the follower of the rule, when in fact the meaning of the word actually lies in its use. Ammereller similarly argues that Wittgenstein ‘wants to make us realize how we arrive at
the picture of a mysteriously inexorable kind of compulsion, a compulsion that forces us with
the inexorability of logic, by the quasi-mechanistic means of an inner psychological process.’
(Ibid., 145). When doing philosophy, we misinterpret our natural responses in ways which
lead us to entertain mythologies from which Wittgenstein’s method if properly applied can
allow us to be freed. Whilst it does cover a fair amount of ground that has by now become
excessively familiar, Ammereller’s paper in general conforms to a reading of the relevant passages
over which a fair amount of consensus has developed in the recent secondary literature. The
notion of therapy it espouses, unlike Fischer’s, would appear to be mostly free of psychological
overtones.

In his interesting paper on the Private Language Discussion (§§ 243 - 315), Severin
Schroeder begins by reflecting that probably the last demand that these passages manage to
satisfy is Wittgenstein’s need for a ‘synoptic representation’ as described in § 122, an overview
of the subject that allows for a clear grasp of the questions raised and how they may be resolved.
On the contrary, Schroeder sees these passages as a prime example of what Wittgenstein refers
to in the Preface to his book, when he talks of it as an album in which the same points are made
many times over from new and different directions (Ibid., 147).

Where, then, in the Investigations are these synoptic representations to be found? Schroeder believes that Wittgenstein provides suitable examples with his simple fictitious
language-games, including those of buying apples (§ 1), the builders (§ 2), the description of
coloured squares (§ 48 & § 64), and the reading of a table according to different schemas (§ 86).
Despite his initial reservations about finding similar examples in §§ 243 - 315, however, Schroeder
does eventually discover two passages which meet his requirements:

Taken together, §§ 258 and 270 make as good an instance of a synoptic
representation as one can find in the Investigations. A simplified, hence
easily surveyable representation of a segment of sensation language. In
two steps we are given a scenario that fulfils the minimum requirements
of a language-game of naming and referring to a comparatively private sensation (Ibid., 162).

Whilst one may wonder what ‘comparatively’ is doing here, Schroeder describes these two sections as instances of synoptic representations because in § 258 ‘in response to certain sensations which have no other expression, someone enters the sign “S” in a diary’, and in § 270 ‘after a while he is able to say correctly when his blood-pressure is rising, citing S as evidence’ (Ibid.). If we take these points together with the conclusion which Schroeder expresses in an endnote (Endnote 8, 168), one in which he finds that ‘the Augustinian picture is the ultimate source of the private language confusions’, we can gain an overview of Schroeder’s reading of some of the most complex passages in the entire book. Schroeder’s conclusion, of course, bears a close resemblance to that already encountered in von Savigny’s paper, when he describes a subject restricted to his own mental resources, who can by merely attending to or mentally pointing towards some object, ‘christen this object in such a way that its name is now a word with an unambiguous meaning’ (Op cit., 56).

We can take it, then, that the most enigmatic passage, and also as it turns out the most mulled over one in the entire book (§ 258), endlessly quoted in all discussions about Wittgenstein’s account of private language, concern a ‘subject’ who ‘believes’ that by mentally attending to or by mentally pointing at some object, in this case a radically private one, he can christen this object and provide it with a name which has an unambiguous meaning. It would be common ground to many commentators that what Wittgenstein is able to reveal in § 258 is that this just cannot be done. Yet why it cannot be done has been the subject over the last sixty years of an extraordinary amount of debate.

If, however, we do closely study Wittgenstein’s method in these sections, we can see that far from discovering or revealing that what the so-called private linguist is attempting to achieve cannot be done, Wittgenstein defines a private language in such a way that it can bear no relation to those distinctive features which characterise our ordinary sensation talk. These features would
include the central point that first person sensation ascription is criterionless, that we additionally express our sensation talk within a public context by the use of a public language, and that at least in more obvious cases this talk is associated with expressive behaviour. This is indeed why the vexed idea of a private language is often combined in philosophical circles with another proposal that Wittgenstein repudiates because it has no application within the context of our use of a public language, viz., that the 'subjective character' of one person's kind of sensation might differ from that of someone else without there being any possibility of discovering this to be so. But this is no more than an idle speculation that in Wittgenstein's later thinking has no genuine content because there are no ordinary contexts in which this picture might be applied. Like 'the logical possibility of zombies', it depends on staring at a picture that in this case has no genuine use, and therefore no real sense within the contexts in which people employ a public sensation language.

Of particular importance to this reading of Wittgenstein on private language is the interpretation of § 288, where the expression of doubt is said to have no place in the ordinary language-game involving the criterionless self-ascription of sensations. The abrogation of the ordinary public language-game therefore results in a legitimate return of doubt about the correct or incorrect identification of a private object. This point he emphasises in the course of defining how we are to understand the nature of this distinctively private language. It must be evident that Wittgenstein is not in the business here of demonstrating the truth of certain theses, or of discovering important philosophical insights, since he is describing and defining features of this private language in the course of ruling it out as a viable language, a point he confirms when he allies the criterionless aspect of first person sensation ascription to the salient point that he knows this colour to be red not by a form of 'mental pointing', but because he has 'learnt English' (§ 381, Cf. § 384).

How does this bear upon Schroeder's reading of § 258 and § 270? If we take this connection with § 288 seriously, we have to relate the enigmatic reference to 'whatever is going to seem right to me is right' to the very dire consequences which accrue from the attempt to correctly identify an individual sensation according to criteria in circumstances in which this identification
has already been ruled out by Wittgenstein because it has no application, and therefore no sense in relation to our ordinary talk about our sensations in a public language.

§ 270 as Wittgenstein presents it is from this perspective misleading, because the term ‘sensation’ has at least the appearance of being used with the same meaning in § 258 and in § 270. Yet what he says about the sensation in the later passage only makes sense if it is understood to be an ordinary sensation of a particular kind, a description which simply cannot apply to the private object which is the subject of § 258. This point is reflected in § 270’s claim that it is indifferent whether the sensation is recognised right or not, where the ambivalence arises from the simultaneous reference to an ordinary sensation of a particular kind that is correlated with a manometer reading, one to which of course the question of correct or incorrect private identification cannot apply. Schroeder himself says of § 258:

This is a powerful argument directed at the very core of the Inner Object picture. If a sensation were an inner object perceived and identified through introspection, it would be conceivable that one should misperceive and misidentify it. It would be possible to be mistaken in one’s belief that one was in pain. That sounds absurd, and § 258 and § 290 explain why; we do not identify our sensations by criteria. And where there is no criterion, there is no possibility of error (Ibid., 159).

This fails to gel, however, with Schroeder’s interpretation of ‘whatever is going to seem right to me is right’, for in claiming that this verdict is a little too harsh, it is perfectly evident that he is conflating the reference to a private object in this passage with our ordinary talk about a sensation of a particular kind, a point confirmed when he claims that ‘it would still be wrong for me to write down “S” on a day when none of my sensations seemed to be of the same kind as the one I initially called “S”’ (Ibid., 158), a reason he provides for concluding that one may very well speak of a correct or incorrect application of ‘S’. No doubt one may, but only in a public language where the only relevant kind of error in the first person would be
verbal, because sensations *can* innocently be said to be individuated by their own introspectible characters within the context of a public language. This point, incidentally, is indirectly connected to a fairly standard claim, beginning with Ayer, and later made by a host of philosophers of a broadly empiricist bent, that Wittgenstein neglects the evident fact that our sensations do have their own introspectible and representational contents independently of our possession of a public language (9). Wittgenstein’s answer to this is simply that these philosophers are relying for their own metaphysical purposes on their prior possession of a public language in order to make yet another claim which he would repudiate on what are admittedly methodological grounds.

Severin Schroeder ends his paper with a very readable account of ‘why both the overall structure of the Private Language Discussion and the presentation of its crucial arguments leave so much to be desired; that is to say, leave so much exegetical work to be done by Wittgenstein scholars’ (*Ibid.*, 163). He partly puts this down to Wittgenstein’s temperament, to his inherent inability to write a clearly structured treatise, to his lack of concern whether others would understand him, and to his wish to condense his remarks to the point that at their best they will be found to have the character of poetry. Schroeder illustrates this by mentioning § 302, which he claims to have enough material in it to justify a substantial journal article. On this point he may not be going far enough, given that some of Wittgenstein’s remarks have already been taken to justify the publication of entire books. Schroeder has managed to provide a workmanlike overview of these various aspects of Wittgenstein on privacy that it is his intention to clarify.

In the first, and comparatively short paper belonging to Part 2, Sir Anthony Kenny begins by arguing, *contra* Peter Hacker, that Wittgenstein really does maintain, strictly speaking, that there are no arguments in philosophy, and that philosophical methods arrive at no conclusions. On Kenny’s view, that philosophy can definitively dispose of the errors of solipsism, idealism and the idea of a private language, results from a method comparable more to the cure of a delusion than to the deduction of a theorem (*Ibid.*, 174). Nevertheless, this therapeutic procedure is not for Kenny a mere incantation, and has, indeed, all the hallmarks of an *argument* since it must obey the laws
of logic, therefore justifying the thought that philosophers who refer to ‘the private language argument’ are not necessarily committing an error (Ibid., 176).

It will come as no surprise, therefore, that his aim in the paper is to find out how much Wittgenstein’s practice matches his theory. Just before he proceeds to investigate this issue in detail, however, it is worth pointing out that he identifies two different applications for the word ‘hidden’ in Investigations § 126 and § 128 (Cf. Mulhall’s paper in the present volume), the first ‘hidden in spite of being familiar’ and the second ‘hidden because familiar’ (Ibid., 177). Whilst the second interpretation is sound, it is difficult to see how what ‘is of no interest’ to Wittgenstein can be hidden in spite of being familiar when what is of importance to him can often be hidden because of its familiarity. This suggests that what is hidden is of no interest to his investigations more likely than not because it is instead unfamiliar (e.g., forms of scientific explanation) although no doubt important enough in their own proper contexts.

In the final analysis, it ought to be clear that the tension arising from Kenny’s description of Wittgenstein’s activity in the Investigations, and the import of the famous methodological remarks, remains unresolved because Kenny is simply unable to interpret Wittgenstein’s treatment of philosophical problems other than theoretically. He ends by remarking in relation to § 401 of On Certainty, that even at the end of his life Wittgenstein could not hide from himself that there were more things in his philosophy than could be confined within his metaphilosophy. This is very much a Kenny whom we have come to know rather well.

The Oswald Hanfling we meet in The Use of ‘Theory’ in Philosophy is also one we know rather well. He begins by remarking, in the course of using what is said in § 109 and in § 126 as examples, that Wittgenstein’s dismissal of theory from philosophy has seemed absurd to ordinary readers. Observing that Wittgenstein rather conventionally uses the plural ‘we’ or ‘our’ in referring to what in effect he really applies only to himself, Hanfling continues with a protracted discussion of the different kinds of uses that are generally made of the terms ‘philosophy’ and of ‘theory’. He then expands his discussion by commenting on the changing meanings of words like ‘issue’ and
‘dilemma’ in the course of reminding us that the word ‘theory’ has suffered a similar dilution insofar as it is sometimes used to mean only ‘view’ or ‘opinion’. This is how he sees the ‘picture of the essence of human language’ that Wittgenstein finds in Augustine, and here Hanfling comments that the apparent plausibility of this picture to the ordinary reader, as something hardly in need of defence, is suitable as a starting point for Wittgenstein because it is more powerful than any theory, as conventionally understood, could possibly be.

Hanfling asks ‘what is wrong with describing Wittgenstein’s “reminders” themselves as theories, as some commentators have done?’ (Ibid., 187), and comments that despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself would reject such an idea, it would nevertheless be in accord with an established usage. He then attempts to identify the kind of use of the term ‘theory’, especially as occurring in philosophy, which is being repudiated, and discovers that Wittgenstein uses this term in connection with something put forward to explain rather than to describe, an explanation in terms of what is hidden instead of what is lying open to view. Although this account can cover the theories of science, Hanfling finds that it also applies to metaphysical theories including the *Tractatus* theory of meaning.

Hanfling finds the distinction between what is hidden as against what lies open to view to form a pivotal role in Wittgenstein’s rejection of theory, insofar as what lies open to view is connected with what he refers to as ‘the logic of our language’. It may, however, be thought that his asking in the course of questioning what is meant by ‘open to view’ whether the conclusions of theories based on deductive argument can also in some sense be said to lie open to view to be rather beside the point. Finding that there appears to be some contradiction between what he says about surface and depth grammar in § 664 and in his claim in § 126 that what is hidden is of no interest to us, Hanfling resolves the problem by remarking that in play here are two different senses of ‘surface’ and ‘open to view’ that Wittgenstein employs.

Hanfling winds down his paper by concluding that Wittgenstein might be described nevertheless as presenting theories in relation to his diagnostic remarks, and by these he has in
mind cases like the differences in the use of the words ‘five’, ‘red’ and apple’ in § 1, and the temptation to regard meaning, expecting and thinking as mental processes. He finally asks what the connection is between these diagnostic remarks and his description of his work as ‘therapy’ (Ibid., 197), and in general he is inclined to divest this notion of any psychological associations, e.g., the ‘cravings’ we may associate with psycho-analytic theory, thinking of it more as a means of leading a perplexed philosopher by argument to a true understanding of philosophical questions. He lists some examples of argument relating to private language and to the ordinary use of proper names, which are said to be typical of Wittgenstein’s writings.

Whilst Hanfling’s treatment of the issues he discusses will be found by some readers to be interesting and rather informative, reminding us occasionally of elements in Wittgenstein’s thinking that we may sometimes be inclined to forget, others will find his detailed attention to the ordinary use of words at some remove from what is important to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and may regard it as at worst merely tedious. His procedures nevertheless require close attention because Hanfling will be found occasionally to successfully hit the mark.

Cora Diamond is seldom an easy writer, and Criss-Cross Philosophy is no exception. Indeed, one would be hard put to find an approach to Wittgenstein which is more at variance with that of Oswald Hanfling in his preceding paper. On one minor point, however, they may be seen to be in some agreement since she mentions that Wittgenstein in his Preface to the Investigations, talks of his struggle to force his thoughts into a natural order, using the first person singular to do so before abandoning the attempt, then switching to the plural when referring to the need that compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction, something which belongs to the very nature of the investigation (Ibid., 218).

Diamond mentions that Wittgenstein talked of the importance of ‘crosswise strips’ in philosophy as early as 1933, and this is very important to her understanding of the true nature of philosophical clarity, one that genuinely distinguishes it from the search for answers to ‘Big Questions’ that characterises Wittgenstein’s notion of what it means to provide ‘lengthwise
strips’ when attempting to answer philosophical questions. Generally speaking, although the piecemeal approach to philosophical problems that is normally associated with the later philosophy, is not absent from the Tractatus, Wittgenstein on Diamond’s view was in that earlier context critically engaged with a ‘dogmatic’ conception of essential philosophical problems that in § 65 of the Investigations he comes to repudiate when he talks about the great question that lies behind all these considerations, one involving the general form of propositions and of language:

So, to understand the difference between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thought one has to see the difference in his conception of clarification; and to understand that, one has to see how his earlier thought was in the grip of the idea of big fundamental problems, and how the later thought was meant to free us from the grip of that idea (Ibid., 207).

That idea involves taking philosophy in lengthwise strips and not from adopting Wittgenstein’s later conception of crosswise strips. Unless our understanding can be properly transformed in favour of the latter, we will run into ‘unsettled’ disputes’. Many readers may not find this terminology at all easy to fully grasp, but Diamond comes to our aid with a pertinent example of a philosophical problem that illustrates the concepts she is employing: the well-known idea of a Robinson-Crusoe-from-birth. Followers of ‘Individualist’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that so long as this Crusoe is regarded as someone speaking a language which is in principle public, Wittgenstein is ‘arguing’ that this idea is perfectly coherent, whereas those adopting an opposing ‘Communitarian’ reading would claim that in the absence of a community of speakers Wittgenstein would not have allowed that the lone Crusoe could ever mean anything by his terms, so that the idea of his teaching anything to Man Friday would be ruled out of court.

Cora Diamond sees this as a typical ‘unsettled dispute’ involving a Big Question that illustrates a lengthwise strip of philosophy concerning the possibility of meaning anything that
is uttered or written (*Ibid.*, 216), a dispute which will remain unsettled unless it is transformed into crosswise strips of philosophy. In favour of Diamond’s view are the reasons that philosophers have typically provided for adhering to an Individualist stance, *viz.*, that it is in accordance with one’s ‘philosophical intuitions’, or that it reflects the genuine B & H distinction between the genesis and the exercise of an ability (10), so that Wittgenstein was concerned merely to show that linguistic abilities are in principle shareable, not that they need in practice be shared. The opposing Communitarian will immediately reply that Wittgenstein is clearly renouncing the very idea that the concept of a born-Crusoe can make any sense whatsoever, because the notion of a communal setting in which a language is used by a variety of speakers is integral to his understanding of what a public language is (11).

But if this dispute, still a recurring feature of the secondary literature, is to avoid going round in a circle, how on Diamond’s view are we to imagine that it might be resolved by effecting the transformation into crosswise strips that she recommends? Whilst not exactly grasping either horn of the dilemma as it is normally presented, there can be little doubt where her sympathies lie:

...the transformation may be effected by considering in detail
the kind of case we are asked to imagine; for it is no good saying
that we are to imagine someone whose words have ‘public’
meanings. What does the person do, what exactly (in the absence
of other people) shows the shareableness of what she is doing?
...If we are to imagine someone who has a word supposedly meaning
‘tree’, but who has not learned words from others and who does
not use the words with others, where exactly, in what she does, am I
supposed to see what the shareableness of what she says comes to? (*Ibid.*)

This for Diamond is not so much a grasping of the Communitarian horn of the dilemma as it is a refusal to take part in a dispute that is characterised by its all-or-nothing adherence to opposing claims which usually refer to language use as essentially requiring a public context
involving a community of speakers, or which insist that we can freely imagine a born-Crusoe who, assuming he is not already born possessing one, is able to invent a language for himself based on his prior acquaintance with the different kinds of individuals in the world around him. Diamond by contrast evidently sees a Wittgenstein who is issuing a reminder that the imaginative picture of the born-Crusoe results solely from viewing the child through Augustine’s eyes as a user of language in isolation from the circumstances in which his language is learnt, just as the Communitarian picture presents an individual who in some supposedly philosophical sense possesses a language essentially only in a communal setting. But there is no such sense that disallows imagining the opposite, and this once again takes us round in a circle. Here we can see that Diamond is effectively presenting Wittgenstein as someone who is drawing our eyes away from those pictures that lead philosophers into her ‘unsettlable disputes’. Yet the abandonment of these pictures transforms the ‘Big Question’ at stake here into something much more manageable, something which shows that the ‘problem’ does not really arise if we look at matters from the proper perspective, one which effectively dissolves the puzzle and transforms the question. In many ways this paper reveals Cora Diamond to be a philosopher who has been and still evidently remains an adherent to a quite specific understanding of Wittgenstein’s methodology.

Hans-Johann Glock in All Kinds of Nonsense takes a stand against Cora Diamond and James Conant as the primary exponents of a conception of the ‘plain and simple nonsense’ that Diamond talks about in her paper when she refers to ‘an interpretation which says that Wittgenstein did mean the metaphysical-seeming propositions, including those about the nature of language, to be recognisable as plain and simple nonsense’ (Ibid., 208). As she expresses this point about the Tractatus in a footnote:

The issue of a ‘resolute’ interpretation of the book should be separated sharply from the question whether Wittgenstein had genuinely freed himself from metaphysics in his thought about language. In fact, I think that propositions like ‘Propositions are truth-functions of elementary
propositions’ are particularly good examples we are meant to be able to recognize to be plainly nonsensical, to have no content, speakable or unspeakable. It is nevertheless arguable that they are also excellent examples of how Wittgenstein had not freed himself from a metaphysical conception of language (*Ibid.*, Endnote 4, 219).

The clear response to this is that if these propositions genuinely are examples which can be used to reveal this about Wittgenstein, then they cannot lack the metaphysical overtones that she identifies, in which case they cannot be plain nonsense or sheer gibberish. Indeed, this point is so obvious that she must be using the notion of *recognizing to be plainly nonsensical* in such a way that it cannot be incompatible with the notion of *appearing to have metaphysical content*, yet it is not at all clear how such a compatibility might be explained and understood.

Glock’s own account he wishes to sharply distinguish from that of ‘the New Wittgensteinians, both exegetically and substantially’ (*Ibid.*, 222), arguing that Wittgenstein throughout allowed that nonsense can result either from failing to assign a meaning to certain expressions, or from combining meaningful expressions in a way prohibited by the rules for their use. So there are many kinds of nonsense, one of which results from the illicit combination of meaningful words, a point particularly relevant to our understanding of the term ‘nonsense’ as it relates to the *Investigations*. Glock’s paper very much reflects a traditional reading of all the relevant issues, one which begins with the kind of common observation we would associate with Oswald Hanfling, *viz.*, that ‘nonsense’ has at least three different meanings in everyday use, as ‘patently false or unreasonable’, ‘obviously pointless or futile’, and lastly as ‘meaningless or unintelligible’ (*Ibid.*, 223). It can come as no surprise that the *austere* conception of nonsense he believes to be wholly untenable, both in its own right and as an interpretation of Wittgenstein. But this inevitably leaves the reader wondering once again whether the difference in approach between the traditional and the resolute interpreter is so great that we cannot but have failed so far to properly understand, as the quote from Diamond suggests, what *really* separates them.
In the final paper in the book, Stuart Shanker reveals how *A Picture held me Captive*, the picture in question being the irresistible temptation when thinking philosophically to adopt a form of psychophysical parallelism, one which Wittgenstein famously rejects in *Zettel* § 611 on the grounds that it results from a primitive interpretation of our concepts. We cannot help imagining that to allow for a causal relationship between psychological phenomena which is not mediated physiologically is to allow for ghostly phenomena which in some sense float free of what we know to be truly *real*, the physical phenomena in terms of which the existence of the psychological phenomena can ultimately be explained.

Wittgenstein aims to dispel the illusion that lies behind this *picture*, and his main consideration is that in the final analysis what are involved here are two quite different forms of explanation, one in terms of what have been referred to as our reactive attitudes as agents acting in the world, and one suitable for the explanation of purely physical phenomena. Whilst there is is no need for him to deny that the psychological phenomena are in the final analysis causally dependent on neurophysiological processes, what he can be seen to be denying is the idea that there has to be some form of one-to-one correlation between complex psychological attitudes in general and events in the human brain. Explanations in terms of our reasons, intentions and motives are not in this respect *replaceable* by explanations of a radically different kind. Yet when doing philosophy it is the easiest thing in the world to see notions like *consciousness* and *thinking* in isolation from the surroundings in which they are normally applied, so that the ‘mental states’ to which these terms are presumed to refer take on the appearance of processes that have a distinct and identifiable source in the physical makeup of the cerebral cortex. This can give rise to the naive notion that there must be a one-to-one correlation between individual ‘thoughts and feelings’ and processes in the brain.

These points are partly confirmed by his example in § 412 of the *Investigations* when he reflects that an effect of light he experiences in the course of an experiment can straightforwardly be explained by stimulation of a particular part of the brain: when the kind of phenomena being
considered are appropriate, e.g., a sensation of pain or an effect of light directly experienced, *psychophysical parallelism* may be said to have a proper application. This is in spite of the fact that when doing philosophy it can often seem that staring at, or turning one’s attention towards one’s own consciousness leads to the feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-processes. But this is an element in the overall *picture* that Wittgenstein wishes to renounce.

The problem for many philosophers, including even some commentators like Anthony Kenny (12), is that Wittgenstein sometimes appears to be renouncing far too much, even to the extent of denying the possibility of scientific explanation altogether. This for Kenny places him in the position of a Renaissance Aristotelian, a Schoolman anachronistically attempting and failing to turn back the tide of Galileo’s New Science. Yet we need not see Wittgenstein, in Kenny’s terms, as questioning whether every mental capacity must have a physical vehicle. He is instead reminding us that we have an only too naive conception, following the prejudice in favour of psychophysical parallelism that dominates our thinking, of how the causal dependence of our mental lives on neurophysiological processes may come to manifest itself. This prejudice is encouraged by the fact that our ordinary talk of *thoughts* and *feelings* and psychological states generally is itself highly object-orientated.

What Shanker effectively does is to use general considerations of this kind as a means of showing that, far from denying the possibility of scientific explanation, Wittgenstein is pointing instead to the sheer complexity of the phenomena under investigation, and to the naivite of assuming that there must be one-to-one correlations of the kind referred to. By so doing, he directs our eyes away from a *determinist* picture of the relationship between the psychological and the physiological. His claim, for example, that certain psychological phenomena cannot be investigated physiologically because nothing corresponds to them, need not be regarded as a denial that in the final analysis there is no causal dependence of the mental on the physical.

Shanker is nevertheless initially perturbed by what to many other philosophers must also seem the evident denial of the possibility of explaining the properties of a plant in terms of its
DNA, when Wittgenstein talks of plants multiplying by seed even if nothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which develops from it, so that it is impossible to infer the properties of the plant other than from the history of the seed (Zettel, 608). Once again, however, all that Wittgenstein need be seen to be objecting to here is not the explanation of the development of the plant in terms of its fundamental structure, but a too deterministic picture of how this comes about, a point confirmed by Shanker when he explains that ‘Wittgenstein’s argument has received its strongest support from, of all places, molecular biology itself’ (Ibid.,249), which has put considerable pressure on that determinist picture of genes to which he has discovered himself to have been subject. Shanker then provides a range of examples from the field in order to show that, from a scientific perspective, the commonplace observation that a gene’s chemical structure defines its potential, is far too restrictive because it totally neglects all the surrounding environmental circumstances which have a crucial role to play in the development of an organism.

Whilst none of this shows that there may not be closed systems within which more deterministic viewpoints may be seen to have an application, Shanker uses Wittgenstein’s ‘shutting the door’ on psychophysical parallelism as a means of proceeding towards an understanding of psychological causality which sees it as categorially rather than incrementally different from physical causality. Whilst this is surely a principle integral to Wittgenstein’s outlook from the beginning, and not a conclusion to be derived from any ‘argument’ found in Zettel §§ 608 - 612, it forms a fitting conclusion to Shanker’s account of how he had been ‘taken in’ by a certain way of looking at these matters that he understands to be endemic in Western thinking.

Like the 2007 volume on Wittgenstein and His Interpreters from Blackwell, also dedicated to the memory of Gordon Baker, this book is without doubt one of the better collections of essays on Wittgenstein published within the last decade. Truly international in scope, it is interesting to note that seven of the book’s twelve contributors can boast German as their native language. Some of these writers may also be said to command that ‘pellucid English style’ Glock attributes to a number of people like Hanfling who decided to adopt the UK as their home. (Guardian, Obituary Nov. 2005).
ENDNOTES

(6) Cf. the approach to these questions provided by Cora Diamond in her paper in the present volume.
(8) Ayer’s interesting reply to Austin can be found in his ‘Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory?’ originally in Synthese, 17, 1967, but more readily available in Metaphysics and Common Sense (London: Macmillan, 1969).
As do most philosophers, Derek McDougall fondly remembers the publication of his very first paper. This was in MIND in 1972. He has, however, continued to worry whether Gilbert Ryle’s comment that “the matter is stated well and almost interestingly” referred more to the quality of its treatment rather than to Ryle’s aversion to the nature of its subject (religious belief). Other papers have appeared in organs including PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH and PHILOSOPHIA. His latest, on Wittgenstein, appears in the 2008 edition of JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH, with a further in PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS January 2010.